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The public squares are filled once more. There’s 
a hope on the street corners, a hope in each and 
every one of us. It is as if most of the nation 
had been taken by an uncontainable need to 
vomit at the sights of all this shamefulness.  
 
 
Paulo Freire, 2006: 2 
 
 
 
Only a few miles of night, the moist distances of 
the country dawn, a handful of earth separated 
us, the transparent walls we did not cross, so 
that life later put between us the seas and the 
earth, and we came together in spite of space, 
seeking each other step by step, from one ocean 
to another…regaining earth and life. 
 
 
Pablo Neruda, 1952: 157 
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Countering an Illusion of Our Epoch: The Re-emergence of the Single 
State Solution in Palestine/Israel 
Abstract 
Since the Oslo Accords, the two-state solution has dominated, and 
frustrated, the official search for peace in Israel/Palestine. In parallel to 
it, an alternative struggle of resistance — centered upon the single state 
idea as a more liberating pathway towards justice to the conflict — has 
re-emerged against the hegemony of Zionism and the demise of a viable 
two-state solution in Israel/Palestine. This thesis inquires into the 
nature of this phenomenon as a movement of resistance and 
investigates its potential to become a counterhegemonic force against 
the processes of Zionism as embedded within the peace process since 
Oslo. To this end, it reconstructs the re-emergence of the single state 
solution both intellectually and organizationally. 
This reconstructive analysis is undertaken in two interlinked ways. On 
the one hand, this thesis analyzes and evaluates the single state 
alternative from within its own self-understandings, strategies and maps 
to power. In doing so, it centers the political practices of the situated 
resistances of the oppressed themselves. On the other hand, it mobilises 
a classical Gramscian theoretical approach—one that re-centers the 
processes of counterhegemony, and Gramsci’s radical embrace of the 
transformative power of the human being—through the writings of 
Edward Said. This theoretical lens enables the analysis of the 
counterhegemonic potential of this alternative through an evaluation of 
the extent to which it meets the more stringent demands of becoming a 
Gramscian-Saidian counterhegemonic force of liberation. Hence, this 
thesis represents both an empirical contribution to knowledge, and a 
theoretically informed analysis of the nature of the single state 
alternative.  
The thesis finds that the single state alternative can be seen as a 
Gramscian-Saidian movement of critical pedagogy aimed at creating a 
reconstructive moment within the conflict. It argues that it has laid 
much of the groundwork required to become an expansive 
counterhegemonic force. However, this potential has yet to be seized 
through a unified, officially led vehicle openly endorsing a single state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and has several obstacles left 
to overcome in its process of becoming an established political force.     
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Introduction 
I. The Single State Movement in Palestine/Israel 
Few handshakes in history have been celebrated more for ushering in a 
new dawn of peace in the Middle East than that between Yasser Arafat 
and Yitzhak Rabin after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. 
Perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace 
and justice in Israel/Palestine, this moment enshrined the two-state 
solution as the only possible, viable solution to the conflict within the 
international arena, as well as within the hearts and minds of many 
diverse publics. Since then, the two-state solution has continued to 
dominate, and frustrate, the official search for peace in Israel/Palestine. 
In parallel to this however, a more obscured struggle of resistance—
centered upon the single state idea as a more liberating pathway 
towards justice—has re-emerged against the hegemony of Zionism and 
separation, and the shrinking space for a viable two-state solution in 
Israel/Palestine.  
Crystallizing in the aftermath of the principle and processes of 
separation embraced and exacerbated by the Oslo Accords in 
Israel/Palestine—this phenomenon of resistance seeks to highlight the 
failure of Arafat’s strategy to create a viable two-state solution from 
within the paradigms of Oslo, and the expansion of the processes of 
Zionism on the land despite the existence of the American sponsored 
peace process. In doing so, it strives to reformulate Palestinian 
resistance into a collective struggle that opposes Zionism and 
separation; is relocated within a framework of international law, 
universal human rights and citizenship for all; and is based within the 
political desire to both re-unite the Palestinian national collective and 
bring about a single state solution to the conflict built upon a vision of 
coexistence, democracy and the sharing of the land among all of its 
inhabitants. It is with the illumination of this largely silenced struggle of 
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resistance, and its potential as an alternative pathway of liberation 
against Zionism, that this thesis is centrally concerned.  
The single state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict re-emerged 
within this present historical conjunction largely as an academic debate, 
centered upon a critique of Oslo—and driven by a number of prominent 
Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals. Painted and dismissed by many as a 
utopian academic exercise, this thesis seeks to take a different pathway 
of inquiry. As such, it inquires into the nature of the single state 
alternative as a movement of resistance and investigates its potential to 
become a counterhegemonic force against the processes of Zionism as 
embedded within the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Oslo. Rarely 
engaged with from within this context in existing academic literature—
this thesis explores the single state alternative through the analysis of 
diverse primary sourced material. To this end, it re-constructs the re-
emergence of the single state solution both intellectually and 
organizationally since the signing of the Oslo Accords.  
In presenting this reconstructive analysis, it is perhaps important to 
note that this thesis acknowledges the political nature of writing and 
knowledge production and views “the study of social movements (as) a 
political act. In taking the possibility of a particular movement seriously, 
social movement scholars are helping to call it into existence” (Eschle & 
Maiguashca 2005: 22). As such, it seeks to explore the possibility of a 
single state movement seriously, and to highlight the existence of its 
processes as a potential arena of further investigation within academia. 
In this vein, this thesis reconstructs and analyzes the single state 
movement in two interlinked ways. On the one hand, it endeavours to 
highlight and analyze the single state movement from within its own 
self-understandings, strategies, and maps to power. In doing so, it 
strives to mobilize this primary sourced material in order to center the 
political practices of the situated resistances of the oppressed 
themselves—and to inquire into what these practices may be able to 
inform the discipline of International Relations (IR) about what 
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constitutes the political today. Interlinked with this is an exploration of 
where the potential for meaningful social transformation is perceived to 
be located when it is analyzed from within this different point of 
beginning, and simultaneously—an intervention to resurrect within the 
discipline the often muted potential of the human spirit to resist. 
On the other hand, as shall be elaborated upon below, it is from within 
this reconstruction that this thesis has striven to resurrect a classical 
Gramscian theoretical approach—one that re-centers the processes of 
counterhegemony themselves in its analysis, and Gramsci’s radical 
embrace of the transformative power of the human being—through the 
writings of Edward Said. This approach is argued to be a more fruitful 
lens through which to understand the nature and dynamics of this 
particular phenomenon of resistance than the more dominant 
frameworks associated with Neo-Gramscian approaches in IR. Moreover, 
the elaboration of this lens enables both the analysis of the 
counterhegemonic potential of the single state alternative from within 
its own self-understandings—and through an evaluation of the extent to 
which it meets the more stringent demands of becoming a Gramscian-
Saidian counterhegemonic force of liberation. Hence, this thesis 
represents both an empirical contribution to knowledge, and a 
theoretically informed analysis of the nature of the single state 
alternative.  
In view of the above, this thesis deploys a Saidian re-reading of Gramsci 
to trace what it argues is a presently (re) emerging collective of one state 
organic intellectuals attempting to trigger an ‘intellectual-moral 
reformation’ within their communities in Israel/Palestine. As such, it 
argues that there is a single state movement behind the resurgence of 
the single state idea as a more just avenue through which to counter the 
injustices inflicted and exacerbated by Oslo’s transformations. 
Contending that it is centered within a transformative project of critical 
pedagogy, this movement is argued to be Gramscian in spirit, and to be 
laying the groundwork of an expansive anti-Zionist historic bloc based 
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upon the desire to coexist within a framework of democracy and equal 
citizenship. Hence, this thesis argues that this historic bloc aims at 
countering the conception of the world upholding the formulation of 
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process since Oslo—a conception that is 
based upon the notion that separation remains the only avenue through 
which the conflict can be resolved. However, due to both the emergent 
character of this alternative, its lack of discernable leadership, and 
divisions within its ranks as to the form of movement it should organize 
itself to become—this thesis finds that while the single state movement 
has laid much of the groundwork required to become an expansive 
Gramscian-Saidian counterhegemonic force, this potential has yet to be 
fulfilled. More specifically, it has yet to be seized by an officially 
recognized single state leadership, or transformed into an actively 
endorsed single state political force or party. On the one hand, this 
reflects the ambiguity within the role of these intellectuals as leaders 
within an expansive alternative, who nevertheless have no official 
mandate to represent their constituencies. Added to this, a majority 
among them prefer to be organizers engaged in activism centered on a 
long-term process of critical pedagogy that shifts established political 
positions, rather than a process in which they become these established, 
more traditional political forces themselves. On the other hand, this 
thesis finds that this internal indecision is linked to the obstacles the 
single state alternative faces in its struggle to become an established 
political force that aims at unifying the Palestinian national collective. 
Most crucial among these is the continued fragmentation of the 
Palestinians and their leadership. This is especially problematic in view 
of the continued existence of this fragmentation in the Occupied 
Territories; the fact that neither cadres within Fatah or Hamas have 
officially endorsed a single state solution as of yet, and that it remains 
un-represented as an alternative within the Occupied Territories; and of 
course, the fact that the Palestinian Authority has yet to walk away from 
the official peace process.      
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II. Theoretical Framework: Edward Said, Gramsci and a Decolonial 
Approach 
The publication of Edward Said’s groundbreaking Orientalism (1978) is 
often credited with inaugurating Postcolonialism as a body of writing 
(eg. Rubin 2003) which arguably takes as its unifying element a focus 
upon the “historical fact of European colonialism and the diverse 
material effects to which this phenomenon gave rise” (Ashcroft et al. 
1995: 2). Mirroring Said’s defiance of disciplinary labels, these writings 
defy categorization in terms of subject matter, methods or 
theorizations—beyond an arguably Saidian spirit of opposition that 
seeks to animate silences, highlight exclusions, and shift points of 
historical beginning, with the activist aim of advancing struggles of 
liberation on the ground. Thus, besides their point of beginning, or 
contextual focus upon the historical processes of European 
colonialism—postcolonial writings are loosely bound together by an 
explicitly political aim to embody, create space for, and insert, 
insurrectionary, disruptive narrations by “the people without history” 
into dominant Western accounts of ‘global’ history. The aim of this is to 
contest the silences and erasures of dominant Western accounts of 
human history and progress—which neglect the contexts, struggles and 
humanity of the vast majority of the world’s people. Hence, it is an 
epistemic intervention of alternative ways of being, and of 
understanding the world—one that is inhabited by the impulse of 
Cabral’s words,  
“The colonialists usually say that it was they who brought us into history: today we 
show that this is not so. They made us leave history, our history, to follow them, right 
at the back, to follow the progress of their history” (Young 2003: 18).  
While placing itself within the broad contours of this literature, and 
recognizing its immense contribution, liberating potential, and 
continued political significance—this thesis steers itself in an 
overlapping, but slightly different decolonial1 direction. In highlighting 
                                                 
1 The term decolonial here refers to its meaning as it is elaborated within Branwen 
Gruffydd Jones’ edited volume Decolonizing International Relations—one of the few 
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the difference between these two intertwined strands of thought which 
share common themes and epistemic and political motivations, and yet 
choose to undertake them in slightly different ways—this project seeks 
to align itself with those writing to decolonize knowledge in IR, as 
opposed to painting itself as adding to particular debates within 
postcolonial thought, or delineating a specifically postcolonial approach 
to counterhegemony.  
This choice is a reflection of the fact that this thesis is located within a 
broadly historical materialist framework that contends that there is a 
need to revive Gramsci’s obscured project of counterhegemony in IR—
through a re-centering of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis; of his 
emphasis upon the transformative power of critical pedagogy; and of 
the centrality of organic intellectuals in both empowering the 
oppressed, and building counterhegemony on the ground. Hence, it 
arises from within, and speaks to, the tensions and omissions of the 
dominant interpretations of Gramsci’s work by the Italian School in IR. 
Arguing that these interpretations blunt the transformative power 
energizing this Gramscian revolutionary project, this thesis strives to re-
excavate an image of Gramsci that begins with the latent potential 
within people’s thoughts, or conceptions of the world, to revolutionize 
the limits of the possible, and usher in alternative, liberating social 
realities. In striving to re-cover this arguably neglected Gramsci within 
IR, this thesis has mobilized the Gramscian images and interpretations 
within the writings of Edward Said. The overall aim of highlighting this 
particular image of a Saidian Gramsci is an attempt to decolonize the 
potential of the politics of resistance on the ground in Critical IR 
today—and more specifically, one that emerges from within the 
endeavour to illustrate and analyze the counterhegemonic potential of 
the present single state movement in Israel/Palestine.  
                                                                                                                                               
books to highlight the need for a decolonial intervention, and decolonial strategies of 
research, within the discipline of IR specifically.  
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However, while this thesis emerges from an engagement with neo-
Gramscian debates in IR, it must be noted that the tensions and 
omissions critiqued in chapter one do not reflect a trend to neutralize 
critical theory and privilege abstracted disciplinary debates that is 
specific to neo-Gramscian scholars—but one that is reflected in many 
strands of IR theory today (Ayers 2008). As Gruffydd Jones writes,  
“A lot of writing in IR seems strangely more interested in the discipline itself than the 
world around us, even the substantive concerns that are recognized as defining IR’s 
field of enquiry remain stubbornly narrow” (Gruffydd Jones, 2006: 2).  
Since this thesis is concerned with re-affirming the fact that “critical 
theorizing constitutes a necessary part of subaltern politics and radical 
transformation” (Ayers 2008: 2), and that “without revolutionary theory 
there can be no revolutionary movement” (Ayers, 2006: 2)—it 
endeavours to re-vitalize Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, while 
emphasizing the fact that “the mode of theorizing has profound 
implications, not only for explanation and analysis, but also for political 
practice” (Ayers 2008: 2). As such, it is a reminder that a central element 
of historical materialism involves a highlighting of Marx’s thesis eleven 
(Saurin 2008: 26) and aims at “providing a theoretical foundation for 
interpreting the world in order to change it” (Ayers 2008: 7). Moreover, 
it underlines that both Gramsci and Marx were “involved in a practice of 
critique which aimed at uncovering and making explicit a social 
ontology” (Ayers 2008: 3)—and crucially, that it is “through the practice 
of critique that ontology itself is radicalized… it becomes an on-going 
social product, historically concrete and contestable” (Ayers 2008: 3). 
While arguing that re-reading Gramsci through Said highlights these 
buried images of an obscured Gramscian revolutionary project in IR—it 
is important to note that this re-reading simultaneously recovers 
aspects of Said’s writings that have been similarly blurred in the 
dichotomies in much postcolonial writing today. Thus—in bringing the 
writings of both of these intellectuals and activists together—this thesis 
also endeavours to overcome the abstracted disciplinary dichotomies 
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between a more recent Postcolonialism that seeks to disengage itself 
from the material, and a Marxism that seems to dilute Gramsci’s more 
radical embrace of human subjectivity. Moreover, it is a reminder of the 
activist anti-colonial Marxist roots of Postcolonialism itself, as well as 
the flexible, situated Marxism many postcolonial activists and 
intellectuals have tried to elaborate as part of specific liberation 
struggles, against specific forms of oppression in the non-West (Young 
2001).  
Hence, it must be recognized that as part of the elaboration of a 
Marxism more suitable to the lives, struggles and realities of oppression 
in the non-West, there has been a movement by postcolonial scholars to 
both highlight the importance of subjectivities in the creation of 
liberation movements, as well as the role culture plays in both 
maintaining domination and in liberation struggles. As Young argues, 
following some strands of European Marxism—most notably the 
Frankfurt School—postcolonial theory diverges from orthodox Marxism 
by fusing “its critique of material conditions with analysis of their 
subjective effects” (Young 2001: 7). As such, it is part of the increasing 
culturalism of modern political and social analysis (Young 2001: 7). 
Arguing that this highlighting of cultural politics is a reflection of its 
crucial role in liberation practices on the ground, and has 
simultaneously benefited academic theorization through its shift of 
focus—Young stresses that culturalism is not a move away from “more 
direct forms of political action” (Young 2001: 8) but a needed insertion 
of people’s subjective experiences, as well as the recognition of the 
diverse forms of knowledge, that complements more traditional forms 
of analysis on the Left (Young 2001: 8).  
While acknowledging the significance of this contribution in elaborating 
a more flexible Marxism, and the importance of a particular notion of 
culture as an arena of struggle against the ‘common sense’ of an 
oppressive status quo (following both Gramsci and Said)—it must be 
emphasized that the work of many anti-colonial intellectuals is greatly 
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diluted if truncated from the historical materialist basis within which it 
first sprang. Moreover, in view of the fact that Postcolonialism itself 
credits Said for its birth, this sidelining of the materialist aspect of 
Said’s work on culture (Said 1983: 177) does not just obscure the 
Gramscian transformative aspect of his writing, but also his 
(acknowledged) indebtedness to several Marxist intellectuals—most 
notably Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin (Williams & Chrisman 
2006: 7). In a similar vein, commenting upon the “fashion of French 
theory and poststructuralism, and the serious reception of Foucault’s 
work in the early 1980s” (Rubin 2003: 864), Rubin notes that this 
emphasis, while important, has obscured both the role of Gramsci in 
Said’s work, and that of British Marxism. More problematically still for 
the purposes of this project, this “fashion” has sidelined Gramsci’s 
emphasis upon resistance as a process that must be built, must be 
historical, and must involve “collective man” (Gramsci et al. 1971). For 
example, criticizing the Postcolonialism reflected in The Empire Writes 
Back, Williams and Chrisman stress that it paints resistance as 
effortless, continuous and instantaneous (Williams & Chrisman 2006: 
12-13).  
In the context of IR, and on this widening divide within postcolonial 
writing, Gruffydd Jones writes,  
“Much contemporary postcolonial theory distances itself from historical materialism 
and political economy while in the process misappropriating iconic figures such as 
Fanon into a cultural studies shorn of political economy” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 6).  
Hence, in this context, an increased culturalism would in effect 
represent a move away from more direct forms of political action. 
Similarly, this artificial theoretical distancing of those who write within 
more poststructural locations, and those who locate themselves within 
the sphere of political economy—both obscure a Gramscian philosophy 
of praxis, and blunt its transformative power. This can be seen to be at 
the root of Saurin’s warning that, while deeply political and 
interventionist, Postcolonialism does not fundamentally challenge “the 
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dominant representations of world order in IR (which) reflect what 
James Blaut has called ‘the colonizer’s model of the world’” (Saurin, 
2006: 24), since it does not begin by acknowledging IR’s continuing 
imperial character.  
Saurin’s intervention seeks to highlight the need to revive the more 
Marxist (Leninist) tradition of anti-colonial (or anti-imperial) writing 
which centers (a continuing) historical process of imperialism “as the 
fundamental problem for the study of IR” (Saurin 2006: 29)—as opposed 
to those who argue that “the period of de-colonization from about 1947 
represents the clear historical demise of colonialism and ushers in a 
period of national freedom” (Saurin 2006: 28). In many ways, this speaks 
to the problematic tension among postcolonial scholars about the term 
postcolonial itself, and what this particular “post” is meant to signify 
(Williams & Chrisman 2006: 5-6). This has become increasingly 
problematic in view of the fact that it has become increasingly more and 
more difficult to overlook the fact of neo-colonialism, and hence the 
fallacy of any trans-historical notion of colonialism that celebrates the 
(imperial) idea of the nation-state as liberation (Saurin 2006: 28). This, of 
course, begs the question of what is really new about the processes of 
Postcolonialism themselves. More importantly still for our purposes, 
Saurin argues that those who portray colonialism as having ended and 
ushered in a new liberated world order of sovereign independent nation-
states are simply creating theory that reflects, and bolsters, the status 
quo—rather than critical theory that is based upon contextualized 
realities on the ground, or that seeks to explain the origins of a world 
order in order to transform it (Saurin 2006: 30). 
Similarly, Gruffydd Jones argues that it is remarkable that a discipline 
such as IR has yet to acknowledge its inherited imperial character—and 
acknowledge its imperial origins; its exclusionary choice of “canon in 
classical European thought from ancient Greece through to the 
Enlightenment” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 3); its narrow debates and 
concepts which “reflect the history of the West (in idealized form) and 
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the interests of the powerful” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 3); and hence, to 
problematize its own self-presentation as ‘international’ relations 
(Gruffydd Jones 2006: 2-3) rather than “imperial relations” (Saurin 2006: 
23-42). Gruffydd Jones echoes Saurin, arguing that a large part of the 
effort to decolonize IR must be one that revolves around method—and 
the need for critical theory to de-mystify, historicize, and situate the 
illusory, abstracted image of IR presented by more conservative, 
problem-solving strands of theory in their imperial contexts—
highlighting the intertwined political nature of knowledge and power, 
and the situated (in this case imperial) human agencies which created it. 
She writes,  
“What is needed is a broader and deeper form of critique that encompasses the 
discipline as a whole—its underlying assumptions, modes of thought and analysis, and 
its consciousness and very attitude… only by doing so can we hope to free the 
imagination of social inquiry from the narrow blinkers of Eurocentrism and enable the 
study of IR ‘from the perspective of the world’” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 6). 
While de-colonizing IR as a discipline is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
it does proceed in the spirit of Saurin’s highlighting of the fact that 
there must always be an organic link between de-colonizing knowledge, 
and “struggling against the real structures and practices of imperial 
international relations” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 219). Hence, as previously 
stated, it seeks to underline the centrality of Gramsci’s philosophy of 
praxis in the creation of revolutionary theory, and hence in the re-
invigoration of the practices of building counterhegemony on the 
ground. More specifically in this context, it endeavours to revitalize 
Gramsci’s liberating project of counterhegemony through a broadly 
Saidian re-interpretation. As such, it follows one of the central strategies 
of decolonizing knowledge elaborated within Decolonizing International 
Relations, and described by Gruffydd Jones as a refusal of “the 
disciplining taboos of dominant inquiry” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 223), 
which are “precisely both legacy and continuation of what Saurin has 
termed imperialism’s ‘habitual refusal to translate or interpret’ but only 
impose meaning” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 223).  
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In the context of theorizing resistance—this involves an insistence that 
the practices of resistance of the oppressed, their situated strategic 
maps to power, their self-understandings, and agency—be taken 
seriously in re-defining what is worth knowing within the discipline, and 
in re-imagining what the political is in the process of becoming today. 
As Anghie points out, knowledge in IR, “is governed by a set of 
conceptual categories centered on Europe, and it is these categories that 
are routinely reaffirmed by conventional histories” (Anghie 2006: 223). 
In this context then, “the detail of non-European history more broadly 
are ‘somehow incidental’ to the proper disciplinary concerns” (Anghie 
2006: 223). Thus, there is a need here for the highlighting of alternative 
types of historical knowledge, of alternative social and political relations 
and struggles in much longer historical perspectives—that are not 
“framed by the same coordinates as dominant forms of knowledge” 
(Gruffydd Jones 2006: 223).  
Moreover, this project echoes Saurin’s sentiment that while it is 
essential for the oppressed to counter narratives of history that erase 
their existence, locations, and knowledges, that alone is not enough—for 
it does not challenge the politics of disciplinary knowledge production 
itself (Saurin 2006: 29), which Said referred to as, “the nexus of 
knowledge and power creating “the Oriental”…obliterating him as a 
human being” (Said 1978). As Said himself argued in Orientalism, 
Orientalism has little to do with the agency, context, history or writings 
of anyone located in the Orient. Rather, it involves the exclusion of 
those lives, histories, and voices through an outsider’s abstracted 
representation, which simply mirrors the superiority of his own reality, 
or location (Said 1978). Hence, in the context of IR, Saurin links this 
argument of exteriority with the abstractions of international relations 
theory as a discipline, arguing that there is a need to acknowledge the 
imperial character of IR itself, and thus, a need to decolonize its 
concepts, theories and methods in order for the voices, experiences and 
histories of the excluded to be taken seriously as an anti-colonial 
  
13 
struggle for liberation (Saurin, 2006: 23-42). In re-reading Gramsci’s 
project of counterhegemony through Said, this is what this thesis strives 
to do. 
III. Methodological Reflections 
While this thesis does emerge from within an engagement with the 
wider available academic literature upon the single state idea in the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—it has been significantly 
influenced by primary sources of information in the form of texts 
written by intellectuals linked to the single state solution; this author’s 
presence and observations within diverse single state forums, public 
interventions, and academic conferences; and a series of in-depth semi-
structured interviews undertaken with key figures linked to the 
resurgence of the single state solution.  
While texts on the single state solution as a re-formulated Palestinian 
resistance struggle are difficult to find within academia—with the 
notable exception of writing linked to the single state idea published in 
the Journal of Palestine Studies—these texts, interventions and 
declarations abound on the alternative media sites and blogs of the 
Internet. Since some of these media sites are linked to the single state 
movement itself (such as the Electronic Intifada, the AIC’s blog and 
podcasts, the websites of Zochrot, PACBI or ICAHD) much of the 
primary texts used in researching this thesis stem from within these 
spaces. The attendance of single state conferences, debates, book 
launches and public interventions has also been a valuable source of 
information, as well as an important arena from within which to meet 
diverse people involved with the idea and engage in informal 
conversations, email exchanges and skype chats about it and its nature. 
Among the most influential of these has been attending one of the 
founding single state conferences held in SOAS, London in 2007; a 
conference debating diverse solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
held in York University, Canada in 2009; and the book launches and 
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diverse university talks of Omar Barghouti, Ilan Pappe, Jeff Halper, 
Joseph Massad and IJAN. These public forums were all chosen due to 
the fact that they either revolved around the single state solution, were 
being participated in by prominent single state intellectuals, and were 
geographically and financially accessible. While I am not a member of 
any single state groups or initiatives, and had not seriously engaged 
with this idea before the researching of this thesis—the fact that I was 
sympathetic to its premises, to the intellectuals involved within it, and 
to the Palestinian people’s struggle of liberation from Zionism 
positioned me as a participant-observer within these forums. It should 
also be noted that the fact that I am Egyptian played a big role in 
establishing an easy rapport based upon a natural solidarity with the 
Palestinian people, and provided a foundation of openness and trust 
with many among the Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish intellectuals 
encountered both formally and informally during these forums. This 
form of participant-observation has been especially relevant in the 
process of formulating this thesis due to the relatively recent re-
emergence of the single state idea in the context of Palestine/Israel. 
Thus, these empirical snap-shots of what is argued to be a resistance 
phenomenon in the making colour much of the mappings of the 
movement presented in chapters four, five and six.  
Interlinked with the above, a significant source of primary material 
informing the content, arguments and ideas within this thesis are ten 
semi-structured in-depth interviews. Of these, nine were recorded using 
a digital recorder, one was both not recorded and off the record, and all 
were conducted in English. The selection of the interviewees was based 
upon them being prominent intellectuals linked to the resurgence of the 
single state idea in diverse public arenas—as well as undertaken with 
the intention of speaking to as representative a selection as possible in 
terms of the diverse communities of Palestinians and Israelis these 
intellectuals are linked to. In practice however, this proved difficult and 
the majority of the intellectuals interviewed were Ashkenazi-Jewish 
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Israelis and Diaspora Palestinians. Their brief biographies are provided 
in the appendix of this thesis, along with those of the prominent single 
state intellectuals cited in this thesis. The purpose of these interviews 
was primarily to inquire into whether or not the single state solution 
simply represented the resurfacing of an idea within the corridors of 
academia; to illuminate the kind of phenomenon the single state idea 
could be in the process of becoming; and to inform the understandings 
of political and social transformation deployed within it. In parallel to 
this, the interviews were an inquiry into—and a highlighting of—the 
histories, self-understandings, motivations, strategies and visions of 
those involved within both the articulation of the single state as a more 
just solution, and its mobilization as a practice. As such, they contained 
within them a biographical section linked to the backgrounds of the 
interviewees, the re-emergence of the single state solution itself and 
their perception of their roles within it; a strategy section linked to the 
nature of the movement and the ideas, vision, aims, and strategies of 
resistance underpinning it; an organizational section focused upon what 
this phenomenon looks like structurally, the groups, associations or 
parties it is linked to, and its outreach, alliance building and sources of 
funding; as well as three further sections linked to the specific activities, 
strategies and presence of the single state alternative globally, 
regionally and locally within Palestine/Israel. Of these interviews, eight 
have been central in the direction of argumentation this thesis has 
taken, the avenues of research explored and the theoretical approach it 
has attempted to elaborate in order to analyze the single state 
movement.  
In practice though, many of the interviews conducted were constrained 
by the geographical location, availability and willingness of the 
interviewees. This was made more difficult by the short time span 
within which they were conducted, and the lack of funding for this form 
of research. As such, none of these interviews were conducted with 
Palestinian intellectuals living under Israeli occupation. While this thesis 
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has striven to rectify this lack of access through other sources of 
available information, this under-representation also reflects the fact 
that this particular segment of Palestinians is not among the central 
driving forces behind the resurgence of the single state solution in 
Israel/Palestine, and as such is also difficult to find represented within 
its public forums and conferences. In a different vein, despite being the 
central driving force behind the resurgence of the single state solution, 
none of these interviews were conducted with Palestinian-Israelis either. 
This is mostly due to the time constraints on the schedules of these 
intellectuals when they travel to attend conferences and forums. This 
however was rectified in view of their visible presence both within the 
conferences and public forums of the single state idea, within its written 
interventions, initiatives and declarations, as well as through informal 
meetings and email exchanges with these intellectuals. It should also 
perhaps be noted that with the exception of one interviewee who was 
uncomfortable with being recorded and with the line of questioning 
itself, and another Jewish-Israeli interviewee who declined to be 
interviewed due to the intensity of the backlash against his views—the 
remainder of those interviewed and recorded were very open about their 
lives and views, related to the questions asked, were generous with their 
time and with the detailed information they provided, as well as helpful 
in establishing connections for future interviews, conversations and 
meetings among their colleagues and friends.  
IV. Structure of the Argument 
From within the spirit, and framework highlighted above, the first 
chapter of this thesis attempts to elaborate a critique of the tensions 
and omissions found within some neo-Gramscian interpretations of 
Antonio Gramsci’s writings, and the application of his ideas within 
disciplinary debates in the realm of Critical IR Theory. In doing so, it 
aims at placing an emphasis upon a particular revolutionary project 
within Gramsci’s writings that seems to be largely silenced within the 
appropriation of his ideas in the discipline of IR. Thus, it argues that 
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there is a need for the resurrection of this energetic image of Gramsci—
an image that centers the power of organic intellectuals, critical 
pedagogy and the philosophy of praxis in the building of 
counterhegemony and the empowerment of the oppressed. In this vein, 
this chapter suggests that resurrecting this image of Gramsci through 
Edward Said’s interpretation of his writings opens up a possible channel 
through which this form of a decolonial Gramsci could be re-excavated.  
Building upon this critique, chapter two attempts to resurrect this 
silenced project of Gramscian counterhegemony using the writings of 
Edward Said. This reformulation is presented with the aim of deploying 
it in order to trace, illustrate, and analyze the re-emergent single state 
idea as a Gramscian form of counterhegemonic resistance—aimed at 
creating an anti-Zionist historic bloc to counter the conception of the 
world upholding the Palestinian-Israeli peace process since the Oslo 
Accords. Hence, this reformulation attempts to re-center the role of the 
organic intellectual within Gramsci’s insurrectionary writings; the 
centrality of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis and emphasis upon situated 
territorial geography in elaborating the process of building 
counterhegemony; and the necessity of re-visiting Gramcsi’s critique of 
‘common sense’ and his interlinked revolutionary strategy of the ‘war of 
position’ as central processes within the triggering of liberating social 
transformation on the ground.  
Following from this chapter three aims to set the context of the situated 
Zionist hegemony that single state activists perceive themselves to be 
struggling against in Israel/Palestine. In doing so, it simultaneously 
outlines the context and struggles from within which the single state 
idea re-emerged as a potential alternative force to the current Israeli-
Palestinian ‘peace process’. As such, this chapter attempts to highlight 
the disjuncture between the rhetorical production and elaboration of 
the ‘common sense’ of Oslo as the inauguration of a peace process 
towards a two-state solution, while disguising the territorial expansion 
of Zionism on the ground—in the form of a reformulated Allon Plan. 
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Following the outlining of the contextualized setting from which a single 
state idea resurfaced, chapter four and five aim to sketch a preliminary 
picture of what this thesis argues is a present day (re) emergence of a 
conception of the world championing a single state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This sketch involves an intellectual and 
organizational mapping of this alternate conception of the world. Based 
upon the interlinked thoughts and actions of four distinct, yet 
overlapping, blocs of organic intellectuals argued to be central to this 
process—these chapters argue that it is their conceptual articulations 
and interlinked strategies and practices of resistance that underlie the 
resurgent single state movement today.  
Contending that the alternative vision outlined by single state organic 
intellectuals represents a critical conception of reality that goes beyond 
the common sense notions of the so-called ‘peace process’ in an attempt 
to dismantle it’s illusion in favour of a single state future of some 
form—it is chapter six that demonstrates how these blocs fuse to create 
the groundwork for a potential anti-Zionist war of position against the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Centring upon the global Boycott 
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel, this chapter 
argues that the BDS call is an integral part of the single state 
movement’s conception of the world, and its attempt to build an anti-
Zionist war of position against the current Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. In presenting an analysis and interim evaluation of the BDS 
tactic itself, this chapter suggests that this practice of resistance, and 
the intellectual reformulations underpinning it, could prove to be a 
powerful and expansive strategy within the long-term process of 
building counterhegemony within diverse, yet interlinked, geographical 
spaces. The conclusion of this thesis strives to bring the arguments 
within this thesis full circle by reflecting upon the mobilization of—and 
the processes, potentials and limitations within—this Saidian-Gramscian 
re-excavation of counterhegemony. 
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Chapter One 
Antonio Gramsci, International Relations and the ‘Politics of 
Resistance’: A Literature Review 
I. Introduction 
This chapter is written as a critique of the tensions and omissions found 
within many neo-Gramscian interpretations of Antonio Gramsci’s 
writings, and the application of his ideas within the on-going 
disciplinary debates in the realm of Critical International Relations (IR) 
Theory. It is a critique that aims at highlighting a particular 
revolutionary project within Gramsci’s writings that seems to be largely 
diluted within most neo-Gramscian appropriations of his ideas in IR, as 
well as a particular method of empowerment and critical praxis that 
seems to be neutralized in neo-Gramscian practice. Bizarrely, it is 
arguably this face of Gramsci that holds the key to the most 
empowering interpretations of his writings, that speaks to the activism 
and political praxis he embodied in his life, and that holds the most 
potential for fulfilling neo-Gramscian scholarship’s initial promise of 
highlighting where the potential lies for the ushering in of alternative, 
less oppressive, realities. It is the re-excavation of this face of Gramsci 
that this chapter is most concerned with in the following engagement 
with the literatures linked to neo-Gramscian appropriation of his 
writings within Critical IR.  
In doing so, it should be underlined that the focus of this critique arose 
from this author’s engagement with the nature, processes and dynamics 
of what is argued to be a resurgent single state movement in 
Israel/Palestine. As such, this critique emerged out of the nature of the 
phenomenon being explored, and is driven by the need to better 
understand and analyze it. As shall be demonstrated in later chapters—
this phenomenon is argued to be most fruitfully understood as a 
struggle of counterhegemonic resistance that centers upon the 
revolutionary power of philosophy; the energizing role of organic 
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intellectuals within its liberating processes; and the inherent link 
between thought and action in building a new, unified, collective 
historical force against a particular status quo. As such, the objective of 
this chapter’s re-excavation is to argue for the need for a re-reading of 
Gramsci that begins with the potential within actors’ thoughts, or 
conceptions of the world, to challenge the limits of the possible—and 
hence, centers the power of organic intellectuals, critical pedagogy and 
the philosophy of praxis in the empowerment of the oppressed and the 
triggering and analysis of counterhegemonic processes of resistance. 
This thesis aims to then deploy this re-reading in the following chapters 
to analyze the counterhegemonic potential of the present single state 
movement in Israel/Palestine, and more broadly—to attempt to 
decolonize the potential of the politics of resistance on the ground in 
Critical IR theory today.  
This chapter begins by highlighting the many contested images of 
Gramsci, and the centrality of the politics of interpretation in the choice 
of which fragments of Gramsci’s thoughts are emphasized in the 
discipline of IR, and which are obscured. Following Edward Said, Section 
II argues that in not engaging with the life, context and political praxis 
of Gramsci himself, neo-Gramscian interpretations of his thought 
sideline an empowering image of his fragmented oeuvre which centers 
around the power of the mind to both transform societies and uphold 
status quos—as well as a Gramscian underlining of the latent power 
within people to become active forces of change in the making of 
societies when organized and led by organic intellectuals. In parallel to 
this, this section suggests that rather than engaging in debates that 
either seek to privilege Gramsci himself or the discipline of IR—critical 
theorists can strive to activate Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis by 
choosing to begin from within the situated practices of resistance 
themselves, inquiring into how they may inform our understandings of 
international relations. Section III briefly outlines the theoretical 
promise of liberation sparked by the emergence of neo-Gramscian 
scholarship, or the ‘Italian School’ (Gill 1993: 21), into the discipline, 
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while Section IV endeavours to illustrate how this promise’s power was 
diluted by the Italian School’s elaboration of a largely reductionist 
interpretation of Gramsci. Engaging with neo-Gramscian concepts, while 
emphasizing the advent of the Gramsian/Neo-Gramscian debates in IR—
this section argues that it is the neo-Gramscian focus on an abstracted 
international that blurs Gramsci’s theorizations of counterhegemony 
and radical embrace of human agency. Section V builds upon this, 
arguing that it is not the internationalization of Gramsci’s concepts that 
is problematic, but their point of beginning within the abstract rather 
than the situated national. In this vein, Section V stresses that it is this 
point of beginning—and consequently abstracted method of conceptual 
insertion within disciplinary debates—that results in the neutralizing of 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis; the blurring of counterhegemony itself; 
the obscuring of Gramsci’s critique of common sense and his strategy of 
the war of position; and a resultant silencing of the ‘periphery’ in the 
process. This chapter concludes by suggesting a re-excavation of a 
particular Gramscian project of counterhegemony through a Saidian 
lens—that begins within the territorial, centers upon the activation of 
Gramsci’s political praxis, and highlights Gramsci’s level of the ethico-
political and the role of organic intellectuals within it in triggering 
revolutionary change—as a remedy to these exclusions. It is contended 
that this return to more classical Gramscian concepts through Edward 
Said creates a framework from within which the nature and processes of 
the single state movement in Palestine/Israel can be better understood 
and evaluated. 
II. The Many Images of Antonio Gramsci  
A. The Politics of Interpretation, and the Highlighting of a Silenced 
Revolutionary Project of Resistance 
 
Within the realm of IR today, there appears to be a fragmented 
assortment of images of Antonio Gramsci (eg. Germain & Kenny 1998: 
10; Rupert 1998: 427; Morton 2003: 118-146; Ayers 2008: 1-228). This 
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largely seems to be a result of Gramsci’s rather scattered writings, and a 
lack of consensus surrounding the interpretations that should be 
assigned to his theories and visions. Thus, each image of Gramsci seems 
to be painted by highlighting certain aspects of his dense web of 
interconnected, fragmented, and at times coded and contradictory 
writings, while rendering other facets less important, or at times, even 
invisible. While it is true that interpretation is a contested terrain (Said 
et al. 2000: 195-217), and understandable that within certain contexts 
and historical junctures, authors are naturally, and perhaps politically, 
more inclined to bring out certain sides of Gramsci’s thoughts into play, 
something about the overall picture presented by neo-Gramscian 
appropriations of his writings does not seem to do justice to the rich, 
diverse, loosely intertwined, sometimes contradictory, whole of 
Gramsci’s vision.  
While virtually all scholars who engage with Gramsci’s work 
acknowledge the difficulties surrounding the interpretation of his texts 
(eg. Germain & Kenny 1998: 3-21; Said 2001: 453-473; Morton 2003: 118-
146; Ayers 2008: 1-228; Hoare & Nowell-Smith 1971)—it seems obvious 
to argue that the life, political activism, struggles, motivations, and 
context of the author himself should not be forgotten in any 
engagement with, or mirroring of, the political meaning of the texts 
themselves. Borrowing from Auerbach, and Vico before him (Said 2001: 
453-8), Said argues that it is this attentiveness to historicism and 
temporality that gives the art of interpretation meaning, when it is 
mediated through the agency of a critical consciousness (Said 2001: 
456). In the appropriation of Gramsci’s writing in IR however, it was not 
until Germain and Kenny’s intervention that a disciplinary debate was 
launched on the apparent lack of engagement neo-Gramscian scholars 
have given to the life, context and motives of Gramsci himself in the 
analysis of his writing, as well as the validity of their application of 
interpretations of his texts to the debates of the discipline, and the 
realm of the international (eg. Murphy 1998: 417- 425; Ayers 2008: 1-
228). Sorely overdue, this debate highlights that while an unproblematic, 
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definitive interpretation of Gramsci’s writings will never be possible—
neo-Gramscian appropriations of his thought are problematic due the 
fact that they de-contextualize the author from his texts, and the texts 
from the settings within which they were written.  
Thus, Germain and Kenny argue, “Gramsci comes to IR at a third 
remove: abstracted from the debates which sparked his thinking, from 
the interpretive difficulties surrounding his ideas, and from the 
contending interpretations which his thinking has ignited” (Germain & 
Kenny 1998: 8). While Germain and Kenny go on to attempt to 
“reconnect Gramscian IR with the bountiful scholarship devoted to his 
ideas” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 8), and to debate the validity of neo-
Gramscian appropriations of his concepts in IR, this chapter strives to 
stress a related, but slightly different concern. In this vein, it takes 
minor issue with Craig Murphy’s criticism in defence of the Italian 
School that, “as students of international relations we should keep our 
focus more on understanding international relations than on 
understanding Gramsci” (Murphy 1998: 417). For, in this context, it can 
be argued that it was the overlooking of Gramsci himself by the neo-
Gramscians, and their narrow focus on the advancement of the debates 
within critical IR theory, which resulted in an appropriation of his 
writings which silenced his political praxis; his emphasis on the power 
of the mind to both transform societies, or uphold status quos; and his 
underlining of the latent power within people to become active forces of 
change in the making of societies when organized and led by organic 
intellectuals.  
Following Gramsci himself, who strove to always begin with “life” 
(Gramsci et al. 1971: 330), this chapter would like to make a case not 
only for the need to take one of Gramsci’s most energizing projects of 
social transformation seriously—but to also suggest that there is a 
different path that can be taken by critical theorists concerned with 
analyzing the politics of resistance and counterhegemony today. This 
path does not need to either privilege International Relations as such, or 
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debates surrounding Gramsci himself. Instead, it can locate its 
beginning within the situated practices of resistance, and inquire into 
how they may inform our understandings of international relations, and 
illuminate new situated paths of liberation for those who struggle on 
the ground today (Shaw 2003: 199-221). Both truncated theoretical 
debates on understanding international relations that are divorced from 
“life” and privilege disciplinary conversations as an end in itself, and 
debates that reify and essentialise an author’s texts as the only valid 
interpretation within any discipline in the name of a grand, abstracted, 
forever coherent and clinical theory, ignore the spirit of critical praxis; 
the desire to overcome the crude distinction between theory and 
practice on which it entered the discipline; and most crucially—its 
celebrated purpose of affirming that ‘another world is possible’.  
In parallel to this, debates of this kind which are framed as Gramscian 
sideline one of the core themes of Gramsci’s writings—which revolves 
around a critique of this ‘traditional’ type of intellectual work as elitist 
and disconnected from the people and their struggles, and as bolstering 
a past and present status quo within which they tend to hold privileged 
positions (Gramsci et al. 1971: 1-23). More importantly, in the call for a 
‘new’ type of intellectual to emerge as a theorist who is simultaneously 
an active part of the world for which he or she theorizes, and the 
elaboration of the centrality of these organic intellectuals for the 
empowerment of the groups to whom they belong and for instigating 
revolutionary change—Gramsci highlighted the importance of breaking 
down the artificial distinction between theory and practice. 
Simultaneously, Gramsci attacked those who are intellectuals by 
profession—and perceive the situated, practical knowledge of those 
struggling on the ground as beyond the realms of academia, or belittle it 
as irrelevant to their abstract theorizations. Hence, he argued that these 
traditional intellectuals disempowered the masses, perpetuating the 
myth that philosophy is beyond the intellectual capabilities of ordinary 
people (Gramsci 1971: 323), and putting up barriers towards both the 
analysis of, and the attainment of a more liberating world. In the Prison 
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Notebooks—describing the efforts of the socialist magazine he edited to 
politicize this matter and create these empowering new types of 
intellectuals—Gramsci writes,  
“The Ordine Nuovo worked to develop certain forms of new intellectualism and to 
determine its new concepts. The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer 
exist in eloquence…but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, 
organiser, ‘permanent persuader’…from technique as work one proceeds to technique 
as science and to the humanistic conception of history, without which one remains 
“specialised” and does not become “directive” (specialised and political)” (Gramsci 
1971: 9-10).  
 
Following from this, in the context of neo-Gramscian interpretations of 
Gramsci, this chapter argues that perhaps interpretations which do not 
engage with the author himself, and paint over the revolutionary intent 
behind both his political praxis and writings, can be argued to be more 
about their insertion into disciplinary debates and the advancement of 
abstract theoretical conversations among specialists in a specific area, 
rather than an engagement with a political activist and revolutionary 
intellectual that is aimed at both understanding and promoting social 
transformation on the ground. In this vein, it is the obscuring of 
Gramsci’s attempt to empower the oppressed through his own critical 
praxis and his belief in the transformative potential found within a 
critical pedagogy triggered by organic intellectuals that this chapter 
takes issue with as an erasure of Gramsci’s interpretively problematic 
legacy, and argues for a need to resurrect. As Edward Said has argued, 
while acknowledging the severe difficulties of interpretation found 
within the Prison Notebooks, they are still held together by Gramsci’s 
“own central determination…to come to clearer formulations of the role 
of the mind in society” (Said 2001b: 465), and the fact that “everything 
Gramsci wrote was intended as a contribution to praxis” (Said 2001b: 
466). Following Said, this chapter also suggests that the significant 
interpretive difficulties presented by Gramsci’s writings aside, there 
may be a liberating space and elasticity to Gramsci’s concepts that defy 
a forever static context, time or space, that recognize the 
unpredictability and messiness of reality in their contradictions, and 
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that derive their meaning from the specific, the particular, and the local 
at any given point in time or contextualised space. Hence, these 
difficulties can also be perceived as something that can be celebrated, 
rather than lamented as indecipherable, or as a neglect that must be 
corrected in the name of a monolithic, all-encompassing, grand theory 
that applies to all times and all places.  
This point may be taken further to argue, as Said does, that Gramsci was 
intentionally opposed to the “tendency to homogenize, equalize and 
mediatize everything” (Said 2001b: 466); and that though his 
fragmented writings were partly a result of his conditions, they also 
represent a chosen textual form that reflects “his desire to preserve his 
critical consciousness” (Said 2001b: 466); and a choice of “never 
finishing his discourse… for fear that it would compromise his 
work…turning it into a body of resolved systematic ideas that would 
exercize dominion over him and his reader” (Said 2001b: 467). While 
these self-admitted speculations on Said’s part (Said 2001b: 466) may be 
debatable, and may reflect the faces of Gramsci that most influenced his 
own critical practice—they emphasize the fact that there is much to be 
gained by not de-linking the author from the text, and the text from the 
situations and struggles out of which it sprang. For it is herein where 
the strength, and transcendental art, of the historical method lies.  
 
III. IR, Robert Cox and the Neo-Gramscian Moment of Theoretical 
Liberation  
A. IR, Critical Theory and Robert Cox’s application of Gramsci 
 
It is Robert Cox who is most often credited with introducing the works 
of Gramsci, and (re) inserting the power of critical theory into the 
mainstream of the discipline of IR (eg. Germain & Kenny 1998: 3-21; 
Saurin 2008: 23-43; Ayers 2008: 1-20; Murphy, 1998: 417-425). With this 
revolution in thought, new voices were heard where previously there 
had been silence. Histories were told where there had been un-
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contextualized vacuums. Time and space were reinserted challenging 
the apathy of a static unchangeable infinity. There was movement. 
Dialectics. If coming across Robert Cox ignited a revolution of time, 
place and scale, within the minds and imaginations of many of his 
readers, his writings, and the writings of those who are broadly 
considered to belong to the neo-Gramscian arena, arguably had a similar 
effect upon the field of IR itself. As Mustapha Kamal Pasha states,  
“The neo-Gramscian framework offers one of the more innovative contributions to a 
discipline long embedded in the self-same verities of behaviouralism, positivism and 
neo-Realism, exploring the materialist underpinnings of states structures, recognising 
variations in state-civil society complexes and showing possibilities of newer forms of 
political agency” (Kamal Pasha 2005: 544).  
 
In “Social Forces, States and World Orders”, Cox himself contrasts 
critical theory with problem-solving theory, arguing that problem-
solving theory takes a value-laden vision of the eternal present as its 
framework of analysis and that its underlying aim can be argued to be 
conservative—it is theory that supports the status quo by fragmenting it 
into static parts. Making the complexities of its inner workings—the 
multiplicities of its dialectic structures and actors, their context, 
histories, settings and temporal and spatial locations—invisible, 
problem-solving theory is argued to highlight areas of conflict it intends 
to smooth over. This gives the big picture a false image of an unbiased, 
unchangeable, inevitable order (Cox 1981: 209). Critical theory however, 
“does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted 
but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and 
how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox 1981: 
208). Thus, it attempts to highlight the processes involved within the 
formation of a certain world order—to discern how it is that a specific 
configuration of social forces came about. It is meant to be fluid, to be 
about multiplicities and differences, about alternative voices, locations, 
and contradictions. It is concerned with the whole, with the big picture 
that transcends world orders and ushers in new ones. And in order to 
transcend a world order, one must not only describe it, but discover its 
  
28 
origins, and hence uncover the possibilities available therein for its 
transformation. And yet, there is perhaps an inherent contradiction in 
what Cox attempted to accomplish by affirming the power of critical 
theory, and Gramsci’s historicism and critical praxis for the creation of 
revolutionary theory on the one hand—while, applying this ‘method’ to 
elaborate a grand theory of world order based upon the interstate 
system and revolving around the agency of states (Ayers & Saad-Filho 
2008) on the other. As shall be discussed below, this perhaps over-
ambitious attempt to reconcile two seemingly opposing aims can be 
argued to be at the heart of most tensions within much neo-Gramscian 
scholarship.  
B. The Emergence of the Neo-Gramscians in IR  
 
As outlined above, the question of who the neo-Gramscians are exactly 
in IR, what they have in common as scholars, and why they have 
subsequently become known as the ‘Italian School’ is itself a deeply 
problematic one (Saurin 2008: 29-30), but one that is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. Suffice to say that Robert Cox, considered to be “the 
grandfather of neo-Gramscian IR” (Saurin 2008: 30), does not consider 
himself to belong to any school of thought. Thus, to this end, this 
chapter borrows from Julian Saurin the recognition of the fact that, “The 
need to identify and create schools of thought has more to do with 
academic industry building than philosophical or even pedagogical 
coherence” (Saurin 2008: 41). In the same breath though, it concurs with 
Germain and Kenny’s assertion that though lumping all those who use 
the ideas of Gramsci in diverse ways blurs their differences, 
“It is useful to the extent that it highlights how a particular set of ideas has come to 
exert an important influence within the discipline. For it is by the pioneering efforts of 
these scholars that Gramsci’s ideas have been introduced to an entirely new academic 
audience, and through them to today’s IR students” (Germain and Kenny 1998: 4).  
 
Following from this, for the purposes of this critique, those who 
emerged as neo-Gramscians in IR are considered to have done so from 
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within the space cleared by Robert Cox’s seminal intervention in 1981, 
and as such branch out from this point of beginning—while retaining 
the common platform of using Gramsci’s writings and concepts as a 
basis for most of their interventions within the discipline (Saurin 2008: 
30). Beyond this, it should be pointed out that these scholars are most 
commonly located in the realm of the International Political Economy 
(IPE) within Critical IR; that, following from Cox, their works have been 
framed around the application of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (and 
hence civil society) to the international in order to understand the 
workings of world order; and that many of these scholars’ work focus 
on analyzing the transnational managerial (capitalist) class’ links to the 
bolstering of this global hegemony (Ayers 2008).  
Robert Cox himself is argued to have turned to the work of Gramsci to 
understand the international system partly as a sympathetic critique of 
World-Systems Theory (Murphy 1998: 418). Citing Richard Falk, Murphy 
argues that Cox wanted to “move beyond (World-System Theory’s) static 
sense of history and disappointing conception of change and 
discontinuity” (Murphy 1998: 418). Murphy argues that it is this 
continued attraction to Gramsci’s historicism and embrace of a more 
powerful sense of the potential of human agency that forms the basis of 
the emergence of the neo-Gramscians in IR (Murphy 1998: 418). More 
specifically, this critique is concerned with those scholars among the 
neo-Gramscians who strove to contribute to the project of historical 
materialism (Ayers 2008: 2); began with Gramsci’s liberating, innovative 
historicist method as a way to counter the positivism of IR theory 
(Germain & Kenny 1998: 6); sought to embrace the radical potential of 
human beings to transform the world (Gill 1993); and most 
importantly—whose work embraced Cox’s re-affirmation of critical 
theory, and its application to the analysis of world order aimed at 
contributing to the construction of more liberating alternatives 
(Bedirhanoglu 2008). It is to these neo-Gramscians that this critique 
seeks to speak.  
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IV. The Gramscian/Neo-Gramscian Debates in IR 
A. Germain and Kenny’s Intervention 
 
As it has been stated above, it was Germain and Kenny who triggered a 
long overdue debate on the validity of the Italian School’s appropriation 
of Gramsci’s thought within the discipline of IR. In “Engaging Gramsci”, 
Germain and Kenny (who locate themselves as more classical 
‘Gramscians’) comment on the rise of the neo-Gramscians in IR, and the 
enthusiasm with which many scholars embraced Gramsci’s concepts as 
a breathe of fresh air, applying them to the international arena in a 
whirlwind of delightful theoretical emancipation. Thus, they state, “Gill 
boldly claims that a Gramscian-inspired IPE overcomes the subject-
object dualism at the heart of positivist social science” (Germain & 
Kenny 1998: 5); that “Gramsci’s radical embrace of human subjectivity 
gives IR scholars a way out of avoiding a deterministic and ahistorical 
structuralism” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 5); that Gramsci’s notion of a 
historical bloc, “helps these scholars to look beyond the state, to peer 
through its narrow juridical form in order to apprehend the broader 
social order of which it forms a constituent element” (Germain & Kenny 
1998: 6) and more generally that a powerful aspect of Gramsci’s appeal 
is to be found in the innovative historical materialist method articulated 
by the Italian school—with a historicist reading of the power of ideas, 
class, and institutions that resulted in a more liberating and flexible 
view of social relations and world order through his concepts (Germain 
& Kenny 1998: 6). 
Thus hegemony here becomes a configuration of social forces that 
comes together at a certain point in time and place in history. It is not 
divinely ordained, but constructed by human agents. It is not just about 
economics, but created by a whole dialectic ‘fit’ of ingredients which 
include ideologies and cultures, institutions, classes and identities, 
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languages and articulations, ‘world conceptions’ and battles of ‘common 
sense’. It is a temporary manifestation, it is fluid, contested and forever 
in motion, it is layered and limited, and it contains within itself multiple 
avenues and spaces of contention, opposition and resistance. Similarly, 
a historical bloc is also a temporary configuration of social forces that 
come together in a certain place and time to create a larger unity 
(Germain & Kenny 1998: 6), though it seems to operate primarily within 
a national context. Arguably most importantly though, is the neo-
Gramscian conception of civil society—which left its previous location 
and operation within the national to be placed within the realm of an 
international that is largely linked to “the practices and values fostered 
by public and private transnational institutions, which are in turn based 
upon the progressive transnationalisation of dominant social forces” 
(Germain & Kenny 1998: 7). This application of civil society at the 
international level is crucial for the dynamics of transformation within 
the neo-Gramscian framework, for it is within (national) civil society that 
Gramsci argued that social orders were built, contested, dismantled and 
re-configured. Civil society can therefore be viewed as the key arena of 
struggle within which historical blocs are formed and operate. It can be 
an essential ally to Gramsci’s ‘political society’, and is the coveted 
terrain from within which hegemony is emanated, defined, perpetuated 
and kept into place by the common sense ideologies of a leadership of a 
historic bloc. Civil society though is also simultaneously the site of 
alternatives, wars of positions, and the space from within which organic 
intellectuals battle the dominant ‘common sense’ view of reality, raise 
critical consciousness, transform mentalities, and launch 
counterhegemonic movements against political society. However, as it 
will be pointed out below, it is these aspects of counterhegemony that 
are most blurred by neo-Gramscian application of Gramsci’s concept of 
civil society (and hence hegemony) to the international, and this 
application itself that raises the most doubts as to the strength of their 
conceptual interpretations within the discipline.  
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B. Ayers et al Intervention 
It was not until recently (in 2008) that the marginal Gramscian/neo-
Gramscian debate was revived in IR, and framed more urgently as a 
hegemony of concepts and thought that must be engaged with more 
critically for the sake of the creation of relevant liberating alternatives 
within the critical branch of the discipline (Ayers 2008). Thus, Ayers 
applauds the historical emergence of the neo-Gramscians within the 
discipline, welcoming it as an intervention which, against the currents 
and predominant moods of the time, managed to trigger a resurrection 
of the political itself into the mainstream of the discipline and inspire a 
new generation of scholars into believing that ‘another world is 
possible’. Simultaneously, neo-Gramscian scholarship challenged the 
tendency of orthodox Marxist scholarship to privilege theoretical 
debates and detached grand theorizing, while remaining distant from 
the political practices, and social forces on the ground. Hence, Ayers 
emphasizes that it represents “the most important alternative to realist 
and liberal perspectives in the field today” (Ayers 2008: 2).  
Ayers argues that it is specifically to the historical materialist political 
project that neo-Gramscians have striven to contribute, with an 
emphasis upon an ethical commitment to social change, as well as a 
highlighting of Marx’s empowering assertion in thesis eleven that it is 
not enough for philosophers to only interpret the world—the point is to 
change it (Marx 1845). This emphasis radicalizes the act of critical 
thinking itself, underlining the importance of the unveiling of the 
historical, human-made nature of reality and the political possibilities 
therein to transform it in particular contexts on the ground. This 
empowering conception of people as agents who are intertwined in the 
making of reality itself also creates the space for the re-insertion of 
intellectual production within situated historical conjunctions that are 
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fashioned by temporally and spatially situated agents with particular 
interests, agendas and worldviews. Linked to this is a dialectic view of 
history itself, and an emphasis upon the historical process as the most 
powerful lens through which people can seek to understand their 
realities, understand themselves, and seek to resist injustice and create 
liberating change (Ayers 2008: 1-20).  
Thus, Ayers writes that—in contrast to the prevailing mainstream 
discourse of a discipline which until then had been “long associated 
with, and heavily implicated in, imperial designs and practice” (Ayers 
2008: 6)—neo-Gramscians unearthed an image of Gramsci as a humanist 
historicist, and a “praxis theorist who foregrounds the role of human 
agency” (Ayers 2008: 5). She highlights that Stephen Gill states that a 
“Gramscian approach differs from the prevailing orthodoxy in that it 
insists upon an ethical dimension to analysis” (Ayers 2008: 3); that Mark 
Rupert argues that “both Gramsci and Marx were engaged in a practice 
of critique, which aimed at uncovering and making explicit a social 
ontology” (Ayers 2008: 3), and that through this practice, “ontology 
itself…becomes an on-going social product, historically concrete and 
contestable” (Ayers 2008: 3). Moreover, she stresses that Cox’s 
Gramscian emphasis upon history as the most powerful arena within 
which human knowledge can be understood led to his conception of 
historical structures as a framework for action (Ayers 2008: 4); and that 
it was this framework for action that Cox then applied to the 
international as a form of explanatory method for the rise and demise 
of world orders—a framework who’s ingredients and constitutive 
elements and forces can only be determined by particular case studies.  
As Ayers writes, “At a time when much critical scholarship in the 
discipline has tended towards theoreticism, Cox’s call for empirical-
historical study is to be welcomed” (Ayers 2008: 6). This call should 
have also created space within the discipline for an affirmation of the 
fact that new generations—their identities, politics, histories and 
aspirations—must be taken seriously in the theorization of the political 
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today, and not be painted over by the ideas, convictions and maps 
towards liberation of particular past generations, no matter how 
influential they may have been, and continue to be. For in the 
(unintentional) silencing of the politics on the ground of the present, 
and the privileging of theoretical debates—and of the confinement of 
relevant politics within their set parameters—the radical core of the 
historical materialist project generally, and of the writings of Gramsci 
specifically, is lost.  
V. Engaging Gramsci: Some Neo-Gramscian Tensions 
A. Neutralizing the Philosophy of Praxis 
As previously alluded to above, this project contends that rather than 
viewing the internationalization of Gramsci’s concepts in itself as the 
crux of the debate between the Gramscians and the neo-Gramscians—it 
may be more accurate to argue that the abstracted method through 
which the neo-Gramscians applied Gramsci’s concepts to the 
international, (focusing on hegemony as their central concern) while 
sidelining both the national and counterhegemony as a result, is the real 
cause of much of the uncertainties surrounding whether or not these 
concepts are truly Gramscian, or valid. In this vein, Saurin comments 
upon the obscuring of the present realities and struggles on the ground 
and its link with the abstracted point of beginning within neo-Gramscian 
thought:  
“As Gramsci became neo- in the seminar rooms of international relations, so thesis 
eleven was neutralised. Any survey of the intellectual development of neo-Gramscian 
analysis must begin by recognizing that it has evolved through the theoretical 
resolution of given problems… its evolution was driven by the theoretical disputes 
within the academy” (Saurin 2008: 26). 
 
It is precisely this kind of theoretical elaboration that stands in direct 
opposition to what Gramsci stood for as a revolutionary activist whose 
writings reflected his own struggles, experiences and realities, and were 
conceived of and refined within both the historical conjunction, as well 
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as the empirical theatre of life in which he existed and struggled to 
create concrete revolutionary change. Moreover, it is perhaps this very 
same problem that underlies the core tension between those who 
perceive themselves to be Gramscians and those labelled as neo-
Gramscians within the IR Gramscian/neo-Gramscian debate.  
For, in many ways, the central questions elaborated within the 
Gramscian/neo-Gramscian debates revolve around this application of 
Gramsci’s concepts to the international—and hence within the 
frameworks of the debates upon the international already outlined 
within the discipline’s critical theory branch. Moreover, they question 
whether or not this is an accurate reflection of Gramsci’s own concepts, 
and if it is, how they help us understand the politics on the ground in 
today’s world. Perhaps though, as highlighted above, the divide between 
these two (sympathetic) camps is one that is really about method, and 
as Saurin argues, a commitment to Marxism—or Gramscian political 
praxis—rather than about the internationalization of concepts itself as 
such. In this vein, Saurin writes,  
“Whilst Gramsci, at least in his political praxis, retained a commitment to Marxist 
politics, I argue that this is redundant in the development of neo-Gramscian thinking. 
Specifically, the question of method abstraction that has been central to Marxism… 
has been jettisoned by neo-Gramscian IR” (Saurin 2008: 39). 
  
It is arguably within this jettisoning that the core tension between neo-
Gramscians and their sympathetic critics can be uncovered, since it is 
precisely this jettisoning that renders the attractiveness of Gramsci’s 
method—or flexible, historicist reading of social class, institutions and 
the power of ideas within the context of historical materialism—less 
powerful. For, if the power and flexibility of Gramsci’s concepts can be 
found in the fact that their full meaning can only be deciphered, when 
placed within a situated, historical, geographical context—this power is 
obscured by neo-Gramscian appropriations of these concepts as 
unchanging theoretical abstractions that are de-linked from political 
practice on the ground(s) today.  
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As Ayers and Saad-Filho argue, these methodological problems were 
inherited by many neo-Gramscians from the theoretical eclecticism and 
contradictions within the work of Cox himself (Ayers & Saad-Filho 2008: 
109-30). Thus, they point out that despite his own self-identification as 
a historical materialist, “Cox’s work reflects a willingness to sample 
from discordant intellectual traditions to create a method” (Ayers & 
Saad-Filho 2008: 112). While this creates diverse problems for neo-
Gramscian theory, one central point stands out in the context of this 
critique. This point revolves around the question of what remains within 
Coxian analysis of global world order that is truly Gramscian—in the 
sense of a critical theory which truly problematizes IR’s state-centrism 
(and hence its Western bias); creates space for a less structuralist view 
of world order; for a more radical conception of the transformative 
power of collective human agency; and for a more empowering account 
of the processes of counterhegemony on the ground, and the potential 
for the ushering in of more liberating alternatives of reality.  
For example—to illustrate some of these tensions—though Cox affirms 
Gramsci’s insistence on the importance of moving beyond the 
economism of orthodox Marxism, and mobilizes his concepts on the 
level of the international in order to do that, Steans and Tepe emphasize 
that his own conception of hegemony still privileges the economic realm 
in its analysis. For, it places “those with decisive influence in the 
economic sphere” (Steans & Tepe 2008: 141)—and class itself—as 
central leaders and determinants within its construction. Hence, in 
practice, other forms of power are only recognized nominally within the 
formation, dissemination and maintenance of hegemony (Steans & Tepe 
2008: 141). Similarly, Bedirhanoglu underlines that while Cox mobilized 
the language of social forces, state/society complexes and historical 
blocs to counter mainstream IR’s state-centrism, “he argued somewhat 
paradoxically that ‘states act with a certain autonomy’ and has 
consistently underlined the autonomous position of the state vis a vis 
production relations, social forces and world order” (Bedirhanoglu 2000: 
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90). Echoing Bedirhanoglu, Ayers and Saad-Filho highlight that while Cox 
centers class analysis in his research on historical change, he deploys a 
static, categorical conception of class that is not sensitive to historical 
structures and diverse contexts, and is stripped of any agency in the 
making and transforming of the capitalist system (Ayers & Saad-Filho 
2008: 112-115). Arguing that this omission reflects the fact that Cox’s 
approach to world order remains “profoundly state centric”, 
paradoxically privileging the state as the most important agent on the 
level of the international (Ayers & Saad-Filho 2008: 115-116). Thus, this 
continued emphasis upon states as the most important agents within 
the international, and primary shapers of the political, mutes the 
potential transformative power of human agency and resistance in IR 
yet again, and keeps the disciplinary conversations structured in a 
Western-centric manner, that “privileges the interstate system” (Ayers & 
Saad-Filho 2008: 117).  
These criticisms go a long way towards diluting the neo-Gramscian 
promise of innovation in terms of creating space for a different kind of 
political agency, the highlighting of diverse state/society complexes, or 
the analyzing of social forces within states. Hence, it becomes unclear 
what unites the contradictions within neo-Gramscian methodology, and 
what this means for the theorization of resistance and a more 
empowering form of human agency in the discipline of IR. For, this form 
of application of Gramsci’s contextualized historicism and empowering 
humanism erases the strength of its critical explanatory power, as well 
as the temporal and spatial flexibility of its context-sensitive concepts. 
Paradoxically, in his essay on method, Cox wrote,  
“A concept in Gramsci’s thought is loose and elastic and attains precision only when 
brought into contact with a particular situation which it helps to explain… This is the 
strength of Gramsci’s historicism, and therein lies its explanatory power. The term 
‘historicism’ is however, frequently misunderstood and criticized by those who seek a 
more abstract, systematic, universalistic and non-historical form of knowledge” (Cox 
1983: 162-3).  
Hence, while ushering in the importance of critical theory to the 
discipline, it remains unclear what is Gramscian in practice about Cox’s 
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contradictory method. Moreover, as Steans and Tepe have pointed out, 
by “remain(ing) steadfastly wedded to the fundamental theoretical 
framework developed by Robert Cox in the 1980s” (Steans & Tepe 2008: 
134) many neo-Gramscians have inherited these contradictory 
drawbacks in their own work and have yet to truly problematize them in 
terms of a Gramscian inspired, innovative method that is “geared 
consistently to the practical purpose of political action…and 
underline(s) the practical revolutionary purpose of philosophy” (Cox 
1983: 163). Instead, Saurin argues, neo-Gramcian scholarship is largely 
pre-occupied with the maintenance and workings of the capitalist 
system itself: 
“It is a compelling historical irony that the abiding legacy of Gramsci—the Marxist 
revolutionary actively organizing for the concrete transformation of society and the 
overturning of a capitalist order—has been embraced as the Marxist theory and 
theoretician that describes how capitalist order is maintained and reproduced” (Saurin 
2008: 26).  
 
While not seeking to take away from the power, necessity, or relevance 
of such an endeavour—to paint it as a form of revolutionary theory that 
embraces a Gramscian political praxis, and addresses the identities, 
realities, and political struggles of the majority of the world’s oppressed 
in an effort to empower them towards the attainment of more liberating 
realities is misleading at best, and an erasure of their history, agency, 
and struggles as irrelevant at worst.  
B. Blurring Counterhegemony and the National 
It is with the neo-Gramscian notion of global civil society that 
uncertainties about the possibility of exporting Gramsci’s concepts to 
the international arena become most evident. For, as Joseph Buttigieg 
emphasizes, interlinked with the fact that Gramsci’s conception of civil 
society is the sphere of hegemony (and hence the arena from within 
which counterhegemony is waged) is the fact that it not only is “an 
integral part of the state”, but “its most resilient and constitutive 
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element” (Buttigieg 1995: 4). As such, Gramsci’s political struggle was 
aimed at waging a ‘war of position’—or revolutionary strategy,  
“That would be employed in the arena of civil society with the aim of disabling the 
coercive apparatus of the state, gaining access to power and creating a consensual 
society where no group is reduced to subaltern status” (Buttigieg 1995: 7).  
When viewed from within this frame, it is true that de-linking this 
conception of civil society from a particular state, or ‘political society’, 
raises questions about the locations and workings of both hegemony 
and counterhegemony, and what waging a ‘war of position’ in this 
context would entail. It is this question that seems to be at the heart of 
the debate between the Gramscians and neo-Gramscians that still 
continues within (the margins of) IR today. Hence, in response to 
Germain and Kenny’s assertion that Gramsci’s civil society cannot be 
separated from the state, Rupert writes,  
“I argue that the political significance of civil society and ideological contestation need 
not be circumscribed by the borders of the state, for the state itself is being 
transformed as the new hegemony is being constructed, and new ways of organizing 
social relations are being learned” (Rupert 1998: 431).  
It is difficult to believe that Gramsci would have been unable to conceive 
of a ‘global’ civil society, as Germain and Kenny argue, had he lived in 
the present historical conjunction. Perhaps though, he may not have 
found it a particularly liberating space if it was conceived of as a 
homogenous one, void of diverse cultures and identities. Perhaps he 
may have called upon ‘organic intellectuals’ to look at this space more 
critically, and wage battles against ‘common sense’ to challenge this 
misleading worldview. It is also unclear how much the “state” itself is 
really being transformed here, how much it still corresponds to 
Gramsci’s vision of the state/society complex, and how much this neo-
Gramscian version of the state applies to the vast majority of the globe’s 
social forces and their realities—whether geographically, politically, 
organizationally, or otherwise. Regardless, the crucial element for this 
chapter—is that the essential point that needs to be made about the 
internationalization of Gramsci’s concepts is perhaps not about whether 
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or not it is possible, but about the fact that their points of origin, or 
configurations, should begin from within the local/national, and be 
refined according to the peculiarities of this specific location.  
Hence, it must be acknowledged that neo-Gramscian conceptions of a 
global civil society are innovative and powerful—and do contain within 
them the seeds of the outlining of a new form of political space in which 
many resistance struggles located within spaces of the more coercive 
periphery create alliances, find empowerment and novel avenues from 
within which to launch or continue their struggles. However, it must be 
emphasized that these “global” spaces themselves are linked to specific 
state/society complexes, and as such are not “global” in any real sense. 
Instead, they are presently spaces that in terms of geography, politics, 
resources, strategies, freedoms and ideologies are located (in some 
manner or another) within the consensual (or hegemonic) states of the 
“West”, and as such, target specific aspects within this particular 
hegemony. This, of course, does not include the more recent avenue of 
activism linked to the Internet—which can be viewed as more global in 
its actual (lack of) location. Yet, it remains a channel that is un-
accessible to the majority of those living within the coercive ‘non-West’, 
and when it is, remains technologically, financially and linguistically 
limited to a privileged minority. 
It is these struggles of liberation of the disempowered, these forms of 
resistance, these political practices and state/society complexes that are 
most often excluded by the neo-Gramscian conception of a “global” civil 
society. This exclusion persists, even though for many of these struggles 
that are located within spaces of coercion—it is the interlinked spaces 
of consent within Western state/society complexes that remain the 
source of this coercion, and as such, one of their primary targets in the 
battle of ‘common sense’ and alternative ‘conceptions of the world’. It is 
within these civil societies that the “non-West” places much hope for a 
form of Gramscian revolutionary change that would eventually disable 
the coercive apparatus of the state in their own national context—and 
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yet it is their agency in the shaping of both hegemony and 
counterhegemony that neo-Gramscian scholarship often negates.  
Moreover, in cases where these struggles in the “non-West” are brought 
to light in the analysis of alliance building, political solidarity or even 
joint struggle—more often than not, the concepts of analysis, 
theorizations of politics, definitions of what is possible, is relevant, is 
powerful, or is being fought for—remain defined by scholars located in 
the West, and the set boundaries of specific disciplinary debates. Hence, 
resistance in the “non-West” in this sense—though it is a central space 
from within which counterhegemony is meant to be launched—is still 
dealt with (theoretically and unintentionally) in the same imperial, 
colonial way that the neo-Gramscians entered into the discipline to 
counter (Ayers 2008). The result of this is to be found in the stripping of 
the Gramscian emphasis on the dialectic of its power, on its radical 
embrace of human agency in the construction of alternatives, as well as 
the centrality of beginning from the political struggles and realities of 
the oppressed in order to create relevant revolutionary theory in 
specific times and spaces.  
It might follow from this then, that rather than viewing hegemony as a 
globalized, all-encompassing, abstracted, irresistible blanket of power—
it could be more useful, and more Gramscian, to limit its nature and 
existence to specific forms in the context of specific cases/struggles, 
and specific national/local settings. Thus, arguing for a form of 
hegemony that encompasses more than one state/society complex—for 
example in the institutional form of international organizations, peace 
processes, legal conventions, etc—does not have to (and should not) de-
link it from the consensual ‘common sense’ that is emanated by a 
particular state or ‘political society’, or an alliance of several, in 
justification of it, and thus of an oppressive status quo that is linked to 
spaces of coercion/domination in areas of the “non-West”, and 
sometimes areas of the “West” itself. In this way, the working of 
counterhegemony, and Gramsci’s elaboration of the revolutionary 
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strategy of the ‘war of position’ would remain valid—though located 
within particular, and multiple, state/society complexes, battling a 
particular form of hegemony that is justified by a particular form of 
‘common sense’, upholding a particular unjust status quo by a 
particular dominant social group or groups.  
To return to Buttigieg, there would be little within this framing that 
would stand in the way of the creation of a Gramscian ‘war of position’, 
since it would still be aimed at “disabling the coercive apparatus” 
(Buttigieg 1995: 7) of a particular state (or interlinked groups of states) 
and attempting to locate pathways to power—albeit from within 
multiple, interlinked civil societies as opposed to one. Hence, Gramsci’s 
stress upon the necessity of “disseminating and instilling alternative 
common sense by means of mass cultural preparation, critical and 
theoretical elaboration and organization” (Buttigieg 1995: 14) in order 
for a revolution to become possible; his insistence that this form of 
empowerment of the oppressed must be implemented within civil 
society; that this “requires the creation of new spaces in civil society 
beyond the reach of the governmental, administrative and judicial 
apparatus of the state” (Buttigieg 1995: 14); that the social forces 
carrying out this struggle must “establish their own conception of the 
state and become this state in civil society” (Buttigieg 1995: 14); that all 
of this must be carried out by organic intellectuals who must create an 
alternative “socio-cultural and political consciousness among subaltern 
classes through autonomous organizations before any attempts to 
assume power” (Buttigieg 1995: 19); and that the form of party unifying 
these intellectuals should be viewed as “a collective intellectual that 
carries out its primary and most important functions in civil society” 
(Buttigieg 1995: 19); remains valid. The unifying platform of this 
struggle would still be the waging of a battle against a particular 
‘conception of the world’, or form of ‘common sense’, which all groups, 
or movements involved perceive as buttressing an oppressive status 
quo—regardless of where they are geographically located. Hence, the 
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‘global’ nature of civil society here, would be limited to the fact that in 
this particular historical conjunction, civil societies—that remain linked 
to, and an integral part of their states—are also interlinked with diverse 
other civil societies across states, are capable of waging unified battles 
against unified targets, and therefore, can be argued to be infinitely 
more powerful.  
C. Obscuring Gramsci’s ‘War of Position’  
It is the centrality of Gramsci’s critique of ‘common sense’ to the power 
of the ‘war of position’ as a strategy of revolution, and hence the 
importance of the role of organic intellectuals and their construction of 
an alternative, oppositional, and liberating ‘conception of the world’ 
within civil society, that is erased by most neo-Gramscian writing—in 
favour of an emphasis upon an image of Gramsci that highlights the 
economic level of analysis (Ayers 2008). This understandable bias (due 
to the fact that most neo-Gramscians are located within the critical 
branch of IPE in the discipline) goes back to one of Germain and Kenny’s 
most crucial criticisms of their scholarship within the Gramcsian/neo-
Gramscian debate. In this context, citing Gill’s interpretation of 
Gramsci’s idea of ‘historical necessity’, they state that “he is adamant 
that by this Gramsci means that social interaction and political change 
as challenging and redefining the limits of the possible” (Germain & 
Kenny 1998: 10), since these limits are not “fixed, or immutable but 
exist within the dialectic of a given structure” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 
10). And yet, they argue that what neo-Gramscians do not address, is 
how these interactions actually redefine these limits—a question that 
can be answered in multiple ways by multiple understandings of 
Gramsci. They write,  
“What remains open for question is how do we understand social interaction and 
political change as challenging the limits of the possible? By prior economic relations 
which set unbreakable limits? By actors’ thoughts, which are the products of the 
prevailing hegemonic ‘common sense’? By actors who through lived experiences and 
shared cultural codes learn what constitutes the possible? All three were possible for 
Gramsci, rendering this a more complex area in terms of his work than the neo-
Gramscians allow” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 10). 
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And while this is true, and reflects the fact that for Gramsci all of these 
arenas were interlinked, it also seems to be the case that images of a 
Gramsci who is concerned with, or begins his analysis with, economic 
relations abound in neo-Gramscian scholarship in IR (Steans & Tepe 
2008: 141)—in comparison to those who engage with Gramsci’s level of 
the ‘ethico-political’ (or conceptions of the world), and begin with the 
revolutionary potential within actors’ thoughts, or their lived 
experiences, in challenging the limits of the possible. Considering the 
central role that the power of ideas, critical pedagogy, human agency, 
organic intellectuals, and ‘conceptions of the world’ play in the building 
of a Gramscian ‘war of position’, as well as of a unified historic bloc—
and hence preparing for revolution, and for the moment wherein a ‘war 
of manoeuvre’ becomes possible—this erasure seems rather strange.  
Within this debate, it is only Andrew Robinson who underlines this fact, 
arguing that neo-Gramscians have obscured the crux of Gramsci’s 
revolutionary project, and disregarded the centrality of the battle 
against oppressive ‘common sense’ and the creation of alternative, 
liberating ‘conceptions of the world’ to his analysis. Hence he writes,  
“The recovery of Gramsci’s revolutionary message is part of the same 
process as the recovery of the critique of common sense, which has 
been repressed in most readings of Gramsci” (Robinson 2005: 470). 
Paralleling Germain and Kenny’s observation that there are “many 
different Gramscis on offer” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 8); and stressing 
Gramsci’s self-reflexive, situated, creative and at times contradictory 
relationship to Marxism, Robinson highlights the often muted fact that 
Gramsci’s “position on the crucial issue of the role of economics and 
production in constituting social forces varies between different texts” 
(Robinson 2005: 471). Hence, while Gramsci sometimes “maintains a 
more-or-less orthodox attachment to the last-instance primacy of the 
economic sphere” (Robinson 2005: 471), there are instances in his 
writing which equally begin within the realm of the ethico-political and 
give primacy to the power of conceptions of the world to challenge the 
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limits of the possible instead. As such, this Gramsci does not view 
history as a “succession of modes of production” (Robinson 2005: 471), 
but rather as “the struggle between ways of viewing reality” (Robinson 
2005: 471).  
It is this Gramsci who is brought to light so little within the discipline, 
and yet, it is also this Gramsci who is the key to both his energetic and 
powerful revolutionary strategy, as well as to his radical embrace of 
human agency—an embrace that is most famously reflected in his 
phrase “everyone is a philosopher” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 323). It is also 
only by bringing this Gramsci to life within the discipline that his 
writings around why ‘wars of position’ must begin within the ‘ethico-
political’ level of civil societies, the liberating potential of education, and 
the pivotal role of the organic intellectual in the empowerment of the 
oppressed and their transformation into a historical force can be 
understood. This applies equally to Gramsci’s writings upon the 
necessity of the creation, and dissemination of an oppositional, 
liberating ‘conception of the world’ against the ‘common sense’ of a 
status quo, which is “a terrible slave driver of the spirit” (Gramsci et al. 
1971), and his theorization of the building of ‘wars of position’ through 
the ideational (in the first instance)—championing an alternative reality. 
It was this Gramsci who wrote that a new society can only be built when 
its vision has already come alive in the imaginations of those struggling 
to bring it about (Gramsci et al. 1971). And it is this Gramsci who argued 
that “every revolution has been preceded by an intense labour of 
criticism, including the spread of ideas among masses of men that are 
at first resistant” (Gramsci et al. 1971). It is also this Gramsci who 
stressed that “the creation of a new world view is equivalent to the 
creation of a new type of political and civil society” (Robinson 2005: 
474); and that “emancipation in practice must be preceded by ideational 
emancipation” (Robinson 2005: 472). And, crucially, it is this Gramsci 
who, in response to Germain and Kenny’s question on how social 
interaction and political change would challenge and redefine the limits 
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of the possible would respond—by both actors’ thoughts and actors’ 
lived experiences. In this context,  
“Classes or social groups on the ethico-political level are for Gramsci defined primarily 
by their mode of thought and action… It is groups of people united by particular 
conceptions of the world (not classes in the economic sense) which are the main social 
forces on the ethico-poltical level, which is the most important level for transformative 
politics” (Robinson 2005: 473).  
And yet, it is this humanist, situated and empowering Gramsci who is 
diluted in neo-Gramscian scholarship in IR. Recently, it is only Rupert 
who has sought to remedy this exclusion—while simultaneously 
acknowledging that his interpretations of Gramsci are not “innocent” 
(but politically driven) and that “he doubts whether any such thing (as 
an innocent reading) is possible” (Rupert 2003: 189). Rupert’s 
intervention places ‘common sense’, the revolutionary potential of 
critical education, and the construction of an ‘intellectual-moral bloc’ at 
the center of its analysis of Gramsci’s political project:  
“At the core of Gramsci’s political project was a critical pedagogy which took at its 
starting point the tensions and possibilities latent within common sense, and which 
sought to build out of these materials an emancipatory political culture and social 
movement to enact it- not simply another hegemony, re-arranging occupants of 
superior/subordinate social positions- but a transformative counterhegemony” (Rupert 
2003: 186).  
Rupert argues that the central mechanism of revolutionary change for 
Gramsci in this context is the historic bloc, which is “led and educated 
initially by a class identified political party”, that can only become 
hegemonic “by transcending a narrow sectarian approach to politics and 
by attaining hegemonic leadership of a bloc of social forces committed 
to the attaining anti-capitalist futures” (Rupert 2003: 188). Hence, in this 
context, it is only through the process of creating alliances, debating 
ideas, and discovering common principles upon which to base a unified 
struggle that a common vision is fashioned. (And though Rupert here 
underlines the image of Gramsci who argued for a class identified 
collective intellectual, it should be emphasized that Gramsci himself 
alternatively deployed the term social group as well). This common 
vision, or ‘conception of the world’ is not just imposed by the 
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hegemonic leadership of a bloc upon its allies as the decided upon 
blueprint for a liberating future—but is found through a process of 
radical dialogue and education that “involves the transformation of all 
parties involved in its construction, including the leading party” (Rupert 
2003: 189). It is through this unity that is created out of diversity, that 
Gramsci argues people become a collective force capable of challenging 
the limits of the possible:  
“An historical act can only be performed by ‘collective man’, and this presupposes the 
attainment of a ‘cultural-social’ unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, 
with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an 
equal and common conception of the world” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 349).  
Underlining the centrality of education to this process—and hence of 
organic intellectuals—Rupert argues that Gramsci highlights “the 
transformative potential of such a relational vision by interpreting 
politics and the historical problem of the leaders and the led in terms of 
education” (Rupert 2003: 187). Moreover, it is only when viewed from 
within this context that Gramsci’s conceptualization of the ‘party’ as a 
“collective intellectual”, and of organic intellectuals as “leaders” and 
“organizers”, who empower the oppressed through the gift of critical 
thinking can be understood. Gramsci argues, 
“A human mass does not ‘distinguish’ itself, does not become independent in its own 
right without, in the widest sense, organising itself; and there is no organisation 
without intellectuals, that is without organizers and leaders. In other words, without 
the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely by 
the existence of a group of people ‘specialized’ in the conceptual and philosophical 
elaboration of ideas” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 334).  
Importantly for the purposes of this chapter—is the underlining within 
this image of Gramsci upon the fact that a historic bloc here (or the 
potential for collective action) is only homogenous to the extent that it 
has agreed upon a common platform from within which to wage a battle 
against an oppressive conception of the world. Thus, it is 
simultaneously made up of an alliance of diverse groups who are fluid, 
forever transforming each other, and who do not always agree. It is this 
that gives Gramsci’s historic bloc its transformative potential, for it is in 
practice one of the essential platforms within which organic 
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intellectuals debate critical ideas and notions of self, of history and 
philosophy, and of liberating future visions—transforming themselves 
and everyone else involved in the collective process under the umbrella 
of a common worldview upon which they remain united in the struggle 
for a better tomorrow.  
D. Silencing the Periphery  
In a similar vein, neo-Gramscians have been criticized by some for 
ignoring “otherness” in the dynamics and construction of IR (Pasha 
2005: 543-558). This criticism however can be taken more broadly to 
reflect the sidelining of localities and of the national in their 
theorization of global versions of hegemony and counterhegemonic 
movements. As Kamal-Pasha emphasizes, in this view hegemony is just 
beamed down from the international arena into the domestic spheres of 
those in national spaces, who are stripped of any agency, and just 
accept western hegemony silently and complacently. Thus, “Hegemony 
is often treated as something that arrives, like a ship, from outside the 
society in question” (Kamal-Pasha 2005: 546). This view (along with that 
of an undifferentiated global space) also enforces the consensual aspect 
of transnational hegemony, and obscures the theorization of coercion—
though it is an integral element of the realities of those who live in the 
‘periphery’ under conditions of coercive domination. Moreover, it is an 
equally integral element of Gramsci’s conception of the dynamics of 
hegemony, and the interplays between the wars of position and 
manoeuvres. In this vein: 
“The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but 
rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this 
fact, non-Westerners never do”1 
Perhaps this is due to the positioning, histories and world conceptions 
of these scholars, and to the fact that they operate within a largely 
western space of modern states and capitalist hegemony. In the spirit of 
                                                 
1 Huntington, cited on the (Pax) “Where is Raed? blog, (http://dear_raed.blogspot.com/) 
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critical theory though, biases should be acknowledged rather than 
concealed. An example of this kind of bias stemming from the 
abstraction of specific interpretations of Gramsci’s concepts to a general 
disciplinary law about what is considered to be Gramscian can be seen 
in Rupert’s previously mentioned intervention. Hence, in relation to 
Gramsci’s passage on the unity of history, Rupert writes,  
“I understand this to mean that the class based relations of production under 
capitalism create the possibility of particular kinds of collective agency, but this 
potential can only be realized through the political practices and struggles of situated 
social actors…” (Rupert 2003: 186).  
And while this may be true, valid and powerful for the particular 
movements that Rupert engages with, and is certainly a valid and 
powerful interpretation of Gramsci’s work—it does not follow from here 
that it is the only interpretation upon which the discipline of IR must 
judge whether or not an analysis is truly “Gramscian”, nor that rival 
interpretations of Gramsci that do not privilege class based relations, or 
anti-capitalism as the central platform of unity of progressive social 
struggle misconstrue the legacy of Gramsci. For, as Rupert himself 
emphasizes, “Gramsci was a Marxist, but his Marxism was a historicism” 
(Rupert 2003: 186). Moreover, Gramsci wrote that “the experience on 
which the philosophy of practice is based cannot be schematized, it is 
history in all its infinite variety and multiplicity” (Rupert 2003: 186); and 
crucially, Gramsci, 
“Insisted that historical materialism was a situated knowledge, which implies the 
potential for productive political dialogue with other forms of situated knowledge 
constructed in contexts where capitalism’s been articulated with various kinds of 
social identities and relations not reducible to class” (Rupert 2003: 186).  
Most importantly, as touched upon above, any biases within Rupert’s 
reading of Gramsci have been confessed to by Rupert himself, and his 
open acknowledgement that they are motivated by an advocation of a 
particular kind of politics.  
Rupert’s intervention aside though, there is something disconcerting 
about what seems to be an exceedingly reductionist vision of Gramsci 
  
50 
reflected by much neo-Gramscian scholarship in IR. This is especially 
bizarre considering that Gramsci himself was vocally opposed to this 
form of reduction, and emphasized the importance of language, ideas 
and culture, spaces and places in all his analytical concepts, as well as 
the dialectics involved in the creation of any conception of the world. 
Specifically criticizing Cox’s later reconfiguration as an advocate of 
pluralism, Kamal-Pasha argues,  
“Recognition of a ‘plural world’ and its multiple intersubjectivities does not resolve the 
analytical conundrums of neo-Gramscian thinking on ‘transnational hegemony’. 
Without fully appreciating the coercive nature of power in the so-called ‘periphery’, 
and the mutually constitutive nature of inside/outside, appreciation of a plural world 
appears more nominal than real” (Pasha 2005: 549). 
Much to the disappointment of many scholars involved in critical 
political projects of resistance, it would seem that even neo-Gramscians 
unintentionally obscure the ‘periphery’, rendering them powerless in the 
construction of hegemony—while highlighting the agency, values, 
dynamics, and agendas of dominant western voices. Strangely enough, 
the periphery is allowed an appearance only to counter a hegemonic 
order it is not part of from within what appears to be an 
undifferentiated global space. Even here, there appears to be little that 
is international about International Relations, let alone plural or multi-
accentual. It is these tensions that are argued to be more troubling 
about the neo-Gramscian conception of world order for the purposes of 
this specific chapter—as opposed to the debate upon whether or not the 
internationalizing of Gramsci’s concepts is in itself possible.  
VI. Conclusion: Towards a Decolonial Gramsci  
This chapter sought to highlight that perhaps the crux of the tension 
within much neo-Gramscian scholarship can be linked to a critique to its 
scholarship revolving around a diluted aspiration to create 
revolutionary theory that is committed to the empowerment and 
liberation of the oppressed, and to the highlighting of their situated 
struggles and voices. For, while critiquing orthodox Marxist theoretical 
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traditions within the discipline for creating abstract theory that largely 
remained blind to the politics of resistance on the ground—and re-
asserting the revolutionary potential within Gramsci’s insistence upon 
the transformative power of the human being—the Italian School 
appeared to create theory that did not live up to its Gramscian promise 
in the end. As this chapter argued, this disjuncture between much neo-
Gramscian theorizing and the actual struggles and strategies of 
resistance today may be an unintentional reflection of the location, 
realities, political interests and biases of those scholars involved within 
it—and the fact that their self-definition of their political project may 
have been more narrow than they had imagined. In this, they may have 
succumbed to Marx’s powerful lament about the intellectual difficulties 
plaguing those who attempt to create truly alternative ways of thinking 
and being—without paying attention to the desires, identities and 
situated contexts of new generations, and their freedom to create their 
own history, and transform the world according to their own realities 
and self-understandings (Marx 1852).  
Thus, this chapter argued that rather than breaking out of the 
theoretical limitations of IR, and revolutionizing critical theory by 
remaining true to engaging it in an interplay with situated practice and 
political struggle, neo-Gramscian scholarship unearthed some of the 
thoughts and writings of Gramsci, and applied them within the 
boundaries of the disciplinary debates themselves. In doing so, it 
neither remained true to the revolutionary potential within the writings 
of Gramsci, nor to its own aspirations to create revolutionary theory 
within the discipline. Interlinked with this, this chapter has contended 
that this abstracted neo-Gramscian point of beginning has resulted in 
obscuring an energetic Gramscian project of transformation. For, in 
privileging the abstracted international, it neutralized Gramsci’s 
philosophy of praxis, his theorizations of counterhegemony and his 
critique of common sense that is intertwined with his revolutionary 
strategy of the war of position.  
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It is the blunting of these concepts within neo-Gramscian scholarship 
that this chapter argued represent an erasure of Gramsci’s work and 
political praxis. Hence, it is the re-excavation and re-centring of these 
concepts within Gramsci’s theorization of the processes of 
counterhegemony that the next chapter endeavours through the 
writings of Edward Said. For, this contradiction between Gramsci’s 
original writings and method and his appropriation by the neo-
Gramscians in IR is arguably remedied by Said’s arguments concerning 
where the power of Gramsci’s writings lie for the creation of 
revolutionary change. As such, as the next chapter will show, it is Said’s 
reading of Gramsci through the work of Giambiatista Vico that re-
locates the power of his concepts within the territorial, and re-energizes 
his philosophy of praxis through an insistence upon both beginning 
within, and reflecting, the contradictions and messiness of ‘life’ itself.  
Interlinked with this divergent point of beginning, Said resurrects the 
territorial processes of counterhegemony itself in Gramsci—stressing 
that the power of his thought lies in the fact that he “was political in the 
practical sense, conceiving of politics as a contest over territory, both 
actual and historical, to be won, fought over, controlled, held, lost, 
gained” (Said 2001b: 464). As such, Gramsci is seen to be attempting to 
produce a critical consciousness that was both “geographical and 
spatial” (Said 2001b: 465); embodied the unification of theory and 
practice; was aimed at contributing to praxis; and is in itself the 
embodiment of the kind of intellectual work that he argued to be 
revolutionary—and called upon all organic intellectuals to produce as a 
central catalyst to the triggering of revolutionary change. Moreover, in 
reading Gramsci in this way, Said re-centers the role of the organic 
intellectual within Gramsci’s theorizations of counterhegemony. In 
doing so, he builds upon Gramsci’s image of the oppositionary 
intellectual, arguably resurrecting it as an instigator of change that is 
more atuned with our modern times and possesses more concrete 
strategies for the instigation of empowering change within their situated 
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contexts. Thus, this Saidian image of Gramsci is argued to not only re-
excavate a silenced project of Gramscian resistance, but to re-animate it 
in ways that may be more aligned with understanding the more modern 
context of anti-imperial resistance today—and hence to illuminating 
pathways towards liberation within it.  
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Chapter Two 
Edward Said and Revitalizing Gramsci’s Project of 
Counterhegemony: Laying Theoretical Foundations 
I. Introduction 
 
In the Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci wrote that, “every revolution 
is preceded by an intense labour of criticism, including the spread of 
ideas among masses of men that are at first resistant”. For this Gramsci, 
“every relationship of hegemony is necessarily an educational 
relationship” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 349) and the creation of a new 
conception of the world is synonymous with the creation of a new type 
of civil and political society. Hence, for this Gramsci, the elaboration of 
a new conception of the world marks the beginning of an energizing 
project of counterhegemony that centers around the power of critical 
pedagogy to revolutionize possibilities on the ground. Within this 
framework, organic intellectuals are the pivotal agents in the forging of 
new historic blocs, based upon the creation of collective wills 
championing alternative, liberating conceptions of the world, and 
waging battles to disseminate this world view within diverse civil 
societies. This form of counterhegemony involving alternative popular 
education initiatives, and an ‘intense labour of intellectual criticism’ 
aimed at dismantling a world view, and its transformation into political 
action on the ground, is arguably the first step in the long and arduous 
road towards the creation of a potential Gramscian counterhegemonic 
force—one which eventually becomes expressed in the emergence of a 
new, coherent, and unified historic bloc.  
This chapter attempts to resurrect this silenced project of Gramscian 
counterhegemony using the writings of Edward Said. This resurrection 
emerges from within an engagement with neo-Gramscian debates in IR, 
and therefore speaks to the tensions and omissions within these 
debates as highlighted in the Literature Review. As such, it neither 
directly speaks to Postcolonialism, nor does it engage with, or seek to 
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add to, the debates within this body of literature. Rather, it aims at 
highlighting the centrality of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis in both 
empowering the oppressed and creating revolutionary theory that 
begins with “life”—while highlighting alternative potential pathways to 
power within situated struggles for liberation. In doing so, it neither 
seeks to essentialize Said as a Gramscian, nor to box his 
interdisciplinary largely anti-methodological spirit into a specific arena 
of thought. Instead, it aims at deploying this Saidian re-reading of 
Gramsci in the following chapters in order to trace what can arguably be 
seen as a presently (re)emerging collective of one-state organic 
intellectuals, and their (on-going) attempts to trigger an ‘intellectual-
moral reformation’ within their own communities on the ground. This 
project of critical pedagogy is arguably aimed at creating an expansive 
anti-Zionist historic bloc to counter the conception of the world 
upholding the formulation of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process since 
Oslo—a conception of the world that these organic intellectuals perceive 
to be based upon the preservation of an oppressive, expansive, and 
coercive status quo—and the triumph of Zionist ‘common sense’ 
ideology. In painting this emergence—through the mapping of the 
struggles, solidarities and strategies of those involved in the attempt to 
create it; and by highlighting their situated political practices, self-
understandings and critical knowledge—this project endeavours to both 
decolonize the potential of the politics of resistance in Critical IR theory 
today, and—more specifically—to analyze the counterhegemonic 
potential of the present one state movement in Israel/Palestine. Echoing 
Mark Rupert, this is neither an innocent reading of Gramsci, nor of 
Said—but one that is inspired by the desire to enable a particular lens 
into the processes of a largely silenced political project of 
transformation, as well as to enable a politics of solidarity to emerge on 
the ground today (Rupert 2003: 189).  
This chapter begins by engaging with Edward Said, the appropriation of 
his writings in Postcolonialism, and emphasizing an arguably neglected 
Gramscian influence in his work. It then proceeds to outline a Saidian 
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inflected re-excavation of Gramsci’s writing in an attempt to re-vitalize 
Gramsci’s arguably obscured project of counterhegemony, and method 
of collective human empowerment. In doing so, it attempts to re-center 
the role of the organic intellectual within Gramsci’s insurrectionary 
writings; the centrality of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis and emphasis 
upon situated territorial geography in elaborating the process of 
building counterhegemony; and the necessity of re-visiting Gramcsi’s 
critique of ‘common sense’ and revolutionary strategy of the ‘war of 
position’ in triggering liberating social transformation on the ground. It 
is hoped that through this re-excavation, more space will be created for 
the empowerment of human beings to resist situated forms of 
oppression today.  
II. Edward Said, Postcolonialism and Neglected Images 
A. Edward Said: A Brief Look into a Spirit of Opposition 
 
As highlighted in the introduction, it is a stand in defiance and 
opposition to the disempowerment of the oppressed—and the political 
act of underlining the secular, situated nature of humanly constructed 
history that underlies it—that represents a unifying thread through 
much of the eclectic work of Edward Said from the writing of the 
fittingly entitled Beginnings (1985) onwards. Beginnings itself was 
triggered by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the alienating existential 
crisis it unleashed in Said himself—who found himself within an 
American context in which “everybody was very powerfully identified 
with the Israelis” (Said et al. 2000: 422). The shaking up of Said’s 
sanitized setting as a literary scholar, who had “placed himself in an 
environment that presented few reminders of his past and his identity” 
(Said et al. 2000: xxi), and Said’s consequent political awakening, came 
as a result of living through the process of this crisis (Said et al. 2000: 
422-3). It is from here that the emphasis upon the link between the life, 
context, situated historical juncture and motivations of an author and 
the narratives he or she writes emerges in Said. In parallel to this 
  
57 
personal and political awakening, Beginnings was simultaneously 
inspired by the work of the Italian philologist Giambiatista Vico and his 
emphasis upon the links between situated beginnings and narrative. 
Thus, as Bayoumi and Rubin write, Said embraced Vico as a thinker who,  
“Represented a method of situating and unfolding the literary work of art in all its 
worldly, secular relations. Furthermore, he challenged the specialization and 
sequestering of knowledge.” (Said et al. 2000: xxiii).  
 
It is from within this context that Said embarked upon a lifelong quest 
against the specialization and fragmentation of knowledge, the erasure 
of its affiliations with power and imperialism, and its de-linking from 
the general body of citizens within civil society. Thus in “Secular 
Criticism”, he would arguably lay the basis of his whole critical practice 
writing, “My position is that texts are worldly, to some degree they are 
events, and part of the social world, human life, and of course, the 
historical moments in which they are located and interpreted” (Said 
1983: 4). For Said, it was criticism—as a political act of illuminating 
affiliations between power, knowledge and imperialism; as a practice 
that is located within the secular, situated, humanly created world—that 
would constitute the groundwork for any loose methods he may have 
deployed in his writing after this point. In The World, the Text and the 
Critic, Said would clearly emphasize this point:  
“Contemporary criticism has retreated from its constituency, the citizens of modern 
society… a precious jargon has grown up, and its formidable complexities obscure the 
social realities that… encourage a scholarship of ‘modes of excellence’ very far from 
daily life… Criticism can no longer cooperate in or pretend to ignore this enterprise… 
Each essay in this book affirms the connection between texts and the existential 
actualities of human life (Said 1983: 5).  
 
Linking this erasure to “the cult of expertise and professionalism” (Said 
2001e: 119) Said, as Gramsci did years before him, held intellectuals 
both accountable for participating within a “program of non-
interference”, which privileges and exalts professional and expert 
knowledge, and viewed them as potential powerful agents of dissent, of 
disseminating non-coercive knowledge, and of outlining alternative 
social and political relations. He therefore embraced the role of the 
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activist, public, secular intellectual who defiantly took positions against 
injustice, and historicized, contextualized, and humanized knowledge in 
the name of the oppressed—while reminding readers that knowledge 
production and the political, the personal, the spatial, and the 
circumstantial were intimately intertwined.  
Thrust into the realm of the political, and following his newfound 
conviction in the link between thought and action, Said “began to feel 
that what happened in the Arab World concerned (him) personally and 
could no longer be accepted with a passive political disengagement” 
(Said et al. 2000: xxii). Thus Said began to re-affiliate himself with the 
Palestinian community in the Arab World (Said et al. 2000: xxiv). In 1977 
he was elected as an independent member of the Palestinian National 
Council (PNC), which he embraced as a channel through which he could 
“act politically on behalf of Palestinian self-determination” (Said et al. 
2000: xxiv). The Question of Palestine (1979) emerged in this period, and 
represented a “more political, cultural, and historical investigation of 
Palestinian dispossession…(that) delved into the brute practices of the 
various colonialism that the Palestinians have endured” (Said et al. 2000: 
xxv). Never one to advocate solidarity before criticism, Said took a 
public stand against the PLO here arguing for a two-state solution, as 
opposed to the liberation of all of historic Palestine. Years later he 
would come out in vocal opposition to Arafat and his selling out of the 
Palestinian cause for his own personal gain in signing the Oslo Accords, 
demanding that he resign. In an interview on this period, Said 
confessed,  
“In 1991 I was involved with a group of people…to formulate the assurances that we 
as Palestinians required as our entry into the Madrid process. Our conditions were 
fairly stringent…Arafat simply cancelled them all. He more or less made it clear to the 
Israelis and the Americans that he had no conditions. He just wanted to be in on the 
process…by accepting these conditions Arafat was in effect no longer representing the 
Palestinian people” (Said et al. 2000: 439). 
Having quit the PNC, in 1999 Said would come out in favour of a single 
state solution to the conflict, and against the principle of separation 
(Said et al. 2000: 429). 
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Intertwined with the above, Said’s discovery of Vico also led to his 
discovery of Gramsci, and the consequent shift in his writing towards an 
emphasis upon imperialism, power and geography (Wainwright 2005: 
1036)—which began with the writing of Orientalism (1978). Culture and 
Imperialism (1994) which Said originally began writing as a sequel to 
Orientalism, came out of the desire to emphasize this Gramscian 
influence more directly—which had arguably been blurred due to an 
over-emphasis on the influence of Foucault in Orientalism. In an 
interview, Said explains,  
“I think, this is perhaps one of the negative effects of Foucault: You get the impression 
that Orientalism is just continuing to grow and have more power. This is misleading. I 
was much more interested in locating the axis of this book, Culture and Imperialism, in 
the contest over territory, which is at bottom what I am really writing about” (Said 
1994: 3). 
In this vein, and on the importance of Gramsci’s emphasis upon 
geography and its constant contestability to his work, Said states,  
“This is the single most important thing that I took from Gramsci- the idea that 
everything, including civil society to begin with, but really the whole world, is 
organized according to geography…” (Said 1994: 13). 
 
For Said, this emphasis upon geography was linked to a desire to 
highlight the actual historical experiences on the ground, and the 
physical realities on which they were built and experienced, rather than 
“a shift away from the contents of history... to their form, their 
language, their rhetoric” (Said 1994: 5). Thus Said describes Culture and 
Imperialism as a book that is about the complexities of the on the 
ground lived experiences of history (Said 1994)—complex experiences 
which, following Gramsci, he has no interest in resolving into a 
systematic grand theory—but in working out on the ground (Said 1994: 
13). Culture and Imperialism, and many of Said’s writings that followed, 
were really an attempt to uncover a form of liberation that transformed 
social and political relations on the ground in a way that set both the 
colonized and the colonizers free. As such, this form of liberation has 
little to do with nationalism, statehood or independence for Said at this 
point in his life—but with a cathartic energy that frees everyone 
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involved within it from the imperial experience, and stands against the 
principle of separation.  
“Liberation is really what I am trying to talk about, and freeing oneself from the need 
to repeat the past. We’re back to the Eighteenth Brumaire… We’re not always 
necessarily condemned to repeat the past. I’m trying, here, to move toward some 
notion of a universalism… it has to be universally accepted that certain democratic 
freedoms, certain freedoms from domination of one kind or another, freedom from 
various kinds of exploitations, and so on, are the rights of every human being- which is 
not the framework of the imperial world in which we live” (Said 1994: 14). 
 
As such, it is a struggle that must begin with the tensions and 
irreconcilabilities that exist within situated contested geographies, and 
aspires to a form of reconciliation that is not based upon the imperial 
impulses of partition, nationalism or separation (Said et al. 2000: 437). 
Rather, it is a form of reconciliation that involves the building upon 
these territories in the interest of what Said advocated as “an attempt to 
find out about the other” (Said et al. 2000: 431) based upon a desire to 
“extend the notion of human rights to cover everyone” (Said et al. 2000: 
433), and Gramsci advocated as a struggle towards the construction and 
consolidation of new social relationships (Gramsci et al. 1971). It is this 
face of Said, and its connection to the writings of Gramsci, that the rest 
of this chapter attempts to bring back to light in order to re-vitalize 
Gramsci’s project of counterhegemony on the ground.  
B. Postcolonialism and Neglected Images of Edward Said  
 
In view of the above, this chapter sounds a note of caution on the 
directions in which, or aspects of, Edward Said’s work that have either 
been embraced, or largely ignored in the appropriation of his writing in 
IR specifically, but also in the overall picture of the debates emerging 
within Postcolonialism itself today. As Gruffyd-Jones argues, 
“Much Postcolonial theory seems to be framed by unhelpful dichotomies between 
political economy and materialism on the one hand, and poststructural inflections of 
power, identity, culture and knowledge on the other” (Gruffydd Jones 2006: 6).  
In sounding this note, it simultaneously strives to stress the fact that 
though much has been written about Said in the context of 
Poststructuralist and Postcolonial debates within IR, it is striking that 
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not more attention has been given to the influence of the writings of 
Gramsci on much of Said’s work, ideas and activism. This neglect 
remains despite the credit given to Gramsci’s writings and ideas by the 
author himself in a vast array of diverse interventions (eg. Said 1983; 
Said 1994; Said 2000; Said 2001: 464-468). As Andrew Rubin writes, this 
neglect may be linked to Said’s own interdisciplinary eclecticism, and 
refusal to, “Identify a method other than in relative general terms of an 
on-going and worldly process and activity of critical consciousness, 
which undermines the immobilizing limitations around which almost all 
methodologies revolve” (Rubin 2003: 863). However, a further barrier 
revolves around the obscuring of the vast oeuvre of Said’s work—with 
its diverse influences—by Orientalism itself, and the interlinked 
perception of an overriding Foucaultian element in any analysis of a 
Saidian method (Rubin 2003: 863). This is not to say that there isn’t an 
important Foucaultian element in much of Said’s work, but that this 
element is not without its tensions, disagreements and limitations. 
Limitations that were engaged with and underlined by Said himself in 
many of his writings (eg. Said 1983; Said 2001; Said 1978), and even 
more significantly for this re-excavation—contrasted with Gramsci’s 
resistance enabling conception of power and overtly political praxis of 
social transformation on the ground. For example, in “Criticism Between 
Culture and System” Said argues that Foucault’s work was instrumental 
in emphasizing the disguised power dynamics within texts, as well as 
the interlinked nature between discourse and authority—one which 
becomes all the more powerful due to the invisibility of its affiliations to 
power (Said 1983: 178-225). Thus, Said acknowledges that for Foucault,  
“Where there is knowledge and discourse, there must criticism also be, to reveal the 
exact places—and displacements—of the text, thereby to see the text as a process 
signifying an effective historical will to be present, an effective desire to be a text and 
to be a position taken” (Said 1983: 221).  
However, what remains relatively obscured in considerations of Said’s 
work, is the fact that he does not stop there. He continues to argue that 
one of the strangest elements within Foucault’s work is the fact that 
despite the power that they afford criticism as an activity, “Foucault 
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takes a curiously passive and sterile view not so much of the uses of 
power, but of how and why power is gained, used and held onto” (Said 
1983: 221). He writes, 
“Power can be made analogous neither to a spider’s web without the spider nor to a 
smoothly functioning flow diagram; a great deal of power remains in such course 
items as the relationships and tensions between rulers and ruled, wealth and privilege, 
monopolies of coercion…” (Said 1983: 221-22). 
 
For Said, this is the “most dangerous consequence of Foucault’s 
disagreement with Marxism, and its result is the least convincing aspect 
of his work” (Said 1983: 221). Said also argues that this is a reflection of 
the fact that while “Foucault’s theories move criticism from a 
consideration of the signifier to a signifier’s place, a place rarely 
innocent, dimensionless, or without the affirmative authority of 
discursive discipline” (Said 1983: 220), Foucault stops there and appears 
uninterested in broaching the question of why this is the case (Said 
1983). As such, for Said, “Foucault’s flawed attitude to power derives 
from his insufficiently developed attention to the problem of historical 
change” (Said 1983: 222). It also reflects his lack of interest in human 
empowerment, in the processes of building collective action and 
creating critical consciousness, and thus, a deep pessimism towards any 
possibilities of instigating liberating change within an oppressive status 
quo. Hence, it should always be stressed that there is a conscious 
significant methodological divide for Said between his own work and 
that of Foucault’s, which he argued was “largely with rather than against 
(power)” (Said 2001a: 242), and was at the base of Foucault’s paradoxical 
oeuvre: 
“I would say that [Foucault’s] interest in domination was critical but not finally as 
contestatory as on the surface it seems to be. This translates into the paradox that 
Foucault’s imagination of power was by his analysis of power to reveal its injustice and 
cruelty, but by his theorization to let it go on…” (Said 2001a: 242).  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that what Said found lacking in 
Foucault’s work, he did find in—and frequently contrast with—
Gramsci’s (Said 1983: 221-22). As such, for Said criticism “must see 
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itself inhabiting a contested cultural space” (Said 1983: 225); it must 
recognize that it is of this world, and “aspire to hegemony in Gramsci’s 
sense of the word” (Said 1983: 167); it is “an interventionary and 
directive phenomenon” (Said 1983: 171); and it must remain linked with 
the realities of human life. Thus Said writes,  
“The realities of power and authority—as well as the resistances offered by men, 
women, and social movements to institutions, authorities, and orthodoxies—are the 
realities that make texts possible, that deliver them to their readers…these realities are 
what should be taken account of by criticism and critical consciousness” (Said 1983: 
5). 
 
In many ways, this is an affirmation of the centrality of Gramsci’s 
philosophy of praxis in the elaborating of revolutionary theory—one 
which remains of this world, begins with human empowerment, and 
with the building of counterhegemony as a process of mapping spaces 
of power that can be gained on the ground by an oppositionary 
collective with an alternative vision of social relations. Furthermore, it is 
also one that centers its struggle for elaboration and expansive 
hegemony within civil society. 
Within this potential space in civil society, Said argues that it is the 
intellectual’s role to impart their students or constituencies with critical 
awareness; to highlight the fact that human beings make their own 
history; to re-assert the intellectual vocation as one that opposes 
oppressive orthodoxies in order to alleviate human suffering; to realize 
that their writings and activities are located within the realm of the 
public sphere and hence to defiantly take positions against misguided 
policies (Said 2001c: 501-6); to act as a public memory that strives “to 
recall what is forgotten or ignored; to connect and contextualize” (Said 
2001c: 503), since in an increasingly fragmented and separated public 
sphere “it falls to the intellectual to make the connections that are 
otherwise hidden; to provide alternatives for mistaken policies” (Said 
2001c: 503); to remain marginal and “try…not to collaborate with the 
centralizing powers of society” (Said 2001c: 504); and perhaps most 
crucially, to align themselves with an on-going struggle against human 
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subjugation, become part of its process, and actively seek to conquer 
more space for it within civil society by creating new audiences and 
constituencies (Said 2001c: 504-5). Of course, Said’s engagement with 
the central role of the intellectual in instigating social change stems 
from the writings of Gramsci, and what he argued was his central 
“determination to elaborate, grapple with, to come to clearer and clearer 
formulations of the role of the mind in society” (Said 2001b: 465).  
Hence, interlinked with the above arguments, this chapter strives to 
highlight what it perceives to be a lack of engagement with the different 
images of Gramsci that arise out of a broadly Saidian re-interpretation 
of his writings in IR, and their potential for re-invigorating a Gramscian 
project of counterhegemony for those struggling on the ground against 
oppression today. In doing so it neither seeks to box Edward Said in as a 
Gramscian, nor to essentialize his interventions as elaborations of a 
straightforward Gramscian form of counterhegemony. What it does 
contend is that a re-reading of Gramsci through Said may go a long way 
towards highlighting these buried images of an obscured Gramscian 
revolutionary project in IR. In outlining this re-reading however, it is 
important to note that this chapter simultaneously recovers aspects of 
Said’s oppositional writings that have arguably been blurred in a similar 
manner in the dichotomies within much Postcolonial writing today. 
III. Edward Said and Buried Images of Gramsci 
A. A Saidian Inflected Gramsci 
 
As highlighted in chapter one, the power of this Saidian inflected 
Gramsci lies in a re-excavation of the fact that Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks—while ridden with textual and interpretive difficulties—
remain held together by Gramsci’s “own central determination to 
elaborate, to grapple with, to come to clearer and clearer formulations 
of the role of the mind in society” (Said 2001b: 465); as well as by the 
fact that Gramsci himself “was political in the practical sense, 
conceiving of politics as a contest over territory, both actual and 
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historical, to be won, fought over, controlled, held, lost, gained” (Said 
2001b: 464). As such, the power of Gramsci’s writings for Said were 
centered around what he viewed as Gramsci’s attempt to produce a kind 
of critical consciousness that Said argued was both “geographical and 
spatial” (Said 2001b: 465); embodied the unification of theory and 
practice; was aimed at contributing to praxis; and is in itself the 
embodiment of the kind of intellectual work that he argued to be 
revolutionary, and called upon all organic intellectuals to produce as a 
central catalyst to the triggering of revolutionary change (Said 2001b: 
465).  
In attempting to bring out a Saidian inflected Gramsci, perhaps it is 
important to begin by emphasizing the fact that Said came to Gramsci 
having already accidentally discovered the work of Giambattista Vico 
(Said 1994: 421-22). Vico’s relatively obscure work on the connection 
between situated history—with an emphasis upon its human 
construction and its physicality—and philology would greatly influence 
Said’s own critical methods, and arguably his reading, and placing of 
Gramsci’s work (Said 2001: 86). As such, Said always underlined the 
need to recall the fact that Gramsci’s training was not only in 
philology—but in a form of philology that was, following Vico, always 
contextualized, always historical, always situated. These situated texts—
their contexts, producers, inclusions and exclusions—can then be used 
to reconstruct and animate human history, societies and self-
understandings when mediated through an intellectual’s critical 
consciousness.  
It is from within the context of this Vichian opposition to Cartesian 
philosophy (Said 2001), and Vico’s desire to resituate philology into 
human history in his New Science, that Said highlights the fact that, 
“cutting through the large and fundamentally disjunct edifice of his 
work is the never to be forgotten fact that Gramsci’s training was in 
philology” (Said 2001b: 465). As such, Said argues that Gramsci 
remained always conscious of the “profoundly complex and interesting 
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connection among words, texts, reality and political/social history of 
distinct physical entities” (Said 2001b: 465). Due to this, Said argues that 
Gramsci is forever sensitive to the fact that texts and ideas are always 
situated, and that the fact that they are produced, disseminated, and 
become accepted as ‘common sense’ within a historical juncture, is in 
itself a reflection of the power dynamics on the ground in a particular 
place and time (Gramsci et al. 1971: 345). Of equally crucial importance 
to Said here is the fact that Gramsci’s theorization of both ‘common 
sense’ and hegemony is one that centers around the empowerment of 
human agency, underlines the always present latent potential for 
counterhegemony in any historical juncture, and is at its base, 
energizingly oppositional in its affirmation of the crucial link between 
collective thought and action (Said 2001b: 130).  
Before engaging with these images in more detail below, two more 
crucial elements of Said’s representations of Gramsci should be 
highlighted in order to do the over-arching picture of a Saidian inflected 
Gramsci justice. The first concerns Said’s own critical attitude towards 
the camps of abstracted grand theory, which first surfaces in his 
writings on Vico, but would arguably also colour Said’s understandings 
of, and affinities with Gramsci. Hence, Said would describe Vico’s 
method as a form of “anti-Cartesian atavism with a vengeance” (Said 
2001: 85) that, “drives meanings back into the bodies whence originally 
they came” (Said 2001: 85); and represents a “methodical anti-
theorizing…(that forces) one to see the gross physical circumstances 
from which a text emerges” (Said 2001: 86). Of course, one of the crucial 
aspects of Said’s work and thought that this analysis mirrors, is his own 
concern to always highlight the contradictions and messiness of real, 
actual, physical, lived life—and his opposition to any desire to erase, 
censor or otherwise tame or dilute the complex, colliding, contradictory 
and ultimately incredibly human dimension of the reality of life on the 
ground—by an overriding desire to create pure theory (Said 2001e: 131).  
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For Said, this crowded spectacle of life (Said 2001) is also embraced in 
Gramsci’s writing, concepts, and more importantly, in Gramsci’s 
philosophy of praxis—and hence his concepts and theorization of 
counterhegemony. In this vein, Said celebrates the liberating space and 
flexibility he attributes to Gramsci’s terms—arguing that they are 
“critical or geographical rather than totalizing or systemic”; that they 
“illuminate and make possible elaborations and connections rather than 
reify”; that they represent terms that are inhabited by a view of power 
that “is never abstracted from a particular social totality; never 
irresistible; never one directional”; and that they ultimately always 
“remain in contextual control” (Said 2001b: 467). It is due to this that 
Said stresses the political and practical aspects of Gramsci’s thought, 
which are not abstracted, or based within theoretical disciplinary 
conversations that are divorced from the complex, forever fluid, 
political realities on the ground.  
It is also due to this that Said emphasizes Gramsci’s particular type of 
situated, empowering critical consciousness (Said 2001b: 465), which 
revolves around locating, situating and understanding the self as a 
process within history. For Gramsci of course, this process of critical 
self-understanding represents the starting point for the possibility of 
any revolutionary action, the centrality of human empowerment to any 
successful revolutionary process, and crucially the basis upon which 
this form of social transformation is not one that aims at replacing an 
oppressive reality with its mirror image, but “as an act of exorcism for 
both the colonizer and the colonized” (Saurin 2006: 26). Foreshadowing 
the centrality this Gramscian emphasis upon critical self-understanding 
would have for Said’s own critical practice—Said confides in his reader 
that it was this Gramscian impulse that lay at the base of his personal 
motivation to write Orientalism itself (Said 1978: 25). 
Intertwined with the above, the second element that should perhaps be 
underlined, revolves around the fact that at the basis of Said’s 
understandings of and attraction to Gramsci is an appreciation for the 
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central place Gramsci accords to a situated and contextualized 
geography, territory and place in his concepts, and especially with 
regards to his theorizations of counterhegemony (Said 2001b: 465). This 
emphasis within Gramsci’s theorizations mirrors Said’s central concern 
with countering imperialism, not just as an expansive, oppressive 
ideology of common sense—but also as an interlinked deeply territorial 
process of colonizing land. Hence, the connection between culture and 
imperialism for Said (1994) is one that involves a deeply territorial 
battle that is always in motion, always in search of expansion, and 
always contested—and it is within the sensitivity to this connection, and 
to the fact that the common sense ideas of an epoch are produced and 
maintained territorially, geographically and materially, that Said’s 
attraction to Gramsci lies. Moreover, Gramsci’s emphasis upon the 
territorial creates space for Said for the re-insertion of realities on the 
ground that may have been silenced, or buried, by an oppressive 
common sense narrative—but which when viewed from within the 
power of their geographical physicality, become part of a strong 
counter-project (Said et al. 2000: 425).  
This underlining of the crucial place of geography in both Gramsci’s 
writings, as well as Said’s interpretations of Gramsci—and hence his 
own work—is crucial for any understanding of what waging a Gramscian 
‘war of position’ looks like on the ground. It is simultaneously a 
highlighting of the fact that this re-excavation of Gramsci’s theorization 
of counterhegemony is ultimately a strategy for the conquering of 
territory, space and constituencies on the ground in order to create 
more just social and political relations that alter oppressive realities—
and not an invitation to descend into discursive battles that are 
truncated from a strategy of actual social transformation on the ground. 
As such—and of crucial importance to the purposes of this project—it is 
an affirmation of the centrality of a Gramscian philosophy of praxis in 
bringing about social transformation and liberation on the ground. 
Thus, as Saurin warns in Decolonizing International Relations—and 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis illustrates—while it is crucial, 
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insurrectionary and deeply political to highlight the histories, voices and 
struggles of the oppressed, that alone is not enough for the triggering of 
liberating, empowering change on the ground. For, as previously 
emphasized, this too is ultimately a question of method, and of re-
invigorating a Gramscian (following Marx’s) political praxis on the 
ground—a re-invigoration that takes anti-imperial counterhegemonic 
resistance, as a practice, seriously:  
“Resolving the problems of historical subordination, whether material or ideational, is 
not exclusively (perhaps not even primarily) an intellectual or mental task but instead 
a substantive political task: thesis eleven… Decolonizing IR therefore requires not just 
the willingness—which was always there—of the subordinated to write world history 
but also, crucially, the means of production of that world history to be recovered by 
the dispossessed, by agreement, or by force” (Saurin 2006: 37-8).  
 
Simultaneously, it is a highlighting of Said’s own arguably obscured 
political project, which did not just involve (as incredibly important as it 
is) what many in Postcolonialism have hailed as the inauguration of 
colonial discourse as a field of academic inquiry (Williams & Chrisman 
1994: 5). While recognizing that “an analysis of the texts of imperialism 
has a particular urgency given their implication in far-reaching, and 
continuing systems of domination and economic exploitation” (Williams 
& Chrisman 1994: 4), this begs the question of whether this emphasis 
upon Said’s work does not focus in upon only one aspect of his writings, 
while not building upon its Gramscian counterhegemonic potential. For, 
as this chapter tries to show, Said’s work can arguably equally be read 
as an attempt to activate Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, and theorizing 
of counterhegemony, in a more modern context of anti-imperial 
resistance and struggle. As such, it is only that much more perplexing 
that, with the notable exception of Subaltern Studies, there has not been 
more engagement with these Gramscian politically liberating faces of 
Said generally, and especially within critical IR.  
Thus, while it is true that there are many irreconcilable influences 
within Said’s own writings, any engagement with the author beyond a 
narrow reading of Orientalism should leave the reader concerned if his 
main academic legacy becomes one that truncates any discursive 
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elements of hegemony and resistance from the deeply political, 
physical, situated reality of life and struggle on the ground (Said 1994: 
5). After all, it was Said who, in praising Vico’s exaggerated emphasis 
upon the human and the physical, wrote that Vico’s works, “openly rub 
the philologists’ and philosophers’ noses (back into) what Yeats calls 
‘the uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor’” (Said 2001: 84). 
Hence—from these points of beginning—it is the contention of this 
chapter that a re-reading which centers these images of Gramsci at the 
core of its conceptualization of counterhegemony may go a long way 
towards remedying some of the tensions and omissions of neo-
Gramscian scholarship in IR highlighted in the Literature Review, and re-
vitalizing Gramsci’s obscured project of counterhegemony.  
B. Re-Centring the Revolutionary Role of the Intellectual 
 
One of the central themes of the Prison Notebooks revolves around 
Gramsci’s scathing critique of ‘traditional’ intellectuals for producing 
work that is “vulgarized”, elitist and disconnected from the people and 
their struggles, and bolsters a past and present status quo within which 
they tend to hold privileged positions (Gramsci et al. 1971: 1-23). Within 
this critique, it is important to emphasize that Gramsci was doing two 
inter-related things. The first involved a recognition of the central role 
played by traditional intellectuals and institutions of knowledge 
production and dissemination in bolstering hegemony in western 
societies, and masking oppressive status quos as the inevitable ‘natural 
order of things’. The second involved a critique of those who are 
intellectuals by profession—and perceive the situated, practical 
knowledge of those struggling on the ground as beyond the realms of 
academia; or belittle it as un-intellectual, or irrelevant to their abstract 
theorizations—for disempowering the masses, perpetuating the myth 
that philosophy is beyond the intellectual capabilities of most ordinary 
people (Gramsci et al. 1971: 323), and putting up barriers towards both 
the analysis of, and the attainment of a more just, democratized, 
liberating world. From here, Gramsci elaborates upon the need for the 
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formation of a ‘new’ type of intellectual, who is an active part of the 
world for which he or she theorizes. These organic intellectuals are 
central to the empowerment of the groups to whom they belong, to the 
instigation of revolutionary change, and most crucially—are the 
embodiment of the unity of theory and practice, and hence the key 
instigators (protagonists) of the process of actively building 
counterhegemony on the ground.  
One of the most influential theorists who have built upon this 
Gramscian image of oppositional intellectuals in the context of more 
modern times is arguably Edward Said. Thus, Said’s Representations of 
the Intellectual, is inspired by (among several other influences) 
Gramsci’s analysis of intellectuals and their role in either preserving or 
countering hegemony in the context of Western states, and attempts to 
reformulate this role in a more modern context. Counter-posing 
Gramsci’s famous statement that, “all men are intellectuals, one could 
therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of 
intellectuals” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 3) with that of Julien Benda’s more 
elitist and divinely inspired image of intellectuals as “a tiny band of 
super-gifted and morally endowed philosopher-kings who constitute the 
conscience of mankind” (Said 1996: 5), Said writes, 
“Gramsci’s social analysis of the intellectual as a person who fulfils a particular set of 
functions in society is much closer to reality than anything Benda gives us, particularly 
in the late twentieth century when so many new professions… have vindicated 
Gramsci’s vision. Today, everyone who works in any field connected with the 
production or distribution of knowledge is an intellectual in Gramsci’s sense. In most 
industrialized Western societies the ratio between so-called knowledge industries and 
those having to do with actual physical production had increased steeply in favor of 
the knowledge industries” (Said 1996: 8-9).  
 
Said argues that this proliferation of people connected to these 
‘knowledge industries’ in modern times has led theorists such as Alvin 
Gouldner to describe this phenomenon as the ascendancy of 
intellectuals as the new class, replacing the old more traditional 
understandings of class that are linked to money, land or property (Said 
1996: 9). Simultaneously, Said argues that this shift in the role of the 
intellectual is crucial in its transformation from a public one that is 
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organically connected to citizens within its community or civil society, 
to one of a specialized expert within a community of ever more 
inaccessible, disconnected, specialized experts (Said 1996: 9). Lamenting 
the impending loss of the figure of the intellectual amidst this 
proliferation of professionalized, disconnected specialists of 
information production and dissemination, Said’s Reith Lectures insist 
upon the existence of both the image and the role of the public 
intellectual as insurrectionary, and as connected to particular 
communities. In order to do this, Said begins with Gramsci (Said 1996: 
11), and attempts to resurrect his image of the counterhegemonic 
organic intellectual in modern day times and spaces in Western 
societies. Thus, he writes, 
“The central fact for me is that the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty 
for embodying, articulating… a philosophy or opinion to as well as for a public. This 
role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of being someone whose 
place it is to publicly... confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than produce them), to 
be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and 
whose raison d’etre is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely 
forgotten or swept under the rug. The intellectual does so on the basis of universal 
principles…” (Said 1996: 11).  
 
It must be emphasized, that like Gramsci, Said’s image of the 
intellectual is intimately connected to his understanding of the 
intellectual’s public role as an articulator of an insurrectionary, 
liberating conception of the world to, and for, a community the 
intellectual is organically linked to, against an oppressive reality. This 
conception of the world is not meant to only transform people’s self-
understandings—and thus, transform social relations and political 
possibilities on the ground—but to simultaneously strive for attaining 
hegemony itself in a counterhegemonic battle against the ‘common 
sense’ produced and disseminated by the traditional intellectuals linked 
to that status quo. Hence, above all else, it is a geographical battle (or 
‘war of position’) that focuses upon the conquering and en-largening of 
oppositional territory, or space. 
In parallel to this, it must also be underlined that, in opposition to 
Gramsci’s conceptualization of the intellectual, Said’s oppositional 
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public intellectual is not linked to a particular class, but instead to 
communities of belonging—by which Said mainly means a nation (Said 
1996). This, of course, is a major re-formulation of one of Gramsci’s 
main arguments, part of which revolves around a highlighting of the 
fact that “the notion of the intellectuals as a distinct social category 
independent of class is a myth” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 3). From here, 
Gramsci goes on to argue for the need for the working class to develop 
its own intellectuals, who “are distinguished less by their profession 
than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class 
to which they organically belong” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 3). To this, 
Gramsci adds that the role of the political party is to fuse the ideas of 
these intellectuals with their class members, hence fusing theory and 
practice, as well as channelling the conception of the world of the group 
to broader segments of society, and creating alliances between the 
group and members of the traditional intelligentsia (Gramsci et al. 
1971). This point—underlining the centrality of the traditional 
intelligentsia in maintaining hegemony, and the importance attached to 
the conquering of their conception of the world by any successful 
counterhegemonic movement—is one that is often overlooked in 
Gramsci’s writing, and hence, may be worth quoting at length:  
“One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards 
dominance is its struggle to assimilate and conquer ‘ideologically’ the traditional 
intellectuals—but this is made more efficient and quick the more the group in 
question succeeds in elaborating its own organic intellectuals” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 
10).  
 
A few points should be emphasized about Said’s images of the 
oppositional public intellectual, which diverge from the organic 
intellectual of Gramsci’s context. Firstly, for Said, though the intellectual 
is born into particular communities of belonging, and as such is at all 
times grounded within a locality, a language, a history, or a situated 
context—it is the oppositional intellectual’s duty to resist uncritical 
loyalty to these organic communities, to always choose criticism before 
blind solidarity, and to defiantly take positions against oppressive 
realities, and political and social relations, in the name of advancing 
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human freedom and liberating knowledge (Said 2001). Thus, it must be 
emphasized that though Said’s public intellectuals are intellectuals who 
both organically belong to a certain community, and as such must 
represent the collective suffering of the groups to whom they belong, 
“testifying to (their people’s) travails, reasserting (their) enduring 
presence, reinforcing (their) memory” (Said 1996: 44), this alone is not 
enough. For Said, this oppositional act only gains powerful 
counterhegemonic potential when it is universalized, linked with the 
suffering of other people, (Said 1996: 44) and ultimately, aims at 
liberating both the oppressors and the oppressed in the name of their 
common humanity. Hence, following Fanon, Said asserts that, “The goal 
of the native intellectual cannot simply be to replace a white policeman 
with his native counterpart, but rather, the invention of new souls” (Said 
1996: 41). Simultaneously, these intellectuals must be close to, or 
champions of a political cause, and preferably should be active 
members of a political movement in the name of that cause. Hence, 
while these intellectuals must be an organic part of a struggle, they 
must simultaneously actively create universalized links between that 
struggle and others in an attempt to create alliances in the common 
struggle for human liberation everywhere.  
In parallel to this, Said’s emphasis on the necessity of affiliation for the 
oppositional public intellectual (as well as the emphasis on the public 
nature of the act of writing, teaching, representing, etc.) arises in 
juxtaposition with the de-linking of traditional intellectuals from the 
general public, and their acceptance of what Said describes as the 
“principle of noninterference” (Said 1983: 3). Writing specifically about 
literary theory, Said argues that though its European origins in the 60s 
were an oppositional and revolutionary response to the “traditional 
university, the hegemony of determinism and positivism…the rigid 
barriers between academic specialties” (Said 1983: 3), by the late 70s 
this had changed. In the context of American literary theory, there was a 
marked retreat into “the labyrinth of textuality” (Said 1983: 3), which 
truncated texts, documents, writings, ideas, etc. from what Gramsci 
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would have described as “life”. As such, this move into textuality 
represented,  
“The exact antithesis and displacement of what might be called history. Textuality is 
considered to take place, yes, but by the same token it does not take place anywhere or 
anytime in particular. It is produced, but by no one at no time… literary theory has for 
the most part isolated textuality from circumstances, the events, the physical senses 
that made it possible and render it intelligible as the result of human work” (Said 
1983: 4).  
Thus, Said criticizes what he describes as the erosion of Gramsci’s 
organic intellectual, and the triumph of the traditional intellectual, and 
“the ethic of professionalism”, which Said links to the “ascendancy of 
Reaganism” (Said 1983: 4). This obviously has grave political 
ramifications for the dissemination of forms of ‘common sense’ 
upholding oppressive status quos to which Said is opposed, and attacks 
as evidence of the erosion of the intellectual vocation and 
insurrectionary critical theory and consciousness.  
Within this critique is also an argument for where organic intellectuals 
should strive to locate themselves physically in order to counter this 
“ethic of professionalism” and thus maintain their critical consciousness 
and ability to create oppositional, life-enhancing critical theory, which 
aims at producing “non-coercive knowledge in the interest of human 
freedom” (Said 1983: 29). As such, Said’s emphasis upon geography, 
place, and territoriality in his re-construction of a Gramscian form of 
counterhegemony extended to the geographical location in which he 
envisioned his oppositional intellectual to ideally operate. Within this 
location, which Said always elaborated as one that must be marginal—
and hence “to stand between culture and system” (Said 1983: 26); 
“between loneliness and alignment” (Said 1996: 22)— the image of the 
exile is very strong: 
“Exile is a model for the intellectual who is tempted, and even beset and overwhelmed 
by the rewards of accommodation… To be as marginal and as undomesticated as 
someone who is in real exile is for an intellectual to be unusually responsive to the 
traveller rather than the potentate, to the provisional and risky rather than the 
habitual, to innovation and experiment rather than the authoritatively given status 
quo. The exilic intellectual does not respond to the logic of the conventional but to the 
audacity of daring, and to representing change, to moving on, not to standing still” 
(Said 1996: 63-4).  
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For the organic intellectuals whose lives, struggles, political practices 
and interventions will be highlighted within the rest of this project, this 
image and its interlinked geographical and metaphorical locations, will 
prove to be significant.  
 
C. The Philosophy of Praxis, Geography and Counterhegemony 
 
Though the influence of Marxists, and in this particular case Gramsci, is 
rarely highlighted in writings about Said, it is important to emphasize 
that Said’s own method—described by him as ‘secular criticism’—is 
mainly a call for a return to a Gramscian philosophy of praxis, which 
begins with “life”, and not with the truncated abstractions of theory. As 
such, it recognizes the political nature of ideas, texts and institutions, 
and—most importantly—elaborates a strategy for the waging of a 
geographically sensitive counterhegemony in an effort to politically 
reclaim, as Saurin has described it, “the ownership of the means of 
production of memory and the definition of progress” (Saurin 2006: 37). 
As such, it diverges significantly from the points of beginning (and 
hence contention) within which IR scholars debate the possibility of 
deploying Gramsci’s concepts within IR. It is this chapter’s contention 
that within this divergence lies the basis of the anti-colonial, activist 
nature of Said’s images of Gramsci on the one hand, and the continuing 
(unintentionally) colonial (or abstracted) nature of IR debates on the 
other. In this vein, Said writes:  
“The dangers of method and system are worth noting. Insofar as they become 
sovereign and as their practitioners lose touch with the resistance and the 
heterogeneity of civil society, they risk becoming wall to wall discourses, blithely 
predetermining what they discuss, heedlessly converting everything into evidence for 
the efficacy of method, carelessly ignoring the circumstances out of which all theory, 
system and method ultimately derive” (Said 1983: 25-6).  
 
As stated above, one of the central attractions of the counterhegemonic 
theorizations of Gramsci for Said revolves not only around the fact that 
they always remain in contextual control—but that intertwined with this 
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contextual control is, necessarily, a specific physical location that is 
embedded within an actual territorial geography. Moreover, it is a 
conception of both counterhegemony and hegemony that centers 
human agency in both its construction, as well as its transformation—
and as such stresses the complicated, contradictory, interconnected 
messiness of actually lived human history. 
It is the taking of this ‘human involvement’ (Said 2001d: 131) in both 
creating and transforming the world seriously—as well as the 
heterogeneity and irreconcilable contradictions of diverse physical 
historical realities seriously—that lay at the base of Gramsci’s 
understanding of history as, “a far more open-ended series of 
developments which could be articulated in different directions and end 
in different kinds of resolutions” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 10). It is also 
this Vichian inspired point of beginning that can be argued to be at the 
origin of Gramsci’s formulation of the historic bloc as the main vehicle 
for both transformation, and domination through hegemony. Thus, 
Gramsci understood history “as comprising of a contingent and 
unpredictable sequence of developments which he labelled historical 
blocs”, and historic blocs as, “temporary unifications of major social 
relations within a given national context under the hegemony of a ruling 
coalition” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 10). Even more crucially perhaps, it is 
this emphasis that led to Gramsci’s breaking away “from Crocean theory 
in his rejection of strongly teleological forms of thinking” (Germain & 
Kenny 1998: 10), but also in his emphasis upon the continuously 
contested nature of human reality. In this vein, Said writes: 
“Gramsci understood that if nothing in the social world is natural, then it must also be 
true that things exist not only because they come into being and are created by human 
agency but also because by coming into being they displace something else that is 
already there: this is the combative and emergent aspect of social change as it applies 
to the world of culture linked to social history” (Said 2001d: 130). 
  
Hence, it is also from within this starting point that Gramsci highlights 
the centrality of (national and Western) civil society as the arena within 
which social orders are built, contested, dismantled and re-configured. 
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Civil society can therefore be viewed as the key arena of struggle within 
which historical blocs are formed and operate. It can be an essential ally 
to Gramsci’s ‘political society’, and is the coveted terrain from within 
which hegemony is emanated, defined, perpetuated and kept into place 
by the ‘common sense’ ideologies of a leadership of a historic bloc. Civil 
society though is also simultaneously the site of alternatives, ideological 
struggles, wars of positions and manoeuvres, and the space from within 
which organic intellectuals battle the dominant ‘common sense’ view of 
reality, raise critical consciousness, transform mentalities, wage cultural 
revolutions, teach the ‘masses’ to become liberated leading forces within 
society, and launch counterhegemonic movements against political 
society.  
Equally crucially here however is the fact that Gramsci’s notion of a 
historical bloc—and indeed, all of his interlinked concepts—is mobilized 
in order to view human reality as the fluid, combative interaction 
between situated collectivities of social relations, or social forces. Thus, 
Germain and Kenny’s assertion that the concept of historic blocs helps 
neo-Gramscians, “to look beyond the state, to peer through its narrow 
juridical form in order to apprehend the broader social order of which it 
forms a constituent element” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 6) It is this social 
order, which for Gramsci is located within (national, Western) civil 
society that Gramsci is concerned with, and it is the hegemony of this 
social order that Gramsci’s historic blocs in the making attempt to 
counter in order to become ‘integral states’ themselves—and thus 
become in the position to launch a ‘war of manoeuvre’ against the 
political society of a state/society complex.  
Hence, the fact that the meaning of Gramsci’s terms cannot be 
discerned without beginning within the contextualized, multi-
directional, territorial ‘national’ within which the social forces of a 
state/society complex exist—does not mean that they therefore cannot 
be seen to be interlinked with social forces in the international, which of 
course, Gramsci himself (as an international socialist revolutionary) 
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recognized. However, these ‘international’ social forces themselves also 
have to be situated geographically. As such, Said asserts, “All 
intellectual or cultural work occurs somewhere, at some time, on some 
very precisely mapped out and permissible terrain, which is ultimately 
controlled by the state” (Said 1983: 169). Thus, it seems strange within 
this context that a debate surrounding the usefulness of Gramsci’s 
concepts for the discipline of IR would be framed around whether or 
not they can be exported into ‘the international’—when by their critical 
and geographic nature they precisely create the space and fluidity for 
such (situated) elaborations. (Said 2001)  
As highlighted in chapter one, it is the contention of this thesis that the 
underlying tension within this debate is one of method. As such, the 
question is not whether or not Gramsci’s concepts can be 
“internationalized”, but how this internationalization itself is done. As 
shown above—there is an inherent methodological problem with the 
desire to create critical, liberating theory under the banner of historical 
materialism—while simultaneously negating Marx’s thesis eleven (Saurin 
2008) and simply “applying” concepts within already defined and 
abstracted disciplinary IR debates. As Saurin highlights—these 
disciplinary debates themselves need to be problematized and 
historicized as a discursive, exclusionary reflection of their imperial 
origins on the ground—and as such, as abstracted discussions reflecting 
“the illusion of the epoch”—which have yet to truly go beyond what 
Marx has famously called, “the inherited circumstances” of IR’s narrow 
conceptual framing, and self-definition, as a discipline (Saurin 2008).  
Nothing is more illustrative of this than the fact that most IR debates 
seem to operate within a framing of two opposing abstractions that 
must be pitted against each other, since they are perceived to reflect 
two essentially different entities, with essentially different 
characteristics, and ironically enough, essentially different locations. In 
this specific case, this abstracted opposition is represented in the 
debate between those who claim that Gramsci’s concepts can only 
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operate within the national, and those who claim that they can be 
applied within the “international”. However, what the framing of this 
debate in this oppositional manner does not problematize—is what is 
actually meant by a ‘national’ that is the opposite of an ‘international’. 
More problematically still—especially in the context of neo-Gramscian 
discussion of hegemony (and hence ‘global’ civil society)—is the 
question of what is meant by an ‘international’ that does not by 
definition include the ‘national’. Put differently, if the international is 
not to be found within situated, contextualized, geographic, territorial, 
physical diverse nationals, the question of where it is actually situated, 
how it can be discerned, and whom it includes or excludes within its 
spaces is a particularly problematic one. This is especially the case if, 
following Said, Gramsci’s theorization of counterhegemony, can only 
derive meaning—and be operationalized—within a territorial, 
geographical context that is inherently linked to spaces within a situated 
national. Moreover, framing a debate upon the meaning and 
operationalization of Gramsci’s concepts in such terms of abstracted 
opposition cannot be more unrepresentative of Gramsci’s whole 
political project.  
In view of this, the over-arching question should not be, “whether 
Gramscian influenced analyses are themselves capable of 
comprehending the complex nature of social order in today’s world” 
(Germain & Kenny 1998: 4)—but rather, where the contextualized, 
complex, fluid, physical world is in IR’s narrow, abstracted disciplinary 
debates, and crucially, where the vast majority of the world’s humanity 
have gone in such a world. As Said emphasizes: 
“[Gramsci’s] terms always depart from oppositions… which are then contextualized… 
(not controlled) by some hypostatized, outside force… which supposedly gives them 
their meaning by incorporating their differences into a larger identity” (Said 2001b: 
467). 
 
Hence, while Germain and Kenny’s concern about IR scholars’ 
decontextualized application of Gramsci’s methods and concepts 
(Germain & Kenny 1998: 4) remains valid, it must equally be emphasized 
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that by doing this, IR scholars remain neither true to Gramsci’s method, 
nor to his actual concepts. For this application begs the question of 
what it means exactly to place Gramsci’s terms within an abstracted, all-
encompassing entity—that defies situatedness, and is not mediated 
through a critical consciousness that is, following Said, “geographical 
and spatial”—such as that of “the international” in IR. In a similar vein, 
while it also remains true that “it is not at all clear that (Gramsci’s) 
concepts can be ‘internationalized’” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 4), it must 
equally be emphasized that the problem does not lie with Gramsci’s 
concepts themselves, but with the Italian School’s conception of an 
international that is disembedded from the geography of the national, 
and hence privileges an abstracted, difficult to locate, ‘global’ realm. 
Hence, it is only in this context, that a conception of a ‘global’ civil 
society that is disembedded from the national, the territorial, the 
physical or the geographical, can be elaborated as a Gramscian inspired 
conception—in connection with an abstracted, global, all-encompassing 
notion of hegemony. However—besides representing the anti-thesis of 
Gramsci’s spirit, activism and life’s work—this abstraction which 
(unintentionally) privileges theoretical disciplinary conversations over 
the production of revolutionary critical theory, only serves to eradicate 
some of the most revolutionary aspects of Gramsci’s theorizations 
themselves. As Said writes, the revolutionary power of Gramsci’s writing 
lies precisely in the fact that his notions of power and hegemony are 
always deciphered from within a physical, contextualized geography 
(Said 2001b: 467). 
Thus, there is nothing that is meant to be all-encompassing, abstracted, 
indecipherable or monolithic about Gramsci’s notion of hegemony—it is 
a contextualized, historicized, inherently territorial production of 
society, and the dominant ‘common sense’ notions upholding the 
conception of the world of an oppressive status quo as inevitable, 
natural, necessary, or desirable. As such, it happens within an equally 
contextualized, historicized and inherently territorial conception of civil 
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society, in alliance with a contextualized, historicized, inherently 
territorial conception of a political society, or state. And it is precisely 
this refusal to paint hegemony as all-encompassing, abstracted, 
monolithic or un-located that makes Gramsci’s notion of hegemony 
resistible: 
“For Gramsci… the analysis of discursive power is made coeval with an image of what 
we could describe as contingent power, the principle of whose constitution is that, 
since it is constructed by humans, it is therefore not invincible… there is the 
theoretical insistence of a guaranteed insufficiency in the dominant culture against 
which it is possible to mount an attack” (Said 2001a: 244-5).  
 
In addition to this, for Gramsci, hegemony is never static, but a 
manifestation within a continuous battle with marginalized groups who 
seek to overturn the conception of the world underpinning it—hence 
hegemony itself (as with all of Gramsci’s terms) is mired within diverse, 
continuous ‘wars of position’ in many diverse spaces, times and 
contexts. As such, it cannot retain any over-arching monolithic meaning 
outside of these situated contexts and the contexts of the specific 
struggles of wars of position themselves. As Rupert writes, Gramsci did 
not conceive of hegemony as “an unproblematically dominant ideology 
that simply shut out all alternative visions or political projects” rather, 
hegemony was perceived as “the unstable product of a continuous 
process of struggle, ‘war of position’” (Rupert 2003: 185). As such, 
hegemony always aims at conquering more territory, and is by its nature 
expansive (and hence inter-national).   
Moreover, Gramsci elaborated his conception of hegemony in the 
practical pursuit of and elaboration of a revolutionary theory of 
counterhegemony on the ground. Thus, when Said asserts that Gramsci 
“was political in the practical sense, conceiving of politics as a contest 
over territory” (Said 2001b: 464)—he is not only underlining the 
importance of the Gramscian territorial battle for the production of 
hegemony, but the fact that Gramsci’s theorization itself represents the 
anti-thesis of any attempt at producing grand, ‘pure’ theory, which: 
“Cuts itself off from a self-reflective consideration of its relationship to material and 
political power, deluding itself as to its pure and autonomous status, and thereby 
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becomes all the more readily an instrument and mirror of social domination” (Williams 
& Chrisman 1994: 10-11).  
 
Self-reflection through praxis though, following Adorno, “would see 
through itself to its practical moment; instead of mistaking itself for the 
absolute, it would know that it is a kind of conduct” (Williams & 
Chrisman 1994: 10-11). Therefore, in view of this—and of Gramsci’s own 
method—it appears to be more fruitful to begin with the situated 
practices of counterhegemony themselves in order to uncover 
alternative pathways to power and social transformation—rather than 
with a description of the workings of an all-encompassing ‘global’ 
hegemony.  
Besides remaining true to Gramsci’s political praxis—as well as de-
colonizing the way in which resistance is studied within the discipline 
by re-empowering the agencies and knowledges of those on the ground 
pursuing it—this re-centring of counterhegemony has the advantage of 
simultaneously re-affirming Gramsci’s conception of the state/society 
complex as one of the few historically and contextually sensitive views 
of human social and political organization and habitation that does not 
operate within the abstracted imperial dichotomy between the nation-
state and the international. As Saurin argues, this dichotomy is itself a 
reflection of IR’s exclusionary approach to social inquiry: 
“The consequence of the illusion of the epoch lies in mistaking the products of 
international ordering for international ordering itself…Central to orthodox IR is the 
assumption that to leave the waiting room of history and gain historical recognition 
can be achieved only through the assumption of national identity and state form… As 
a discipline IR served first and foremost to nationalize social scientific investigation” 
(Saurin 2006: 30-1).  
 
While Said did not directly engage with these more detailed aspects of 
Gramscian counterhegemony, it should be stressed that the advantage 
of Gramsci’s theorization of the state/society complex, is precisely the 
fact that it overcomes this specific dichotomy between the nation-state 
and the international. As such, it cannot be deployed within a framing 
that juxtaposes an abstracted, uniform ‘national’ with an abstracted, all-
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encompassing ‘international’ and still retain any of its original meaning. 
Rather, as with most of Gramsci’s concepts, it is a theorization that 
recognizes the interlinked nature of both national and international 
social forces, but strives to situate them within the national in order to 
bring out their contextualized forms and meanings.  
Moreover, it is a theorization that is based upon a recognition of the 
little emphasized difference between (mainly Western) hegemonic 
state/society complexes that are ruled by consent, and state/society 
complexes located in the (mainly) non-West under systems of direct 
domination and open coercion. Needless to say, Gramsci recognized 
that oppressed peoples living under systems of direct, open, coercive 
domination did not need to be alerted to the fact that they were 
oppressed, or living within an oppressive status quo that must be 
transformed. Gramsci also recognized that in these societies a war of 
manoeuvre (or frontal attack on the state) was an appropriate strategy 
to pursue (Gramsci et al. 1971). His theorization of counterhegemony 
though, along with his revolutionary strategy of the ‘war of position’, 
evolved out of a recognition of the inherent power within perpetuating 
an oppressive status quo through a form of consent and ‘common 
sense’ that is produced by a strong civil society allied to a ruling, 
hegemonic political society. Hence, Joseph Buttigieg’s emphasis that, 
civil society here is not only “an integral part of the state…(but) its most 
resilient and constitutive element” (Buttigieg 1995: 4). Thus, Gramsci’s 
theorizations of counterhegemony linked to the building of a ‘war of 
position’ specifically target hegemonic state/society complexes of the 
West, and operate within their situated civil societies in an attempt to 
(re)conquer its territory, to (re)politicize its citizenry, to transform them 
into historical forces of change, and to produce and disseminate an 
alternative, liberating conception of the world championed by a 
collective hegemonic enough to create its own ‘integral state’—and 
hence confront the political society of the oppressive state/society 
complex (Gramsci et al. 1971: 207).  
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However, what remains rarely engaged with in the literature 
surrounding Gramsci in the discipline is not whether or not Gramsci’s 
conception of civil society can be exported into the arena of an 
exclusionary ‘global’—but what this theorization of the distinction of 
the intertwined dynamic between force and consent may mean in a 
modern context where geographically situated civil societies (and hence 
the struggles within them) have become more and more interlinked 
themselves. Put differently, in the context of a hegemonic world order, 
in which the social forces of domination are interlinked and expansive 
by definition—and yet emphasize consent within Western state/society 
complexes and coercion within non-Western state/society complexes—
perhaps the battle for liberation from oppression has in fact become a 
joint ‘war of position’ that centers primarily within Western civil 
societies, and aims to dismantle specific hegemonies within them as a 
pre-requisite for liberation for those who live within spaces of coercive, 
brutal oppression, as much as for those who live in spaces of consent.  
D. An Emphasis on the Critique of ‘Common Sense’   
 
Perhaps it might be useful to begin this section by highlighting that for 
Gramsci, philosophy was a central, powerfully liberating ingredient of 
the intertwined whole of thought and action. This view is also evident in 
the fact that Gramsci argued that the dominant philosophy of an age 
reflects that of the common sense of the dominant group upholding a 
particular world order, and attempting to disseminate it as the “natural 
order of things”. In this vein, the critique of this dominant common 
sense by unveiling alternative philosophies (or conceptions of the 
world), on the level of ideas, is where counterhegemony begins for 
Gramsci. In this vein, paralleling his view on philosophy—Gramsci’s 
notion of the organic intellectual is not that of a detached intellectual 
who speaks to academic audiences and practices philosophy for its own 
sake within specialized, elite circles of knowledge. Rather, Gramsci’s 
organic intellectual is a political figure who is simultaneously of his 
people, while in a privileged position to access theoretical ideas, fuse 
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them with the realities of lived knowledge, struggles and experience on 
the ground—and unlock the key to revolutionary praxis. In the Prison 
Notebooks, Gramsci writes,  
“A philosophy of praxis…must be a criticism of common sense, but base itself on 
common sense in order to demonstrate that ‘everyone’ is a philosopher, and that it is 
renovating and making critical an already existing activity” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 323-
34). 
 
The energetic power within the statement that everyone is a philosopher 
is often overlooked in analyses of Gramsci’s writings—for it reflects not 
only his belief in the untapped, latent power within human agency (an 
energy that is unlocked by privileged organic intellectuals) but also the 
fact that situated political agents have their own situated knowledges 
and practices that must always inform, and be an organic part of the 
theoretical elaborations presented by organic intellectuals—if theirs is 
ever to become a true “philosophical movement”. Gramsci writes, “Only 
by this contact (with situated people on the ground) does a philosophy 
become historical, purify itself of intellectualistic elements of an 
individual character, and become life” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 323-34). 
Simultaneously, this is a reflection of Gramsci’s belief in the liberating 
potential of theory itself—a theory that enables and empowers the 
oppressed, presents them with the gift of critical thinking, and 
transforms them into a (collective) historical force—while always 
beginning within their situated historical contexts and realities. 
As such, the point of beginning of this revolutionary praxis represents a 
response to one of Germain and Kenny’s most powerful criticisms of the 
Italian School—namely, that for this Gramsci, counterhegemony 
challenges the limits of the possible through the transformation of 
actors thoughts, “which are the products of the prevailing, hegemonic 
‘common sense’” (Germain & Kenny 1998: 10). Hence, for this project’s 
Saidian Gramsci, this question represents its point of beginning. Thus, it 
attempts to elaborate a guide to revolution based upon a political theory 
in which the central protagonist is the organic intellectual, and in which 
the politics of knowledge plays a central role in either enabling or 
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disempowering social change. Here, it is Gramsci’s level of the “ethico-
political”, or conceptions of the world, which is given primary 
importance as the terrain within which counterhegemony must first be 
created. Thus, this project takes seriously Gramsci’s contention that a 
new world cannot be built before it has been ignited, or has come alive, 
within the minds of its activists. Also within this call to action is a 
political theory that does not just pay lip service to the fact that realities 
of oppression and status quos are secular and humanly constructed, but 
is based upon an affirmation of the power within human beings to 
transform them. For this Gramsci, the answer to Germain and Kenny’s 
question lies in both actors’ thoughts and lived experiences, which on 
the ground—following Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis—are intertwined 
and revolutionize the limits of the possible (or constitute those limits) 
in relation with each other.  
Thus, in this context, it is within the challenging of Gramsci’s ‘notion of 
common sense’ through the articulation of a liberating alternative 
conception of the world that transforms the way in which the oppressed 
think and act—and hence redefines the political limits of the possible—
that the process of building counterhegemony must begin. In the Prison 
Notebooks, Hoare and Nowell-Smith write that the notion of ‘common 
sense’ was, “used by Gramsci to mean the uncritical and largely 
unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the world that has 
become ‘common’ in any given epoch” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 322). For 
Said Gramsci’s notion of ‘common sense’ is translated into situated 
ideas linked to a dominant social group that are produced within a 
hegemonic civil society—and hence, that are given an aura of 
permanency and legitimacy through its diverse institutions (Said 2001b: 
466). As such, Gramsci’s sphere of civil society and its production of 
‘common sense’ notions that uphold the hegemony of a status quo is a 
powerful terrain of both domination and political struggle for Said—
precisely because it is not based upon the use of force in order to 
maintain its conception of the world. Rather, it is based not only upon 
the ‘consent’ of diverse marginalized groups—but upon the production 
  
88 
of something altogether more positively affirmative, which mirrors 
Said’s own conception of ‘culture’ and his writings upon its own 
pervasiveness: 
“Gramsci grasped the idea that culture serves authority and, ultimately, the national 
state, not because it represses and coerces, but because it is affirmative, positive, 
persuasive. Culture is productive Gramsci says, and this, much more than the 
monopoly of coercion by the state, is what makes a national western society strong, 
difficult for the revolutionary to conquer” (Said 1983: 173). 
 
Said argues that the power of Gramsci’s insight here lies within the fact 
that, “thought is produced so that actions can be accomplished, that it 
is diffused in order to be effective, persuasive, forceful” (Said 1983: 
170), and that crucially, “a great deal of thought elaborates on what is a 
relatively small number of principle, directive ideas” (Said 1983: 170). 
Thus, culture, art, the media, schools, universities, etc.—are essential 
components within the ensemble of elaborations that perpetuates a 
conception of the world, and bolster its hegemony.  
“One could even go so far as to say that culture—elaboration—is what gives the state 
something to govern, and yet (as Gramsci is very careful to demonstrate) cultural 
activity is neither uniform nor mindlessly homogenous…” (Said 1983: 171-3).  
 
Of course the mirror image of this depiction of hegemony, is that this 
process of elaboration within Gramsci’s conception of civil society, is 
crucial in the process of building an expansive counterhegemonic 
conception of the world. For Gramsci, the central elaborators—who can 
either represent the central legitimators of a status quo, or the leaders, 
organizers and directors of an alternative conception of the world—are 
intellectuals. In parallel to this, the central process of challenging the 
‘common sense’ notions upholding an oppressive hegemonic status quo, 
and elaborating an alternative, is termed by Gramsci an ‘intellectual-
moral reformation’: 
“A thoroughgoing transformation and development of people’s ways of thinking and 
acting in every day life… A transformation fundamental enough to break the grip of 
bourgeois ideological formations and to transform the subaltern strata from a passive 
mass into an active historical force” (Robinson 2005: 470). 
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The key to this transformation is to be found within a project of critical 
pedagogy that must be launched by organic intellectuals within their 
own communities with the aim of transcending the ‘common sense’ 
notions, which Gramsci famously describes as the terrible slave-driver 
of the spirit (Gramsci et al. 1971) mentally condemning them to 
“political and social slavery” (Robinson 2005: 473). In order to do so 
however, organic intellectuals must remain true to the philosophy of 
praxis (Gramsci et al. 1971: 331).  
It is within the context of a ‘war of position’ that Gramsci argues for a 
revolutionary strategy that centers upon the transformative power of 
ideas, education and intellectuals, and paints a strategy for how a 
collective can begin to conquer intellectual, geographical and 
institutional space within civil society to begin to create an alternative 
way of life. This process is meant to end in the formation of an ‘integral 
state’—which, in this context, can be seen as an alternative civil society 
(the integral, most resilient constitutive part of the state/society 
complex for Gramsci) who’s alternative vision, institutions and collective 
social and political self-understandings become powerful and expansive 
enough to be in a position to counter the hegemony of the existing state 
and wage a war of manoeuvre against its political apparatuses and 
institutions. 
Hence, it is only within this context that Gramsci’s vision of a political 
party can actually be conceived of as being a “collective intellectual” 
that is trying to conquer space and constituencies for its more liberating 
conception of the world, and for organizing and setting up alternative 
institutions, spaces of identity and social relations, and communities to 
counter the status quo—without actually directly assaulting the existing 
political society, or state apparatuses instrumental in oppressing them. 
This is evident in the strategies of the present, re-emergent one state 
movement, which mainly center upon the countering of the prevailing 
‘common sense’ notions linked to the peace process since Oslo within 
Western hegemonic civil societies—in an attempt to re-align them with a 
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conception of the world that is based upon the struggles, realities on the 
ground, and collective social and political aspirations of a particular 
group of the oppressed on the ground. 
In this vein, one of the most powerful Gramscian weapons of 
intervention in this battle of transformation involves the persuasion, 
construction, or ideational “de-colonizing” of collective communities of 
people on the ground, unified by an alternative conception of the world 
articulated by a hegemonic, or leading, group of organic intellectuals. 
This process is one that is launched within diverse civil societies, is the 
beginning of the creation of a counterhegemonic historic bloc, and yet 
again, is of course only possible through the vehicle of critical theory. A 
critical theory that is aimed at creating a program of transformative 
action. And it is only in this context that theory and practice become 
‘life’—or in other words, revolutionary praxis. 
Moreover, the process of constructing a counterhegemonic historic bloc 
for Gramsci is one that itself is fluid, and involves the meeting, 
intermingling and exchange of diverse collective visions, selves, aims 
and strategies. As such, though it begins by being led by the vision of a 
hegemonic group, it becomes itself a powerful arena of transformative 
politics and strategy and alliance building. A process that, as Rupert 
argues, is also rooted in the belief in the political and liberating nature 
of education, and enables the meeting of activists that normally would 
be fragmented, made invisible, or denied collective action by an 
oppressive status quo that seeks to portray resistance as futile, the 
oppressed as powerless, or the status quo as impossible to transform. 
While Rupert stresses anti-capitalism (Rupert 2003: 188) due to the 
specific nature of the counterhegemonic movement he writes about—
this Gramscian analysis can be applied to other contextualized struggles 
against oppressive status quos that may not center on dismantling 
capitalism itself as a system. For, the central point being made here is 
that in negotiating political difference, and creating alliances and 
strategies within a Gramscian counterhegemonic historic bloc—political 
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solidarity is created through alliances based upon the common “anti’s” 
of diverse oppressed social groups. It is this that creates unified 
platforms within which diverse groups can come together and wage a 
united struggle centered against a particular context of oppression, 
while agreeing upon a broad, forever evolving, outline of a more just 
future for all—as opposed to universal, homogenous, dogmatic 
solutions.  
As such, existing tensions do not disappear or cease to exist in the 
sweeping victory of a homogenous identity and homogenous future 
vision. As Rupert reminds us, this form of counterhegemonic politics 
that is underpinned by a historic bloc that is not monolithic, 
deterministic or bent upon the need to wipe out political difference, in a 
dogmatic effort to not compromise, create alliances or engage in the 
enriching, transformative process of the struggle itself in all of its 
complexity, is a reflection of Gramsci’s true political project of 
liberation, and his aversion to economism (Rupert 2003). For, in the 
process of launching a counterhegemonic effort, all groups are 
transformed in the articulation of this forever fluid and emerging 
common vision, including the hegemonic group.  
Simultaneously, a group can only become the hegemonic leading group 
of a counterhegemonic bloc of forces when its vision transcends its own 
particularity, to inspire, include and liberate all oppressed groups within 
its bloc as a collective. Thus, Gramsci’s counterhegemonic bloc can be 
argued to be homogenous in the sense that it is built upon the common 
ground of what it rejects and stands against, and the principles upon 
which it would like to envision a more just world order—underpinned 
by liberating space for the creation of new political and social relations. 
This kind of liberating political transformation would potentially make 
room for a multiplicity of diverse visions of community and politics—all 
of which are silenced within the context of oppression, and all of which 
would be a particular illustration of liberation.  
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IV. Conclusion: Towards the Invention of New Souls  
It is the kind of liberating politics described above that this chapter 
contends represents the essence of a form of social transformation that 
is aimed at human empowerment, the activation of Marx’s thesis eleven, 
and the “invention of new souls”. In pursuit of a window into this 
process, it is to an analysis of the struggles, strategies and practices 
linked to the building of this form of counterhegemonic resistance on 
the ground—in the form of the single state solution to the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict—that the next chapters turn. In alignment 
with the above, this window into the building of counterhegemony is 
focused upon the situated practices of counterhegemony itself. As such, 
counterhegemony constitutes its point of beginning. As this chapter 
argued, counterhegemony as it is understood in this thesis, begins with 
the latent potential within people’s thoughts—or conceptions of the 
world—to revolutionize the limits of the possible, and usher in 
alternative liberating social realities. Following Gramsci’s argument that 
hegemony is necessarily an educational relationship, counterhegemony 
here begins in the realm of the ethico-political—or that of the formation, 
articulation and transformation of conceptions of the world.  
Encompassing a movement of popular education as well as a process of 
critical and historical self-understanding, this form of counterhegemony 
is aimed at the systemic construction and consolidation of new social 
relationships on the ground. In this context, it is groups of people 
united by particular conceptions of the world—not classes—that are the 
most important social forces of transformation. It is also new 
conceptions of the world—elaborated and organized for by collectives 
of organic intellectuals—that represent the basis of new types of civil 
and political society. Considered a ‘party’, this unified collective of 
organic intellectuals aims at transforming an alternative conception of 
the world into an emergent, expansive, unified historic bloc—involved in 
the waging of a war of position for hegemony within the diverse spaces 
and institutions of civil society. Meant to represent the basis of 
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alternative visions and institutions of state and society that become 
powerful enough to replace the existing state/society complex that is 
being countered, this counterhegemonic bloc aspires to become an 
‘integral state’ or, a new form of collective social self-determination. It is 
only once a strong integral state is formed within civil society that a war 
of manoeuvre—or a direct assault upon the political society of the state 
itself—becomes possible.  
It is this chapter’s contention that this view of counterhegemony 
reflects Gramsci’s belief in the revolutionary nature of philosophy, as 
well as the inherent link between thought and action, and, as such, re-
vitalizes his empowering project of counterhegemony. To the extent 
that this thesis engages with hegemony itself—it is a form of hegemony 
that is understood as a situated form of domination that is discerned 
through the political practices, strategies, visions and understandings of 
the single state intellectuals attempting to transform it. It is also itself 
an unstable product of a continuous war of position that aims at 
overtaking more and more territory—and as such, is inherently 
contestable. Dependant upon consent in Western state/society 
complexes—which is manufactured through complex mediums and 
diverse institutions, and ensembles of ‘elaboration’ located within civil 
society—it is based upon “uncritical and largely unconscious ways of 
perceiving and understanding the world that have become ‘common’ in 
any given epoch”, which translate into incoherent, passive or 
conservative norms of collective action. This oppressive discourse of 
‘popular common sense’ hence becomes a central arena of struggle in 
the countering of hegemony—and it is from within this base that the 
process of constructing an intellectual-moral bloc begins, and is built 
into a ‘war of position’ seeking to revolutionize collective norms of 
thinking and acting. Thus, from within this Saidian Gramscian lens, it is 
to the outlining of the oppressive ‘common sense’ notions underpinning 
the hegemony of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Oslo—as 
defined by the collective of organic intellectuals struggling against them 
on the ground—that the next chapter turns. 
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Chapter Three 
The Context: The Oslo Accords and the Hegemony of 
Zionist Common Sense 
I. Introduction 
As argued in the previous chapters, it is the aim of this thesis to 
attempt to present, and deploy, a re-reading of Gramsci that centers the 
practices of counterhegemony in its analysis. Since hegemony and 
counterhegemony are inevitably interlinked though, this chapter aims to 
provide the context of the Zionist hegemony that single state activists in 
Israel/Palestine perceive themselves to be struggling against on the 
ground—as embedded within the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 
Oslo, and veiled by the rhetoric of a future two-state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Edward Said has argued, the Zionist 
hegemony contended to have prevailed in Oslo’s vision and processes is 
one that is perceived to be in the form of a “modified Allon Plan” (Said 
1993: 3), and to have transformed Palestinian and Israeli lives and 
territory along the lines of this vision and its imperatives. As such, while 
the peace process launched in the aftermath of Oslo was perceived to be 
one that would lead to a two-state solution1 by the ‘international 
community’, and was represented in that way within their civil 
societies—it represented a process based upon the principle of 
separation, and limited Palestinian autonomy for the Israeli side, while 
for the Palestinian side it represented the potential of launching a 
                                                 
1 The first time the two state solution itself was directly addressed and articulated as 
the mutually agreed upon solution to the conflict by both sides was in Annapolis in 
2007, under the mediation of George Bush. One of the aims of the conference was to 
“demonstrate international support for the commencement of negotiations on the 
realization of peace between two peoples". At the conference itself, George Bush 
stated, “We've come together this week because we share a common goal: two 
democratic states - Israel and Palestine - living side by side in peace and security”. 
(http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Historic+Events/The+Annapolis
+Conference+27-Nov-2007.htm) The Middle East Quartet strongly supported this 
initiative, as did the UN.  
For more details on this, as well as the text of the Joint Understanding on Negotiations, 
See, 
(http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Historic+Events/The+Annapolis
+Conference+27-Nov-2007.htm).  
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territorial war of position towards the formation of a viable two-state 
solution.  
Much has been written about the Oslo Accords, and the new era and 
realities they represented in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and it is not the intention of this chapter to add to this 
literature or to go into the details of these agreements in depth. Rather, 
it aims to provide the contextual setting for the platform from within 
which single state activists and intellectuals emerged and articulated 
their thoughts, visions, strategies and struggles for social 
transformation against the current Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
since Oslo. As such, this chapter begins by briefly outlining the 
circumstances within which the Oslo Accords were born, and 
highlighting the fact that it is these circumstances themselves—and the 
groundwork they lay as the basis of future negotiations and 
transformations on the ground—that foreshadowed the expansion of 
Zionism on the ground within the unleashing of the peace process. This 
it attempts to do in two sections. The first briefly outlines the 
circumstances, personalities and processes that led to the dominance of 
the ideology of the Allon Plan in the negotiation of the Oslo Accords—as 
well as its basis within an Israeli impulse of separation from the 
Palestinians rather than a decision to launch negotiations towards a 
viable two-state solution to the conflict in the future. The second briefly 
outlines the circumstances, personalities and processes that led the 
Palestinians to accept the processes and vision of the Oslo Accords—
and their gamble upon a strategy of waging a territorial war of position 
towards a viable two state solution from within the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT).  
Having set the stage of the formation of a Zionist hegemony in the form 
of a modified Allon Plan—the chapter then continues to set out the 
main features of the Oslo Accords themselves, and the extent to which 
they represented a departure from the pre-Oslo days. This is done both 
in terms of the negotiation of a solution to the conflict itself, as well as 
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in terms of the transformations unleashed or accelerated on the ground 
to both Palestinian and Israeli lives, resources and territory in the 
aftermath of Oslo. Finally, this chapter attempts to highlight the 
disjuncture between the rhetorical production and elaboration of the 
‘common sense’ of Oslo as the inauguration of a peace process towards 
a two-state solution, while disguising the territorial expansion of 
Zionism on the ground, along the lines of the Allon Plan. It does this 
with the aim of arguing that it is within this episode of history that the 
Palestinian war of position to create a viable two-state solution was 
perceived to have largely failed—and was reformulated by some Israeli 
and Palestinian organic intellectuals into a re-emergent war of position 
against Zionism and separation.  
II. The Context: The Oslo Accords and their Aftermath 
A. The Oslo Accords: Circumstances of Emergence and the Groundwork 
Lain for the following ‘Peace Process’ 
 
1. Yitzhak Rabin and the dominance of the Allon Plan’s imperatives 
In the aftermath of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
(WBGS) in 1967, a new reality emerged on the ground in which all of pre-
1948 Palestine became Israel. For the Israelis, the question of what to do 
with these areas was an essential one in terms of Israel’s future as a 
state. As underlined by Nils Butenschon, this question re-opened a 
classical debate within the Zionist movement due to the strategic and 
symbolic value of the OPT themselves. This debate revolved around the 
questions of what the meaning and objective of the Jewish state is, what 
its relationship is with the non-Jewish population, and how best to 
conceive of maintaining its security in the future (Butchenson 1998: 33). 
Hence, Butenschon writes,  
“Translated into the field of practical policies after the 1967 war, these questions all 
focused on the definition of the future status and national identity of the 
territories…The Israeli government decided not to commit itself to a very specific 
position on these questions with the important exception of East Jerusalem, which was 
formally annexed by Israel in July 1967” (Butenschon 1998: 34).  
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As Butenschon highlights, since 1967 the conception of the OPT as 
either an integral part of the land of Israel that cannot be conceded, as 
opposed to a territorial buffer zone, or strategic additional base, for 
Israel’s security—represents one of the main dividing lines in Israeli 
politics2. These two diverse conceptions on the OPT translated into 
‘strategic pragmatism’ and ‘frontier nationalism’ in Israeli politics. 
Butenschon elaborates: 
“The first trend was essentially formed around the Labour Party, which was in power 
until 1977; the other was anchored in the coalition of right-wing and national-religious 
parties which formed the government from then until 1992…the best known 
document conveying the strategic approach was presented by the late Foreign Minister 
and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon (of the Labour Party), and hence known as the 
Allon Plan” (Butenschon 1998: 35).  
The Allon Plan’s aim was to “identify the significance of the Territories 
for Israeli security and strategic needs and come up with suggestions 
for territorial arrangements” (Butenschon 1998: 35). Within the 
framework of the WBGS, Yigal Allon argued that Israel should annex the 
territories that were essential for it strategically (namely Jerusalem, the 
Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert)—while withdrawing from areas 
with large populations of Palestinians as part of a territorial 
compromise with Jordan (Butenschon 1998: 35).  
As Butenschon highlights, the ideology of the Allon Plan revolved 
around three main concerns. The first of these involves the 
establishment of secure borders, and as such viewed the West Bank as 
“a buffer zone against an Arab invasion from the east” (Butenschon 
1998: 35); the Jordan Valley as “an essential line of defence” 
(Butenschon 1998: 35); while the annexation of land around Jerusalem 
was seen as crucial for control over the city, and the southern part of 
the Gaza Strip as crucial as a buffer against possible attack from Egypt 
(Butenschon 1998: 35). In this vein, in 1968, “the Israeli government 
started the construction of semi-military settlements in those zones that 
                                                 
2 For a detailed account of these two approaches to Jewish sovereignty, see for 
example, Raz-Krakotzkin, 1998. A Peace without Arabs: The Discourse of Peace and the 
Limits of Israeli Consciousness. In After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems. London: 
Pluto Press. 
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the Allon Plan had marked for Israeli annexation” (Butenschon 1998: 
35).  
The second concern outlined by Allon revolved around the question of 
demography, and was of special importance to the Labour Party and 
left-wing Zionists generally—for whom maintaining Israel both as a 
Jewish state as well as a democracy was essential (Butenschon 1998: 35). 
As such, “the borders of the Jewish state had to be redrawn…to include 
as few non-Jews as possible in the appropriated areas” (Butenschon 
1998: 35). Thirdly, Allon’s plan revolved around a territorial 
compromise with Jordan as a route around the problem of the 
Palestinian refugees and the dilemma of the Right of Return. 
(Butenschon 1998: 36) However, with the coming to power of Menachim 
Begin and the right in 1977, the Allon Plan was shelved and a “new 
intensive phase in the Israeli politics of expansion was initiated” 
(Butenschon 1998: 37).  
It is in this context that the first Intifada broke out, and Yitzhak Rabin 
was eventually elected (in 1992) on a platform that promised 
peacemaking, with “a priority to the Palestinian track” (Shlaim 1994: 27). 
As Avi Shlaim writes though, Rabin continued to view Arafat as an 
“archenemy” (Shlaim 1994: 28) in this historical conjunction, and as 
representing the Palestinian Diaspora and the Right of Return of the 
refugees of 1948 (Shlaim 1994: 28). As such, Rabin continued to, “shun 
the PLO and pin his hopes on the local leaders from the occupied 
territories who he considered more moderate and pragmatic” (Shlaim 
1994: 28). In this context then, the reversal in Rabin’s3 attitude and the 
decision to directly negotiate with the PLO (first in secret and then 
                                                 
3 As Shlaim recounts, Rabin was initially “inclined to ditch the Palestinians altogether 
and to strike a deal with Syria” (Shlaim, 1994: 28), who was prepared to make peace 
with Israel in return for complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and the 
dismantling of Israeli settlements there. Faced with a choice between a deal requiring 
complete withdrawal and the dismantlement of settlements- as opposed to an Interim 
Agreement on self-government with the PLO- Rabin chose to recognize the PLO 
instead. See, Avi Shlaim, 1994. The Oslo Accord. Journal of Palestine Studies, 23(3), 24–
40. 
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officially) “constituted a revolution in Israeli foreign policy” (Shlaim 
1994: 28). However, Shlaim underlines, as opposed to Peres and Beilin4,  
“Rabin…had no clear idea of the final shape of the settlement with the Palestinians. 
His thinking was largely conditioned by the Allon Plan, by the Jordanian option, and by 
the idea of territorial compromise over the West Bank…Hence the attraction of the 
idea of Palestinian self-rule for an interim period of five years during which the 
settlements would stay in place” (Shlaim 1994: 29-30).  
This analysis is echoed by Raz-Krakotzin, who emphasizes that Rabin 
only agreed to recognize the PLO when he, “realized that this was a 
better way to serve the same strategic interests” (Raz-Krakotzkin 1998: 
61). Raz-Krakotzin elaborates: 
“Rabin was a follower of Yigal Allon, who after the 1967 war outlined a plan according 
to which the district of Jerusalem, as well as parts of the Hebron district and the 
Jordan Valley, would be kept under Israeli sovereignty. The remaining territory…would 
become an autonomous Palestinian area, with a link to Jordan. Rabin considered the 
Oslo framework to be one which would enable him to achieve, via different tactics, the 
policy he had always favored” (Raz-Krakotzin 1998: 61).  
It was also within this juncture that violence intensified on the ground 
in Israel/Palestine, Rabin “ordered the closure of the occupied 
territories” (Shlaim 1994: 30), “started the process of economic 
separation” (Shlaim 1994: 30) between both sides, and a “public debate 
reopened in Israel on the proposal for a unilateral withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip” (Shalim, 1994: 30). As Raz-Krakotzin argues though, the 
Intifada also:  
“Disturbed the self-image of Israelis, undermining their image of themselves as 
victims, an image which was central to their consciousness… (it) emphasized the 
contradiction between the Israeli self-image and the reality of occupation, confiscation 
and brutality. This led more and more Israelis to the conclusion that there could be no 
solution except through negotiations with the PLO” (Raz-Krakotzin 1998: 63).  
As Raz-Krakotzin highlights, “the principle of separation was the 
essence of the logic of the Oslo Agreement from the Israeli point of 
view… Both ‘right’ and ‘left’ accept(ed) the desire for separation as a 
starting point” (Raz-Krakotzin 1998: 65). Thus, “the reality of separation 
which was formed after the Oslo Accord actually diminished the 
differences between the main political powers in Israel concerning the 
                                                 
4 For more on the roles of Peres and Beilin in bringing about the Accords, and the 
initial emphasis on economic cooperation in the negotiations prior to Oslo and Rabin’s 
closure policies, see, for example, Avi Shlaim, 1994. The Oslo Accord. Journal of 
Palestine Studies, 23(3), 24–40. 
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future of the Occupied Territories” (Raz-Krakotzin 1998: 65). Raz-
Krakotzin argues that the motivating factor which brought both Labor 
and Likud around to accepting the solution offered by Oslo was “a 
rejection of a bi-national state…they all agreed that Jerusalem and most 
of the settlements should remain in Israeli hands” (Raz-Krakotzin 1998: 
65). Thus, he writes: 
“The Oslo framework terminated the previous debate about the settlements. The 
Labour Party and the whole ‘peace camp’ accepted the settlements as a fact of life, and 
in that sense, they have accepted Likud policy. On the other hand, the Likud accepted 
the principle of autonomy, and therefore the essential principle of the peace process” 
(Raz-Krakotzin 1998: 66). 
It is in this context that Shlaim writes that Rabin did not oppose the 
‘Gaza-Jericho first’ formula, for—due to his support for the Allon Plan—
he had always “envisaged handing over Jericho to Jordanian rule, while 
keeping the Jordan Valley in Israeli hands” (Shlaim 1994: 31). However, 
Rabin’s condition was that “the Palestinian foothold on the West Bank 
would be an island inside Israeli controlled territory, with the Allenby 
Bridge also remaining in Israeli hands” (Shlaim 1994: 31). It is also in 
this context that Said denounced the Oslo Accords as a “re-formulated 
Allon Plan”, and the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish stated 
that the Accords laid the groundwork for “Gaza-Jericho first… and last” 
(Shlaim 1994: 35). It is this Zionist hegemony, with its underlying 
principle of separation, that is argued to have prevailed in both the texts 
and the transformations on the ground that were either rooted in—or 
accelerated by—the Oslo Accords and the ensuing peace process.  
 
2. Yasser Arafat and the Waging of a War of Position  
While the PLO had adopted the formula of ‘two states for two people’ at 
the Palestinian National Council’s meeting in Algiers in 1988, it was not 
until the signing of the Oslo Accords that this formula became one in 
which the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem were clearly 
designated as the territories upon which a Palestinian state would be 
constituted (Hilal 2007: 3)—and the Palestinian refugees’ right of return 
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was deemed mutually exclusive to this formula.5 Prior to 1988, and 
stretching as far back as the Palestinian national movement during the 
British Mandate period—the Palestinian position “called for a 
democratic state to include the various ethnic and religious 
communities that made Palestine their home” (Hilal 2007: 1). As such, it 
stood against the idea of partitioning the land into separate Arab and 
Jewish states, and against the idea of establishing an exclusionary 
ethno-religious Jewish state (Hilal 2007: 1-3). And though it was the 
British Government which issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917 that 
would—as shall be discussed below—set the stage for the paradoxical 
peace process that would ensue, it is also important to note that the 
British themselves initially envisioned a sharing of the land between 
both parties within the framework of a unitary state based upon the 
principle of parity. As Ilan Pappe recounts,  
“Until 1937, the British were still visualizing the future within a one state paradigm… 
In a country that had a majority of Palestinians (85% of the population), the British 
must have felt triumphant when they succeeded in persuading the Executive 
Committee of the Palestinian National Council… to share land with the Jewish settlers. 
The idea was to build a state on the basis of parity... It was a concept of a unitary state 
that was accepted by a Palestinian leadership in a rare moment of unity… But the 
Zionist leadership refused to partake in such a solution… The Zionist leaders 
preferred the idea of partition, with the hope of annexing more of Palestine when 
favourable conditions for such expansion would develop” (Pappe 2007: 35).  
As such, Butenschon argues that it is the Balfour Declaration itself that 
lies at the core of the irreconcilable, contradictory nature of the two-
state solution as adopted by the UN Partition Plan in 1947. For, it was 
the Balfour Declaration that furnished the basis for both the recognition 
of the right to self-determination of the indigenous inhabitants of the 
land of Palestine (the Palestinians), while simultaneously validating the 
Zionist claim to the land, “based on a ‘historical connection’ with 
Palestine of an external non-territorial population” (Butchenson 2007: 
                                                 
5 In 1974, after the Israeli-Arab war of October 1973, the PLO first adopted the idea of 
a two-stage struggle. This strategy was based on accepting the existence of a 
Palestinian state next to an Israeli one as an initial phase in the struggle towards the 
establishment of a single democratic state on all of historic Palestine. This idea was 
articulated further in the PNC meeting in Algiers in 1988 at the time of the first 
Intifada. Though the PLO endorsed the idea of ‘two states for two people’ in Algiers, no 
territories were specified, and the Right of Return of the refugees remained an integral 
part of this formula.  
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78). This resulted in a “dual commitment to self-determination” 
(Butenschon 2007: 75) to two separate parties on the land of Mandatory 
Palestine, that, “deviated fundamentally from well-established legal 
interpretations of the principle of self-determination” (Butenschon 
2007: 75), and gave “a clear political priority to the latter (i.e., to the 
Zionist claim)” (Butenschon 2007: 78). As Butenschon highlights, it is 
herein that the unprecedented paradox of Palestinian self-determination 
was born from a legal, and hence political, perspective:  
“The policy implications implied… that any solution to the question of Palestine would 
have to be based on the recognition of a Jewish national right in the country and that 
the rights of the non-Jewish population (i.e., the Palestinians) would have to be 
subordinated to that policy… The paradox is that recognition of Palestinian national 
rights has been conditioned on Palestinian renunciation of their right to the same, 
leaving any Palestinian leadership with a catch 22 situation” (Butenschon 2007: 75).  
By making this paradoxical unprecedented dual commitment to the 
territory of Palestine—one to the indigenous people, and the other to 
immigrant-settlers whose claim of a ‘historical connection’ to the land 
on behalf of world Jewry was “unique and not supported…by 
established interpretations of the principle of national self-
determination, expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations 
(LON), and as applied to other territories with the same status as 
Palestine (‘A’ mandate)” (Butenschon 2007: 78)—the British planted the 
seeds for any ensuing peace process to be based upon contradictory, yet 
internationally recognized claims to self-determination in Palestine. 
These claims, while operating outside the realm of accepted 
international law and the resolutions of the LON, were nevertheless 
accepted by the dominant powers as the basis for the creation of a 
future peace: 
“The ‘international community’ (or more precisely dominant powers in the 
international system) has contributed directly to creating the conditions of 
intractability of the conflict… by accepting a dual commitment to the two parties. The 
incompatibility of the conflicting claims was from the very start inherent in 
declarations, treaties and agreements related to the political future of Palestine” 
(Butenshon 2007: 78). 
This paradox was accepted and adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 
1947. This is reflected in the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the 
partition plan on Palestine in 1947, despite the centrality of the 
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principle of national self-determination to its creation as a world 
organization. As Butenschon recounts, 
“Finding a lasting political solution to the historical ‘Jewish problem’ in the aftermath 
of the World War II genocide against the Jews and the failure of the mandatory 
government of Palestine to find a solution within a unitary state were given as reasons 
by the majority of UN members to ignore the principle of self-determination for the 
Palestinians” (Butenschon 2007: 79).  
In a similar vein, Ilan Pappe highlights the fact that the inquiry 
commission set up by the UN in the aftermath of the British decision to 
leave Palestine (UNSCOP) was inexperienced, and “acted within a 
vacuum that was easily filled by Zionist ideas” (Pappe 2007: 36). In 
1947, the Jewish side originally proposed to the commission a solution 
to the conflict based upon the creation of a Jewish state on 80% of the 
land of Palestine—which constitutes the state of Israel today without the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) (Pappe 2007: 36). The 
commission reduced this proposal to 55% of Palestine, and it is upon 
this plan that the partition plan was drawn up as UN General Assembly 
resolution 181 and imposed upon the Palestinians—who remained 
united against the idea of partition. 
In the aftermath of Palestinian rejection of the partition plan, the Jewish 
leadership decided to take matters into its own hands, and unilaterally 
create a Jewish state on the ground upon 80% of Palestine (Pappe 2007). 
On this process, Ilan Pappe writes: 
“The problem was that within the desired 80% of the land, the Jews were a minority of 
40%... The leaders of the Yishuv had been prepared ever since the beginning of the 
Zionist project in Palestine for such an eventuality. They advocated… the enforced 
transfer of the indigenous population so that a pure Jewish state could be established. 
Therefore, on March 1948, the Zionist leadership adopted the by now infamous Plan 
Dalet, which ordered the Jewish forces to ethnically cleanse the areas regarded as the 
future Jewish state in Palestine” (Pappe 2007: 36).  
As Pappe argues, during this episode of history, “Palestine was not 
divided it was destroyed, and most of its people expelled” (Pappe 2007: 
36). Those who were expelled or forced to flee the Zionist forces became 
refugees, under the administration of the UN—the most impoverished 
of which were housed in around 60 camps in surrounding countries 
(Hilal 2007: 3). The Palestinians who remained were given Israeli 
nationality,  
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“But were looked upon with suspicion, treated as second class citizens and as non-
Jewish minorities, and not as a national group with collective rights. This is consistent 
with the self-definition of Israel as combining Jewishness and democracy” (Hilal 2007: 
3). 
As Hilal writes, the Palestinian national movement did not recover from 
the devastation of 1948 until after the 1967 Six Day War—when it re-
emerged under the umbrella of the PLO. It was not until 1974 though—
in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973—that the PLO 
adopted a strategy of a transitional struggle, based upon the model of 
“two states for two people”:  
“In 1974 the PLO adopted the notion of a two-stage struggle in which it was envisaged 
that a Palestinian state would exist next to an Israeli one, while the establishment of a 
full democratic state would be left to a later stage of the struggle” (Hilal 2007: 3). 
It is telling that even in the PLO’s initial acceptance of a paradigm of a 
two-state solution based upon a partitioning of the land of Palestine—
this it did in the form of a transitional strategy of war of position on the 
ground. Emboldened by the outbreak of the first Intifada, and the 
promise it held for a struggle of liberation on the ground, the PLO 
shifted its strategy to one centring upon returning to the OPT and 
launching a territorial struggle from within.  
B. Accepting a Two-State Paradigm and The Main Features of Oslo 
 
Upon returning from exile to the OPT after the signing of the Oslo 
Accords, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat addressed a crowd of 70, 000 
Palestinian refugees in the camp of Jabalya—where the first Intifada had 
begun in 1987—and said, “I know many of you here think Oslo is a bad 
agreement. It is a bad agreement. But it’s the best we can get in the 
worst situation” (Usher 1995: 1). As Hilal underlines, understanding the 
slow and reluctant acceptance of the Palestinian national movement of a 
two state paradigm must begin in remembering the PLO’s increasingly 
difficult and fluctuating situation, as well as the regional and 
international transformations from the late 60s to the 80s (Hilal 2007: 3-
5). To begin with, the fact that the PLO did not have a territorial base of 
its own resulted in frequent clashes with the host governments in which 
it set up headquarters, as well as frequent relocations—as was seen with 
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Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. (Hilal 2007: 4) This left the PLO with little 
space in which to manoeuvre or to organize and mobilize its people. 
Describing the hostility of this episode in history, Graham Usher writes, 
“Lebanon had already imposed draconian restrictions on its Palestinian residents. This 
was aggravated by a Syrian-sponsored siege…against Palestinian refugee camps in the 
late 1980s…There was no possibility of any PLO mobilisation in Syria given the frigid 
relations between Arafat and Asad. Finally, relations between the PLO and its 
constituency in Jordan…were increasingly tense. King Hussein was historically 
suspicious of any PLO activity on his turf…” (Usher 1995: 2).  
This shrinking of territorial manoeuvring space, added to the dispersal 
of PLO forces from Lebanon in the wake of Israel’s 1982 invasion (Hilal 
2007: 4), made the OPT themselves much more politically and 
strategically significant in the PLO’s considerations of its strategy at this 
point in its history. As such, this shift in strategy based upon territorial 
considerations also strengthened the appeal of accepting a two-state 
solution to the conflict. For, for the Palestinians of the OPT,  
“The immediate and most important aim… was, and still is, freeing themselves from 
the Israeli occupation, which raises the question about the political future of the 
Palestinians. The obvious answer was to establish an independent Palestinian state. 
The first Intifadah…made the two state solution the logical solution” (Hilal 2007: 4-5).  
In parallel to the above, it should also be recalled that the PLO received 
a significant amount of funding from the oil rich Arab states, as well as 
Soviet and socialist countries—which enabled it to both establish a fast 
growing and cumbersome bureaucracy, as well as provide the 
Palestinian communities (particularly the refugees in the camps) with 
services, employment, welfare, organization and empowerment (Hilal 
2007: 4). This special link made the PLO particularly vulnerable to the 
political advice of the Arab states and the socialist camp—both of which 
largely favoured the acceptance of a state on the OPT (Hilal 2007: 4). 
More importantly however was the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
1980s, which dealt a heavy blow to the PLO internationally. This 
collapse of, “what for the PLO had been a historic counterweight to the 
imperial and pro-Israel designs of the United States in the region” (Usher 
1995: 2), was worsened further still by Arafat’s ill-fated decision to side 
with Saddam Hussein during the second Gulf War in 1990. As Graham 
Usher recounts, Arafat’s decision,  
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“Estranged the PLO from Egypt and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and cost the 
organization $120 million in annual donations from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. 
Confiscations of Palestinian deposits in Kuwaiti banks, plus the loss of revenues, 
brought the PLO forfeits from the Gulf states in the years 1991-93 to around $10 
billion” (Usher 1995: 1). 
The effect of all of the above on the PLO itself was devastating, and 
negatively affected many of its missions abroad and its services of 
empowerment, mobilization, connection, employment and welfare to its 
Palestinian constituencies. As Usher writes,  
“Thousands of functionaries were laid off, missions abroad closed and, crucially, 
educational, welfare and social services for Palestinian refugees suspended. In August 
1993, on the very eve of Oslo, the PLO in Tunis simply closed down the 
organisation’s…departments for lack of funds” (Usher 1995: 2).  
It was this context that Arafat was referring to as ‘the worst situation’, 
and it is in this state of international and regional despair that “a 
delegation of Palestinians from the territories, excluding Jerusalem, and 
approved by the Shamir government” (Usher 1995: 3) entered the 
Madrid conference in 1991, as part of a Jordanian delegation. As such, 
the Oslo Accords “reflected the core PLO leadership reading of the 
balance of forces existing at the time” (Hilal 2007: 5). As stated above, 
the only silver lining in the liberation organization’s woes was the 
Intifada, which “gave that leadership the feeling that it could change the 
balance of forces once it returned to Palestine, to the extent of achieving 
an independent Palestinian state” (Hilal 2007: 5).  
It is important to note that the Madrid conference itself came about 
after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and as such constituted part of the 
‘new world order’ George Bush Senior envisioned for the region of the 
Middle East (Usher 1995: 3). Seeing the potential for US hegemony in the 
region in the aftermath of the Gulf War, which had “thrown together a 
coalition of Arab states more susceptible to US hegemony than at any 
point in the last 40 years” (Usher 1995: 3), the American president 
strove to provide these “authoritarian and discredited regimes with 
some gesture of US concern for Arab grievances” (Usher 1995: 3). These 
grievances, of course, revolved around the Israeli occupation of Gaza, 
the West Bank, Jerusalem, South Lebanon, as well as the Golan Heights. 
It is here that the principle of “territories for peace” was born (Usher 
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1995: 3). For the PLO, this American “rhetorical accommodation to the 
anti-Saddam alliance” (Usher 1995: 3), provided a window for it to rejoin 
the international scene after its exclusion as a result of the Gulf War. As 
Graham Usher argues, by this point in history, “the only thing the PLO 
had going for it…was the ‘peace process’” (Usher 1995: 2).  
The Oslo Accords themselves were negotiated through “14 secret 
meetings between PLO officials and Israeli government advisors and 
academics…hosted and facilitated by Norway’s Foreign Affairs Minister 
Johan Jorgen Holst and social scientist Terje Rod Larsen” (Usher 1995: 
7). They are made up of two parts—mutual recognition letters between 
Israel and the PLO and a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements (DOP or Oslo I) signed by Israel and the PLO 
on September 13th, 1993 (Butenschon 2007: 85). As Avi Shlaim notes, 
perhaps the most significant achievement of the Accords lies in the fact 
that “mutual denial has made way for mutual recognition” (Shlaim 1994: 
25). Crucially though, the Accords are not a peace treaty, but 
“agreements on a method and timetables for reaching a lasting solution 
and interim institutional and security arrangements” (Butenschon 2007: 
85). This calendar for negotiations initially covered an interim period of 
5 years, after which a permanent settlement would be negotiated based 
upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (Usher 1995: 8). It 
was this clause that gave Palestinian supporters of Oslo the most hope, 
since, as Hanan Ashrawi (Palestinian delegation spokesperson) said, 
“This means that you recognize that Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza 
are occupied territory, that international law prevails and that 
withdrawal is a basic component of the agreement” (Usher 1995: 9).  
The agenda itself though was made up of five main points. The first 
stipulated that upon the signing of the DOP, the IDF would withdraw 
from Gaza and Jericho, and “be replaced by a ‘strong Palestinian police 
force’ responsible for Palestinian ‘internal security and public order’” 
(Usher 1995: 8). The second stipulated that Israel would remain in 
control “of external relations and foreign affairs” (Usher 1995: 8). The 
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third point stated that once the IDF withdrew from Gaza and Jericho, 
“the Israeli government would transfer to ‘authorised Palestinians’ civil 
power over five services: education and culture, health, social welfare, 
direct taxation and tourism” (Usher 1995: 9). Fourthly, the Palestinians 
would elect a Palestinian Council in nine months time to be responsible 
for these services (Usher 1995: 9), and finally, “No later than two years 
after this, Israel and the Palestinians would start negotiations on a 
permanent settlement and address such issues as Jerusalem, 
settlements and the 1948 refugees” (Usher 1995: 9). A settlement on 
these issues, of course, has yet to be reached.  
In essence, for the PLO, the Accords represented their acceptance to 
create a Palestinian Authority with limited powers in Gaza and Jericho 
first—while agreeing to bracket the issue of statehood itself to 
negotiations on a permanent settlement (Hilal 2007). In parallel to this, 
as Pappe emphasizes, there were three central Israeli stipulations upon 
entering negotiations after 1967, and upon any future peace agenda. 
The first concerned “being absolved from the 1948 ethnic cleansings, 
with that issue no longer being mentioned as part of a prospective peace 
agenda” (Pappe 2007: 39). The second outlined the OPT of 1967 as the 
only territories upon which any peace negotiation would be valid (Pappe 
2007: 39), while the third stipulated that the Palestinians within Israel 
would not be part of any future negotiated settlement (Pappe 2007: 39). 
Thus, in effect,  
“This meant that 80% of Palestine and more than 50% of the Palestinians were excluded 
from the peacemaking efforts in the land of Palestine. This formula was accepted 
unconditionally by the USA and sold as the best offer in town to the rest of the world” 
(Pappe 2007: 39).  
Moreover, Pappe argues that the core of the Oslo Accords revolved 
around the reselling of the idea of ‘territories for peace’, conceived of in 
Madrid:  
“At the heart of this formula stood an equation of territories for peace, produced by 
the Israeli peace camp, and marketed by the Americans. It is a strange formula, if you 
stop and think about it: at one end of the equation you have a quantitative and 
measurable variable: at the other, an abstract term, not easily conceptualized, or even 
illustrated” (Pappe 2007: 39).  
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In parallel to this Oslo mirrored Israel’s approach in Madrid, which: 
“Focused upon the specifics of Palestinian self-government…while avoiding discussion 
of substantive issues…Many Palestinians began to view Israel’s stonewalling as a cover 
for escalating land confiscation and military repression in the territories…In 1991, the 
year of Madrid, Israel expropriated a further 187, 000 dunums of Palestinian land in 
the West Bank and Gaza…This was de facto annexation. It was no longer creeping: it 
was raging” (Usher 1995: 3-4). 
The significant difference the DOP represented to the Madrid formula 
was to be found in Israel’s “pledge to withdraw militarily from the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho as the ‘first step’ (towards 
Palestinian autonomy)” (Usher 1995: 8).  
For the PLO of course, and especially for Arafat, the greatest incentive of 
the Accords was Israel’s recognition of the PLO, and not the text of the 
DOP—which he signed unilaterally from his headquarters in Tunis, 
without consulting with the Palestinian delegation. Upon being faxed the 
document from Tunis, the delegation was “alarmed by its content...It 
overhauled positions they had previously been told to defend ‘at all 
costs’. They were also angered by the cavalier way in which Arafat had 
relegated their status to that of a ‘fax machine for Tunis’” (Usher 1995: 
10). For their part, the Israelis had come around to the idea of 
negotiating directly with Tunis, and granting the PLO recognition after 
“‘internal security assessments’ assured Rabin that Arafat’s domestic 
and international plight had become so dire, that for the carrot of 
recognition, he would be amenable to making unprecedented political 
concessions” (Usher 1995: 11). The secret Oslo channel confirmed this 
assessment, and the fact that “the PLO- though not any other Palestinian 
or Arab representative- would sign the DOP” (Usher 1995: 11). For 
Arafat and his supporters, these concessions—which included that the 
PLO “renounces all acts of terrorism and other acts of violence and will 
assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to 
ensure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators” 
(Usher 1995: 11)—marked the beginning of a war of position within the 
OPT as opposed to an armed struggle of liberation. In this new phase,  
“The stakes of liberation would depend on whether Israel’s security-led and 
‘functional’ vision would prevail or whether the PLO could establish independent, 
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national, democratic institutions inside the territories that would make the momentum 
toward national independence and self determination irreversible” (Usher 1995: 13).  
As Mahmoud Abbas—Arafat’s main political advisor at the time—
reflected after the signing of the DOP, Oslo, “could lead to a Palestinian 
state or a catastrophic liquidation of the Palestinian cause” (Usher 1995: 
15). For Oslo’s opponents—including the PLO’s Marxist Popular and 
Democratic Fronts, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Palestinian refugees—
these concessions, sold as ‘realism’ by Abbas, “disguised a political 
defeat for the PLO that would prove to be every bit as catastrophic as its 
1982 military defeat in Lebanon” (Usher 1995: 13). As Usher writes 
though, “at the time of Oslo, the optimists were in a majority” (Usher 
1995: 13), and even the majority of the pessimists of the WBGS could 
not resist the wave of joy triggered by Israel’s recognition of the PLO.  
C. Extent Oslo Represents a Departure from pre-Oslo 
 
As Butenschon emphasizes, the Oslo Accords, “irreversibly altered the 
legal and political landscape of the Middle East. Even if the peace 
process remains stalled for the next decade, the Accords will continue 
to furnish the basis for Israeli-Palestinian relations, to serve as a sort of 
“Basic Law” or constitution for the unhappy polity” (Butenschon 2007: 
85). While, as stated above, the Oslo Accords were essentially a re-
packaging of the principle of territory for peace—their greatest 
advantage for the Israeli side was precisely the fact that they were so 
vague on the issue of territoriality—focusing instead upon a “temporal 
spacing of issues” (Usher 1995: 9). As Usher writes,  
“‘While the proposal lacks the clarity of a map’, said Peres, ‘it provides the 
commitment of a calendar’. ‘The clarity of a map’, however, was what most 
Palestinians had insisted the peace process was all about. The core of their conflict 
with Israel had always been about land… Yet it was on the issue of territoriality that 
the DOP was so deeply ambiguous” (Usher 1995: 9).  
In addition to this, as underlined by Butenschon, the agreements 
avoided negotiations on any of the fundamental issues of the conflict—
such as questions of sovereignty, borders, Jerusalem, the right of return 
of the Palestinian refugees, or the Jewish settlements in the OPT—
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sidelining them to future ‘permanent status negotiations’6 (Butenschon 
2007: 85). Instead, both sides agreed to officially disagree upon the legal 
status of the OPT. Thus, while paragraph 7 of the DOP states that 
“neither side shall take any step that will change the status of the WBGS 
pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations” 
(Butenschon 2007: 86), the fact that both sides have conflicting views on 
this status renders it open to diverging interpretations. Thus, as a result 
of this lack of reference to the internationally recognized status of the 
OPT as occupied, “as expressed in all relevant UN General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions, confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory 
opinion” (Butenschon 2007: 86), the status of the OPT was left “open to 
conflicting interpretations, giving Israel a reference for its claim that the 
status of the territories is ‘disputed’” (Butenschon 2007: 86). This 
arguably remains one of the gravest consequences of Oslo for the 
Palestinians, and represents a great triumph for the Israeli side in all 
negotiations that were to follow, as well as in any discussion 
surrounding its continuous land confiscation and settlement expansion 
on the ground in Israel/Palestine. As Butenschon emphasizes, in the 
aftermath of Oslo, the Israelis challenged the Palestinian claim that “all 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967 should be handed over 
to a Palestinian Authority as the territorial foundation for a future 
independent and sovereign state”, and “never renounced their self-
proclaimed rights to expand the Israeli-Jewish society into parts of or 
the entire OPT” (Butenschon 2007: 87).  
In a similar vein however, it should also be pointed out that while the 
UN Security Council has been disabled from imposing sanctions upon 
Israel due to the US’s non-opposition to its policies,  
                                                 
6 The two sides came close to an agreement on permanent status issues in Camp David 
in 2000, and in Taba in 2001, with the mediation of Bill Clinton. Though the talks 
officially broke down, they unofficially continued and resulted in the Geneva Accords 
in 2003. As Butenschon writes, “The Geneva Accords represent the most elaborate 
compromise to date within the ‘Oslo paradigm’ between established political and 
military elites on both sides” (Butenschon, 2007: 94). However, the Sharon government 
rejected them. The Annapolis Conference in 2007 also involved negotiations on 
permanent status issues.  
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“In terms of prevailing international law, Israel has not been able to change the status 
of the OPT as ‘occupied’, as clearly demonstrated in the advisory opinion by the ICJ. It 
is worth noting that the Oslo Accords…have not in any way impacted on the legal 
status of the OPT” (Butenschon 2007: 87).  
At the time of the signing of the DOP, its Palestinian supporters viewed 
this territorial ambiguity as something that could potentially be used to 
their advantage once the Palestinian Authority was created in Gaza and 
Jericho: 
“’Gaza-Jericho will not automatically lead to national independence’, said Fatah leader, 
Marwan Barghouti, ‘but the political space it opens up enables us to set off an 
irreversible dynamic (towards independence) through the new national mechanisms we 
set in place” (Usher 1995: 9-10).  
For those that opposed it, these ambiguities represented the beginning 
of the end of the idea of a viable two-state solution, and the beginning 
of a form of apartheid: 
“Haidar Abd al-Shafi, head of the Palestinian delegation (to Madrid)…argued that the 
notion of ‘disputed’ rather than ‘occupied’ territory pervaded every aspect of the DOP. 
Even where Palestinians were granted limited jurisdiction…this refers to ‘Palestinians 
in the territories’ but not the territories themselves...Israel would preserve jurisdiction 
over existing Israeli settlements and military installations…At the time of the signing 
of Oslo, these lands comprised 65 percent of the West Bank and 42 percent of 
Gaza…In the opinion of Abd al-Shafi, this augured ‘a kind of apartheid’” (Usher 1995: 
10).  
Meanwhile, the political (and territorial) space Oslo actually opened up 
for Arafat on the ground was filled with daunting obstacles impeding 
the creation of a viable Palestinian state. To begin with, by signing the 
DOP, Arafat had,  
“In effect accepted that building a Palestinian state was from now on, subordinated to 
Israeli security concerns…The DOP authorized the PLO to establish ‘a strong police 
force’, but Arafat could not use his constantly growing number of security forces to 
liberate the OPT. That would be a material breach of Oslo” (Butenschon 2007: 87). 
Instead, the police force could only be deployed to either repress 
Palestinian resistance and armed struggle against Israel, its settlements, 
occupation forces, and its settlers—or defend the PA itself from 
Palestinian threats against it. In a context of continuing settlement 
expansion and occupation, this put the PA in a very precarious position, 
and begged the question of how Palestine would be liberated if its forces 
(and people) can only do so under the command of the Israelis.  
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In the sphere of the economy, the establishment of the PA in 1994 also 
served to heighten and exacerbate Israel’s policies on economic 
development in the WBGS. As Alissa argues, “these policies have been 
directed coherently and consistently to secure military, economic and 
political control over the WBGS and…to undermine the viability of the 
Palestinian economy…and weaken its indigenous economic base” (Alissa 
2007: 123). Israeli policies sought to implement this “process of de-
development7” (Alissa 2007: 124) by pursuing two contradictory aims—
“improving the standard of living without achieving any structural 
change in the WBGS economy and progressively weakening the 
indigenous economic base” (Alissa 2007: 124). Created through 
employment in Israel, an improved standard of living was part of both 
creating dependency upon Israel and combating nationalism—and never 
included professional, middle class or skilled labour (Alissa 2007: 124-
5). Based upon what former mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benevisti has 
called “individual prosperity and communal stagnation” (Alissa 2007: 
125) that is mainly based upon what Alissa has described as 
marginalization, dependency and exploitation: 
“Marginalization and isolation mean here the systematic destruction of the WBGS 
economy and its production base and the segregation of this economy from the 
international market. This process has been consolidated by a policy of closures. 
Exploitation in this context refers to the use of the WBGS as a cheap source of labour 
and raw materials and as a supplementary market for Israeli goods. 
Dependency...refers to the deliberate and systematic process of making the separation 
of the WBGS from the Israeli economy an impossible task” (Alissa 2007: 125).  
As Alissa recounts, these policies were made much worse after the 
second Gulf War in the 1990s when Israel began to employ collective 
punishment policies restricting the movement of people and goods. This 
intensification of closure policies, added to “settlement building, bypass 
construction and, a separation wall and control over natural resources” 
                                                 
7 The term ‘de-development’ was coined by Sara Roy in 1995, to refer to an economy 
that “is deprived of its capacity of production, rational structural transformation, and 
meaningful reform, making it incapable of even distorted development” (Roy, 1999: 
65). Roy argues that Oslo brought on a significant increase in these processes, which 
were made much worse by Israeli policies of closure. These policies of closure were a 
defining feature of the post-Oslo economy, and have not been lifted since 1993. For 
more on this see, Roy, Sara. Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. 
(Pluto Press: 2007)  
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(Alissa 2007: 125-6) made the economic realities on the ground in the 
WBGS dire. These Israeli policies were also paralleled a political process 
of ‘Bantustanization’ on the ground in the WBGS: 
“The term was first used by Azmi Bishara (1995 and 1999) and Meron Benevisti (April 
2004) to refer to the territorial, political and economic fragmentation model that the 
Israeli government has created in the WBGS. Bishara defines the Palestinian Bantustan 
as ‘a place that lacks sovereignty and at the same time is not part of Israel. It’s neither 
one thing nor the other. Its people do not have right of entry to…neighbouring 
countries” (Alissa 2007: 128). 
Alissa argues that there are four Bantustans being created on the 
ground in the WBGS by Israel. The first is that of the Gaza strip itself, 
which became much more apparent in the aftermath of Sharon’s 
disengagement (Alissa 2007: 128). The remaining three, which “will be 
finalized with the completion of the separation wall” (Alissa 2007: 128) 
are made up of Jenin-Nablus; Bethlehem-Hebron; and Ramallah.  
As Alissa highlights, this process of destroying the basis upon which a 
viable Palestinian state can be created, is rooted in the Oslo Accords. 
The Oslo Accords themselves “specified the PA mandate over the WBGS” 
(Alissa 2007: 131) as well as “its ability to determine political and 
economic policies” (Alissa, 2007: 131). The Accords also dictated the 
“institutional nature, structure and capacity of PA institutions” (Alissa 
2007: 131)—while granting the PA full control over only 18% of the 
WBGS. The Oslo Accords divided the WBGS itself into zones A, B and C: 
“Zone A (the 18%) is under full control of the PA; Zone B is under the administrative 
control of the PA and the security control of Israel; Zone C is under full control of 
Israel. Zone A is divided into many enclaves, effectively dividing one from another. 
These enclaves are surrounded by areas B and C, which gives Israel effective control 
over the whole WBGS…Since 2000 the PA no longer even controls Zone A, since Israel 
reoccupied most of it” (Alissa 2007: 131).  
With no control over foreign policy, over borders or determining 
citizenship, with no currency or control over fiscal policy or natural 
resources, let alone any full control over territory—the PA was created 
not as a sovereign state in the making, but as a client authority that is 
highly dependent upon Israel. Alissa writes, 
“The term client state is used by Jamil Hilal and Mushtaq H. Khan to characterize the 
transfer of selective responsibility by Israel to the PA to ensure political compliance by 
this authority in the security-first route to Palestinian statehood in the WBGS…many 
conditions observed in the WBGS since the establishment of the PA appear to support 
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the consolidation of a client state. For instance, the PA has played the policing role in 
the WBGS to protect Israel…and to oppress opponents of Oslo. In addition, Israel has 
controlled the finances of the WBGS” (Alissa 2007: 132).  
Moreover, as Jad Isaac and Owen Powell argue, it is transformations to 
the Palestinian territorial environment itself that represent the most 
serious obstacles to the establishment of a viable, sovereign state. 
Though the Oslo Accords brought about the rhetoric of a Palestinian 
state, Isaac and Powell highlight the fact that “this rhetoric of a 
Palestinian state does not indicate, for example, the size, or political and 
socio-demographic parameters of such an entity” (Powell & Isaac 2007: 
144). As previously underlined, whereas the Palestinian side envisages 
the creation of such a state upon all of the Palestinian territory occupied 
by Israel in 1967, “Israeli governments have come up with a wide range 
of scenarios and options for defining what could constitute…a 
Palestinian state, which comprises 40%-70% of the Palestinian area 
mentioned” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 144). As such, in view of both the 
territorial ambiguities inherent within the DOP, as well as the bracketing 
of both statehood (and its components) itself and the delineation of 
borders to ‘permanent status’ negotiations, the space (and time) was 
created within which Israel could establish the possible options open as 
answers to these questions as new, unalterable realities on the ground. 
Isaac and Powell write,  
“The power imbalances between Israel and Palestine have enabled Israel to appropriate 
Palestinian land and other resources virtually unchallenged...The borders of a future 
Palestinian state and the status of its environment will most probably be determined 
by Israel’s unilateral actions over the coming years as it continues its occupation and 
unilateral ‘disengagement’ or ‘convergence’. Subsequently, the viability and 
sustainability of a Palestinian state will be profoundly influenced by the geo-political 
and environmental conditions Palestine will inherit” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 145-6). 
Among the issues that Isaac and Powell cite as the most worrying in an 
analysis of the viability of a Palestinian state in the WBGS are 
“population growth, lack of space, depletion of water resources, solid 
waste disposal, deterioration in water quality (and) land degradation” 
(Isaac & Powell 2007: 146). Of these, however, the most dramatic 
transformation to the Palestinian environment remains its 
fragmentation into ‘cantons’, or ‘Bantustans’: 
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“The presence of checkpoints, settlements, the segregation barrier and bypass roads 
constitute perhaps the greatest transformation of the Palestinian environment. Many 
of these activities have led to the destruction of Palestinian assets such as orchards 
and arable land… However, by far the greatest impacts have been related to socio-
economic factors deriving from the fragmentation of the environment and the 
compartmentalization of Palestinian areas into isolated cantons” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 
151-2). 
As Isaac and Powell illustrate, the expansion of the settlements in the 
WBGS is “geared to the formation of blocks; i.e. they grow outwards and 
towards each other” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 152). Thus, different Israeli 
governments “have encouraged the development of specific blocks more 
than others, which enables the linking of Israeli colonies and the 
enclosing of Palestinian areas” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 152). This 
expansion—part of which aims at de-linking Jerusalem from the West 
Bank—as well as the construction of new housing blocks, has increased 
since the signing of the Oslo Accords. This segregation is further 
exacerbated by the many Israeli checkpoints restricting the movement 
of Palestinians in the WBGS, as well as the by-pass roads linking the 
Israeli settlements. Perhaps the most destructive of all of these 
transformations for the Palestinian environment though, is the 
construction of the separation wall. Isaac and Powell write,  
“Construction of the segregation barrier is a fundamental component of Israel’s geo-
political strategy…its construction has clearly been shown to be part of Israel’s ‘land 
grab’ policy…The wall dips significantly into Palestinian territory dividing Palestinian 
communities, annexing land and appropriating vital resources…(it) encloses…83% of 
the Israeli settler population and 55 Palestinian localities. The wall has effectively 
become the de facto boundary of Israel/Palestine” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 157).  
As Ilan Pappe has previously argued, the Oslo Accords were in essence a 
celebration of the Zionist idea of partition—that was applied only upon 
the WBGS, and based upon the idea that everything could be divided up 
between Israel and the PA therein. This resulted in emptying Palestinian 
statehood of any meaning. (Pappe 2007: 40-3) Furthermore, as 
previously highlighted, the Oslo Accords themselves set the stage for 
the creation of a Palestinian Authority that in essence is a client 
authority of Israel, and as such incapable of resisting its geo-political 
goals. Thus,  
“The geo-political ambitions of Israel can be analyzed in direct relation to Zionist aims 
to secure strategic advantage, provide high standards of living for Israelis, as well as to 
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accommodate large numbers of immigrants for the purposes of creating an ethnically 
Jewish state” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 160).  
With the onset of the first Intifida though, as well as the rise of Hamas, 
the Zionist political elite began to reconsider its policies in the OPT, its 
position against the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, 
and the advantages of unilaterally separating form the OPT instead. 
(Isaac & Powell 2007: 161) As such, the emergence of the two-state 
solution, as it is formulated in the DOP, has been “assimilated into the 
Zionists’ strategy to maximize their control over Palestinian land” (Isaac 
& Powell 2007: 161). As Isaac and Powell point out, demography is also a 
factor in the on-going territorial realities being created on the ground. 
They write,  
“Israel cannot continue to deny equal rights and services to a portion of its territory’s 
population on the basis of ethnicity, without this appearing as a form of apartheid. 
The only way for Israel to resist both democratizing pressures and the moral dilemma 
of racial discrimination is to exclude Palestinians physically and declare that they have 
a ‘state’…”(Isaac & Powell 2007: 161).  
By the year 2000, in Camp David, the Israelis proposed, “65% of the 
West Bank on a discontinuous land mass” (Isaac & Powell 2007: 157) to 
the Palestinians.  
Finally, and in parallel to the above—another consequence of Oslo, 
which came about as a result of the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), was the dismantling of the PLO’s empowering forums, 
associations and institutions in favour of building the PA. As Hilal 
illustrates, this disintegration of the former PLO superstructure, left 
both Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian minority within Israel 
abandoned and disconnected from those Palestinians in the OPT: 
“The result (of the PA) was the effective dismantling of the entire organizational 
superstructure that the PLO had constructed in the last 1960s, which provided a 
complex network of relations connecting Palestinians in their diverse and scattered 
communities and a forum for their political deliberation” (Hilal 2007: 5). 
As Karma Nabulsi highlights, the Oslo Accords were responsible for 
setting up an opposition between the Palestinian principle of self-
determination, and that of the Right of Return of the Palestinian 
refugees, and making them appear to be mutually exclusive and 
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incompatible. Arguing that these two interlinked principles have defined 
the Palestinian struggle from its beginnings, she writes: 
“The fundamental question that connects these two principles to the debate about a 
one-state or two-state solution is whether they are harmonious and conjoined to each 
other, or are incommensurable and in conflict with each other. Previously-the last time 
probably in 1988 at the Palestinian National Council in Algiers-it was commonly 
understood that both these principles were fundamental, and were, above all, 
inextricably linked to each other” (Nabulsi 2007: 233).  
The Oslo process however, along with the elections and the institutional 
structures that were set up in the WBGS, resulted in the,  
“Slow emergence of a Palestinian political discourse of a predominantly interest-based 
nature, which assumes that the two key principles of self-determination and the Right 
of Return are incompatible…From the Geneva initiative to the Nusseibeh-Ayalon 
platform one can hear articulated the claim that there can be no independent 
Palestinian state while holding on to the Right of Return” (Nabulsi 2007: 233-4). 
This formula, articulated as a ‘painful compromise’ (Nabulsi 2007: 234) 
fragmented the Palestinian national community into rival interest 
groups, operating under the assumption that these two interlinked 
principles were incompatible. She writes: 
“The institutional arrangements that helped strengthen this discourse also brought 
about a radical fragmentation not just among geographically disparate Palestinians, 
but also between different Palestinian classes, between Palestinian refugees and non-
refugees, between Gaza and the West Bank...The Palestinians have been reduced to 
distinct interest groups pursuing different agendas” (Nabulsi 2007: 234).  
After having been at the core of the PLO’s struggle, its decision-making 
processes, as well as its institutions of deliberation, mobilization and 
empowerment, the Palestinian refugees found themselves completely 
silenced and disempowered as a result of Oslo. In parallel to this of 
course, the PA—as opposed to the PLO—only represents those 
Palestinians within the OPT. This sudden transformation of emphasis (in 
the aftermath of Oslo) upon those in the Diaspora from “a people with 
the internationally recognized right to self-determination and of return” 
to:  
“‘Palestinian refugees’, rather than a core element of the Palestinian decision-making 
body politic…(who were) made the subject of ‘final status’ negotiations…suddenly put 
the civic and political status of millions of Palestinians into an existential limbo from 
which they have yet to emerge” (Nabulsi 2007: 235). 
As Nabulsi argues, it is only through the renewed interlinking of the 
principles of national self-determination and the right of return—upon 
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which the Palestinian struggle was premised prior to Oslo—that a 
common platform can be rebuilt uniting all Palestinians everywhere, and 
that any formulation of a state can represent a just way forward to 
ending the conflict.  
III. Conclusion: Towards a Countering of Zionist Common Sense 
 
There are few handshakes in history that have been celebrated more as 
inaugurating the beginning of peace in the Middle East as that between 
Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin after the signing of the DOP. At the 
White House lawn, amidst cheering crowds, Bill Clinton introduced both 
leaders and continued to say, “The peace of the brave is within our 
reach. Throughout the Middle East there is the great yearning for the 
quiet miracle of a normal life” (1993). However, as has been illustrated 
above,  
“The reality on the ground was one state, 20% of which was under indirect Israeli 
military occupation, while it was represented as the making of a two state solution 
with the display of a dramatic discourse of peace” (Pappe 2007: 39). 
For those Palestinians on the ground in the OPT, as well as those in the 
Diaspora and those inside of Israel, the signing of the DOP—and its 
consequent ramifications upon both the geography of Palestine, 
Palestinian lives, and the Palestinian national movement—effectively 
marked the beginning of the implementation of a re-formulated Allon 
Plan in the form of an American sponsored peace process.  
It is the masking of these oppressive realities on the ground—through 
the production of a dominant common sense discourse that is 
elaborated as a reflection of the power dynamics on the ground—that 
Gramsci argued keeps oppressive conceptions of the world hegemonic, 
and seemingly inevitable and unchangeable. As such, it is within the 
countering of these common sense notions that Gramscian 
counterhegemony, with its empowerment of human agency, and 
revolutionizing of political possibilities on the ground begins. In parallel 
to this, as Said argued, Gramsci’s emphasis upon the territorial creates 
space from within which the silenced realities on the ground can be re-
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inserted, and can become a powerful, geographical counter-project 
against an oppressive common sense narrative that—in this case—veils 
Palestinian dispossession on the ground. Moreover, this different point 
of beginning also stresses that hegemony itself must be located in the 
national, and refined according to the peculiarities of this situated 
contextualized location. As such, this chapter tried to show that the 
Zionist hegemony embedded within the peace process, and veiled by the 
rhetoric of the two-state solution, was based on slightly different 
common sense notions in different geographical locations. As such, 
(broadly speaking) in European and North American civil societies, this 
common sense was based upon the acceptance of the principle of 
separation as the only viable solution to the conflict, and as one that 
would lead to two independent states for two people. In the Israeli 
arena, this common sense was also based upon the embrace of the 
Zionist principle of separation, but in the pursuit of a solution along the 
lines of a modified Allon Plan. In the Palestinian arena of the OPT, this 
common sense also involved an embrace of the principle of separation 
as the only viable way forward—but in this case, it was coupled with a 
territorially focused strategy to create a viable two-state solution on the 
ground. It is from within this context that the single state 
counterhegemonic movement eventually emerged—against the principle 
of separation embraced within the peace process since Oslo, and its 
situated common sense notions within these different, interlinked 
locations. It is to a description of who the single state organic 
intellectuals are, the process of their emergence, and an analysis of their 
efforts to counter their own perceptions and elaborations of these 
‘common sense’ notions in order to reveal the oppressive nature of the 
present status quo, and empower resistance against it by embracing a 
new conception of the world that is against separation—that the next 
few chapters will turn. 
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Chapter Four 
The Re-Emergence of the Single State Solution: An 
Intellectual Mapping of a Movement in the Making 
 
I. Introduction 
It is the aim of the following two chapters to attempt to sketch a 
preliminary picture of what can arguably be perceived to be a present 
day (re) emergence of a conception of the world championing a single 
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This sketch will involve 
an intellectual as well as an organizational mapping1 of this alternate 
conception of the world. Both of these sketches are based upon the 
interlinked thoughts and action of three distinct and yet overlapping 
central blocs of organic intellectuals to this process: the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel; the Palestinian Diaspora, refugees and the Palestinians 
under occupation; and anti-Zionist Jewish-Israelis (who will later expand 
to include anti-Zionist Jewish people globally). While these groups 
themselves will be introduced in the next chapter, it is important to note 
that it is their conceptual articulations and interlinked strategies and 
practices of resistance that underlie the resurgent single state 
movement—despite the fact that other groups of people may also be 
involved in solidarity, or joint struggle with them.  
As shall be demonstrated in chapter six, these groups themselves 
arguably fuse to create what appears to be becoming a Gramscian 
inspired war of position in the making against the current peace 
process—a war of position articulated and waged by their respective 
organic intellectuals. The preliminary groundwork for this war of 
position can be seen to be set under the umbrella of an over-aching, 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘mapping’ is used to describe an analytical 
and descriptive narration of the present day re-emergent single state movement both 
intellectually and organizationally. As such, it is not a historical mapping of the single 
state idea itself—but a mapping that sets its beginning with the signing of the Oslo 
Accords. This narration is presented within a Saidian-Gramscian framework.  
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inter-national anti-apartheid movement, empowered by a global boycott 
divestment and sanctions (BDS) strategy, and centered around the 
dismantling of Zionism, the ending of the Israeli occupation of the OPT, 
the return of the Palestinian refugees, and the embracing of imaginative 
ways Palestinians and Israeli-Jews can reconcile, share land and coexist.  
It is not the intention of the next three chapters to argue that the re-
emergence of the single state idea, and the potential movement 
emerging around it, represents the only Palestinian resistance 
movement against the peace process today. For, as underlined in the 
previous chapter, the two-state solution itself (as outlined by the UN) 
represented an attempt at staging a territorial war of position from 
within the OPT for the Palestinians—and some Palestinians and Israelis 
remain committed to carrying this territorial struggle forward despite 
the obstacles created on the ground after Oslo. However, the perceived 
failure of Arafat’s war of position after Oslo by many Palestinians also 
set the stage from within which the single state idea re-emerged, and 
arguably set out to reposition itself as a reformulated, potential war of 
position against the principles of Oslo. The next three chapters strive to 
tell the story of this re-emergence, and its potential as an alternative 
pathway to power towards justice in Palestine/Israel.  
In this vein, these chapters contend that the alternative conception of 
the world outlined by single state organic intellectuals represents a 
critical conception of reality that goes beyond the common sense 
notions of the so-called ‘peace process’ in an attempt to dismantle it’s 
illusion in favour of a single state future of some form, appears to be 
expansive, and to show signs of hegemonic potential. They also contend 
that while the re-emergence of the single state idea initially ignited a 
divisive intellectual debate between Palestinian and Israeli supporters of 
a two-state solution, and those supporting different forms of a single 
state solution—this debate when viewed from within the lens of 
practices of resistance to Israel’s policies in the OPT, as well as inside 
Israel proper, becomes a largely superficial abstraction within the 
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present phase. As such, it is argued that since the point of beginning of 
the single state movement is that the reality on the ground is of a single 
apartheid state—it may be more fruitful to locate the distinction (in 
terms of practice) between those who are engaged in “anti-Zionist 
practices” of resistance, and those who are engaged in practices of 
separation.  
However, it must be clearly stated that the expansiveness, de-
centralisation and myriad of diverse groups and personalities with 
multiple visions and separate, un-coordinated actions involved within 
the broader picture of this single state project makes it difficult to 
decipher as one concrete unified phenomenon that resembles any 
traditional view of what a coherent movement looks like. As such, it is 
contended that a more accurate reflection of the dynamics, shifts, and 
strategies of this movement may emerge when analyzing it through a 
lens inspired by a Saidian Gramsci—which centers upon the 
revolutionary power of philosophy, and the inherent link between 
thought and action in building a new, unified, collective historical force 
against a particular status quo. In this vein then, the next three chapters 
aim at sketching a picture of the single state movement—and analyzing 
its counterhegemonic potential—in terms of what Gramsci defined as a 
“philosophical movement” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 330). As previously 
elaborated, this form of resistance which begins within the realm of the 
ethico-political, was described by Gramsci as one that “when, in the 
process of elaborating a form of thought superior to ‘common sense’…it 
never forgets to remain in contact with the simple, and finds in this 
contact the source of the problem it sets out to study and resolve” 
(Gramsci et al. 1971: 330).  
As such, it is argued to be a movement that is centered upon the 
launching of a project of critical pedagogy by organic intellectuals 
within their own communities in order to transcend the common sense 
notions linking them to the status quo—in a process of mutual 
transformation and empowerment. This process itself is argued to 
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revolutionize political possibilities on the ground. This central premise 
is reflected within Ilan Pappe’s assertion that while the current two-state 
solution needs politicians, the single state solution needs educators 
(Pappe & Avnery 2007), and involves the launching of a long-term 
process of resistance aimed at de-colonization, liberation and 
empowerment. For Gramsci, this was the central meaning behind his 
claim that the creation of a liberating new conception of the world was 
not only based upon the triggering of a process of critical and historical 
self-understanding—but upon the creation and consolidation of a new 
form of civil and political society. Thus, this process is not just one of 
resistance, but simultaneously “involves a reconstructive moment” 
(Eschle & Maiguashca 2005: 216).  
This chapter begins by highlighting the centrality of the anti-Oslo 
writings of Edward Said to the re-emergence of the single state idea as a 
historical force of joint Palestinian and Israeli resistance to Zionist 
separation and dispossession. It then continues to briefly introduce the 
emergence of the single state movement itself, and elaborate its critique 
of the common sense of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Oslo. 
As such, this critique is elaborated as it is perceived, articulated and 
struggled against by these intellectuals and activists themselves. 
Mirroring this unified critique, this chapter goes on to argue that it is 
within a commitment to anti-Zionism, and an ethical de-Zionization of 
the historical land of Palestine, that the main platform of unity of the 
single state conception of the world lays today. Detailing the articulated 
principles and arguments underpinning this anti-Zionist worldview—
this chapter then goes on to outline the key intellectual reformulations 
and paradigm shifts that are interlinked with this alternative 
conception. Finally, it attempts to highlight the boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion of the single state movement in an attempt to further 
clarify the types of movements and forces that can potentially be 
embraced within this anti-Zionist platform, and those that cannot.  
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II. Critiques of Oslo  
A. The Centrality of Edward Said 
 
As the previous chapter highlighted, it is from within a critique of the 
paradigms and transformations of the Oslo peace process that the 
present single state idea is argued to have re-emerged as an alternative 
pathway to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This 
platform of emergence, anchored within a critique of the process of 
separation and Zionist expansion that the Oslo process exacerbated on 
the ground—is one of the main unifying elements of the single state 
movement’s alternative conception of the world. As such, it is from 
within this critique of common sense—and this “labour of intellectual 
criticism” and “intellectual and moral reformation”—that single state 
intellectuals articulated their visions and strategies of resistance for 
social transformation against the peace process. It is important to recall 
that this form of transformation—that is centered upon a critical 
process of historical self-understanding and empowerment that is 
argued to both make revolutionary action possible, as well as 
revolutionize the political possibilities within any historical 
conjuncture—is one that is based upon overcoming oppression 
altogether, and hence liberating both the colonizer and the colonized. In 
this call for a resistance movement embodying a liberating form of de-
colonization based upon the desire for mutual coexistence and the 
recognition of mutual humanity, the anti-Oslo writings of Said are 
central (Abunimah 2006: 169).  
Thus, the momentum of the transformation of the resurgent one state 
idea into a collectively endorsed vision can arguably be traced back to 
Said’s writing of an article entitled, “The One State Solution” for The 
New York Times in 1999. Interestingly, this same article was run in the 
Egyptian Al-Ahram Weekly, under the different title of, “Truth and 
Reconciliation”—mirroring two key principles that are argued to 
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underlie the single state’s conception of the world. To many of those 
involved in this struggle against the common sense of the peace 
process, this highlighting of the complex, intermingled truth on the 
ground that is based upon a desire for justice, de-colonization and 
reconciliation, reflects what lies at the core of their counterhegemonic 
project of liberation both theoretically and politically. This core premise 
is mirrored in Said’s words,  
“It is my view that the peace process has in fact put off the real reconciliation that 
must occur if the 100-year war between Zionism and the Palestinian people is to end. 
Oslo set the stage for separation, but real peace can come only with a binational 
Israeli-Palestinian state...I see no other way than to begin now to speak about sharing 
the land that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way, with equal 
rights for each citizen. There can be no reconciliation unless both peoples, two 
communities of suffering, resolve that their existence is a secular fact, and that it has 
to be dealt with as such” (Said 1999). 
Arguing that while Israel’s “raison d’être as a state has always been that 
there should be a separate country, a refuge, exclusively for Jews” (Said 
1999), and that this principle of separation was the basis upon which 
Oslo’s vision and processes lay—the fact remains that the lives of 
Israeli-Jews and Palestinians remain inextricably intermingled on the 
ground. This intertwining was further exacerbated by the fact that this 
Israeli urge for separation was paradoxically linked to that of a desire 
for territorial expansion in the OPT, which necessarily entailed the 
annexation of more and more communities of Palestinians. This 
increase, of course, is in addition to the Palestinian-Israelis within Israel 
proper who make up 20% of the population. And while the expansion of 
illegal Israeli settlements within the OPT has been accompanied by the 
building of “a whole network of connecting roads reserved for Israeli 
citizens only and, most recently, the Separation (in Afrikaans, apartheid) 
Wall” (Peled 2006), Said underlines the fact that this has only made 
separation within the small land of historical Palestine even more 
unviable. Thus, he writes, 
“Palestinian self-determination in a separate state is unworkable, just as unworkable as 
the principle of separation between a demographically mixed, irreversibly connected 
Arab population without sovereignty and a Jewish population with it. The question is 
not how to devise means for persisting in trying to separate them but to see whether it 
is possible for them to live together” (Said 1999).  
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In many ways, Said’s article represented a call to action to do just that—
to counter the dominant idea of separation as being the only solution to 
the conflict with a new conception of the world that is based upon the 
desire to coexist, reconcile and share the land. This stemmed from a 
desire to highlight the messiness of life itself, and to re-insert the 
overlapping territorial and human realities back into the accepted 
notion that an abstract, clinical separation remains both possible, and 
the only route to peace. Similarly, it is rooted within the argument that 
partition itself as a solution has historically rarely worked (Said et al. 
2000). 
Perhaps even more crucially for Said, this attack upon separation is a 
reflection of his rejection of the essentialist, static, binary identities and 
histories that underpin much of the common sense understandings and 
depictions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—while concealing the 
fluidity of the overlapping interconnectedness of people, histories, and 
spaces of coexistence that exist and have historically existed upon the 
land. Hence,   
“Palestine is and always has been a land of many histories; it is a radical simplification 
to think of it as principally, or exclusively Jewish or Arab…(there is a need for) an 
innovative, daring and theoretical willingness to get beyond the arid stalemate of 
assertion and rejection” (Said 1999).  
In this vein, Said calls upon both Israelis and Palestinians “to undertake 
political initiatives that hold Jews and Arabs to the same general 
principles of civil equality while avoiding the pitfalls of us-versus-them” 
(Said 1999). In parallel, he calls upon Palestinian intellectuals to 
“express their case directly to Israelis in public forums, universities, and 
the media” (Said 1999), and to actively mount a challenge “within civil 
society, which long has been subordinate to a nationalism that has 
developed into an obstacle to reconciliation” (Said 1999) in the name of 
peaceful coexistence and a more liberating worldview for both people. 
However, Said simultaneously highlights the fact that if this more 
inclusive worldview is to emerge as an effective force—it is imperative 
that injustice is jointly countered by both Israelis and Palestinians who 
seek an alternative pathway to real self-determination for all. In other 
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words, the call was for a movement that must both be one of active 
resistance to the worldview of the present status quo—and, as Ilan 
Pappe would state years later, “the very composition of the movement 
(should) be a model for the future” (Pappe, Ilan 2009).  
It is within this context that Said is often cited as one of the central 
inspirations behind the resurgence of the single state idea in its present 
form, as well as the intellectual to whom many of the current single 
state advocates dedicate their struggle both theoretically and politically. 
Thus, the inauguration of the SOAS conference in 2007 on “A Single 
State in Palestine/Israel”, begins with a tribute to Said, and a quote from 
this very same article,  
“The beginning is to develop something entirely missing from both Israeli and 
Palestinian realities today: the idea and practice of citizenship, not of ethnic or racial 
community, as the main vehicle of coexistence” (SOAS Palestine Society & London One 
State Group 2007).  
It is crucial to emphasize that this point of beginning sets the stage for 
what would become the single state conception of the world’s second 
unifying platform—which is that of its articulation as an attack on the 
ideology and practices of a separatist, essentialist, settler-colonial 
political Zionism.  
While this unifying anti-Zionist platform will be elaborated upon in 
detail below—it should be noted that the single state movement was 
primarily conceived of as a decolonial counterhegemonic resistance 
struggle that is based upon the political desire to de-Zionize 
Israel/Palestine. This is rooted in the fact that it is political Zionism 
itself that is perceived by single state intellectuals to stand in the way of 
coexistence, justice, equal citizenship, and the liberation of both 
people’s common humanity from oppression. The centrality of this 
premise is reflected in Omar Barghouti’s statement that, “We are 
organizing for self-determination (for all) and the ethical de-Zionization 
of Palestine” (Barghouti, Omar 2009). Similarly, it is echoed by Ilan 
Pappe, who argues that, “A movement for a one-state solution 
disseminates a new discourse about the past, about Zionism as 
colonialism…about the magnitude of the Israeli destruction of the land 
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of Palestine, (and) about the future which (can be) different from the 
present” (Pappe, Ilan 2009). As alluded to above, it must be underlined 
that it is within this unifying platform of anti-Zionism that the struggle 
for a single state solution in Israel/Palestine represents not only a 
struggle of Palestinian resistance and liberation—which, of course, it 
primarily is—but one of Israeli-Jewish liberation as well. Even more 
crucially for the purposes of this chapter, this platform of unity is also a 
reflection of the single state movement’s critique of the common sense 
of Oslo itself, and as such—rooted within it in an effort to transcend it, 
and revolutionize political possibilities on the ground.  
B. The Re-emergence of a Single State Movement 
 
In November 2007, the Annapolis Conference was applauded for 
creating history by being the first conference between Israel and the 
Palestinians (within the framework of the American sponsored peace 
process) to directly endorse a two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Aimed at demonstrating international support for 
the two-state solution, at a time when US State Secretary Condoleeza 
Rice warned that the window for the creation of a viable two-state 
solution was closing (Macleod 2007), the conference’s joint declaration 
was strongly supported by the Middle East Quartet. Made up of the 
United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, as well as 
the UN, the Quartet also, “took note of the broad international support 
for the Annapolis Conference”, and, “affirmed its commitment to seize 
this opportunity to mobilize international support to achieve 
meaningful progress towards a just and lasting negotiated settlement to 
this conflict” (The Quartet 2007).  
In parallel to Annapolis though, a different group of Israelis and 
Palestinians came together in a self-financed conference hosted by the 
School of African Studies (SOAS) in London. Entitled, “Challenging the 
Boundaries: A Single State in Palestine/Israel”, this conference was put 
together by students of the newly created London One State Group and 
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the SOAS Palestine Society. Organized as a follow up to the Madrid 
Conference in July of that same year—it aimed at creating “a platform 
for a broad debate on democratic alternatives to the two-state paradigm, 
and mak(ing) those ideas more accessible to the general public” (The 
London One State Group 2007). Bringing together many of the 
prominent Israeli and Palestinian academics and activists who have 
spoken out and written against the peace process since Oslo, the 
conference aimed at highlighting the fact that the two-state solution had 
failed to bring about peace and justice for the Palestinian and Israeli-
Jewish people.  
Instead, these intellectuals argued that the two-state solution served to 
distract from the territorial and political realities on the ground; to 
distract from the fact that the processes unleashed by Oslo 
“entrenche(d) and formalize(d) a policy of unequal separation on a land 
that has become ever more integrated territorially and economically” 
(Abunimah et al. 2007); and to distract from the fact that an 
independent Palestinian state was no longer viable on the ground. 
Moreover, they argued that the process of the solution is based upon a 
false premise of equality in terms of both power and morality between 
“a colonized and occupied people on the one hand and a colonizing 
state and military occupier on the other” (Abunimah et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, the process’ historical point of beginning and terms are 
set within “the unjust premise that peace can be achieved by granting 
limited national rights to Palestinians living in the areas occupied in 
1967, while denying the rights of Palestinians inside the 1948 borders 
and in the Diaspora” (Abunimah et al. 2007). In view of this, these 
intellectuals argued that a just, liberating alternative must be found to 
counter this paradigm of peacemaking and its deflection from the 
continuing processes of separation and colonization on the ground. 
To this end—after two days of debate—the conference culminated with 
the drafting of “The One State Declaration”. This declaration set out the 
principles upon which all of the participants of both Madrid and London 
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agreed an alternative democratic single state solution should be 
founded, mobilized for, and created. These principles included the fact 
that any process of justice must historically begin in 1948, and affirm 
the fact that the land of Palestine historically belongs “to all who live in 
it and to those who were expelled or exiled from it since 1948, 
regardless of religion, ethnicity, national origin or current citizenship 
status” (Abunimah et al. 2007); that any system of government must be 
based upon the principle of equality in all of its diverse arenas; that the 
Palestinian Right of Return must be implemented; that any form of state 
must be non-sectarian; that a process of justice and reconciliation must 
be launched; and significantly, that the segments of the Palestinian 
collective that have been historically silenced by Oslo—the Palestinian 
Diaspora, the Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinians inside Israel—
must be centrally involved in the articulation of the outlines and 
contents of such a solution. (Abunimah et al. 2007) As shall be 
elaborated upon below, it is these principles that remain the basis of 
unity within the vision, strategies and initiatives of this group of organic 
intellectuals and activists—despite their divisions, lack of centralized 
coordination and at times, shifts in emphasis or direction. In parallel to 
this, these principles also reflect what these organic intellectuals 
perceive to be, and articulate as, the oppressive common sense of the 
peace process since Oslo. It is this “labour of intellectual criticism” that 
represents their unified platform of emergence as a potential alternative 
force.  
In the conference’s closing session, the London One State Group stated,  
“The two days of discussions in London proved that there’s a growing movement 
among Palestinians and Israelis that calls for thinking about their common future in 
terms of equality and integration, rather than separation and exclusion”(The London 
One State Group 2007).  
It is to an intellectual mapping of the alternative conception of the 
world underpinning this movement—with its critique of the common 
sense notions of Oslo, its elaboration of an anti-Zionist platform of 
unity with interlinked anti-Zionist strategies and practices, as well as its 
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boundaries of inclusion and exclusion—that the remainder of this 
chapter will now turn. 
C. A Critique of the Common Sense of Oslo and After 
 
Since, as highlighted in the previous chapters, counterhegemony must 
begin within the historical common sense notions elaborated by a 
hegemonic status quo in order for organic intellectuals to overcome 
them with their constituencies, empower them and revolutionize their 
modes of thinking and acting by elaborating an alternative conception 
of the world—this chapter begins by briefly outlining the common sense 
notions of the Oslo Accords and after. These common sense notions are 
outlined as perceived, articulated and struggled against by single state 
organic intellectuals themselves—and as such, represent the base from 
within which their struggle to highlight them as an oppressive form of 
ideology that must be overcome in favour of a worldview that is more 
aligned with the realities on the ground springs.  
1. Oslo represents the Launching of a Process of Peace  
It is important to underline that for single state intellectuals, the fact 
that the American-sponsored peace process since Oslo does not reflect 
the launching of a comprehensive process for peace based upon the 
desire for justice and reconciliation—but rather represents a process of 
separation and fragmentation—is to be found in its choice of historical 
point of beginning. Thus, the choice of beginning the peace process in 
1967 (as opposed to 1948) results in the erasure of the Palestinian 
Nakba, in absolving Israel of any responsibility for the ethnic cleansing 
of 1948, and as such in closing a significant door for justice and 
reconciliation between the two people. Furthermore, beginning the 
peace process in 1967 denies Palestinian history and rights to self-
determination by setting the OPT as the only territorial part of historical 
Palestine upon which negotiations can be held. As such, the peace 
process involved negotiations that would lead to further territorial 
concessions and fragmentation within the WBGS from its inception. 
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Furthermore, by negating 1948, it was also based upon the 
fragmentation of the Palestinian collective from its inception—excluding 
both the Palestinians inside Israel, and the Palestinian refugees from the 
negotiating table. As such, the single state movement is an effort to 
relocate the search for peace and justice between Israelis and 
Palestinians in 1948, and crucially, represents a force that seeks to 
reunify the Palestinian collective “around an idea that serves the rights 
and the agenda and aspirations of all of us” (Abunimah, Ali 2007).  
In parallel to this, single state intellectuals argue that it is only by 
beginning in 1948, that true processes of justice and reconciliation can 
be launched between the two people. Thus Eitan Bronstein argues, 
“One state is the only arrangement that will permit Palestinian refugees to realise their 
right to return. The implementation of this right is both moral and a necessary step 
towards ending the conflict and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. It also 
gives the Israelis the opportunity to be true inhabitants of this land rather than 
settlers or colonisers. Only after Israeli Jews accept the right of return will they 
become aware of the real history and geography of the country, rather than knowing 
only the mythology of the land of Israel” (Bronstein, Eitan 2007).  
It is from within this critique that the One State Declaration stipulates 
that any process of peace must begin in 1948, and involve all of the 
inhabitants of Mandate Palestine, regardless of ethnicity, religion and 
current citizenship status.  
2. Oslo Marks the Beginning of a Process Towards a Two-State Solution 
to the Conflict 
While Oslo was applauded by the international community as the 
beginning of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
single state intellectuals argue that it represented the launching and 
exacerbation of Zionist processes of separation and colonization on the 
ground. While, these processes themselves were highlighted in the 
previous chapter, it is important to note that single state intellectuals 
view the fact that the peace process is officially accepted as one that will 
lead to a two-state solution as both a “misnaming” of the two-state 
solution itself, and as a deflection from the realities on the ground 
within Israel/Palestine that have made a two-state solution territorially 
and economically unviable. In parallel to this, single state intellectuals 
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view the concessions made by Arafat—in order to be able to return to 
the OPT and launch a war of position from within—as the beginning of 
the emergence of a Palestinian Authority that was placed in an 
inevitable position of collaboration with Israeli occupation and 
colonization, while simultaneously having sidelined Palestinian popular 
resistance. To this effect, Said famously wrote,  
“The sudden transformation of Arafat from freedom-fighter and “terrorist” into an 
Israeli enforcer and a guest at the White House has been difficult for Palestinians to 
absorb… most Palestinians saw the new Arafat as the symbol of defeat” (Said 2001d: 
551).  
While the details of this have been dealt with in the previous chapter, it 
should be stressed that this critique reflects the fact that the single 
state movement is an attempt at re-igniting non-violent Palestinian mass 
resistance to the continuing processes of separation and colonization on 
the ground, as well as a call for both reformulating the PA and re-
democratizing the PLO into a mass organization that represents, 
empowers and re-unifies the whole Palestinian collective. Equally 
important to note is that it is due to this position on the two-state 
solution—as mislabelled in the framework of the peace process—that 
single state intellectuals do not perceive their battle to be one that is 
against two-state solution supporters, but one that is against the 
processes of Zionism, and against those who collaborate with its 
processes.  
3. The Palestinian Authority represents the Palestinian People 
As previously argued, only Arafat and his small entourage in Tunis were 
involved in the acceptance of the terms of the Oslo Accords on behalf of 
the PLO—which resulted in a crisis of representation within the 
Palestinian national collective, as well as a questioning of the legitimacy 
of a leadership that viewed the internationally recognized rights of its 
collective as bargaining chips that could be compromised. As such, 
Joseph Massad underlines that,  
“To date, no Diaspora Palestinian has proposed to Israel that if Israel grant the 
Diaspora a right of return, in exchange, it could deny West Bank and Gaza Palestinians 
their right to self- determination, and continue to colonize their land. Why then does 
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the leadership of the West bank believe that it can compromise the rights of 
Palestinians it does not even represent? (Massad, Joseph 2007). 
In accepting the terms of Oslo and after, the PLO officially accepted the 
fragmentation of the Palestinian collective and the erasure of the rights 
of the Palestinian Diaspora and refugees and Palestinian-Israelis. Hence, 
single state intellectuals argue that the view that the PA represents the 
Palestinian people today, is one that only holds if the only people 
recognized as Palestinians are Palestinians who are native to the WBGS 
(and not the Palestinian refugees currently present within the WBGS). In 
this vein then, it would make sense that the only Palestinians set to 
benefit from within the peace process would be native WBGS 
Palestinians. However, single state intellectuals point out that even these 
Palestinians’ lives have been made significantly worse by the processes 
of Oslo, with the “only hope awaiting them being an apartheid 
Bantustan solution” (Massad, Joseph 2007).  
It is from within this context that single state intellectuals seek to throw 
the PA into the “dustbin of history” (Massad, Joseph 2007), and to re-
democratize the PLO. More significantly, it is also from within this 
context that the single state movement can be perceived as one initially 
launched as a war of position of the Palestinian Diaspora, Palestinian 
refugees, and Palestinian-Israelis. As reflected in the One State 
Declaration, it is those who have been historically silenced by Oslo who 
must now become central agents in the articulation, mobilization and 
creation of a more just alternative to the status quo. An alternative 
based upon the urgent need to re-unify the Palestinian national 
collective once again within a mutually inclusive liberation struggle.  
D. Re-inserting Silenced Facts on the Ground 
 
Perhaps it is important to begin this section by noting that the single 
state alternative conception of the world emerged from within an 
explicit Saidian-Gramscian political desire to highlight the territorial 
facts on the ground that have been silenced by an abstracted peace 
process since Oslo. Thus, single state intellectuals seek to push the 
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oppressive common sense notions of the peace process “back into the 
human struggles from which they emerge” (Said 2001: 86), and to re-
insert the “gross physical evidence of human activity” (Said 2001: 86)—
in all of their messy complexities—back into the discussion of the 
promotion of peace and justice in Palestine/Israel. Hence, for single 
state intellectuals, their political project of counterhegemony represents 
the exact opposite of what many two-state solution supporters accuse 
them of—namely, that they are engaged in a dangerous exercise of 
promoting an impossible utopian alternative to a conflict that requires 
an urgent solution more than ever before. Thus, Eyal Sivan argues,  
“It might be a professional deformation, or just a refusal of notions like utopia—but I 
have a problem in speaking about a one state solution…as a future idea. I deal with 
documentary cinema and documentary cinema deals with what exists. One state…is 
the accurate juridical definition of what is today the ruling power over Palestine, or 
Eretz Israel. (This) is not (about) a revolutionary position that requires us to think 
about how we can create this one state. What I’m talking about is more modest, and 
more concrete—the transformation of the existing one state into a democratic state” 
(Sivan, Eyal 2007).  
It is also within this context of dealing with what exists that Virginia 
Tilley’s book The One State Solution, sought to ignite a debate 
highlighting what she termed the “immovable obstacles on the ground” 
that rendered a two-state solution unviable—the most important among 
them of course being the expanding illegal Israeli settlements in the 
OPT. Thus, she stresses that her book sought to illustrate,  
“The geographic realities of the settlement grid—that huge and deliberately sprawling 
network of stone and concrete cities, suburbs, industrial zones and highways that has 
already dissected the West Bank into cantons—as well as the social, political and 
economic grids that underpin them” (Tilley 2006).  
As has been underlined in the previous chapter, this settlement grid 
itself is designed to form blocks, which grow outwards and towards 
each other in order to remain territorially continuous—and enclose 
Palestinian areas into fragmented cantons (Powell & Isaac 2007). 
Significantly, part of this illegal settlement design also aims at annexing 
Jerusalem to Israel and disconnecting it from the West Bank. As Yoav 
Peled points out, the settlement grid itself,  
“Was designed, in terms of its density and territorial dispersion, to make the 
occupation irreversible by fragmenting the territory of the potential Palestinian state 
and making the removal of the settlements impossible. The settlements are inhabited 
  
137 
by over 200,000 people, plus another 200,000 in the area that Israel has already 
annexed as ‘Jerusalem’” (Peled 2006).  
In a much publicized debate with two-state supporter Uri Avnery, Ilan 
Pappe echoes the irreversibility of the settlements on the ground of the 
OPT, stressing that it is the two-state solution that has become utopian 
and divorced from reality,  
“If this unrealistic two-state formula—that says that settlements can be dismantled—is 
realizable, who is going to dismantle Gilo? Who is going to dismantle Ma’ale Adumim? 
The real two-state formula is the one being implemented in front of our eyes. It means 
fifty percent of the West Bank annexed to Israel, and the other fifty percent as a 
Bantustan surrounded by walls and fences, but with a Palestinian flag” (Pappe & 
Avnery 2007). 
In this context of being painted as disconnected dreamers by those who 
oppose them, it is perhaps also important to note that many among 
today’s single state activists and intellectuals had been two-state 
solution supporters themselves. As such, it is this collision with ‘the 
facts on the ground’ that prompted them to re-orient their struggle for 
the re-emergence of a single state as an alternative. Moreover, as Pappe 
emphasizes, this conclusion that the two-state solution had collapsed 
was reached by diverse groups of people within this historical 
conjuncture—and it is within this convergence that the alternative idea’s 
resurgent power lies (Pappe, interview). 
Furthermore, it is important to underline that if the single state 
alternative indeed represented an unattainable flight of fancy, it would 
not have been the subject of the fears, (counter) strategies and debates 
of many among Israel/Palestine’s formally two-state supporting political 
elite. Hence, Ehud Olmert’s famous assertion in Haaretz after the 
Annapolis Conference that,  
“If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, and we face a South African-
style struggle for equal voting rights (also for the Palestinians in the territories), then, 
the State of Israel is finished…The Jewish organizations, which were our power base in 
America, will be the first to come out against us, because they will say they cannot 
support a state that does not support democracy and equal voting rights for all its 
residents” (Landau et al. 2007).  
As shall be seen below, this fear resulted in the reformulation of official 
Israeli policy in the form of the disengagement plan under Sharon and 
the convergence plan under Olmert himself. Moreover, as Al-Jazeera 
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recently reported, the PA began using the single state alternative as a 
threat during negotiations with the Israelis since the Annapolis 
Conference—in an effort to counter the increasingly expanding illegal 
settlement construction and colonization of the West Bank, and the 
demise of a viable two-state solution—with the outcome that the Israelis 
feared the most (Poort 2011). Significantly, by 2009 Saeb Erekat (the 
chief PA negotiator) declared the one-state solution the Best Alternative 
to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) during a meeting with US Middle 
East Envoy George Mitchell—despite the fact that up until 2008 Erekat 
had come out strongly against the single state idea. By November 6, 
2009 Juan Cole quotes Erakat as saying,  
“Palestine Authority president Mahmoud Abbas should be frank with the Palestinian 
people and admit to them that there is no possibility of a two-state solution given 
continued Israeli colonization of the West Bank. It is morally and ethically 
unconscionable to leave millions of Palestinians in a condition of statelessness, in 
which they have no rights. Therefore, if there isn’t going to be a two-state solution, 
there will have to be a one-state solution, in which Israel gives citizenship to the 
Palestinians” (Cole 2009). 
As some single state intellectuals have argued, one of the signs of 
successfully challenging a hegemonic idea is being able to force yourself 
on the agenda—especially when you represent a marginalized 
alternative. As many other single state intellectuals have argued, there is 
inspiration in Ghandi’s words, “First they ignore you, then they laugh at 
you, then they fight you, then you win” (Abunimah, interview). In this 
context, it is a considerable achievement that the single state idea has 
swiftly gone from both being ignored and ridiculed—to being feared and 
fought against by the official Israeli political elite, and perhaps equally 
feared but used as a threat by their official Palestinian counterparts.  
 
III. An Anti-Zionist Conception of the World: Intellectual Points of 
Beginning, Unity and Re-Orientation 
 
As highlighted above, perhaps the strongest unifying thread within the 
single state conception of the world—and hence its point of beginning 
as a counterhegemonic movement against the principle of separation 
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embedded within Oslo—is that it is a resistance movement aimed at the 
dismantling of Zionism’s worldview and interlinked processes of 
separation on the ground. As such, it is politically committed to the de-
Zionization of the land of historical Palestine. What follows in this 
section is an outlining of both the unified critique of Zionism presented 
by single state intellectuals, as well as the positive intellectual re-
orientations they seek to set in motion with the aim of transcending it 
and its interlinked set of processes. The core elements within this 
critique of Zionism are argued to be an emphasis upon the important 
distinction between Zionism and Judaism, a highlighting of both the 
settler-colonial and exclusionary nature of Zionism, as well as an 
underlining of the peculiar dangers this form of exclusionary settler-
colonialism represents when it is coupled with the equally entrenched 
desire to create a democracy upon as much of the land of ‘Greater 
Israel’ as possible.  
These core elements of the of single state intellectuals’ conception of 
the world are the platform from within which they advance a set of 
interlinked positive intellectual re-formulations against the hegemony of 
Zionism’s worldview. These reformulations are argued to firstly center 
upon breaking the taboo of critically and publicly engaging with the 
nature of Zionism and the Israeli regime (in Europe and North America), 
and its links to settler-colonialism, occupation, separation and 
apartheid. Paralleling this is an effort to “South-Africanize” the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in order to unveil the specific nature of Israeli 
apartheid and Palestinian fragmentation and dispossession—and make a 
case for launching a boycott, sanctions and divestment (BDS) strategy of 
resistance to it. Interlinked with this—this section argues—is a political 
stand taken by single state intellectuals against partition, a 
problematizating of the artificial, essentialist binary identities of ‘Arab’ 
and ‘Jew’ underpinning hegemonic understandings of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and a re-instertion of a notion of equal citizenship 
and democracy as important remedies to many of these common sense 
impasses.  
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A. A Unified Critique of Zionism  
 
Following the Encyclopedia Hebraica, Uri Davis defines Zionism as “a 
Jewish national movement emerging at the end of the nineteenth 
century” (Davis 2003: 7) that had as its objective the “returning the 
people of Israel to their historical homeland in the land of Israel” (Davis 
2003: 7). This return was inspired by “a vision of return to Zion (a 
synonym for Jerusalem)” (Davis 2003: 7). Of the various schools of 
thought that this definition encompasses, it was “political Zionism, 
founded by Theodor Herzl, (which) became the hegemonic and 
dominant mainstream” (Davis 2003: 7). Political Zionism itself 
represents a school of thought and interlinked practice that,  
“Is committed to the normative statement that it is a good idea to establish and 
consolidate in the country of Palestine a sovereign state, a Jewish state, that attempts 
to guarantee in law and in practice a demographic majority of the Jewish tribes in the 
territories under its control” (Davis 2003: 7).  
As Ilan Pappe argues, this form of Zionism “secularized and 
nationalized Judaism” (Pappe 2007: 11). According to Judaism itself, 
“Palestine had been revered throughout the centuries by generations of 
Jews as a place for holy pilgrimage, never as a future secular state” 
(Pappe 2007: 10). Furthermore, “Jewish tradition and religion clearly 
instructs Jews to await the coming of the promised Messiah…before 
they can return to Eretz Israel as a sovereign people…(which) is why 
today several streams of Ultra-Orthodox Jews are either non or anti-
Zionist” (Pappe 2007: 10). As such, the single state conception of the 
world seeks to highlight the important distinction between Zionism and 
Judaism, as well as the fact that Zionism goes against the central 
tenants of Judaism, and as such, should not be allowed to speak for—or 
act in the name of—those who belong to the Jewish faith. In this vein, at 
the single state Madrid Conference in 2007, Steven Freedman argued 
that Zionism represented a revolt against the mainstream and widely 
held beliefs of Judaism. Thus,  
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“It is very important that Zionism, as the leading force of the essentialization process 
that has taken place within Jewish identity, be undone and deconstructed, in order to 
erase its structural and fundamental characteristics (colonialist, separatist, racist), 
which are indeed the main obstacles to a just and long-term solution in the region” 
(Salamanca 2007: 57-80).  
Similarly, while Zionism emerged due to the growing persecution of 
Jews in Europe in the late 1880s (Pappe 2007: 10), many single state 
Jewish-Israeli intellectuals argue that it simultaneously has a complex 
inter-relationship with anti-Jewish racism itself. Thus, Davis highlights 
that though political Zionism is based upon the premise that it can offer 
a solution to anti-Jewish racism, it is in fact simultaneously interlinked 
to this racism—since they both “share a common worldview on the 
existential status of Jewish minority communities in non-Jewish 
societies” (Davis 2003: 11). He elaborates,  
“Both the political Zionist and the anti-Jewish racist believe that, given the 
fundamental racial incompatibility of Jews and non-Jew, Jews…cannot…be equal 
citizens and free minority communities within a non-Jewish society and polity…For the 
political Zionist, Jewish society must also be segregated outside the body of ‘Gentile’ 
society, in this case in Palestine” (Davis 2003: 11). 
Haim Bresheeth echoes this analysis at the single state Madrid 
Conference, arguing that Zionism and anti-Semitism have in common 
that they both agree upon the distressing notion that Jewish people 
must, and want to separate themselves from the rest of humanity 
(Salamanca 2007). 
In a different vein, Pappe underlines that while the impulses from 
within which Zionism emerged as a movement can be argued to have 
been both fair and humanistic, the moment it decided that its aims 
would be implemented on the land of Palestine—Zionism was 
transformed into a settler-colonial movement (Pappe & Avnery 2007). 
Elaborating upon this point, Davis writes that political Zionism’s 
solution to anti-Jewish racism involved: 
“The transformation of the Arab country of Palestine…into the Jewish land of Israel, 
through the dispossession and mass transfer of the native indigenous Palestinian Arab 
population out of Palestine, the mass migration of Jews the world over into Palestine, 
and the establishment, through the Jewish colonization of Palestine of a sovereign 
Jewish state…” (Davis 2003: 19).  
While the Zionist colonization of Palestine reflected European practices 
of colonization, single state intellectuals emphasize that there was one 
  
142 
crucial difference—namely that Zionism did not colonize the land in 
order to dispossess and exploit the indigenous population, but to 
dispossess and replace, or exclude them. Thus, Davis writes,  
“Among the key Zionist slogan were not only the ‘conquest of land’ but, equally 
important, ‘the conquest of labour’. As expressed in the programme of (‘The Young 
Worker’) Party, ‘The necessary condition for the realization of Zionism is the conquest 
of all branches of labour in Eretz Israel by Jews’” (Davis 2003: 27).  
As Patrick Wolfe argues, this form of elimination (of the indigenous 
population) is structural, and in the context of the conquest of labour, 
“subordinated economic efficiency to the demands of building a self-
sufficient proto-national Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) at the 
expense of the surrounding Arab population” (Wolfe 2006: 390). It is 
through this practice of conquering both land and labour that the 
problem of creating an exclusively Jewish state amidst an overwhelming 
Arab majority population was resolved. It is also from within this 
context that single state intellectuals argue that the laws and 
institutions of the Israeli state represent a form of apartheid. As Davis 
writes, “the legal structure and the routine of everyday life of the Israeli 
Jewish society are determined in every domain by the apartheid 
distinction of ‘Jew’ versus ‘non-Jew’” (Davis 2003: 157).  
It is important to note however, that in the case of Israel—the official 
veiling of the existence of this apartheid in practice is crucial, since it is 
perceived (as reflected in Olmert’s statement above) that openly 
embracing apartheid in written documents linked to the law, the 
purchase of land, or joining the labour force would cause a serious blow 
to its American support. This is viewed as especially the case among the 
American-Jewish community, and what Tilley has described as a, 
“matrix of high-profile pro-Israeli ‘research’ and lobbying organizations, 
coordinated with a nationwide array of small but active grassroots 
constituencies which are regularly mobilized to pressure Congress and 
the media” (Tilley 2006). Thus, as Davis details, the state of Israel deals 
with this dilemma by enshrining the crucial distinction between ‘Jew’ 
and ‘non-Jew’ in its laws through a “two-tiered structure…that has 
preserved the veil of ambiguity over Israeli apartheid legislation for over 
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half a century” (Davis 2003: 39). Through this system, the first tier 
distinguishes openly between ‘Jew’ and ‘non-Jew’, and involves the 
“Constitutions and Articles of Association of all the institutions of the 
Zionist movement and, in the first instance, the World Zionist 
Organization (WZO), the Jewish Agency (JA), and the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF)” (Davis 2003: 40). The second tier incorporates the 
constitutions and articles of these agencies into the laws of the Israeli 
state (Davis 2003: 40)—using legislation such as the Knesset’s WZO/JA 
Status Law of 1952 (Davis 2003: 44)—while making no explicit mention 
of the open distinction between ‘Jew’ and ‘non-Jew’ above. Thus,  
“It is through this two-tiered mechanism that an all-encompassing apartheid system 
could be legislated by the Israeli Knesset in all that pertains to access to land under 
Israeli sovereignty and control without resorting to explicit and frequent mention of 
‘Jew” as a legal category, versus ‘non-Jew’” (Davis 2003: 43).  
Of course, as Oren Yiftachel underlines, this duality became more 
difficult to veil after Israel’s 1967 occupation of the OPT—when the 
difference between its democratic features and its political programme 
of de-Arabizing the land became more stark, and the subject of much 
criticism (Yiftachel 2000). It is from within this context that Jamil Hilal 
argues that Zionism is a special branch of European settler 
colonialism—one that is an exclusivist ethno-religious state building 
project (Hilal 2007).  
Similarly, it is from within this context that Pappe contends that the real 
source of the Palestinian tragedy is rooted within the fact that the 
Jewish population of Mandatory Palestine was so small—coupled with 
the Zionist movement’s insistence upon creating both an exclusively 
ethnic Jewish state, as well as a democratic state. It is this irreconcilable 
logic, Pappe argues, that led to the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians 
in the past—and that lies at the core of the continued Israeli genocidal 
policies against the Palestinians today, due to the above mentioned 
paradox of a continued desire for more land, yet less Palestinians. On 
the obsession with a “demographic danger” within Israel, As’ad Ghanem 
writes,  
  
144 
“The discourse on the future of Israel is based, according to most of Israel’s leaders, 
elite, and average public, on what is known as the ‘demographic danger’. Related to the 
‘demographic danger’ is the fear that Israel, within its extended borders, including the 
West Bank and Gaza, or within the limits of the borders before the June 1967 war, 
would sooner or later turn into a ‘bi-national’ state” (Ghanem 2007: 48).  
As highlighted in the previous chapter, it is also this irreconcilable logic 
that lies behind the “Bantustanization” of the OPT—the blueprint for 
which was laid out in Oslo, along the lines of a reformulated Allon Plan. 
In this context, it should be noted that two-state solution supporters 
make much of Ariel Sharon’s disengagement from Gaza (and to a less 
extent of Olmert’s consequent ‘Convergence Plan’) to argue that single 
state supporters are misguided to stress the expanding settlements as 
immovable facts on the ground. However, single state intellectuals argue 
that both the disengagement and convergence plans cannot be viewed 
separately from Israel’s desire to preserve its Jewish character as a 
state—while simultaneously annexing as much resource-rich West Bank 
land as possible. Thus, it is precisely during the Sharon and Olmert 
years that this process of “Bantustanization” was made most clearly 
visible on the ground—and within Israeli public discourse. As Lily 
Galilee writes in Haaretz on the link between disengagement from Gaza, 
Ariel Sharon, and Professor Arnon Sofer’s work on the “demographic 
crisis” (Ghanem 2007: 50-1):  
“Demography, as the science that examines changes in the make-up of the population, 
has always existed. But there is no doubt that the sense of the threat that has been felt 
by the Jewish population of Israel during the past two years has removed it from the 
academic realm to daily discourse. From it, transfer has now sprouted as a legitimate 
outlook” (Galili 2002). 
Citing parts of the letter itself that Sofer sent to Sharon, Ghalili writes,  
“Most of the inhabitants of Israel realize that there is only one solution in the face of 
our insane and suicidal neighbor—separation,” wrote Sofer. “You should have known 
this months before they did, as the grave demographic data were put on your desk 
many months ago. In the absence of separation, the meaning of such a majority [of 
Arabs] is the end of the Jewish state of Israel” (Galili 2002).  
As Ghanem argues, Sharon himself was a reflection of Israel’s 
irreconcilable dilemma since its 1967 occupation of the WBGS—namely 
a belief in the “Greater Land of Israel”, coupled with a fear of a bi-
national reality and a desire to maintain both the Jewish and democratic 
character of the Israeli state (Ghanem 2007: 52). Disengagement 
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represented the answer to these irreconcilabilities, based upon a vision, 
“to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and 42% of the…West Bank in return 
for annexing those Palestinian areas where Jewish settlements are 
established and other West Bank areas with coveted resources” (Ghanem 
2007: 52). Similarly, commenting upon the inherent link between 
Olmert’s Convergence Plan and the desire to preserve the nature of 
Israel as a Jewish state through separation (from the Palestinians), 
Jonathan Cook states, “The disengagement from Gaza last year and now 
the convergence plan for the West Bank are about… protecting Israel as 
a “Jewish and democratic” state in the sense that Palestinians, citizens 
and non-citizens alike, will be excluded” (Cook & Bistrich 2006). 
As Ghanem details, Olmert took over after Sharon with the same vision, 
and proclaimed that Israel’s “dramatic and important mission” (Ghanem 
2007: 55) was to “demarcate permanent borders so as to ensure a 
Jewish majority” (Ghanem 2007: 55). Ghanem cites Olmert’s telling 2006 
closing statement Herzliya Conference on Israeli security:  
“The term ‘Jewish nation’ is absolutely clear: it means a Jewish majority. With this 
Zionism began, and it is the basis of its existence…We firmly stand by the historic 
right of Israel to the entire Land of Israel…However, the choice between the desire to 
allow every Jew to live anywhere…to the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish 
country—obligates relinquishing parts of the Land…This is not the relinquishing of the 
Zionist idea, rather the essential realization of the Zionist goal—ensuring the existence 
of a Jewish and democratic state” (Ghanem 2007: 55-6).  
As Elia Zureik highlights, this resurgence in the open talk of transfer 
and expulsion within the mainstream Israeli media, its academic 
institutions and the government of Sharon (Zureik 2003), brings the 
struggle within Israel/Palestine against Zionist settler-colonialism full 
circle. As Jewish-American Tony Judt has written, one marked difference 
is that today Israel finds itself at the start of the 21st century, and as 
such in danger of standing on the wrong side of history. In an article 
that triggered the ire of many within the US, and sparked an urgently 
overdue debate upon the nature of Israeli regime, Judt wrote,  
“The very idea of a “Jewish state”—a state in which Jews and the Jewish religion have 
exclusive privileges from which non-Jewish citizens are forever excluded—is rooted in 
another time and place. Israel, in short, is an anachronism” (Judt 2003).  
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As has been shown above, it is precisely this schism that single state 
intellectuals attempt to unveil, and struggle against, with their 
alternative anti-Zionist conception of the world. As previously 
emphasized, this struggle is based within a deployment of a process of 
critical pedagogy based upon the need for organic intellectuals to work 
within their own communities in order to transcend the common sense 
notions of the present status quo. Thus, as Pappe stated, single state 
intellectuals believe that, “There is a need for people who struggle with 
their society. The kind of people who can say to their society: I’m sorry, 
the collective ideological identity which you have chosen is (immoral), 
and impossible to maintain” (Pappe & Avnery 2007). It is to the 
interlinked strategies and paradigm shifts of the promotion of the 
single state conception of the world that the next section will turn.  
B. Transcending Zionism: Positive Intellectual Re-Orientations  
1. Attacking Zionism: Breaking a Taboo, “South-Africanizing” the 
Conflict and Re-Unifying Palestinians 
 
The link between what Wolfe calls the “Western myopia concerning the 
on-going catastrophe in Palestine” (Wolfe 2007: 315) and the “casting of 
Israelis as victims” (Wolfe 2007: 315), should not be under-estimated as 
a powerful mechanism through which the legitimization of Israeli 
settler-colonialism is maintained in the West’s public consciousness. 
Wolfe argues that while “dispossession is not altered by 
absentmindedness” (Wolfe 2007: 315), breaking through this Western 
myopia requires a highlighting of Zionism as a settler-colonial 
movement that intentionally planned the dispossession and ethnic 
cleansing of the Palestinian people in order to replace them. Thus, he 
writes,  
“The idea that Zionists planned the expulsion of the natives in advance of Palestinians’ 
‘miraculous’ 1948 mass flight is seen as injurious to the crucial image of Israelis as 
victims. So long as Israelis are cast as victims, their opponents figure contrapuntally as 
the persecutors of Jews, a formula whereby Palestinians have been cast as succeeding 
to the mantle of Nazism” (Wolfe 2007: 315).  
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It was in this context, years earlier that Said told David Barsamian, 
“Palestinians have the misfortune of being oppressed by a rare 
adversary, a people who themselves have suffered long and deeply from 
persecution...The uniqueness of our position is that we are the victims 
of the victims” (Barsamian et al. 2010: 15). Breaking through this taboo 
of holding critical debates and conversations on the nature of Zionism, 
coupled with the moral stature of Jewish-Israelis as victims (Said et al. 
2000: 432) is one of the central aims of the single state conception of 
the world—one that is intimately interlinked with a need to decolonize 
the minds of their own communities, as well as open up space for the 
creation of an alternative vision for justice and coexistence within 
Israel/Palestine. As seen above, this aim is coupled with the desire to re-
insert the history of the conflict itself, and counter the erasing of the 
Palestinian Nakba of 1948. As Pappe states, “We have to move (the 
conflict) out of the Occupied Territories” (Pappe, interview). Thus, it is 
important to underline that while the two-state solution focuses upon 
ending the Israeli military occupation and colonization of the WBGS—
the single state solution is about ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
as a whole; de-Zionizing the land of Palestine; and transforming the 
struggle into one that revolves around democracy and equal citizenship.  
In this vein, it was in 2003 that single state advocate Virginia Tilley 
published her groundbreaking book, The One State Solution, declaring 
the two-state solution dead (Tilley 2003), and followed it up with an 
article for the New York Review of Books. It was also within this juncture 
that Tony Judt’s article, “Israel: The Alternative” was published in the 
New York Review of Books, declaring Israel to be “an anachronism of its 
time” (Judt 2003), and a state that is in danger of being on the wrong 
side of history. Due to the article’s controversial and high profile 
reception by the majority of American intellectuals and audiences, it can 
be argued it went a long way towards launching the single state debate 
into public consciousness. In parallel, both these written interventions 
triggered the take-off of the intellectual “one state versus two-state” 
academic debate—which itself triggered a sudden flurry of written 
  
148 
interventions2 (the most influential of which were published in the New 
Left Review in 2006 and Counterpunch in 2008) as well as conferences, 
panels, talks, pod-casts and blogs dedicated to this topic.  
It is important to note that the ignition of this intellectual debate did in 
effect go a long way towards lifting the taboo on questioning Zionism 
and the nature of the regime of the state of Israel in the US (and, to a 
lesser extent, in the UK and Canada). In an article published in The 
Nation in 2003 entitled, “The One State Solution”, Daniel Lazare argues 
that whereas it was impossible to have an honest conversation about 
Zionism in the US previously, it has now become impossible not to 
(Lazare 2003). In Counterpunch, former CIA analysts Kathy and Bill 
Christison declared Zionism a form of racism, and sought to remind 
American audiences of the UNGA’s resolution in 1975 declaring it a 
racist ideology according to the UN’s principles and definitions of 
racism and racial discrimination (K. Christison & B. Christison 2003). 
Helena Cobban also joined the chorus of voices calling for reconsidering 
bi-nationalism (Cobban 2003), while Jeff Halper described Israel’s 
irreversible “matrix of control” in the OPT and the resulting apartheid 
system on the land of historic Palestine at the UN’s International 
Conference on Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People (Halper 
2003). Within this speech, Halper declared the two-state solution 
“doomed”, and a delusion that disguised permanent apartheid (Halper 
2003).  
Though this taboo on critically discussing the nature of Zionism is 
largely an American construction—it was also in 2003 that mainstream 
Labour Zionist Daniel Gavron published his book, The Other Side of 
Despair (Gavron 2004). Concluding that a two-state solution is no longer 
possible, Gavron advocated a move to a multiethnic democratic state. 
That same year, Zionist establishment figure and then mayor of 
Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti declared the two-state paradigm 
                                                 
2 For an example of a written intervention in opposition to the single state idea, see 
Benny Morris One State, Two States, Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2009).  
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“unworkable” in Haaretz (Benvenisti 2003b). Benvenisti also gave a 
seminar at the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of 
International Affairs underlining that binationalism is not a future 
solution, but the current reality in historic Palestine disguised as the 
“military occupation” of the WBGS (Benvenisti 2003a). As such, 
Benvenisti argued that binationalism is the only framework from within 
which a workable solution must be sought (Benvenisti 2003a). The same 
year also witnessed the publishing of Avi Shavit’s “Cry the Beloved Two 
State Solution” in Haaretz—in which he reflected on the fact that both 
Israeli mainstream Zionist figures and members of the radical left were 
declaring the two-state solution unworkable and calling for democracy 
and binationalism (Shavit 2003). This phenomenon in itself highlights 
the extent to which ‘the facts on the ground’ created by Israel were 
irreversible, and how profoundly this reality had transformed the search 
for workable solutions and viable futures.  
Perhaps also important to note is that besides being instrumental in 
packing a blow to the American taboo on discussing Zionism, this same 
intellectual debate had the complementary effect of revealing a platform 
from within which anti-Zionist like-minded activists, academics, 
organizations, students and individuals involved in Palestine/Israel 
could locate each other, share stories, find common ground, and create 
what some have termed to be a growing single state grassroots 
“movement” or “network”. This almost cathartic platform materialised 
as a result of the many conferences, panels and debates on the single 
state solution that suddenly took off in 2004. Beginning with the 
Lausanne University conference entitled “One Democratic State in 
Palestine/Israel” in 2004, these conferences reached a crescendo in 2007 
and 2008 in both Europe and Palestine/Israel; finally managed to cross 
the Atlantic in 2008/2009; and continue to multiply as of the present 
writing. This wave of activity also resulted in the formation of some 
single state groups—many of which were launched by student activists, 
academics, as well as activists in Israel/Palestine.  
  
150 
In parallel to this, it is simultaneously within this juncture that single 
state advocates began to draw parallels between Israeli apartheid and 
South African apartheid, and to call for “South Africanizing” the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict instead of the continued use of the occupation-
liberation paradigm. Thus, in 2003, Uri Davis published his critically 
acclaimed book Apartheid Israel detailing Zionism’s specific form of 
apartheid (Davis 2003). In Press Action, Mark Hand noted that there is a 
movement growing in favour of binationalism in Israel/Palestine, which 
is causing “advocates of apartheid Israel” much concern (Hand 2003). 
Barghouti re-named the two-state solution “the apartheid solution”, and 
detailed Israel’s form of apartheid as a “three-tiered” form of apartheid, 
consisting of, 
“The occupation and colonization of the 1967 territory; the system of racial 
discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel, which is the Zionist form of 
apartheid; and the total denial of refugee rights, particularly the right to return home 
and to reparations” (Barghouti, Omar 2009). 
In this vein, it should be noted that another driving force behind this 
strategy revolves around the re-unification of the fragmented 
Palestinian national collective. For by centering the struggle around 
Zionism, and its multiple forms of apartheid—the rights and aspirations 
of all three segments of the Palestinians are taken into account, and the 
struggle for Palestinian liberation is re-aligned as one that is mutually 
inclusive, and hence a more powerful force.  
The move to the apartheid paradigm itself is one that had begun to be 
advocated by scholars in the post-Oslo period—and especially by 
scholars who believed that this paradigm shift was the only avenue left 
from within which Palestinians could hope to break through the 
intransigent wall of US elite support for Israel and their inaccurate 
reflection, and hence popular understanding, of the occupation-
liberation paradigm within this specific conflict. Moreover, as single 
state intellectuals point out, it is also the most accurate reflection of the 
obscured reality on the ground in Israel/Palestine. On this paradigm 
shift, George Bisharat states,  
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“One of the reasons, that the anti-apartheid movement in the US reached such heights, 
was because it resonated with the American civil rights movement... Unfortunately, 
that’s not the way Israel/Palestine reads to Americans…if you talk to Americans about 
settlers or settlements some of them actually have a positive connotation of that, 
because it reminds them of the American west and pioneering settlers—it’s not a bad 
term. Apartheid however, they all know that apartheid is bad. They all respond to it. 
So, yes, I think that analogy…is a valuable tool. And it’s not just a valuable tool—it’s 
accurate” (Bisharat, interview). 
Similarly, Barghouti underlines the importance this paradigm shift 
represents in terms of the moral and legal power it contains for 
Palestinians within the realm of the established legal conventions of the 
‘international community: 
“The significance to the Palestinian struggle for self-determination of the fact that 
international law considers apartheid a crime against humanity that therefore invites 
sanctions…cannot be overemphasized. The UN and the international community know 
full well…how to deal with apartheid; all Palestinians and defenders of justice have to 
do is prove…how Israel’s…(regime) constitute(s) apartheid” (Barghouti 2011b: 63-4).  
As shall be illustrated in later chapters, the space this reformulation 
opens up for the launching of an anti-apartheid BDS campaign for the 
rights of all three segments of the Palestinians proves to both resonate 
with these wider publics and civil society institutions, and to contain 
much potential of expansive power.  
One of the most recent reflections of the strength of this paradigm shift 
came in March 2011, when veteran diplomat Ilan Baruch resigned from 
his post in the Israeli Foreign Ministry (as Ambassador to South Africa) 
stating that, “Over the past two years the political and diplomatic 
messages by the state’s leaders, which have grown more pointed, have 
infuriated me and given me no rest. I find it difficult to represent them 
and explain them honestly” (Ravid 2011). In the aftermath of his 
resignation Haaretz reports that several senior Israeli ambassadors have 
identified with Baruch’s resignation letter. As Barack Ravid writes,  
“”It has become impossible to explain Israel to others these days,” one ambassador 
said. “There is no clear policy and it is very difficult to respond to international 
criticism.” Another ambassador said: “The diplomatic impasse is dangerous to the 
State of Israel, and it doesn’t seem as if the prime minister has a solution in the form 
of a diplomatic initiative. Under such circumstances, the international community will 
simply force a solution on us”” (Ravid 2011).  
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As Baruch himself reportedly stated, “we have been finding every 
opportunity to turn someone into an opponent. We think the whole 
world is against us...It’s time we checked ourselves” (Ravid 2011).  
Intertwined with this push to “South-Africanize” the conflict is the 
unanimous agreement of single state intellectuals upon the centrality of 
launching a BDS campaign against the state of Israel as one of the 
collective’s central weapons of non-violent resistance. While the 
surprising subsequent takeoff of the BDS campaign, and its 
transformation into a powerful, expanding global movement will be 
addressed in Chapter 6—it should be highlighted that the BDS strategy 
was developed as a central component of the single state movement. 
Thus, as Haim Bresheeth succinctly put it, “Boycott is a tactic, and the 
strategy is one state” (Bresheeth, interview). Elaborating further upon 
this point, Bresheeth states,  
“There are many diverse groups within Israel that are against the occupation—soldiers, 
women, doctors, architects, lawyers, Peace Now, etc—but there are no linkages among 
the separate groups, and they don’t gain any support in Israel because most Israelis 
financially depend on the occupation. This is why there must be structural change in 
Israeli lives, and why this is a South African moment in which the BDS movement is so 
crucial” (Bresheeth, interview). 
Thus, single state intellectuals seek to aid any dissent that exists within 
Israel Proper, by launching a tactic for external pressure against Zionism 
and its practices. Perhaps most crucially of all though is Palestinian civil 
society’s BDS call in 2005—which represented the first unified 
Palestinian national call to unite all segments of the Palestinian people 
within it, and call for the achievement of the rights of all three segments 
of the Palestinian collective. As Nadia Hijab states,  
“In July 2005, over 170 Palestinian coalitions, unions and associations from across the 
spectrum, representing tens of thousands of Palestinians throughout the Occupied 
Territories, in Israel and in exile, issued a call for BDS until Palestinian human rights 
are achieved” (Hijab, Nadia 2009).  
These goals (which significantly mirror those of single state conception 
of the world) were the inalienable right to Palestinian self-determination; 
ending the Israeli occupation and colonization of all Arab lands, and 
dismantling the Wall; the recognition of the fundamental rights of the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and the implementation of 
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the Palestinian Right of Return as stipulated in UNR 1943. Speaking on 
the significance of this call, Hijab states,  
“This is perhaps the most significant national document since the national movement 
was founded. It establishes a clear set of goals for the entire Palestinian people. This 
clear set of goals is the first most crucial source of power of the Palestinian people” 
(Hijab, Nadia 2009).  
Moreover, single state intellectuals developed the tactic of BDS as a 
central weapon of resistance as a result of their disillusionment with the 
PA and the international community’s complicity with Israeli policies—
as well as their interlinked failure to hold Israel accountable for its 
actions under international law. Thus, this campaign primarily targets 
diverse civil societies in Europe and North America in an effort to 
transcend the common sense notions of the conflict among their 
citizens, and transform them into social forces against their 
governments’ complicity with Israeli policies. It also seeks to create this 
change in tactic within all of the organizations, institutions, associations 
and groups that support Palestinian rights, and are involved in 
Palestinian solidarity campaigns. As Pappe recounts, in this aim, single 
state intellectuals were largely successful,  
“I think we are nearly there, with all these good people who were involved in what I can 
say was the ‘kissing cousin industry’—you know, the good people of civil society who 
thought that their role in the West was to assimilate better understanding by giving 
spaces for Palestinians and Israelis to meet. I think we’re succeeding now in changing 
their orientation to the BDS doctrine, which is great, and very important” (Pappe, 
interview).  
In tandem with these shifts, this tactic seeks to shame the PA as a 
collaborator leadership—as well as to present an alternative for those 
within the PA who realize that the peace process is dead; feel the need 
to reformulate their positions; and can be influenced to actively join the 
re-centring of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination around a 
unified, grassroots Palestinian (and Israeli) collective, waging a non-
violent struggle for decolonial liberation. As Mahmoud Darwish 
famously wrote, “Besiege your siege…there is no other way” (Darwish 
1983). For single state intellectuals, that is exactly what the BDS tactic 
represents.  
                                                 
3 (http://www.bdsmovement.net/call) 
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2. Partition, Rethinking Identities, and Highlighting Orientalism 
As detailed above, the single state’s vision stands against partition on 
the grounds that it is interlinked with practices of transfer of 
populations and ethnic cleansing, as well as on the grounds that the 
people of Mandate Palestine have always been too intertwined for such a 
solution to succeed. Interlinked with this argument is another seeking to 
stress that identities themselves are fluid, interlinked and complex. 
Thus, the binary essentialist opposition between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Jews’ that 
underpins much of the common sense notions of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict does not actually reflect the complex reality on the ground in 
Israel/Palestine. For single state intellectuals, nothing reflects the 
silencing of this complexity more than the negating of the identity and 
history of the Arab-Jewish people. Hence, one of the most interesting 
threads within the anti-Zionism of single state supporters revolves 
around the countering of the hegemonic European Ashkenazi depiction 
of Israeli-Jewish history and identity, the re-articulation of the identities 
and voices of Arab-Jews, as well as the re-insertion of the history of 
coexistence between Arabs and Jews within the Arab world within public 
arenas, public consciousness, and written interventions.  
In this vein, the fact that the majority of the Jewish population in 
historic Palestine were Arab-Jews is a suppressed fact that’s highlighting 
plays a large role in the single state worldview, and their desire to 
launch a project of re-Arabizing Jewish history—combating the common 
sense view of what it means to be Jewish, the essentialist Zionist binary 
opposition between Jewish and Arab identity, as well as Israel’s identity 
as a European state rather than a state that is interlinked with the Arab 
world. In this vein, Sivan argues that the Zionist movement was not just 
a European colonial movement, but also an Orientalist one (Sivan, Eyal 
2007). As Smadar Lavie highlights, many among the Mizrahim were 
brought to Israel from countries like Yemen, Morocco and Iraq in order 
to work there instead of the Palestinians who were excluded from the 
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work force. Yet, she argues, these Jewish Arabs did not fare much better 
than Palestinian-Israelis:  
“Like the Palestinian-Israelis, the Mizrahim have only token representation in all Israeli 
financial, legal and cultural institutions run by the Ashkenazi elite. This almost 
heremetically sealed group of families ensures the inter-generational transmission of 
their Ashkenazi Zionist pedigree and financial assets. Upward mobility is almost 
impossible” (Lavie, Smadar 2009).  
Similarly, in a talk at Suffolk University in Boston, Sami Shalom Chetrit 
recounted Ben-Gurion’s famous dilemma with the Yemeni-Jews—50, 000 
of which were airlifted to Israel in 1951 (Chetrit 2010):  
“Ben Gurion said in a discussion in the Knesset, we have to put so much effort to turn 
these Yemenites into Jews as fast as possible. And Yemenites—I mean you could say 
that if you want to talk about a Jew in the Middle Eastern tradition, talk about a 
Yemenite. You know, people who recite the entire Torah by heart from a very early age. 
But that was the concept. A Jew is a European. And, of course, a new Jew must be a 
European” (Chetrit 2010).  
It is within this highlighting of the fact that in the consciousness of the 
Israeli Ashkenazi elite the Jewish identity could only be conceived of as 
a European one that the link between proving your Jewishness and de-
Arabization can be found. Describing this process more concretely in 
terms of a state sponsored project of the de-Arabization of the Middle 
Eastern Jewish communities in Israel, Sivan states, 
“The idea of a Jewish state today is that of a non-Arab state. It’s not a Jewish state in 
any religious definition. The history of the people, the history of the country, is the 
history of the European in the land, and before they came to the land…this is 
(reflected in the) system of education, a system that is built on the fact that ‘we’, this 
common we, have one history which is a European history. This brought us to the 
situation that today, every descendant of an Iraqi-Jewish family in my class would say, 
“but when we were in Poland we were persecuted”. This means that the personal ‘we’ 
transforms every Israeli into a European with a European heritage” (Sivan, Eyal 2007). 
Thus, the Mizrahim themselves were brought into a hostile environment 
in which they represented one of the biggest fears of the Ashkenazi 
Jewish population—that Israelis would sooner or later become Arab. 
This fear is reflected in Ben-Gurion’s concise statement “We do not want 
Israelis to become Arabs” (Wurmser 2005: 21-30)—and lays at the root 
of the resulting ardent Zionism most Mizrahim embrace within Israel 
today. On this paradox and how it is represented from within the eyes 
of Palestinians, Azmi Bishara states:  
“The Palestinian has learned to recognize the Mizrahi as the extremist Israeli. And the 
Palestinian understands that the Mizrahi is in a predicament, since he constantly tries 
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to distinguish himself from the Arab in his Arab-ness. The Ashkenazi does not have to 
emphasize his Jewishness, for it is obvious to him that he is not Arab…There is no 
mixing. Yet, the Mizrahi resembles the Arab in looks, customs, dialects and other 
aspects that force him to differentiate himself from the Arab in order to win equality 
on the basis of national identity. If the criterion for equality is nationalism, then they 
must prove their nationalism” (Chetrit 2010).  
Thus, while the Mizrahim remain among the most Zionist communities 
within Israeli society, there is a growing movement of Arab-Israeli 
intellectuals seeking to counter the mainstream Zionist narrative that 
Zionism saved them from their own (Arab and Iranian) communities. 
Hence,  
“Post-Zionist writers…attack the claim that Mizrahi Jews longed to immigrate to Israel. 
In reality, they argue, as loyal residents of the Arab world, Zionism played a relatively 
minor role in the Mizrahi worldview…Even after the Holocaust, post-Zionist writers 
maintain Mizrahi Jews remained largely opposed to Zionism” (Wurmser 2005: 21-30).  
It is due to the complexity of these suppressed histories, experiences 
and identities and the fear and oppression within which they are based 
that single state intellectuals argue that despite the outward Zionism of 
the Mizrahim—it is a Zionism that can potentially be readily 
transformed through a cathartic reclaiming of all that has been negated 
within them. Interlinked with this, single state intellectuals seek to 
question the Zionist notion of “security” itself—as one of the central 
concerns underlying the need for the existence of an exclusively Jewish 
state. Thus, they argue for the need to enlarge its meaning within Israeli 
society—and thus to counter its definition as one that must be seen in 
demographic and military terms rather than in terms of citizenship, 
coexistence, and cultural, social and educational security (SOAS 
Palestine Society & London One State Group 2007). In parallel to this, 
single state advocates seek to highlight the fact that Zionist security 
does not equate with an equal level of security for all Jews within 
Israel—let alone non-Jews. For, as illustrated by Sivan and Michel 
Khleife’s documentary film Route 181, the Orientalist divide between 
Ashkenazi Jews and Arab-Jews within Israel also plays itself out 
geographically in terms of the security and life worth of the two 
communities. Hence, it is Arab-Jewish communities who reside in both 
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the north and south of Israel Proper—the zones within the range of 
Palestinian rockets.  
It is within this context that Massad stated,  
“There’s been much ambivalence within the Mizrahi population towards Ashkenazi 
hegemony and more generally with regards to their Arab culture. I think this is a 
population that is mobilizable despite the racist Ashkenazi depiction of the Mizrahim 
as something of a right-wing Zionist racist…and I think that’s the work of our Israeli 
colleagues and friends” (Massad 2007).  
It should be noted that the discussion upon the revival of the Arab-
Jewish identity is interlinked within the single state’s broader discussion 
of citizenship and the fluid, intermingled identities of much of the 
population of Israel/Palestine. Moreover, this underlining of the 
complexity of the identities within the land (especially those of the 
Palestinian-Israelis and the Arab-Jews) is an attack upon the argument 
of many single state opponents that a homogenous block of “Israelis” 
would never accept a single state solution, remaining forever united in a 
static (Orientalist and racist) Zionism. The same of course applies to 
critics who claim that “Palestinians” would also never renounce their 
own nationalism—though this argument is voiced much less. Hence, as 
Pappe argues, the one-state solution does not come from a place of 
despair: 
“There is no despair of human nature or of civil society… There is hope. You can see it 
in the Galilee where Jews and Arabs live in a region relatively free from state 
interference…There are business partnerships, joint schools… suddenly there is a 
budding common life of the two nationalities. It turns out that you can fight 
segregation...The idea that nationalism is bound to win around here is the result of 
manipulation and education—not of human nature” (Pappe & Avnery 2007). 
It is this process of critical education that the single state conception of 
the world seeks to trigger within its own communities, as well as within 
diverse civil societies globally.  
C. Points of Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
As has been outlined above, it is the critique of the common sense 
notions of Oslo and the launching of an anti-Zionist conception of the 
world—with all of its various points of beginnings, re-insertions of 
silenced realities on the ground and paradigm shifts—that unites the 
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presently re-emergent single state movement. Thus, it is on the basis of 
adherence to the red lines of the principles of the One State Declaration 
that social forces are either included within this struggle of resistance, 
or excluded. However, while the majority of these red lines are adhered 
to (ie: you cannot be a Zionist, an anti-Jewish racist, negate the history 
of the conflict, stand against the principle of equality, etc.) these lines 
do encounter some divisive tensions when faced with certain forces (of 
perhaps heroic resistance) with slightly divergent, yet potentially 
complementary worldviews in Palestine/Israel—and the dilemma of 
whether or not to include them. This tension is perhaps most clearly 
illustrated with the dilemma that faces single state intellectuals on 
whether or not to include, or form alliances with, members of Hamas.  
As shall be elaborated upon in the next chapter, it is perhaps important 
to note that the broad ideological orientations of single state 
intellectuals are located within the realm of the secular. As such, in 
practice single state intellectuals tend to either place an emphasis upon 
secularism in terms of a vision of a democratic, one-person one-vote 
single state; or of a more flexible recognition of the importance of 
religion within the framework of a binational state centered on some 
form of community rights. However, all the ideological orientations of 
single state intellectuals exclude the possibility of any form of religious 
state. Thus, it is from within this context that the red lines of this 
movement have faced a particular dilemma in negotiating a position 
upon Hamas—which while being anti-Zionist and anti-separationist in 
principle, is largely considered to also desire an Islamic state. This 
dilemma is further complicated within the single state movement by the 
fact that the majority of single state intellectuals also view Hamas as a 
political force that remains largely untouched by the corruption of many 
of Fatah’s elites as a movement; a force that still remains outside of the 
Oslo peace process, and as such have yet to accept its capitulations; and 
a force that represents grassroots resistance, and is neither monolithic, 
nor unwilling to compromise in the interest of national unity and 
national liberation.  
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Hence, many within the single state movement—and especially within 
the Palestinian Diaspora—have raised the necessity of engaging in 
dialogue with Hamas, and the possibility of creating alliances with some 
of its members. It should be mentioned that for most of these 
intellectuals, this engagement is viewed as a necessary part of the 
process of creating a representative deliberative democracy, as well as 
of unifying the full spectrum of the Palestinian collective in a new 
movement of liberation, regardless of the disagreements within it. Thus, 
it is resistance and embracing the plurality of the collective here that 
takes center stage. Thus, Abunimah states,  
“There are people who are opposed to resistance who use Islamism as an excuse. And 
say things like, those people want to oppress women therefore we should oppose 
them. But I don’t think that’s honest politics. What ties Palestinians together is the 
need to resist colonial reality. That doesn’t require them to all sign up for the same 
vision, and I don’t think that most of Hamas requires as a condition for working with 
people that they sign up to any kind of social agenda, or social vision that Hamas has” 
(Abunimah, interview).  
Similarly, Hamas’ leadership—in opposition to those who perceive it as 
being a monolithic, movement with a fundamentalist, unchanging 
vision—has shown itself to be open to accepting a two-state solution. As 
such, some single state intellectuals have argued that since the single 
state is much closer to Hamas’ original vision, they may equally show 
themselves to be open to take part in a movement towards a democratic 
single state as opposed to an Islamic one. Hence, Bisharat says,  
“If Hamas is actually contemplating approving a two-state solution, which they appear 
to be, why wouldn’t they support a one state solution, which is far closer to what they 
aspire to? It wouldn’t entail Muslim rule, but its 95% of their vision instead of 30% of it. 
My expectation is that they would respond to an invitation like that just the way 
Hezbollah has in Lebanon, (and) become a political party…I don’t think they’d ever 
grow beyond their current dimensions, and they would probably shrink once the 
national issue is taken care of” (Bisharat, interview). 
Paralleling Bisharat and Abunimah, and highlighting the urgency of this 
moment in terms of resistance further, as opposed to a rigid desire for 
there to be an absolute agreement on a detailed future vision, Ilan Pappe 
argues that,  
“We cannot allow ourselves to say that we are going to exclude a major Palestinian 
force. The question to my mind is not whether to include, but under what conditions. I 
mean, can we agree, and I think we can, on a set of understandings which leave some 
of the questions which are dear to us all—the nature of the state, gender relations, 
etc—to leave them open? By saying that there’s an urgency…” (Pappe, interview).  
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Thus, while the single state conception of the world is interlinked with 
the realities of oppression and resistance within Palestine/Israel—and as 
such seeks to be as reflective of these realities and inclusive of the 
plurality of forces on the ground as possible—it is important to note 
that the discussion upon Hamas revolved around under what conditions 
it could be included within the single state vision due to the urgency of 
the moment in terms of resistance. In the end, despite this urgency, 
these agreed upon conditions still reflected the principles of the single 
state conception of the world. Thus, while as a major Palestinian force 
of resistance many argued that Hamas should be engaged with and 
included—this inclusion is stipulated upon negotiating an agreement 
wherein the possibility of an Islamic state is excluded. Moreover, it 
should be highlighted that there were single state intellectuals who still 
disagreed with the inclusion of Hamas in principle. Hence, as of the 
present writing, Hamas remains excluded from within the re-emergent 
single state movement.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
Through a highlighting of its emergence, intellectual points of 
beginning, unity and advocated reformulations—this chapter has 
contended that the dynamics and processes of the re-emergent single 
state movement are most fruitfully unveiled when viewed through the 
lens of a Gramscian form of philosophical movement. As such, this 
chapter has attempted to show the central roles of single state 
intellectuals in triggering a project of critical pedagogy within their own 
communities. In doing so, it sought to highlight their own self-
understandings as educators energizing an alternative, more just and 
liberating anti-Zionist worldview from within which coexistence and a 
practice of equal citizenship can begin to be embraced on the ground. In 
parallel to this, this chapter has equally attempted to demonstrate the 
inherent interlinkage between this alternative anti-Zionist worldview—
and the critique of the common sense notions linking these diverse 
communities to a status quo championing the notion of separation as 
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the only solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In doing so, it 
endeavoured to underline Gramsci’s argument that it is only when a 
philosophical movement begins from within the common sense notions 
of its communities that it contains within it the power to transcend 
them in the name of an alternative, liberating vision. For, it is within this 
inter-linkage that the activation of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis lays, 
and as such the potential for building a transformative process of 
counterhegemony. Hence, it is from within this premise that this 
chapter argues that the single state movement both represents a 
Gramscian movement of philosophy, as well as one that contains within 
it much potential for building a transformative process of 
counterhegemony through its project of critical pedagogy. Argued to be 
an energetic avenue through which political possibilities are 
revolutionized on the ground—this chapter contends that the anti-
Zionist conception of the world elaborated by single state intellectuals 
represents a long-term process of resistance aimed at both triggering a 
liberating process of critical and historical self-understanding, and 
laying the groundwork for the formation of a new kind of civil and 
political society. 
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Chapter Five 
The Re-Emergence of the Single State Solution: An 
Organizational Mapping of a Movement in the Making 
I. Introduction 
This chapter endeavours to paint a broad picture of the blocs of organic 
intellectuals argued to be pivotal in the re-emergence of the present 
single state idea—both as an articulated alternate vision to the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process since Oslo, as well as an interlinked set of 
practices and strategies focused upon resistance. As such, it echoes 
Omar Barghouti’s description of the resistance movement within which 
he is involved, as one based upon the dialectical link between thought 
and action: 
“Organizing for self-determination and ethical de-Zionization of Palestine, must 
proceed in two simultaneous, dialectically related processes—reflection and 
action…Ethical decolonization, anchored in international law and universal human 
rights, is a profound transformation that requires above everything else a principled 
and popular Palestinian resistance movement with a clear vision for justice and shared 
society, and an international movement supporting Palestinian rights and struggling to 
end all forms of Zionist apartheid and colonial rule. Without vision and reflection our 
struggle would become like a ship without a skipper. Without resistance, our vision 
would amount to no more than armchair intellectualism” (Barghouti, Omar 2009). 
Thus, though the single state movement largely emerged as a re-
formulated intellectual idea triggering an academic debate—it 
simultaneously attempted to activate Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, 
fusing intellectual vision with the struggles of activists resisting 
oppression as a practice. Similarly, it is a resistance movement 
operating within the Gramscian premise that social transformation 
begins with the potential within people’s thoughts to challenge the 
limits of the possible, triggering critical processes of historical self-
understanding and empowerment that eventually transform them into a 
unified historical force. Hence, there is an emphasis upon the need for 
an idea to be active within people’s minds first before it can become a 
transformative reality. Thus, in Eyal Sivan’s words on the question of 
whether there is support for the binational idea among Jewish-Israelis: 
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“You cannot support or oppose an idea that does not exist yet. It’s language and 
discourse did not yet exist…there is a need to create a debate around this question… 
an urgent need to start to articulate a discourse which is not a discourse of opposition 
to two states, but a discourse that says we should find a real solution” (Sivan, 
interview). 
This point of beginning is echoed by Barghouti—who argues that the 
power of articulating a moral vision for the mobilization of social 
transformation should not be under-estimated as an integral part of the 
process of waging resistance. Thus, in the context of the struggle for a 
single democratic state, 
“The main challenge facing advocates of a democratic state in historic Palestine is to 
convince mass organizations and civil societies around the world of two issues: That 
it’s a morally compelling vision that is worth struggling for, and I believe in the power 
of vision, and second to show that this vision can indeed be realized through ethically 
sound and politically effective processes” (Barghouti, Omar 2009). 
It is in the context of this form of movement that this chapter presents 
a mapping of the political processes and forces underlying the 
alternative vision mapped in the previous chapter. As such, Section II of 
this chapter analyzes the main blocs of organic intellectuals involved 
within the creation of the single state movement, and the ideas, 
experiences, and organizations they may be linked to on the ground. In 
doing so, it argues that these main blocs are made up of a Palestinian-
Israeli bloc, a Palestinian Diaspora/Refugees and Palestinians under 
Occupation Bloc, and a Jewish-Israeli bloc. Following a Saidian Gramsci, 
these blocs are defined in terms of the organic belonging of the 
intellectuals within them to a particular national community, as well as 
a particular geographical location. It argues further that these groupings 
are also reflected organizationally among these intellectuals in terms of 
the contextualized activism each bloc carries out within its own 
community. However, as the fusing of the Palestinians under 
Occupation with the Palestinian Diaspora/Refugees implies, Section II 
also stresses that not all segments of the Palestinians are equally active 
or represented within the single state movement for various reasons. 
Moreover, this general sketch is not intended to obscure the 
considerable overlap within these blocs and their activities.  
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In illustrating this sketch—Section II simultaneously argues that it is the 
Palestinian-Israelis who initially were deemed the hegemonic group 
leading this process of resistance, before what Gramsci would term a 
“collective intellectual”1 with unified principles and visions emerged. 
Section III proceeds to briefly outline the strategies these intellectuals 
try to deploy in pursuit of a broader mass base for the single state 
idea—and the avenues through which they propose to transform the 
reality on the ground from one of separation and occupation, to one of 
joint struggle and coexistence. In doing so, it contends that viewing the 
resistance practices of the single state movement in terms of “anti-
Zionist practices” that oppose the processes and practices of separation 
on the ground provides a more accurate reflection of what it stands for 
as a collective, and what it stands against. Finally, Section IV highlights 
the most significant divisions within the single state movement, with an 
emphasis upon the Gramscian contention that the process of building a 
unified historical bloc transforms all of the social groups involved 
within it. As such, it is neither static, nor void of shifts in positions, 
vision or strategy.  
II. A Sketch of the Organic Intellectuals 
 
This section aims to paint a broad picture of the blocs of organic 
intellectuals that this chapter argues played (and continue to play) the 
most pivotal roles in the re-emergence of the present single state idea—
both as an articulated alternate vision to the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process since Oslo, as well as an interlinked set of practices, strategies, 
and joint endeavours focused upon resistance. The type of Gramscian 
movement this form of resistance through critical pedagogy is argued to 
represent has previously been underlined. However, it should also be 
emphasized that while the majority of single state intellectuals do speak 
of the single state in public arenas as a movement in the making—not 
all of them agree upon the fact that they are in fact part of a movement. 
                                                 
1 As underlined in Chapters One and Two, for this project’s Gramsci the notion of a 
party is defined as a “collective intellectual”.  
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Thus, for example, to the question of whether or not he considered 
there to be a single state movement emerging, and whether or not he 
considered himself to be a part of it, Bisharat states,  
“Yes to both. You know, it’s halting, it’s slow, it’s inchoate, but yes I would say there is 
the beginning of such a movement, and, you know, I’ve been at several of the 
conferences on one state that have issued declarations, and please don’t 
misunderstand me, this is nothing in real organizational terms other than just a 
beginning. So, we’ve…begun a dialogue and begun to refine our thoughts and…to 
establish at least a small community to move forward” (Bisharat, interview).  
Echoing a similar sentiment to the same question, Abunimah states,  
“It is a movement in the sense that there is a significant and growing number of people 
who are enthusiastic about this idea, who are advocating for it, organizing for it… they 
are challenging a hegemonic idea so they are very much marginal...(but) we’re at a 
conference which probably was unthinkable a few years ago, so this is a sign of this 
idea becoming more mainstream, successfully challenging the hegemonic notion that 
there is no solution but a two-state solution, and forcing itself onto the agenda. That’s, 
I think, a result of activism and discussion and so on. So, I think it is a movement in 
that sense, but it has no central leadership, or structure or body... but yes” (Abunimah, 
interview). 
Hence, while the central concern of this section is to shed light upon 
this small community, and their preliminary organizational efforts to 
begin to challenge a particular hegemony—it must be underlined that at 
this early stage, the single state movement does not have a centralized 
leadership, structure or body. Moreover, as reflected in the words of 
Sivan, there are some among these intellectuals who do not perceive 
themselves as part of a movement in the making:  
“No, I don’t see myself as part of a movement. At the same time, I am constantly aware 
of the fact that I’m occupying a public space, and that this is a political question. 
Whether it be in the classroom, or in making films, or in conferences, it’s all-together a 
project. Which is not a question of a movement, but it’s, yea, it’s being conscious that 
it’s a way of, or an act of activism” (Sivan, interview).  
Thus, it is important to note that even among those intellectuals who 
would not characterize their actions to be undertaken within the 
framework of an emergent movement—there remains an emphasis upon 
the consciousness of being part of a transformative political project of 
critical pedagogy, aimed at conquering public spaces and creating new 
constituencies. As previously argued, it is in this context that this 
resistance struggle is viewed as one that is aimed towards the creation 
of a Gramscian reconstructive moment. Similarly, while the majority of 
single state intellectuals view themselves as activists—some also feel 
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uneasy due to an awareness of a lack of official mandate to represent 
anyone but themselves. Expressing the ambiguity of the affiliated 
intellectual’s role, Abunimah states,  
“Of course it’s a political act to speak publicly. To advocate for any kind of programme 
is a political act…But in what capacity am I doing it? As an individual, as an 
intellectual, as a representative of some group of people? Of course, I have no formal 
position. I have no formal mandate to speak for anyone except myself...so I don’t 
represent a party or organization. Sometimes though I do feel that I have a 
responsibility to speak, or to represent peoples’ views...again being very careful not to 
speak for them, but to speak within. I feel that if I’m speaking to an audience with a 
large number of Palestinians, they sometimes receive me as if I’m speaking for them, 
even though I haven’t asked for that, and I would be very cautious about ever claiming 
that. So, it’s an ambiguous role. I feel like people look to me as if I have some kind of 
position of leadership or authority to speak, but I’m very conscious that there’s no 
mechanism…no one really put me in that position, so I have to be very careful about 
it” (Abunimah, interview). 
In this vein, most single state intellectuals feel that they can only 
represent, or speak from within, the collectives of Palestinians and 
Israelis to which they belong—with the recognition that this sense of 
belonging is more straightforward for some than others. Interlinked 
with this however, is a conviction that the emphasis on action and 
resistance has to reside primarily within the local setting within which 
they live, even if it targets a wider audience geographically. Hence, it can 
be argued that the organization of the single state movement mirrors 
that of the London One State Group that brought them together for the 
single state conference in SOAS to a certain degree. On the strategy 
behind the London One State Group’s vision for grassroots mobilization 
for the single state idea, Ziada stresses,  
“Every member of our group work(s) with their own community. Yoni’s in charge of the 
Israeli side, and with finding activists and experts who support the one state idea 
there. I’m involved with the Palestinian side, especially Gaza. There are initiatives to 
link the refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria through one state activists from within 
their communities. One way to create transformation is through grassroots activism 
like this—and this is why it’s so crucial to create a mechanism to connect all of these 
activists together and promote the idea of one state in different locations” (Ziada, 
interview).  
The single state movement seems to also have more or less organized 
itself along this model. Hence, Israeli-Jewish intellectuals work within 
their communities, Palestinian-Israelis within theirs, and so on. In 
parallel to this, those organic intellectuals who live outside of 
Israel/Palestine come together within their local communities in exile to 
  
167 
promote single state initiatives, and give exposure to the idea among the 
diverse groups and platforms they are affiliated with locally. Thus, 
complementing the broad national organic grounding of the different 
groups of intellectuals, there is an emphasis upon the importance of 
simultaneously working within the geographical localities and contexts 
within which they each live. It can be argued that it is due to this loose 
form of organization and activism that stresses both the need for an 
organic connection within a national community, as well as one that is 
fused with a localized theatre of activism, that the single state idea itself 
continues to gain momentum in (loosely interlinked) diverse national 
theatres.  
A. The Palestinian Diaspora, the Palestinian Refugees and the 
Palestinians under Occupation Bloc 
 
In presenting a sketch of this bloc of intellectuals, it is important to 
underline that while the single state idea itself is not new, it was re-
articulated by Fatah in 1969 and became the PLO’s official position in 
1971 “under the slogan of a democratic state in Palestine inclusive of 
Jews, Muslims, and Christians” (Farsakh 2011: 56). As Farsakh writes, 
this re-articulation initiated by Fatah, and later adopted by the PLO at its 
8th Palestinian National Council constituted a shift from the PLO’s 
position to liberate all of historic Palestine, to one that acknowledged 
the Jewish presence within the land. Thus “the democratic state 
represented the first Palestinian attempt to come to terms with the 
reality of Jewish presence on the land, rather than negate it, albeit 
within a nationalist Palestinian paradigm” (Farsakh 2011: 56). As such, 
the Jewish community within this paradigm of a secular democratic 
state was considered Palestinian. However, what is important for the 
purposes of this section is that this historical precedent provides a 
national platform from within which the idea can be legitimately re-
articulated—and re-introduced as the most moral and just solution for 
the Palestinian national collective today. Thus, despite the fact that the 
single state solution remains unrepresented within the OPT by any 
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official parties—it is not a foreign, unimaginable, or even undesirable 
idea for many among them. Moreover, the fact that the idea itself was 
reformulated by Fatah could gradually increase the influence of the 
present single state movement among elements of Fatah (and other 
Palestinian political factions) who are disillusioned with both the PA and 
the current Palestinian-Israeli peace process.  
Equally important to highlight within this context is that amongst these 
three segments of Palestinians, the Palestinian refugees and the 
Palestinians under occupation are the least represented. This is due to 
various reasons linked to geographical accessibility, the non-existence of 
mechanisms of representation, criminalization, or in the case of the 
Gaza Strip, the existence of an Israeli blockade. Thus, for example, it is 
widely acknowledged that the Palestinian refugees—who are estimated 
to constitute around 4.5 million Palestinians—would overwhelmingly 
favor a single state due to the fact that they would not be 
accommodated within the framework of the two-state solution as it now 
stands. However, there is no mechanism of representation through 
which Palestinian refugees can make their voices heard (in the context 
of any Palestinian national solution or movement), and there remains an 
urgent need to re-create such a mechanism of empowerment and 
representation2. In parallel to this, the Palestinians under occupation in 
the Gaza Strip are also under-represented due to the Israeli siege and 
the difficulties this represents in terms of freedom of movement, 
connection and dialogue with the outside world, as well as the 
criminalization of Hamas itself as a movement. Thus, on the obstacles 
to engaging with Hamas in North America, Abunimah states,  
“There’s practical difficulties—in Canada or the US, maybe you’d go to prison. You 
don’t know. Particularly in this post-9/11 era, it’s not easy. You can’t invite someone 
from Hamas to this conference to have a discussion with them. So how? That 
engagement, you know… it’s difficult. If I had more opportunities to do (it), I would. 
But there’s a criminalization of Hamas” (Abunimah, interview).  
                                                 
2 For more on this obstacle in the context of the single state solution, and attempts to 
deal with it, see for example Karma Nabulsi “Justice as the way forward”, Hilal, in 
Where Now for Palestine? : The Demise of the Two-State Solution (Zed Books, 2007). 
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Hence, for members of the Palestinian Diaspora for example, accessing 
geographical spaces within which they can engage with Palestinians 
from Gaza, or Palestinians affiliated with Hamas, remains a difficult 
task. In contrast to both the Palestinians in Gaza and Palestinian 
refugees, the Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank are more 
represented than their two counterparts. However, initial support for a 
single state solution among them was the lowest, since the majority 
were primarily concerned with resistance aimed at ending the Israeli 
occupation of the OPT (and of course still are), and still prefer a 
Palestinian movement that would lead to an independent Palestinian 
state. In this vein, Bisharat states, 
“Well, I certainly know Palestinians who live under Occupation who are supporters of 
one state, and people who are as actively engaged in it as I am. But I do think that 
speaking on the basis of interests—the appeal of one state is greatest for Palestinian 
citizens of Israel and Palestinians in exile. One of the things that the movement for one 
state needs to do is develop a program of relief for people in the Occupied Territories. 
They can’t just focus on the distant future” (Bisharat, interview). 
Thus, while the single state movement does not consider the ending of 
the Israeli occupation to represent the end of Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict—it nevertheless remains centrally concerned with ending the 
occupation as part of its three mutually inclusive demands. However, 
speaking to the urgency of ending the occupation in the OPT was not 
the only hurdle the single state idea faced within this context. As 
Abunimah underlines, 
“Right now the main split among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories is between 
supporters of resistance and effectively…collaborating with Israel. It’s not an even 
split. There is a class and a segment that are benefiting from the status quo and want 
it to continue. That’s one of the tragedies…On the other hand, there is support. All the 
polls show that a solid fifth to a quarter sometimes as high as a third are interested in 
a one state solution, or see it as possible and desirable on the basis of equal 
citizenship. But they’re not represented. There aren’t political parties or movements 
that represent the 20% of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories who want a one state 
solution” (Abunimah, interview).  
Presently, support for the single state solution is increasing 
significantly3 within this segment of Palestinians, despite the above, and 
                                                 
3 In the latest poll carried out by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center in 
April 2010, it was found that there was “a notable increase in the level of support for 
the establishment of a bi-national state in all of Palestine from 20.6% in June 2009, to 
33.8% this month while the percentage of Palestinians who support the two-state 
  
170 
the fact that the solution itself remains unrepresented by any political 
parties within the OPT.  
In view of the above—and of the previously highlighted fact that the 
single state movement emerged as a war of position of the Palestinian 
Diaspora, the Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinians inside Israel—it 
is clear that the driving force behind this bloc of Palestinians are the 
organic intellectuals of the Palestinian Diaspora. As such, their activism 
constitutes the bulk of this bloc’s sketch, with the acknowledgment that 
the gradual increase of support for the single state among Palestinians 
in the West Bank created an increasing overlap within these initiatives. 
Moreover, it can be argued that it is the centrality of the above-
mentioned groups within the present resurgence of the single state idea 
that has placed an emphasis within this reformulated struggle on the 
centrality of equal rights and citizenship for all—as well as that of 
international law—as opposed to that of establishing a Palestinian 
nation-state within a framework of national self-determination.  
Hence, it should be noted that the Palestinian Diaspora represent a more 
fluid and diverse bloc of intellectuals than their generally more 
homogenous counter-parts below. This diversity is reflected in terms of 
the existence of more universalized perceptions of identity, more 
eclectic ideological orientations, and a more pronounced visibility of 
women amongst them. In parallel to this, as opposed to the following 
two blocs—this bloc is overwhelmingly in favor of a secular democratic 
state, as opposed to a binational one. Elaborating on this impulse 
Yasmin Abulaban states,  
“The way I would articulate it is not around binationalism, partly because…when you 
start talking about nation and national communities, it can sound very closed. So what 
does that mean when you say there are two national communities? Who’s included in 
that? I would favour the idea of a secular democratic state—but that being said, I think 
those are terms that you would want to unpack” (Abulaban, interview). 
                                                                                                                                               
solution declined from 55.2% last June to 43.9% in April 2010”. To view this poll, go to: 
(http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=749).  
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On the link between the realization of the three demands re-unifying all 
three segments of the Palestinians and the secular democratic solution, 
Barghouti states, 
“The democratic solution lays out the clearest mechanism for ending the three tiered 
regime of Israeli Zionist oppression—the occupation and colonization of the 1967 
territory; the system of racial discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel, 
which is the Zionist form of apartheid; and the total denial of refugee rights, 
particularly the right to return home and to reparations” (Barghouti, Omar 2009). 
This preference is further emphasized by the description of many 
amongst this bloc of Palestinians of themselves as ‘secular humanists’, 
as well as their more fluid experience of identity and place. Thus, on 
where he would locate himself within the Palestinian collective, Bisharat 
states, 
“I consider myself Palestinian-American. My father was Palestinian, from Jerusalem, 
and my mother is American. I have lived most of my life in the US, although I have 
spent extended periods of time in Palestine, and elsewhere in the Middle East, 
including Cairo. And I consider myself first and foremost a humanist and an activist 
for justice and human rights worldwide” (Bisharat, interview). 
Abunimah echoes this sentiment (Abunimah, interview). As previously 
argued, this worldview can be linked to the marked influence of Said 
within this collective, as well as to the centrality of his arguments in the 
re-emergence of the single state idea within the Palestinian arena. 
However, it can also be argued to be a result of the North American 
location of the majority of these Palestinian intellectuals, and their 
engagement with debates on citizenship, equality, civil rights and 
democracy within this particular setting—coupled with the influence of 
the particular movements they encountered within it (Abulaban, 
interview). Thus, Abunimah stresses the influence of a multiplicity of 
locations and identities—and the resulting disillusionment and 
claustrophobia with one-dimensional nationalism—within Diaspora 
Palestinians: 
“To many Diaspora Palestinians, the whole idea of nationalism…has lost its luster… 
Long accustomed to transience and movement, Diaspora Palestinians no longer 
necessarily feel the need for a unidimensional identity embodied by a homogenized, 
nationalist state. What Palestinians do want and need, is freedom of movement and 
expression, education, and equal access to the benefits of democratic society” 
(Abunimah 2006: 170). 
  
172 
It is from within this context of fluidity, transience and multiplicity that 
for this group of Palestinians in particular, there is anxiety towards 
ideas linked to binationalism that seek to define communities into 
reified national identities—that would magnify antagonistic uni-
dimensional difference, while raising questions around representation.  
While it is Palestinian-Israelis who are acknowledged to be the central 
energy behind the re-emergence of the single state idea, Diaspora 
Palestinians are its fastest growing force. Thus, at a single state 
conference Ghada Karmi states, the “constituency where the one state 
has got the most currency…is the Palestinian Diaspora” (Karmi, Ghada 
2009). This is illustrated in the fact that they visibly reflect the largest 
constituency of single state organic intellectuals present at publicly 
organized single state events—such as the fast growing network of 
conferences aimed at expanding the single state movement. While this 
visibility could be linked to their geographical locations and mobility—
this rapid expansion is also reflected in the growing number of single 
state initiatives and networks within which the Diaspora are involved.  
The first of these initiatives brought together members of all three 
segments of the Palestinian national collective, and represented their 
most ambiguous effort to date. This ambiguity reflects the fact that this 
effort was among the first to be able to bring together many diverse 
representatives of all the segments of the Palestinians from “all walks of 
life” (Abunimah 2008)—in an effort to genuinely re-assess Palestinian 
strategy in view of a disillusioning peace process.  Forming what became 
known as the Palestine Strategy Group—these members met for a series 
of intensive workshops organized by the Oxford Research Group, and 
funded by the EU. They released their own document in 2008 entitled, 
Regaining the Initiative: Palestinian Strategic Options to end the Israeli 
Occupation4. The report’s main aim was to create a unified platform, 
leadership and voice for all Palestinians. In the report, the group calls 
                                                 
4 To read the full report, go to: http://www.palestinestrategygroup.ps/  
  
173 
for the rejection of what they term the “peace building”5 and “state-
building”6 discourses as based on fabricated realities and entities (such 
as a Palestinian state) that do not exist. Thus, as Abunimah writes, the 
report “calls on Palestinians to reject and expose the deceptive language 
of “peacemaking” and “state-building” that have been used to conceal 
and perpetuate a lived reality of expulsion, domination and occupation 
at Israel’s hands” (Abunimah 2008). Instead, the report advocates that 
these discourses must be replaced with a discourse that is centered 
around decolonization, liberation and self-determination—since it 
accurately reflects the lived realities and social, political and territorial 
transformations on the ground. Importantly, the stress for these 
authors is upon the need for the international community to embrace 
this discourse of de-colonization and to stop concealing the gravity of 
these realities by collaborating in the perpetuation of the “peace-
making” and “state-building” discourses.  
In addition to this, the report is an embrace of Palestinian agency, and 
conveys an empowering message to the Palestinian community by 
underlining the fact that they have the power to become an active force 
in shaping where the peace process goes from here, and that they need 
to seize control of their own destiny. Thus, they write, “The central 
proposal in this Report is that Israel’s strategic calculations are wrong. 
Israeli strategic planners overestimate their own strength and 
underestimate the strategic opportunities open to Palestinians” 
(Palestine Strategy Study Group 2008). These ‘strategic opportunities’ 
include, “the definitive closing down of the 1988 negotiation option” 
                                                 
5 The report defines the peace making discourse as one that “assumes that the 
problem is one of ‘making peace’ between two equal partners, both of whom have 
symmetric interests, needs, values and beliefs. This is the wrong discourse because 
there are not two equal conflict parties. There is an occupying power and a suppressed 
and physically scattered people not allowed even to have its own identity legally 
recognized”. 
6 The report defines the statebuilding discourse as one “which assumes that the 
problem is one of ‘building a state’ along the lines attempted in Cambodia or El 
Salvador or Mozambique - or even to a certain extent in Afghanistan. This is the wrong 
discourse because there is no Palestinian state”.  
  
 
  
174 
(Palestine Strategy Study Group 2008), as well as the reformulation of 
the Palestinian Authority from an entity that serves Israeli interest and 
legitimizes occupation, to one that becomes a “Palestinian Resistance 
Authority” (Palestine Strategy Study Group 2008); the reconstitution of 
the PLO as an organization of national unity and resistance; and 
significantly, “the shift from a two state outcome to a (bi-national or 
unitary democratic) single state outcome as Palestinians’ preferred 
strategic goal” (Palestine Strategy Study Group 2008). 
While the report formally favours a two-state outcome, and uses the 
single state solution as a threat more than as a desired outcome—hence, 
playing into Israeli perceptions of it—it does represent an 
unprecedented re-assessment of Palestinian official positions and 
strategies on the peace process by a broad spectrum of Palestinians, 
among whom were official PA members, as well as many Palestinian 
supporters of the two-state solution. Hence, the report does 
acknowledge the increasingly immovable obstacles on the ground to the 
realization of a viable two-state solution—as well as the growing 
support for the single state idea among Palestinians (Palestine Strategy 
Study Group 2008), and the significant support for it among Palestinian-
Israelis (Palestine Strategy Study Group 2008).  
Significantly, the report also discusses the need to radically reformulate 
the PA, or abolish it—regardless of the political outcome advocates 
desire to see manifest most. Moreover, it calls on all Palestinians to 
seize the initiative and to speak in a unified voice for their own unified 
interests—rather than to allow other powers to speak for them or define 
the terms within which they are allowed to speak. Furthermore, it calls 
for the re-establishment of the mutually inclusive link between 
Palestinian self-determination and the Palestinian Right of Return. These 
strategic suggestions do move the internal Palestinian debate in a 
positive direction, regardless of the differences in vision of the 
members. They also reflect the fact that even within such a broad 
representation of diverse Palestinians, the majority agree that the peace 
  
175 
process is going nowhere and are engaging in an active search for 
alternatives—among which the single state solution remains one of the 
strongest contenders, as reflected by the strategic suggestions of the 
report itself.  
Following this report, a significant initiative by this group of 
intellectuals is represented in the launching of Al-Shabaka. Al Shabaka is 
described in a press release as, “The first independent strategy and 
policy-related think tank for Palestinians and by Palestinians. A think 
tank without borders or walls, Al-Shabaka draws on and benefits from 
the diverse experiences of Palestinians from around the world” (Al-
Shabaka: Press Release 2010). Significantly, Al-Shabaka’s principles and 
visions are “are guided by Palestinian Civil Society’s 2005 Call for 
boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS)” (Al-Shabaka: Press Release 
2010) against Israel, until it complies with international law. The BDS 
call—which will be elaborated on in Chapter 6—makes three main 
demands: That Israel dismantle the wall and end its occupation of the 
OPT; that it recognize the right of Palestinian-Israelis to full and equal 
citizenship; and that implements the Palestinian Right of Return 
(Palestinian Civil Society 2005a). Al-Shabaka’s goal is to “to create a 
vibrant forum for Palestinian policy and strategy development and 
analysis” (Al-Shabaka: Press Release 2010). As such, many of the original 
35 policy advisors were prominent single state supporters, the work of 
the network is fully funded by its members and its Palestinian 
supporters, and its self-expressed mission is to “educate and foster 
public debate on Palestinian human rights and self-determination within 
the framework of international law” (Al-Shabaka 2010). Al-Shabaka 
released four policy briefings as of this writing, three of which are 
written by prominent single state intellectuals, and all of which advance 
core single state arguments.  
Many Palestinians within this bloc also engage with the idea of 
incorporating elements of Hamas to their cause, or engaging them 
within the dialogues and platforms of the single state movement. 
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Viewing the movement as one that essentially remains largely 
uncorrupted by politics, and represents a powerful symbol and practice 
of resistance on the ground, these intellectuals are open to, and often 
argue for, the idea of engaging with Hamas’ leadership:  
“I believe that this is a dialogue that should be undertaken. To say that I don’t agree 
with Hamas’ ideology, I mean that’s a platitude in the sense that it’s not this 
monolithic body that has one idea… it’s not a Cyclops… it’s many people and many 
different perspectives. Although I would call myself a secular humanist and a 
democrat, I think that the service that Hamas has performed for the Palestinian nation 
is to have kept its leadership honest, and to prevent it from having surrendered 
basically. So I think they’ve done monumentally important and positive things, and I 
think they’ve done it with incredible courage and principle and sacrifice. So I respect 
them deeply” (Bisharat, interview).  
Moreover, Hamas remains (as of this date) un-co-opted by the Oslo 
peace process, even though its leadership has shown itself to be capable 
of much pragmatism in both accepting a two-state solution, as well as 
being open to a single state solution. Similarly, Massad echoes this 
dismay at the orientalist, secular bias among many of whom seek to 
dismiss Hamas on principle: 
“The elephant in the room of course is Hamas. It is important to address Hamas. The 
Hamas leadership has shown much flexibility on many questions. The attempt to 
depict Hamas through an Orientalist Zionist or even secular chauvinist lens as some 
unchanging Islamist chauvinist group is not only untrue, but anti-Islamist. Hamas 
remains a leadership that has remained uncorrupt, and also open to all kinds of issues, 
and therefore, I think we can influence the Hamas leadership in some ways on the 
question of the one state solution. Many of the top leaders of Hamas have shown much 
openness about the idea of one country. To dismiss them apriori is a big mistake” 
(Massad, Joseph 2007).  
The same of course can be said about elements within the cadres of 
Fatah, who themselves have become critical of the corruption and 
collaboration of the PA’s leaders with Zionism—and as such are 
searching for alternatives to the current reality. As Farsakh has 
highlighted, this disillusionment is taking place in the context of a 
generational struggle within Fatah between its old cadres and its 
younger ones. While Farsakh underlines that it remains too early to 
analyze in which direction these younger elements may shift Fatah’s 
political positions, “What has been noted is that the young Fatah cadres 
in the West Bank at least have started an internal debate on whether or 
not to adopt the one-state solution as a political project” (Farsakh 2011: 
65). This, added to the existence of significant support for the idea 
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among some cadres who view it as reformulating Fatah’s own single 
state idea, provides some hopeful signs for single state intellectuals. 
However, no representative within Fatah has embraced the present 
single state solution as a political position yet. Moreover, as Farsakh 
emphasizes, “Both young and old (Fatah) cadres cannot yet envisage a 
political struggle for citizenship and equal rights before first obtaining 
their own Palestinian state” (Farsakh 2011: 65). Hence, for intellectuals 
within this bloc (and the resurgent movement in general) the question of 
official leadership remains an open one—centering upon calls for the 
need to revitalize the PLO around a political program that reunifies all 
three segments of the Palestinian people.  
B. The Anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli Bloc 
Though the ideological convictions of these intellectuals vary, it can be 
generalized that the main bulk of Jewish-Israeli involved within the 
present single state movement stem from a broadly Marxist, anti-
imperialist background. The majority of them also seem to be 
Ashkenazi Jews. In this vein, many among these intellectuals were also 
founding members of—or activists within—the Israeli socialist anti-
Zionist organization Matzpen. Founded in 1962 by a small group of 
dissidents expelled from the Israeli Communist Party (Warschawski 
2005: 24), Matzpen,  
“Put forward a radical critique of Zionism: breaking with the traditional line of the PCI, 
it analyzed the war of 1948 as a war of ethnic cleansing rather than as a war of 
national liberation; the program of the group called for a democratization, a de-
Zionization of Israel, and its integration into the Arab Middle East…” (Warschawski 
2005: 25).  
In parallel to this, it should be underlined that Matzpen’s emphasis 
upon an internationalist perspective of revolution meant that their 
worldview both liberated them from “the provincialism and the narrow 
nationalism of Israeli political culture” (Warschawski 2005: 34) and from 
the daunting obstacles contained within viewing themselves as a 
powerless minority within a closed Israel that is un-contextualised 
geographically. Thus:  
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“Matzpen was not a marginal and insignificant minority in Israel, but rather it was 
Israel and its people, who, defending a reactionary policy and backward ideas in the 
eyes of most of the world, were a small minority in the context of the decolonization 
of the Arab world” (Warschawski 2005: 34).  
Hence, it is important to highlight that for Matzpen members, the 
emphasis of the struggle for liberation was upon the de-colonization of 
the Arab world in the context of a Pan-Arab revolution that would 
liberate Israel in the process. This emphasis upon both locating Israel 
within a geography that stresses its minority status among its Arab 
neighbours, argues that its own liberation involves its acceptance of its 
‘Eastern-ness’, and locates the potential for social transformation 
outside of Israel itself—is still reflected within the arguments, 
sentiments and positions of many Israeli-Jewish single state intellectuals 
today. Thus, in an interview, Haim Bresheeth argues that Israel should 
have been a place that embraced its Eastern identity and its Arab 
neighbours, and that Palestine was always meant to be an Arab entity 
within an Arab world (Bresheeth, interview). Similarly, underlining the 
empowering impact of rediscovering himself through reconnecting with 
the Arab world, Bresheeth describes his first visit to Cairo as a liberating 
experience:  
“There is something about the liberating effect of stepping into a completely Arab 
world—a city that is an explosion of the presence of Arab-ness that makes you feel like 
you are not alone, that there is an alternative world that exists to which you belong, 
that just by stepping out of Israel, the whole Arab world and its history and your sense 
of self is rediscovered…You are here, you still exist” (Bresheeth, interview). 
Hence, it is within this discovery of community, belonging and 
possibility within the wider region—and more broadly within the 
outside world—that the hope of liberation lays for Bresheeth. 
Significantly then, Bresheeth argues that the impulse for social 
transformation must come from outside of Israel:  
“The key for transformation now is the Palestinians, not the Israelis. They must 
support the one state idea, they must refuse to be partners in the “two-state” peace 
process, and they must refuse to play by Israel’s rules and create a new framework for 
peace…Change will not come from within Israel. For Israelis—changing their position 
as a public has to come from intense pressure—inside and outside” (Bresheeth, 
interview).  
Paralleling these views, Matzpen co-founder Moshe Machover elaborates 
that these positions were also based upon the fact that for Matzpen 
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members, this struggle was not just about Palestinian rights and 
national liberation—but about a struggle for socialism in Israel. In a talk 
at SOAS he states, “Israel’s articulation in the world capitalist system is 
specifically as a Zionist state, a colonial-settler state, with a regional role 
as a local enforcer of imperialism. Therefore the struggle for socialism 
in Israel, against capitalism, necessarily involves resolute opposition to 
Zionism” (Machover 2010). Hence, the emphasis among these 
intellectuals is a perception of Zionism as a project of colonization that 
stems from, and collaborates with, Western imperialism against the 
Palestinian people particularly, as well as being a project that exploits 
the Israeli working classes.  
As such, solidarity and joint struggle with their Palestinian counter-
parts came naturally for the Jewish-Israelis who embraced this Marxist 
internationalist worldview—for they met as people of the left and not as 
Israelis and Palestinians (Warschawski 2005). In parallel to this, another 
recurrent theme among these intellectuals is the impact crossing 
borders—and the resultant highlighting of joint lives between them and 
fellow Palestinians or Arabs—had upon their embracing of an anti-
Zionist single state position. Thus, Eyal Sivan recounts, 
“On the personal level it starts with growing up in Jerusalem…in a period where there 
was a bi-national colonial reality. And then there is a very important moment—which 
is leaving to Paris, and suddenly discovering living with, or encountering, Arabs in a 
non-colonial relation. To be an immigrant, and to be an immigrant with Arabs and to 
suddenly have relations that become very human because of the fact that you are 
immigrants and that you immigrated from the same kind of place in the world” (Sivan, 
interview). 
Echoing this form of experience, Ilan Pappe recounts his own journey to 
becoming a single state supporter in Palestine/Israel,  
“I don’t know when the exact moment was, but I think it has a lot to do with several 
trips I did, before the outbreak of the second Intifada, from my house—which is near 
Nazareth—to friends of mine in Jenin. It was the same landscape. And it was half of a 
Palestinian family I knew in Nazareth. So I couldn’t see the difference. There was 
nothing in what I saw that justified Jenin and Nazareth not being in the same place. 
Now of course, this fit into a longer process of thinking about history, morality, justice 
in Palestine, but I think this particular trip, and particular landscape—both human and 
geographical—was very important” (Pappe, interview).  
As Warschawski stresses, historically Matzpen never had more than a 
few members within Israel, but was always perceived as a significant 
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threat to the Zionist conception of the world and the consensus the 
settler-colonial project had created within Israeli society (Warschawski 
2005: 27). He also emphasizes that the most vicious attacks on Matzpen 
members emanated from within the Israeli left, due to the influence of 
Matzpen’s views, research and information dissemination within the 
circles of the European left—who found it increasingly difficult to relate 
to their Israeli counterparts (Warschawski 2005: 27-30). As such, 
Matzpen’s members were ostracized, and “being a Matzpen militant 
meant expulsion beyond the borders of the (Israeli) tribe” (Warschawski 
2005: 43). This sentiment is still echoed by members of the single state 
movement today. Thus, asked which segment of the Israeli-Jewish 
collective he considered himself to belong to, Ilan Pappe states, 
“Subjectively the sense is of great isolation. However, if you flex the definitions, there 
is a group of people who either went the same way or are nearly there, or are about to 
get there, so the group is bigger than I thought…Its main problem for me was not its 
numbers, but that it’s not a social millet. I envied my Palestinian friends, even those 
who were in the worst kind of condition…because family ties, national ties, social ties 
(gave them) a reference group. There is no reference group (for me yet). There is more 
than one person, and we know each other, but we live and act as individuals. Our 
social community is one in which we are a pariah politically. If we are lucky, people are 
nice. People in my neighbourhood are nice to me, but that does not make it easier. The 
fact that a racist is nice to you does not make them any less racist” (Pappe, interview). 
This sense of marginalization and oppression within their own 
communities parallels yet another thread of Matzpen’s old vision within 
many Israeli-Jewish single state idea activists today—linked to the idea 
that change can only be located within forces and pressures external to 
Israel. Hence, in the context of Matzpen, the debate upon the most 
suitable pathway towards the realization of the common goal of a 
democratic (in this case also socialist) Israel/Palestine or Pan-Arab 
federation caused a split in analysis among its members:  
“For some, the capitalist character of the Israeli economy and the existence of class 
conflict would exacerbate the internal contradictions…For others, the colonial aspect 
of Israel was the dominant factor: the entire Jewish population enjoyed the privileges 
conferred on it by Zionism, and consequently had no interest in changing the situation 
in favor of the Palestinians…Change could only be provoked from the outside…The 
defenders of the second analysis were quick to draw the conclusion it implied: Those 
few Israelis who opposed Zionism should join the Palestinian national movement and 
its struggle” (Warschawski 2005: 50).  
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The majority of the Israeli-Jewish intellectuals and activists involved 
within the single state movement stem from the second analysis, as 
opposed to the first. Thus, at the SOAS conference, Eyal Sivan argued,  
“In this transformation of the one (apartheid) state into a democratic state, we have to 
sell to the privileged ones (we, the Israelis) the benefits of transformation into a one 
democratic state. We have to know who can benefit from this transformation. I would 
think of populations like the non-Jewish Zionists for example—the new immigrants 
from Russia, who are having a lot of problems in terms of identity, marriage, work, 
language, cultural autonomy. The huge population of Arab-Jews that continue to be 
discriminated against inside Israel culturally and economically. Israel’s population is 
still ruled by us—the Ashkenazi Jews” (Sivan, Eyal 2007). 
In a similar vein, Ilan Pappe argued at the same conference, 
“Our main task is to coordinate and re-unite our forces. There is no more room for an 
anti-Zionist Jew to be in his or her own outfit, and for Palestinians to be in their own 
outfit. If we want to have a shared democracy, we should have a shared leadership. We 
should have shared institutions here in exile, before we start to visualize them in the 
future. These are things which we can do without the interruptions of Israelis, the 
Western governments—we have no excuse for not building, as any other liberation 
movement built, institutions outside the occupied land, outside the dispossessed land, 
together with the people who are there, in order to move forward to a better future” 
(Pappe, Ilan 2007).  
Intertwined with the overlap elaborated upon above, today many of 
these same Matzpen members have been central in the creation of 
pivotal single state platforms, strategies and networks in the cities in 
which they currently live—the city of London being a particularly 
powerful example. An important example of this—which will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter 6—is that of the inauguration of the 
International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network’s (IJAN) branch in London in 
2008, in which Moshe Machover was a pivotal figure.  
Within Israel itself lies the example of Michel Warschawski—who is the 
co-founder of the revolutionary Palestinian-Israeli Alternative 
Information Center (AIC) in Beit Sahour. AIC is an organization which 
stands against separation, and was essentially founded by radical 
Palestinian and Israeli activists to bridge the information gap between 
the two societies; promote joint struggle; provide Palestinian activists, 
national organizations, and popular movements with information on 
new developments within Israeli society, and to inform the Israeli anti-
war and anti-occupation movement about new developments inside 
Palestinian civil society. Today it presents critical analyzes of the Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict (and both Israeli and Palestinian societies) from 
within a global anti-imperialist perspective. It also publishes, 
disseminates information, stages talks, and creates awareness on issues 
related to Israeli apartheid and joint struggles and experiences on the 
ground between Israeli and Palestinian activists. Moreover, AIC was a 
central actor in the release of over 1000 Palestinian political prisoners, 
as well as in battles for family reunification.  
Essential in AIC’s tools of awareness creation and critical analysis 
dissemination is the organization’s groundbreaking pod-cast “News 
From Within”. Many sessions of this podcast are specifically dedicated 
to talks, book reviews and debates on bi-nationalism; the boycott 
divestment and sanctions movement against Israel; activist experiences 
within Palestine/Israel; and live recordings of conferences, debates and 
interviews on these topics within both Palestinian and Israeli societies. 
As a reflection of the revolutionary and unprecedented nature of its 
work and its promotion of joint struggle and resistance, in 1987 
Warschawki was arrested and the AIC closed down on (false) charges 
that it created the Palestinian Intifada (Warschawski 2005).  
Within Israeli society itself, three other organizations deserve 
mentioning in this context—Zochrot, the International Committee 
Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) and Anarchists Against the Wall 
(AATW). Zochrot, or “Remembering”, was founded by Eitan Bronstein in 
Tel Aviv, and is made up of a group of Israeli citizens dedicated to 
raising the awareness of the Israeli public about the Palestinian Nakba 
of 1948—as a fundamental first step towards peace and reconciliation. 
Zochrot does this through hosting conferences, panels and research 
initiatives—as well as through direct action initiatives that involve the 
conquering of Israeli public spaces in order to showcase that the land 
upon which every Israeli lives, simultaneously tells the story of 
Palestinian ethnic cleansing and dispossession. The organization also 
has a Learning Center dedicated to this topic; screens films and holds a 
seminar and lecture series; and draws up maps showing the destroyed 
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Palestinian villages. Moreover, Zochrot recently launched an art gallery, 
and a journal on the Nakba—highlighting the integral importance of the 
Palestinian Right of Return for any peaceful reconciliation to occur 
between Israelis and Palestinians. It also suggested ways with which 
Israeli society can come to terms with the Nakba in order to open the 
door for true justice for the Palestinians; begin reconciliation between 
the two people; and significantly, simultaneously launch a process de-
colonizing and liberating Israeli-Jews themselves (Zochrot).  
In 2008, Zochrot held a groundbreaking conference in Tel Aviv on the 
Palestinian Right of Return. Based upon the work of Salman Abu Sitte, 
the conference centered upon how this return could be implemented, 
and what its implementation would mean for Israeli and Palestinian 
inhabitants of Israel/Palestine. The conference showcased detailed 
studies on the physical possibility of return, as well as the number of 
destroyed Palestinian villages that still remain uninhabited and could be 
rebuilt. It was centrally aimed upon the need to dismantle the idea that 
there is no geographical room for the refugees to return should they 
choose to do so (whether independently or as collectives).  
Anarchists Against the Wall (AATW) is also a direct action group, 
founded in 2003, to work specifically against the Israeli apartheid wall. 
It works with Palestinian committees struggling against the construction 
of the wall, its confiscation of their land and resources, and the 
consequent demolition of their homes. Its actions are largely led by 
these Palestinians, and involve physically opposing bulldozers, the 
army, and the occupation—as well as staging demonstrations against 
them. As opposed to Zochrot, AATW do not specifically advocate for a 
single state future, but perceive their struggle to be part of the global 
struggle against the processes of capitalism. However, they argue that 
though they see no need to advocate for a specific political program in 
Israel/Palestine, they “demand an entirely different way of life, and 
equality for all of the inhabitants of the region” (AATW 2004). Moreover, 
they emphasize that the wall is part of Israel’s war against the 
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Palestinians, and is ultimately aimed at “mak(ing) life so appalling for 
the Palestinian people that they will be left with one choice: move out” 
(AATW 2004). As such, AATW’s actions can be interpreted more widely 
as part of diverse “anti-Zionist practices” on the ground—practices 
which highlight Israeli apartheid and ethnic cleansing; wage struggles on 
the ground in order to territorially counter the processes of Zionist 
separation; and are based on joint activities and struggles between 
Palestinians and Israeli-Jews.  
While its ideological orientation is broadly Marxist, AATW is also an 
example of the transition in joint struggle and solidarity that was made 
on the ground in the 80s—after what has been described by radical 
activists as the “death of ideology” and the beginning of a much simpler 
form of solidarity through joint action. Warschawski describes this shift 
in solidarity through a conversation he had with an AATW activist—who 
was on his way to meet a Palestinian activist named Mohammed in Bil’in:  
“I asked him who is Mohammed? Is he communist, PFLP, Fatah or Hamas?” Yossi 
looked at me and said, “I don’t know”. “So how did you make a connection with him?” I 
asked. He said, “I don’t understand what you mean. He’s my friend”. I started thinking 
about what changed. We, Palestinians and Israelis, couldn’t meet in the 60s, 70s, 80s, 
unless we had a clear common platform. As Israelis we had to prove that we had a 
clear anti-Zionist position and offered unconditional solidarity. Otherwise our 
communication would have been accused of being normalization. At the beginning of 
the 80s though (something) changed, (Yossi and Mohammed represented this change). 
Their co-operation in 2000 was made possible through action. The fact that they had 
been struggling together, were arrested together, beaten together by the Israeli 
army…made possible what in our generation needed weeks of writing 
documents”(Warschawski 2008). 
  
Another example of an organization engaged in “anti-Zionist practices” 
of resistance within Israel is the Israeli Committee Against House 
Demolitions (ICAHD). Established in 1997 as a direct-action organization 
against the demolitions of Palestinian houses—which they report to be 
24,000 as of this writing (ICAHD), their activities expanded as their 
awareness of the separation processes of Zionism and the occupation 
itself grew. Thus, they have now expanded their struggle to include 
resisting “land expropriation, settlement expansion, by-pass road 
construction, policies of “closure” and “separation,” the wholesale 
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uprooting of fruit and olive trees, the Separation Wall, (as well as) the 
siege of Gaza” (ICAHD). Hence, in addition to engaging in physically 
blocking Palestinian home demolitions, and mobilizing Palestinians and 
Israelis in order to rebuild demolished homes—ICAHD also works within 
Israeli society to advocate for a just peace; organizes tours aimed at 
highlighting the realities of separation on the ground; stages 
international speaking tours to disseminate information and create 
awareness of the reality within Israel/Palestine; attempts to lobby 
government officials worldwide against these processes of separation; 
and participates in BDS campaigns, among other practices.  
While ICAHD does not openly support a specific solution to the conflict 
since it believes that to be a decision that must be made by the 
Palestinian collective—it supports Palestinian civil society’s 2005 call for 
BDS against the state of Israel, and any solution that is based upon 
justice and the forging of an inclusive peace. Furthermore, ICAHD’s 
founder, Jeff Halper, is a prominent figure in single state events and 
supports a single state solution in the form of a confederation. More 
recently, ICAHD has expanded to open offices of advocacy in both the 
UK and the US.  
C. The Palestinian citizens of Israel 
As Warschawski argues, one group of people within Israel that Matzpen 
affected and eventually developed serious ties with were the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel—or the Palestinians of 1948—who mainly came from 
“villages in the Galilee and the Triangle—the only region in the center of 
the country where the ethnic cleansing of 1948 had failed” 
(Warschawski 2005: 30). These ties began within the realm of university 
campuses, with the Union of Arab Students, which,  
“Had a semi-clandestine existence and its leaders were subjected to the treatment 
reserved for all militant Arabs, whether nationalist or communist: house arrest, a ban 
from travelling outside certain zones, regular arrests followed by rough 
interrogations…Matzpen served as a school for their political and ideological 
education; for many of these students, it was the first opportunity to learn about their 
history, since their parents had chosen to remain silent” (Warschawski 2005: 30-31).  
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These ties quickly spread beyond the university campuses, and 
eventually became organized into a coalition of diverse nationalist 
organizations known as Abnaa El-Balad, or “Children of the Land”. 
Abnaa El-Balad arguably represents the most revolutionary movement of 
the Palestinian-Israelis. Formed in 1969, it is a grassroots movement 
made up of both Palestinian-Israelis and Jews who identify themselves 
as Palestinian-Jews. It views itself as an integral part of the Palestinian 
national movement (Abnaa El-Balad). It grew out of the student 
movement described above by Warschawski in the 60s and 70s, with the 
aim of preserving the collective identity of the Palestinians inside Israel, 
linking their struggle with that of their Palestinian brothers and sisters 
in the West Bank and Gaza, and with that of the Palestinian refugees 
(Abnaa El-Balad). They support the Palestinian Right of Return, 
recognize the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, and advocate for the principle of equality within the 
Israeli state—which they argue was forcibly imposed upon them in 
1948, and which they do not recognize as legitimate. Paralleling 
Matzpen, Abnaa El-Balad is Marxist, anti-imperial, and anti-Zionist in 
orientation. It boycotts the Israeli Knesset and Israeli elections since it 
does not accept the definition of the Israeli state as that “of the Jewish 
people” (Abnaa El-Balad). As such, it stands against the normalizing of 
relations with “the Jewish state in Palestine” (Abnaa El-Balad).  
Instead, these activists participate in local Arab councils and civil 
society institutions and actively seek to empower Palestinian-Israelis 
and link them with the Palestinian national cause. In an interview, one of 
the movement’s founders explains how this form of organization came 
about,  
“In Israel, the Arabs are not allowed to organize themselves freely because the Israeli 
government is opposed to the existence of the Palestinian nation, as a nation. So, to be 
able to operate, we have exploited the Israeli law concerning municipal elections and 
set up our group according to the requirements of this specific law. This means that 
we are run as a local organization. We participated in the municipal elections in 
December 1973 and I was elected to the council in Umm al-Fahm as a representative of 
‘Abna’ al-Balad. The day after the election, we began to expand by setting up a cultural 
club in Umm al-Fahm. There we hold public meetings and speeches about the 
Palestinian cause” (Smith & Kiwan 1978: 15). 
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After this, many other Arab villages in Israel began to organize 
themselves in this way. The movement thus gained ground in forms that 
either paralleled it—remaining linked to the Palestinian national 
movement—or, as in the case of Nazareth at the time, formed a united 
front with the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) to take over Nazareth’s 
municipal council (Smith & Kiwan 1978: 15). For as previously noted, 
Abnaa El-Balad position themselves as both part of the Palestinian 
national movement and as representing the Palestinian and Jewish 
working class. They also advocate for the return of the Palestinian 
refugees, the end of the Israeli occupation, and the establishment of a 
democratic state on all of the land of historic Palestine as the ultimate 
solution to the “Arab-Zionist” conflict. Moreover, they were instrumental 
in the organization of the Palestinian Land Day demonstrations—whose 
importance as a turning point in national consciousness is often 
overlooked. As such, it not only highlighted the emotional bond 
Palestinian-Israelis had with the land, but linked this bond with an 
awakened identification with their Palestinian brethren in the WBGS, and 
hence, their nationalism (Rekhess 2007: 9). 
Abnaa El-Balad became more popular among Palestinian-Israelis after 
the first Intifada. In 1996, it was part of the broad coalition of 
Palestinian nationalists calling for a democratic state of all its citizens in 
Israel. The coalition—known as the National Democratic Alliance, or 
“Tajamuu’”—was headed by Azmi Bishara, and succeeded in winning 
him a Knesset seat. The aims of Tajamuu’ are centered upon ending the 
marginalization and ‘Israelization’ of Palestinian-Israelis (Bishara et al. 
1996). As such, it calls for cultural autonomy in order to transform the 
Israeli state into a state of all its citizens. The demands of Tajamuu’ 
were summarized by Bishara as follows: 
“1) The determination of the curriculum of Arab schools by the Arab community; 2) 
the establishment of an independent, non-government run Arab television station; 3) 
the participation of the Arab community in decisions concerning the development of 
the Galilee and the Negev (centers of Arab population); the abolition of the concept of 
Jewish national land (unavailable for use by Arab citizens); 5) the severing of the links 
between Zionist institutions (the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, for 
example) and the institutions of the state of Israel” (Azmi Bishara et al. 1996: 27).  
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Positioned as a localized Arab national movement within Israel (as 
opposed to earlier positionings as either internationalist, or part of the 
Palestinian national movement) Tajamuu’ was focused upon 
democratizing the state of Israel and both introducing and creating a 
notion of equal (individual) civic citizenship within Israeli-Jewish society 
that simultaneously recognizes Palestinian-Israelis as a national 
minority that wanted collective rights (Azmi Bishara et al. 1996: 27). The 
party won three seats in 2006, represented by Bishara, Wasil Taha and 
Jamal Zahalqa. In the years to follow all three men were tried in Israeli 
courts, Bishara was forced into exile, and in 2009—while Israel launched 
“Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza—Tajamuu’ was banned on the grounds 
that it did not recognize the Israeli state and called for armed conflict 
against it. However, it remains important to note that Tajamuu’ was the 
first party in the Israeli state’s history to advocate for a democratic state 
of all its citizens; cultural autonomy and equal national citizenship for 
all minorities; the separation of religion and state; as well as for the 
implementation of the Palestinian Right of Return. Despite the fact that 
many of its members are single state supporters—Tajamuu’ did this 
within the framework of the two-state solution, advocating for Israeli 
withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state.  
It is from within this context that single state intellectuals today 
acknowledge Palestinian-Israelis to be the pioneers of the return of the 
single state idea, and the initial driving force behind it. As Asa’ad 
Ghanem underlines, “Palestinians in Israel are the only group of 
Palestinians calling clearly for bi-nationality” (Ghanem 2007: 68). This 
can be argued to largely stem from their own peculiar fate as 
Palestinians confined within the Israeli state, and frequently perceived 
as an enemy threat within it (Rouhana & Sultany 2003: 6-10); are 
separated from their own Palestinian people, while being subjected to 
Zionist processes of de-Arabization (Yiftachel 2009: 58-60); were 
rendered invisible by the PLO after Oslo; and yet crucially, are 
simultaneously Israeli second-class citizens. Hence, while they are 
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subjects under what Oren Yiftachel termed an Israeli system of creeping 
apartheid (Yiftachel 2006) they have certain points of access into the 
political process at their disposal. Yiftachel writes,  
“State policies…weaken the minority through segmentation, denial of most collective 
cultural or political rights, and pervasive material deprivation. The Arabs have, 
however, developed a collective political agenda based on grounding their status as a 
national homeland minority. They are determined to protect their property and 
heritage and to achieve equality and recognition” (Yiftachel 2009: 57).  
Yiftachel argues that Palestinian-Israeli citizenship is structurally 
limited by the inherent contradiction within the fact that Israel is 
simultaneously an exclusionary Jewish and a self-proclaimed democratic 
state (Yiftachel 2009). Moreover, the period of Oslo can be argued to be 
one of the lowest points of distress for Palestinian-Israelis who, “Felt 
that they were ‘falling between the chairs’…Their difficult struggle in 
the face of the new reality was aptly described…as a situation of 
“double peripherality” (Rekhess 2002: 7). Ignored by the PA, and 
cognizant of the fact that struggling for equal citizenship within Israel 
Proper is a difficult battle—Palestinian-Israelis found themselves in an 
increasingly precarious position. It is in this context that the idea of 
binationalism was raised as a pathway out of their dilemma as an 
unrecognized national community within Israel, as well as a silenced 
integral part of the larger Palestinian national collective.  
This dilemma was further intensified by the Al-Aqsa Intifada—and the 
consequent protests that broke out in the Palestinian-Israeli community 
in October 2000, and resulted in the “unprecedented killing of 13 Arab 
citizens in the Galilee” (Rekhess 2002: 34) by Israeli police. This was 
paralleled with a sharp rise in Israeli discourse portraying them as a 
“demographic threat” to Jewish-Israelis (Rouhana & Sultany 2003: 5-6). 
Thus, in a Haartez interview Bishara would state, “If a just solution is 
being sought, it can be realized only in the bi-national context” (Rekhess 
2002: 18). Similarly, Nadim Rouhana proposed a model for a binational 
solution that focused upon transforming the Israeli constitution—
though his proposal only dealt with Israel itself, and not with the OPT 
(Rekhess 2002: 18). As’ad Ghanem echoed the efforts of Bishara and 
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Rouhana, making the most forceful proposal against separation yet in 
2000. Within it, he argued that “solutions aimed at developing liberal 
democracy in Israel, or separation, were not workable, and therefore 
efforts must be directed toward a more inclusive solution in the form of 
a bi-national alternative in the entire area of Mandatory Palestine” 
(Rekhess 2002: 18).  
Of these efforts to come to terms with their collective national identity, 
their location, and their visions for a more just future—three documents 
would become central in the context of the single state idea, and the 
possible democratization of the Israeli state: The Haifa Declaration, the 
Future Vision, and Adalah’s Democratic Constitution. Taken together, 
these documents became known as the “vision” documents. Written by a 
group of Palestinian intellectuals, academics and activists in 2007—with 
the prominent involvement of Rouhana—the Haifa Declaration is a call 
for a democratic bi-national solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; a 
stand against the occupation and Israel’s wall, and an affirmation of the 
Palestinian and Arab identity of Palestinian-Israelis, in a context within 
which the Israeli state consistently attempted to erase them (Rouhana et 
al. 2007). A reflection of how pervasive and systematic this erasure was 
can be seen in the Jewish-Israeli public’s reaction to the protests of 
October 2000: 
“The October 2000 protests by Palestinian citizens were construed in Israel as an 
“internal intifada” or “joining intifada.” Jewish Israelis felt deeply threatened by the 
“discovery” that the people they had always called “Israeli Arabs” are, in fact, 
Palestinians; 74 percent of the Jewish public polled in the aftermath of the Palestinians 
protests categorized the behavior of Arab citizens as “treason””(Rouhana & Sultany 
2003: 9).  
The Haifa Declaration itself was a project that was begun in 2002 within 
the Mada al-Carmel Arab Center for Applied Social Research, with the 
aim of providing a forum for a broad collective of Palestinian-Israelis to 
discuss their position in their homeland and possible pathways towards 
a more equal collective future. The Declaration also represented a 
refusal on the part of Palestinian-Israelis to live within a system that has 
discriminated against them through diverse policies of marginalization. 
As Yiftachel highlights, these policies are reflected in numerous areas, 
  
191 
which include land ownership, power-sharing, economic resources and 
opportunities, the legal system, loss of life due to the deployment of 
state violence, and of course, the state’s processes of Judaization 
(Yiftachel 2000).  
In parallel to all single state advocates, Palestinian-Israelis called for 
justice and reconciliation between the two people, and argued that the 
first steps towards de-colonization must begin with the Israeli 
acknowledgement of the Palestinian Nakba, and the acceptance of the 
Palestinian Right of Return. As such, it emphasized the centrality of 
history in any resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and of the 
unity of the Palestinian collective in any just solution to the conflict.  
The Haifa declaration was preceded by The Future Vision of the 
Palestinians of 1948—a similar, though much more detailed document 
that was the result of a year of workshops and meetings fusing 
academics and activists, and initiated by The National Committee for the 
Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel. Published in 2006, it also 
stressed the importance of the development of national collective 
institutions after their disintegration in the post-Oslo era; the creation 
of a unified political leadership; as well as the need for creative dialogue 
with youth-movements, media outlets, trade unions, diverse political 
parties and local authorities, with special attention given to mixed Arab-
Jewish cities (Rinawie-Zoabi 2006).  
In 2007, Adalah—the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel—
followed this up with a draft of a democratic constitution, calling for a 
bilingual, multicultural, democratic state. This action can be argued to 
be especially powerful in view of the fact that Israel has yet to adopt a 
constitution. Adalah took this opportunity to highlight the fact that all 
proposals of constitutions for the state to date had been based upon the 
question of “who is a Jew”, and the preservation of the Jewish character 
of the state—rather than advancing an embrace of democracy and the 
question of who is a citizen (Adalah 2007). Adalah’s constitution also 
stipulated the acknowledgement of the Palestinian Right of Return; the 
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Palestinian Nakba and the occupation; the recognition of the 
“unrecognized villages” in the Negev; and the need for Israel to define 
its border in order to eradicate the ethnic nature of its exclusive form of 
citizenship. 
It should be highlighted that today Palestinian-Israelis are considered 
crucial for the single state solution as a result of the fact that they have 
linked all of their vision documents with the Palestinian collective as a 
whole, and hence produced documents for collective Palestinian 
liberation centered upon equal rights and citizenship for all within a 
democratic unitary state. Moreover, Palestinian-Israelis represent a 
crucial geographical presence for the possibility of a single state on the 
ground. As such, it is acknowledged that their defection from within the 
single state movement would damage the possibility of a single state 
solution on the land of historic Palestine. Thus, in the context of the 
single state movement, they represent one of the most basic, and yet 
perhaps most powerful sources of power for any movement of 
liberation against settler-colonialism—namely, the power of remaining 
upon the land.  
III. Strategies of Resistance advanced by the Single State Movement 
  
Before outlining the various strategies the single state movement has 
launched, or desires to launch, as channels from within which to 
counter the prevalent notions of the two-state solution since Oslo, as 
well as the processes of separation launched by Oslo on the ground—it 
should be highlighted that these strategies came about as a direct 
reflection of the intellectual critique the single state project elaborated 
against Oslo. Thus, what follows here represents a brief outlining of 
these strategies—the majority of which reflect the historical 
background, experiences, and worldviews of the blocs of intellectuals 
illustrated above.  
In tandem to this, it is important to highlight the fact that while the 
single state movement initially resulted in creating an intellectual and 
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political divide between those who support a single state solution and 
those who support a two-state solution—single state intellectuals have 
since attempted to shift this intellectual divide to one that reflects the 
practices and realities of resistance more accurately. As such—while all 
single state intellectuals oppose partition—the emphasis of their 
practices, alliances and strategies have focused less upon a need to 
openly support a specific type of solution to the conflict at this point in 
time, and more upon a need to struggle against Zionism and separation.  
As previously highlighted, this largely stems from the fact that single 
state intellectuals believe that the reality on the ground is already one of 
a single apartheid state that must be transformed into a democratic 
state for all its citizens. Moreover, this shift can be argued to be a 
reflection of the shift in the practices of solidarity and resistance on the 
ground themselves. As highlighted above by the example of the AATW, 
this shift emphasizes joint struggle within a platform that is opposed to 
the processes of separation and apartheid—as opposed to a form of 
alliance that can only be created if an explicit agreement upon a detailed 
and entrenched political outcome exists. It is contended that this new 
understanding of resistance and solidarity is mirrored in the strategies 
of resistance advanced by single state intellectuals.  
Furthermore, this same shift in emphasis can be seen in the initially 
significant division within the movement among those who prefer a bi-
national state, and those who prefer a secular democratic one. Thus, by 
2009, this divide was argued to be based upon false dichotomies 
between ideal types of states that have neither been problematized 
enough, nor reflect the urgency of the present moment. Instead, as 
Abunimah has argued, the present emphasis should not be upon an 
entrenched position regarding the type of state—but rather upon 
mobilizing as broad a base as possible around the principles of the One 
State Declaration (Abunimah 2009). As such, this chapter contends that 
viewing the resistance practices of the single state movement in terms 
of “anti-Zionist practices” that oppose the processes and practices of 
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separation on the ground may provide a more accurate reflection of 
what it stands for as a collective, and what it stands against. Moreover, 
this lens serves to underline the fact that it is the continuing processes 
of Zionism that stand in the way of both a viable two-state solution and 
a one-state solution (Cook 2008). Hence, it is within its unified anti-
Zionist platform, and anti-Zionist practices, that the strength of the 
single state conception of the world lies. It is to these practices that this 
section will now turn.  
A. Conferences, Networks, and Uniting Theory and Practice 
As previously emphasized, one of the most powerful strategies of the 
single state movement is the declared practice of fusing theory and the 
practice of resistance, in an effort to activate a form of Gramsci’s 
philosophy of praxis as the most effective way of creating empowering 
critical historical self-understanding and social transformation. Thus, on 
the importance of the practices of activists to his ideas and strategies in 
the context of the single state movement, Pappe states that much of his 
strategizing and theorizations began with intensive contact with 
Palestinian activists, and are empowered by them (Pappe 2009b). 
Moreover, he argues that in places like Israel “where academia becomes 
the mouthpiece of the government” (Pappe, interview) the Israeli 
activism milieu fills the space that a critical engaging academia should 
have provided.    
The most obvious arena within which both intellectuals and activists 
organise to do this is through a growing network of conferences, 
workshops and talks in various cities within which they seek to mobilize 
for their struggle. As highlighted in chapter four, these conferences 
were sparked with a Lausanne University conference entitled “One 
Democratic State in Palestine/Israel” in 2004—and continued to expand 
to include single state conferences in Madrid and London in 2007; 
Zochrot’s groundbreaking conference in Tel Aviv, and Abnaa al-Balad’s 
Haifa single state conference in 2008; The Massachussets Institute of 
Technology’s conference in Boston in 2009; A second Haifa conference 
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organized by Abnaa al-Balad in 2010, as well as conferences in Dallas, 
Stuttgart and London organized by activists and suppoters of the single 
state idea that same year.     
It is important to note that the majority of single state declarations, 
visions, initiatives, informal networks, groups and strategies emerged 
from within these deliberations. Significantly, this fusion of theory and 
practice was not just initiated by academics, but was equally important 
for groups and activists involved in practices of resistance, who were 
“conscious of the fact that the one state idea is an intellectual exercise, 
and wanted to move beyond that” (Ziada, interview). Hence, Tilley 
argued that the Madrid conference arose out of a need to create a 
programme of political action from within academia (Salamanca 2007), 
while the SOAS conference in 2007 was launched in order to bring 
academics and activists together, fuse activism and theory, and launch 
joint single state projects in Israel/Palestine and trans-nationally (Ziada, 
interview). Complementing the Madrid and London conferences—in 
2008 both Zochrot and Abnaa al-Balad held conferences within 
Palestine/Israel itself that both underscored the necessity of expanding 
the single state resistance struggle within this geographical theatre, as 
well as the necessity of exploring strategies to implement the 
Palestinian Right of Return on the ground. By 2010—bringing this fusion 
of activism and theory full circle—the second Haifa conference 
intentionally highlighted a more activist oriented agenda. As such, its 
workshops centred around outlining the practices of building a global 
movement for the return of the Palestinian refugees and the 
establishment of a single democratic state in Palestine/Israel from 
within the more theoretically elaborated ideas of the previous 
conferences. This conference also underlined the importance of Haifa 
itself as a base for the growing movement for the establishment of a 
single democratic state in Palestine/Israel—thus placing further 
emphasis upon the need for any single state resistance struggle to 
continue to have a strong, and expansive, geographical base within 
Palestine/Israel. Picking up where the Haifa conference left off and 
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building upon the platforms, networks and declarations of the Madrid, 
London, Haifa and Boston conferences—the single state conference held 
by activists and academics in Dallas also outlined an agenda underlining 
the interlinked practices and strategies of resistance itself, and declared 
its aim to be that of the “launching a mass movement for the creation of 
One Democratic State in (historic) Palestine” (Hallaby, Hassan 2010).    
As such, beyond the deliberate desire to create this synthesis, and the 
programmes of action and declarations that came out of them as a 
result, these conferences were instrumental in highlighting the existence 
of a core community of Israeli and Palestinian academics and activists 
engaged in the idea of a single state solution—and linked them in 
expanding networks of action, information dissemination, mobilization 
and deliberation (Abunimah, interview).  
While these networks remain fluid, uncoordinated and lacking in 
concrete organizational structure, many single state intellectuals do not 
see the need for a centralized, structured form of organization in order 
for there to be an active, prominent, linked community struggling for a 
single state. In this vein, Abunimah argues that,  
“You have tremendously committed people. Palestinians second and third generation, 
who have clear politics, who are more committed than their parents, and they didn’t 
need any centralized leadership to bring them to that. I do think that there is 
something (about the internet)…I’m part of the first generation of Palestinians who 
had access to the internet. People talk about social media as if it’s brand new, you 
know, facebook and twitter and all this, but recently I was thinking that ten years ago 
we went through this with much cruder technologies…in those days, listserves were 
very important because they were the first place, for me, that I met other Palestinians 
across global boundaries. There was one particular listserve called freedom list and 
many of the people at this conference, and some of the most visible activists who I 
know and formed strong relationships with, I knew from that list. So for me, that was 
the first time I had this consciousness of being part of a global Palestinian community 
that could talk together, that could act together, and that was really important. Now, I 
think that this is just how things are done. Things aren’t done by centralised 
organizations” (Abunimah, interview). 
Paralleling this view, many single state networks and groups and 
alternative media forums have been created on the internet—the most 
famous among them probably being Ali Abunimah’s Electronic Intifada 
(EI), which he himself describes as “a major forum for discussing the 
One State Solution” (Abunimah, interview), and as the sort of alternative 
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forum that is essential for any marginalized movement to create. As 
such he states, “I do see things as EI as absolutely necessary because 
you cannot rely on the mainstream media, which are generally 
committed to the hegemonic consensus” (Abunimah, interview). This 
strategy is used by the single state movement in order to disseminate its 
critiques, worldview, and actions to as wide an audience as possible, as 
well as in an effort to create new constituencies, and stage interventions 
that would not be accepted within the mainstream media and its 
institutions. Moreover, there are many intellectuals who target popular 
mainstream media outlets, and use their academic standing and writing 
skills in order to infiltrate public discourse (Bisharat, interview). In 
addition to this, a minority among these intellectuals have been able to 
build upon these efforts to establish single state forums of debate and 
information dissemination within academia itself—the most prominent 
example to date being Edinburgh University’s multidisciplinary journal 
Holy Land Studies (Pappe, interview).    
In many ways these arenas of deliberation and forms of organization 
also mirror the fact that with the exception of there being some 
academic bodies that are willing to fund single state conferences—the 
majority of single state initiatives remain self-funded. As Abunimah 
points out in terms of funding single state initiatives, “There’s a lot of 
institutional opposition. Not support. Everywhere” (Abunimah, 
interview). This of course is not only a reflection of the institutional 
opposition to this alternative force in the making—but simultaneously 
that of the backlash its attempted expansion in civil societies, the media 
and academic institutions7 has created.  
                                                 
7 For an example of this backlash, see the controversy surrounding the funding the 
conference partially received from the Canadian government at York University in 
Canada, which resulted in much negative media press and protest from within pro-
Zionist groups and institutions. This, despite the fact that this particular conference 
was not primarily on the One-State Solution, but a debating of solutions to the conflict 
in general.  
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B. Engaging in Joint Action between Israeli-Jews and Palestinians 
Another crucial strategy of the single state movement reflects itself in 
the organization of the movement itself, and in all its intellectual 
endeavours and practices of resistance—namely, the fact that it is based 
within, built upon, and seeks to promote joint action between 
Palestinians and Israeli-Jews, and more broadly, Arabs and Jews. The 
single state movement strives to do this both intellectually and on the 
ground, with the ultimate goal of creating joint struggle and 
highlighting and expanding spaces of coexistence between both 
communities. While this is reflected in all of its deliberations, joint 
writings and strategies, it also involves a project in which they seek to 
revive the silenced common history of Jewish presence and coexistence 
within the Arab world that has largely been silenced by both the 
creation and the narratives of history of the Israeli state—which center 
upon Ashkenazi-Jewish identity, history and experience. On the need to 
engage in this project of joint re-excavation, Sivan elaborates, 
“This is something that can be a joint call both to Arabs and to some Jews—to upload, 
to insist upon, and to create a common knowledge about the history of Jews in the 
Arab world… (To create) a real data base done by the Arab world and Palestinians 
about the history of Jews in the Arab world as an alternative to the perception that the 
existence of Jewish minorities in every place leads to extermination, to persecution, to 
discrimination” (Sivan, Eyal 2007). 
This project of re-excavation parallels another strategy within the single 
state movement—which is that of reviving the erased identity of the 
Arab-Jew, and the attempt to target this community within Israel as a 
latent potential ally to the single state vision. It is important to note that 
this joint project of historical re-excavation aims not only to shift the 
historical understandings of the around 3 million Arab-Jews within 
Israel, but to simultaneously breach the silence around the role Jewish 
people played within Arab history and culture in the Arab world. 
Perhaps equally important to note is that this sort of joint action 
reflects the new type of joint struggle that is emerging between Israelis 
and Palestinians—especially within the OPT—and which was described 
above in the context of organizations such as the AIC, Zochrot, AATW 
and ICAHD. As such, this form of historical re-excavation mirrors the 
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efforts of these groups on the ground. More importantly still, it is an 
effort to highlight that—as opposed to the dominant discourse of binary 
opposition—the reality in Israel/Palestine contains overlaps in identity, 
culture, struggle and solidarity between Arabs and Jews, as well as 
spaces upon which Palestinians and Israeli-Jews already coexist, 
intermingle and overlap, such as in geographical spaces like the Galilee. 
It is these spaces, struggles, overlaps and fusions that the single state 
movement seeks to build upon and expand.  
C. Hamas, the Israeli-Right, and Some Geopolitical Considerations 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many within the single state 
movement—and especially within the Palestinian Diaspora—have raised 
the necessity of engaging in dialogue with Hamas, as well as the 
possibility of creating alliances with some of its members. In a different 
vein to whether or not to incorporate elements of Hamas, a much more 
controversial strategic suggestion (initially from the Israeli-Jewish bloc) 
has revolved around the possibility of forging alliances with elements of 
the Israeli right who may have become more attached to the land, and 
the idea of an undivided land, than the need to cling on to an ethnically 
exclusive Jewish state. This paradox of the Israeli right being a group 
that is historically against partition, and as such perhaps willing to 
chose its love of the land over the form of state was first brought up by 
Sivan at the SOAS in 2007. Commenting upon this idea in the context of 
groups within Israel itself that may be open to a one state solution, Ilan 
Pappe says,  
“(A group) which is interesting, though it’s very hard to imagine how we’re going to 
deal with them, is actually people on the right-wing, even settlers in a way, who would 
think that maybe a certain colony could stay, provided the right of return is given to 
the Palestinians. I mean the people—who I don’t want to idealise—who really cherish 
life more than anything else, and wouldn’t really care what the political regime would 
be. It’s a tiny minority, but I think it’s an important group to include” (Pappe, 
interview).  
This debate upon the Israeli right and the possibility of transforming 
their love of the land into support for a single democratic state has 
recently taken off with the publishing of Abunimah’s piece “Israeli right, 
  
200 
embracing one state?” in Al-Jazeera English (Abunimah 2010). In it 
Abunimah highlights that, 
“Recently, proposals to grant Israeli citizenship to Palestinians in the West Bank, 
including the right to vote for the Knesset, have emerged from a surprising direction: 
right-wing stalwarts such as Knesset speaker Reuven Rivlin and former defence 
minister Moshe Arens, both from the Likud party of Binyamin Netanyahu. Even more 
surprisingly, the idea has been pushed by prominent activists among Israel’s West 
Bank settler movement, who were the subject of a must-read profile by Noam Sheizaf 
in Haaretz” (Abunimah 2010).  
The profile of this group of people included prominent politicians, who 
argued for the granting of Israeli citizenship to most, if not all 
Palestinians in the West Bank, has since vanished from the Internet and 
Haaretz’ website. Sheizaf8 himself though had this to say about the 
actions of this movement,  
“People who read the article understood how revolutionary this step might be, even 
though it’s not complete and it ignores many of the basic problems of the conflict… 
Part of what is fascinating about this group of one-state right-wingers…is that it 
speaks about a land in which the two populations are totally mixed, linked to each 
other, have a common history by now, even though it’s a pretty awful one, and reading 
it as one territorial unit” (Malsin 2010).  
And while these proposals do not include the Gaza Strip, they do 
parallel recent moves being made by a growing number of Palestinians 
in the West Bank applying for Israeli citizenship—moves that largely 
began in East Jerusalem around the time of the Annapolis conference9. 
As Abunimah argues, while these moves remain inadequate, they may 
contain some hopeful possibilities for creating bridges for a single 
democratic state.  
Having said this, these strategies remain within an over-all framework 
that is centered upon Palestinian resistance. As such, while an integral 
part of the single state movement—especially among its Israeli-Jewish 
and Palestinian-Israeli blocs—is to create alliances and bridges with 
communities and movements in Israel who would be open to a single 
                                                 
8 For more on this movement, see an interview with Sheizaf on his article “Endgame” 
here (http://palestinenote.com/blogs/news/archive/2010/07/19/noam-sheizaf-in-
terms-of-the-one-state-solution-we-re-still-in-the-70s.aspx). Also, see 
(http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/is-there-another-option-1.293670).  
9 For more on this trend, see (http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-reports-jump-in-
jerusalem-arabs-seeking-israeli-citizenship-1.232665).  
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democratic state, the movement remains geo-politically focused upon 
mobilizing internal and external resistance to de-Zionize the Israeli 
state, and not upon whether or not Israeli-Jews think a single 
democratic state is a good idea. Barghouti elaborates,  
“The point is not about convincing (Israeli-Jews), it’s about resisting to get there…as 
far as the resistance is concerned—there’s a Palestinian pillar, an Arab pillar and an 
international pillar…. If we work on the three pillars together, I think we can ultimately 
‘convince’ Israelis by putting some sense into their heads. I choose a non-violent path, 
because I believe it is morally and politically much more sound, but ultimately, it is 
resistance. Without resistance we cannot fix the balance of powers, and we cannot 
‘convince’ anyone” (Barghouti, Omar 2009).  
Of course, for the single state movement, the re-unification of the 
Palestinian pillar of this struggle into one mutually inclusive, indivisible 
collective that has the right to self-determination takes central stage. As 
previously mentioned, strategies to reach this goal revolve around 
reforming the PA, and recreating a grassroots, representative, 
empowering PLO. As Barghouti argues on reviving the PLO, this is not 
something that the Palestinian collective has not accomplished before: 
The PLO—it does not exist but it has a seat at the UN. We’re not going to give up that 
seat. We just want to put the right person in it…I suggest a democratic take-over of the 
PLO. Which means, grassroots organizations, Palestinians everywhere, can start 
organizing, as we’ve done in the 50s and 60s…this is not something that we need to 
learn from Ghandi, we’ve had this in our history, we’ve done this before—so (we 
should) re-establish a representative organization” (Barghouti, Omar 2009).  
In parallel to this—and in conjunction with the vision of this movement 
as one that seeks to re-establish the Eastern location of Israel itself, and 
re-locate Palestine within its roots, history and identity in the Arab 
world—single state activists emphasize that the Arab world is a central 
geo-political partner in this struggle if real justice and democracy will 
ever be reached (Barghouti, Omar 2009).  
This point is taken up further by Leila Farsakh, who argues that this 
nurturing environment must be created in the Arab world as a whole in 
order for there to be space from within which to mobilize mass support 
for a single state in Palestine/Israel. Engaging in the creation of this 
kind of space requires “a serious reconsideration of the concept of 
(equal) citizenship, of the other, and of identity” (Farsakh, Leila 2009). 
For the Diaspora Palestinians especially, this goes back to the idea of 
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“rehabilitating cosmopolitan Arab identity” (Farsakh, Leila 2009) as well 
as “rehabilitating a truly humanist identity” (Farsakh, Leila 2009) that 
does not privilege ethnic or religious divisions and recognizes that 
historically these categories have always been porous. This argument 
also ties into the single state movement’s strategy concerning the need 
for the revival of Arab-Jewish history.  
Moreover, for Abunimah, both the centrality of the Arab world in this 
struggle, as well as the difficulties the single state movement faces in 
targeting them revolve around the centrality of resistance. Thus, people 
tend to over-estimate the power of forces within—for example—the US, 
neglecting that resistance to its policies exists, and can play an 
important role in the dialectical outcome of any situation (Abunimah 
2009). However, it is this very same emphasis upon resistance that he 
argues has created difficulties for the single state movement in speaking 
to Arab publics: 
“I think you can only talk about a one state solution, or some kind of common 
future…(which) sound like fuzzy liberal things…in a context where resistance is 
legitimised and seen as legitimate. When people are struggling to maintain the idea 
that resistance is even legitimate, you can’t talk to them about the one state solution, 
because it sounds like affirming the status quo. So you have to win the argument 
about resistance in a sense… You have to establish that this is an anti-colonial 
struggle, and then you can talk about what the possible outcomes are” (Abunimah, 
interview).  
In view of this, it must be said that beyond strategies involving the 
mobilization for a single state within Israel, the OPT, and the Palestinian 
collective—it is within the international pillar that the single state 
movement has been most active in promoting its struggle, and it is also 
within this arena that it has made the most powerful and rapidly 
expanding gains. This success is largely due to the launching of the 
global BDS movement against the state of Israel, which shall be 
expanded upon in Chapter 6. For the purposes of this chapter, it is 
important to stress that the BDS movement is intimately intertwined 
with the single state strategy of “South-Africanizing” the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. Hence, many single state intellectuals felt that this 
paradigm shift would resonate more with Western, and especially 
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American, publics—helping to convey the reality in Israel/Palestine 
better. On the effectiveness of this strategy, Pappe states,  
“I think that there are a few things there that make it potentially effective…there are 
African Americans in the US that are surprisingly pro-Zionist, and one has to work on 
them in terms of disseminating these ideas. Progressive Jews were at the forefront of 
the anti-apartheid movement. America as a whole, as a state, eventually, took a tough 
position on South Africa and used to be South Africa’s ally because of the Cold War. So 
you have all these ingredients that make you think that it’s a familiar concept. Of 
course, the Israelis will do all they can to refuse this comparison, but I think if 
anything will work, this will work better than anything else” (Pappe, interview).  
As such, single state intellectuals do view forces within American civil 
society (and Western civil society more broadly) as key factors in 
launching a successful struggle for a single state solution, and view key 
communities within these societies as potentially mobilizable. These 
groups include students, who make up one of the single state idea’s 
fastest growing supporters—but also involve attempts to create links 
with various unions, with progressive African American communities, 
and with elements of society that are usually considered to be more 
critical—such as academics, artists, and media personalities for 
example. Most crucially however, the most powerful gain of the single 
state movement has been among the growing number of anti-Zionist 
Jewish communities internationally that have joined the BDS 
movement—which continues to expand into a growing force in Western 
civil societies at present.  
IV. Conclusion: Divisions within the Whole and a Gramscian process of 
Transformation 
  
As chapter four highlighted, the large unifying threads of the single 
state conception of the world are its re-emergence out of a critique of 
Oslo, and its underlying embrace of separation as a solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its political and moral stance against 
Zionism’s worldview and processes. Hence, this chapter has contended 
that the single state movement’s practices of resistances should be 
conceived of as “anti-Zionist practices” against the processes of 
separation unleashed by Zionism on the ground. However, as this 
conception of the world is elaborated by separate, though interlinked 
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blocs of intellectuals—divisions inevitably also arise within its ranks. 
Similarly—since the building of a common platform from within which 
to launch a Gramscian counterhegemonic struggle transforms all groups 
involved in its processes—this chapter has tried to underline the fact 
that many of the initial divisions among the blocs within the single state 
movement shifted in its evolution towards collectively agreed upon 
principles within an anti-Zionism platform. Simultaneously, it has 
attempted to show that disagreements and contradictions do exist 
within the diverse blocs of organic intellectuals, as well as within their 
perceptions of themselves as activists and of the nature of the 
movement itself.  
Hence, the biggest of these divides can be argued to have been the 
divide among those who support a single binational state solution, as 
opposed to those who desire a secular democratic state. Hence, it is 
important to note that the majority of anti-Zionist Israeli-Jewish 
intellectuals, as well as Palestinian-Israeli intellectuals initially preferred 
to speak in terms of a binational future that guaranteed collective 
community rights for national minorities within a single state. In 
contrast to this group however, intellectuals of the Palestinian Diaspora, 
and the Palestinians under occupation, overwhelmingly prefer a secular 
democratic, “one person-one vote” state. As this chapter argued, this 
division was bridged in an effort to create unity on collectively agreed 
upon anti-Zionist principles, mobilize as broad a public as possible, and 
place an emphasis upon joint action that reflects the urgency of the 
present historical moment. Similarly, there exists divisions within the 
movement on whether or not to engage elements of Hamas, or—more 
problematically—of the Israeli right. However, the same effort of 
bridging this divide through an agreement upon the movement’s core 
anti-Zionist principles and practices—as opposed to a binding 
agreement upon a detailed blueprint for a future outcome—is being 
advocated as the way forward by many out of this impasse as well. 
Moreover, this strategy is also based within an acknowledgement of the 
fact that solutions themselves become fluid and flexible once applied to 
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a reality—and that neither Hamas nor the Israeli right are monolithic, 
static entities themselves, incapable of pragmatic compromise.  
Perhaps the most significant tension that has arisen within the single 
state movement for the purposes of this chapter revolves around a lack 
of clear consensus upon whether or not it has reached a point in which 
it can envision itself becoming a more traditionally organized part of 
the political spectrum of alternatives. Paralleling this, it remains unclear 
whether or not this evolution is even desirable for the majority of single 
state intellectuals. Commenting upon the type of movement the single 
state represents today, and this internal tension within it, Pappe states, 
“It’s a movement in the making. And the reason it is not a movement yet is because it 
has to take a decision…(on) whether it’s part of the present political game. Mainly, 
does it want to join the game as a new political party? Does it want to join an existing 
political party? Which is one kind of a movement…I think that the whole structure of 
political parties is something which is based on the two-state solution, so we can’t fit 
in. What is better but would take longer, is to be a movement in the more popular 
sense of the word. A force to influence opinions, disseminate new views. It’s more 
fluid as a structural concept, but it’s more powerful because it’s more alternative. 
There’s a certain stage where one can become the other. But we have to be clear on 
what we are, and what we can be, or can’t be yet” (Pappe, interview).  
There are a minority of single state intellectuals who would like to see 
the single state movement become a more traditional political 
organization—the most prominent among them perhaps being Ghada 
Karmi (Karmi, Ghada 2009). However, this chapter underlined that it is 
clear from their own self-perceptions, strategies and perceptions of the 
movement itself, that the majority of single state intellectuals are 
involved in the creation of what Pappe describes above as an alternative 
movement—and what Massad has argued to be a Gramscian war of 
position against the peace process (Massad, Joseph 2007). It is in view of 
these dynamics that the chapters mapping this movement have 
contended that it is most fruitfully viewed as a Gramscian form of 
resistance—aimed at creating a reconstructive moment within 
interlinked diverse geographical theatres. Centered within a framework 
of rights, democracy and international law—it is in the next chapter’s 
engagement with the single state movement’s global BDS strategy that 
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the strength of the potential within their emerging war of position is 
argued to be found. 
  
207 
Chapter Six 
Building a War of Position: The Tactic of BDS, Anti-Zionist 
Jewish Voices and the Single State Solution 
I. Introduction 
This chapter is a culmination of the previous two chapters, which strove 
to map the alternative conception of the world of the single state 
project both intellectually—as a critique of a disempowering form of 
common sense that must be contested in order for a more just reality to 
become possible—as well as in terms of the organization, strategy, and 
political practices mirroring this intellectual critique of an oppressive 
status quo, and put forward by it as avenues of possible transformation. 
As has been shown, this form of intellectual critique turned into action 
seeks to re-energize a form of Gramscian praxis that is seen as a 
promising route towards the transformation of political possibilities 
and oppressive realities by single state intellectuals. As Omar Barghouti 
argues, only resistance that is based upon an interlinking of reflection 
and action can transform the world and create the tools with which 
people can rise above the domesticating power of oppression and 
counter it (Barghouti 2009). It is precisely this form of resistance that 
the emergent single state movement is attempting to build—one that is 
built upon “Palestinian civil society’s reflection on the roots of 
Palestinian oppression, and its concerted action to end this oppression” 
(Barghouti 2009: 1). More importantly still, following a Saidian inflected 
Gramsci, this form of resistance begins within counterhegemony, and as 
such is concerned with (and reflects) the practical, messy, contradictory, 
context-sensitive pursuit of liberation on the ground—as opposed to a 
clinical adherence to dogmatic theoretical positions, static ideas, 
identities and solutions that must remain pure and forever unchanged.  
The conventional assumption upon the recent emergence of a rapidly 
growing global BDS movement against Zionism is that it is de-linked 
from, and a separate phenomenon to, the re-emergence of the single 
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state idea and its counterhegemonic project. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the global BDS movement does not openly champion a single 
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contradistinction to 
this, this chapter strives to show that while the BDS movement does not 
take any positions upon a political solution—it remains both interlinked 
with and an integral tactic of the single state movement’s long-term 
revolutionary strategy against Zionism. As such, it presents an analysis 
of the BDS movement’s emergence, call, tactics, obstacles and strategies, 
and the extent to which they mirror those of the single state 
movement’s anti-Zionist practices of resistance. In doing so, this chapter 
simultaneously attempts to present a preliminary evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the tactic of BDS in light of its own goals within the 
geographic theatres of Palestine/Israel and Europe and North America. 
It does this, however, while underlining the fact that the early stage of 
this analysis skews it more towards the descriptive and the highlighting 
of the expansive potential within these tactics to become an effective 
counterhegemonic force in the long-term—rather than a comprehensive 
attempt at evaluation itself.  
Hence, building upon the previous mappings of the single state 
movement, this chapter begins by re-asserting the fact that the BDS call 
is an integral part of the single state movement’s conception of the 
world, and its attempt to build an anti-Zionist war of position against 
the current Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Secondly, it argues that an 
integral function of the BDS call involved an attempt to re-unify the 
Palestinian national collective from within civil society, and significantly, 
through the practice of resistance itself. As such, the call serves to 
sidestep the lack of official Palestinian endorsement of a single state 
solution to the conflict in the present—by launching a war of position 
against Zionism and separation based within the framework of an inter-
national politics of solidarity, as opposed to preference for a declared 
solution to the conflict. Thus, while the BDS movement may not take an 
open stand on political solutions, this chapter argues that its practices 
of resistance remain interlinked with the tactics of the single state 
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conception of the world. This chapter then goes on to sketch the 
emergent war of position triggered by the BDS call, arguing that it is 
geographically centered within civil society arenas of Europe and North 
America and that it has been given significant expansive power by the 
emergence of a network of anti-Zionist Jewish voices within this arena. 
Illustrating its gradual expansion within diverse institutions and arenas 
within these geographical theatres, this chapter goes on to highlight the 
minor cracks this war of position has begun to create within Israeli 
society itself. This chapter then ends with a brief interim assessment of 
the BDS tactic in light of its own goals, while underlining the fact that it 
is too early at this stage to evaluate its effectiveness in terms of the 
more demanding long-term strategy of an expansive war of position 
against Zionism.  
 
II. The Single State Movement and the Tactic of BDS 
A. The BDS Call as part of the Single State Movement 
 
In July 2005, more than 170 Palestinian civil society groups—
representing all three segments of the Palestinian national collective, 
and including political parties, trade unions, faith-based groups and 
associations—launched a global call for BDS against the state of Israel 
“until it complies with international law and universal human rights” 
(Palestinian Civil Society 2005b). Launched a year after the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Israel’s wall and settlements were illegal 
(International Court of Justice 2004), the call was an attack upon the 
unwillingness of the international community to hold Israel accountable 
under international law. Writing that they were “inspired by the struggle 
of South Africans against apartheid” (Palestinian Civil Society 2005b) the 
call was directed at “international civil society organizations” 
(Palestinian Civil Society 2005b), at “people of conscience” globally 
(Palestinian Civil Society 2005b), as well (and significantly) at 
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“conscientious Israelis” (Palestinian Civil Society 2005b). These citizens, 
institutions and organizations Europe and North America (and Israel) 
were called upon to engage in BDS actions to pressure their states to 
shift their policies regarding Israel—and significantly—to continue to do 
so until the mutually inclusive rights of all three segments of the 
Palestinian collective have been met.  
As such, the BDS campaign is a long-term strategy of resistance, with 
the interlinked goals of ending the Israeli occupation of 1967; 
recognizing the right to equal citizenship of Palestinian-Israelis; and 
implementing the Palestinian Right of Return in accordance with UNR 
194 (Palestinian Civil Society 2005b). As Omar Barghouti argues, this call 
represents the emergence of “a qualitatively different phase in the 
global struggle for Palestinian freedom, justice and self-determination” 
(Barghouti 2011b). In this context, this chapter contends that it is 
important to understand the BDS movement as an expansive practice of 
resistance that is intimately interlinked with the single state conception 
of the world’s war of position against the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. Thus, the BDS movement itself mirrors the intellectual 
reformulations and political strategies of the single state movement in 
several ways, and is arguably one of the most powerful arenas through 
which single state intellectuals are transforming political possibilities on 
the ground—and slowly conquering spaces and institutions within 
hegemonic European and North American spaces for the articulation 
and building of their alternative. 
Hence, in this vein, it should be highlighted that the BDS movement is 
primarily an attack on the marginalization of Palestinian liberation after 
the Madrid and Oslo peace processes—and a resistance practice that 
seeks to re-insert the history of the conflict as an anti-colonial struggle 
of liberation against Zionism within Western civil societies and 
institutions. In parallel, the BDS movement is also an attack upon the 
UNGA’s repeal of its 1975 “Zionism is racism” resolution in 1991 due to 
US pressure—as well as the PLO’s recognition of Israel under Oslo 
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(Barghouti 2006: 52). As Barghouti argues, the repeal of the resolution 
“removed a major obstacle to Zionist and Israeli rehabilitation in the 
international community” (Barghouti 2006: 52). Moreover, the PLO’s 
recognition of Israel added to “the transformation of Israel’s image from 
that of a colonial and inherently exclusivist state into a normal state 
engaged in a territorial dispute” (Barghouti 2006: 52). As such, a central 
part of the BDS movement involves a re-assertion of the roots of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in parallel with the single state conception of 
the world’s critique of Oslo—in an attempt to transform its oppressive 
common sense notions within the arena of practice.  
Further to this, the BDS movement is a re-appropriation of the power of 
civil and non-violent resistance as a powerful form of struggle for 
unified collective Palestinian liberation. Thus, it is an attack upon what 
Barghouti argues is a common sense notion among Palestinians—
namely an interlinking between non-violent resistance and minimalist 
(or fragmented) political goals, as opposed to a linking between armed 
resistance and maximalist goals (Barghouti 2006: 51). In opposition to 
this misconception, he writes,  
“While I firmly advocate non-violent forms of struggle such as boycott, divestment and 
sanctions to attain Palestinian goals, I just as decisively support a unitary state based 
on justice and comprehensive equality to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” (Barghouti 
2006: 51).  
Thus, the BDS movement strives to pave the way for an alternative 
pathway of non-violent resistance to negotiations within the framework 
of the peace process since Oslo that excludes armed resistance. As such, 
it is both an attack upon the dichotomous misconceived ‘natural’ choice 
between the collaborationist policies of the PA within the framework of 
non-violent negotiations, and Hamas’ armed resistance as the inevitable 
only choices facing Palestinians in the present historic conjuncture. In 
this way, it is a revolutionizing of political possibilities on the ground 
within the OPT, and among Palestinians.  
Moreover, it was launched in order to do what single state intellectuals 
had criticized the PLO for failing to do—to take advantage of the 
victories and considerable support the Palestinian people had within the 
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arenas of international law and universal human rights, and advocate 
for Palestinian rights from within this framework as opposed to one of 
direct negotiations with its oppressor that veils the realities of 
dispossession and separation on the ground. Thus, Bisharat writes,  
“A rights-based approach1 is posed here as an alternative, if not an antidote, to the 
approach that prevailed during the years of the Oslo peace process, in which 
international law was treated largely as an impediment to peace negotiations. Although 
Palestinian representatives repeatedly sought to base negotiations on international 
legal principles, Israeli and American negotiators favoured “pragmatism,” flexibility, 
and political accommodation” (Bisharat 2008: 4). 
Hence, while the BDS call is a re-claiming of the Palestinian agenda by 
Palestinian civil society—it is also centrally concerned with re-asserting 
the Palestinian Right of Return, and re-centring international law and 
universal human rights within any negotiation of a just, comprehensive 
solution for the conflict Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Bisharat 
highlights, it is the single state solution that “offers superior 
opportunities to maximize the legitimate rights, interests, and 
aspirations of the greatest number of Israelis and Palestinians” (Bisharat 
2008: 2). This, of course, is especially true in the case of the Palestinian 
refugees (who constitute the majority of the Palestinian national 
collective) and Palestinian-Israelis. And while Bisharat underlines that, 
“states and international organizations wield powerful tools to urge the 
parties toward a one-state solution” (Bisharat 2008: 3), they presently 
lack the political desire to do so, and will arguably continue to lack this 
desire in the future. Thus, Bisharat writes,  
“It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether international civil society is capable of 
playing a facilitating role, analogous to the role it played in fostering the demise of 
apartheid in South Africa. In view of current realities in the region and foreseeable 
trends, it is conceivable that Israel might suffer sustained international isolation, 
similar to that experienced by South Africa during the apartheid era. This might 
eventually bring a cadre of Israeli leaders to view the one-state solution as the only 
viable long-term option” (Bisharat 2008: 3). 
Therefore, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this 
chapter, the BDS call itself was a significant remedy to the fragmented 
Palestinian leadership’s lack of any clear vision of resistance and future 
                                                 
1 For a detailed legal exposition of what a ‘rights-based approach’ entails, see George E. 
Bisharat (2008) “Maximizing Rights: The One State Solution to the Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict,” Global Jurist: Vol. 8: Iss. 2 (Frontiers), Article 1.  
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goals—especially in terms of a simple program of action in which 
European and North American supporters of Palestinian liberation could 
channel their energy and activities in solidarity with the Palestinian 
people. Thus, as Sivan articulated, 
“We have to create debate around one state...We have to realize that the solidarity 
movements with Palestine today are stuck because they are preaching for something 
that exists less and less. Dismantling all the settlements, return to the 64 borders—I 
mean, they are preaching utopia but in the name of what? In solidarity with the 
Palestinians, but in fact they are in solidarity with the Americans and Israelis. I mean 
they are articulating the suspension of a solution. I’m sure that part of the depression 
and the lack of activism comes out of the lack of perspective on what to do and how to 
do it. That is what a solidarity movement comes out of” (Sivan, interview). 
As previously underlined by Pappe, it was precisely this re-formulation 
in both paradigm and practice that single state intellectuals sought to 
lead within the “kissing cousin industry” (Pappe, interview) of civil 
society in Europe and North America, by re-orienting their actions into 
one of solidarity within the BDS call. Crucially, as Barghouti emphasizes, 
the BDS call reformulated Palestinian resistance, and re-integrated the 
struggle for Palestinian self-determination within the “international 
struggle for justice, long obscured by the peace process” (Barghouti 
2006: 54). In doing so, it managed to break through the PA’s 
collaboration with negotiations perceived to be going nowhere, and to 
re-launch the Palestinian struggle for liberation within an arena in which 
it historically had much moral and legal power—that of civil society.  
Moreover, the call also resulted in a challenge by Palestinian civil society 
to diverse segments of Palestinian society within the OPT to embrace an 
alternative pathway of resistance, re-formulate their vision, and create a 
unified collective leadership. Thus it was a direct challenge to the 
legitimacy of the PA as an authority that lacks the mandate or ability to 
mount any credible resistance to Israeli apartheid, ethnic cleansing or 
occupation. Similarly, it was a shaming of Palestinian bodies and NGOs 
linked to international donors who chose to remain complicit with 
Palestinian oppression due to the promotion of their own interests. 
Hence, Barghouti writes,  
“A number of Palestinian NGOS, ever attentive to donor sensitivities, declined (the BDS 
call), some citing as ‘too radical’ the clause on the right of refugee return, while others, 
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bowing to pressure by their European partners, feared the term ‘boycott’ would invite 
charges of anti-Semitism” (Barghouti 2006: 55).  
In parallel to this, it represented an invitation to the most significant 
Palestinian political factions to consider shifting their focus on armed 
struggle in favour of the pathway of resistance offered by a global BDS 
and civil resistance movement. Perhaps most crucially, the BDS call 
made apparent the great difficulties involved in attempting to mobilize 
any official Palestinian leadership body to openly support the 
movement as an alternative. Initially this lack of official support created 
a hurdle for the BDS movement in the sense that many solidarity groups 
and movements in Europe and North America expected a form of 
‘Palestinian ANC’ to take the lead (Barghouti 2006: 54). In view of this 
hurdle and due to the rapid expansion of the BDS movement—the first 
BDS conference was held in Ramallah in 2007. Out of this conference, 
the Palestinian Boycott National Committee (BNC)2 emerged as a 
coordinating body for the BDS movement within Palestine. The BNC 
today is the committee that provides unified Palestinian leadership for 
the BDS movement, is the point of reference of global BDS programs3, 
and coordinates all BDS actions, strategies, programs and statements 
from within Palestine.  
The conference itself brought together activists, members of 
associations and NGOs from the villages, towns and refugee camps of 
the West Bank, as well as representatives of the global solidarity 
movement in Canada, the UK, Spain, Norway and South Africa 
(Conference Steering Committee 2007). Perhaps more crucially for the 
purposes of this chapter, the convenors, speakers and organizers of the 
conference included prominent single state intellectuals, as well as 
organizations and institutes linked with the single state project, and 
aims that paralleled motions and decisions taken by single state 
intellectuals and activists in one of their first official deliberative 
conferences at SOAS in London. Moreover, the conference was made up 
                                                 
2 (http://www.bdsmovement.net/?q=node/126)  
3 (http://www.bdsmovement.net/?q=node/126)  
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of three parallel workshops centered upon the aim of building civil 
resistance in the local, the regional and the international (Conference 
Steering Committee 2007). It is from within these three workshops that 
the different types of boycotts, divestment and sanctions strategies 
emerged—as well as the emphasis upon the need for each tactic to be 
both context and audience sensitive. This involved an over-arching 
three-pronged strategy that is based upon three separate theatres with 
different targets and audiences (the local, regional and international).  
To illustrate, the local Palestinian BDS workshop called for a significant 
emphasis to be placed upon institutions and spaces of education (both 
public and private) to make sure that students were taught historical 
accounts that were accurate and reflective of Palestinian narratives of 
history; to spread both an awareness of and culture of BDS; as well as to 
call upon all private education institutions to refrain from selling Israeli 
products, or collaborating with Israeli organizations through the 
ministry of education (Conference Steering Committee 2007). This 
workshop also called for the forming of popular boycott committees in 
all geographical areas and sectors of the OPT; for the development of a 
strategy with which to combat normalization attempts from within; as 
well as a strategy with which to pressure PA officials to end 
normalization with Israel (Conference Steering Committee 2007). Of 
course, this in essence meant dismantling the institutions and 
organizations that came out of Oslo, as well as declaring the agreements 
of Oslo and after (economic, security, etc.) no longer valid. 
The regional workshop resulted in calls to revive the Arab League 
boycott committee; cooperate and coordinate with anti-normalization 
groups and associations in the Arab world; as well as raise the profile of 
BDS in the Arab media, convince Arab investors to invest in the 
Palestinian economy, and Arab states to sell Palestinian products 
(Conference Steering Committee 2007). In contrast, the workshop 
centered upon the international recommended the highlighting of the 
fact that the BDS campaign aims not only to affect Israel’s economy, but 
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to counter it’s legitimacy as part of the international community by 
exposing it as a colonial apartheid state (Conference Steering Committee 
2007). As such, much of the emphasis of this BDS branch’s strategy is 
upon the launching of an academic, cultural and sports boycott (in 
addition to the consumer boycott). This difference in emphasis is rooted 
in the fact that a core aim of the BDS movement within Europe and 
North America revolves around creating a shift in the common sense 
notions veiling Israeli colonialism and apartheid—as well as engaging in 
a strategy that intentionally creates space within civil societies for 
debating the nature of the Israeli regime and Zionism as a racist and 
separatist ideology. Thus, under suggested targets for this form of 
boycott, the workshop underlined the importance of targets “that 
provide an opportunity for public education about Israel’s apartheid 
regime” (Conference Steering Committee 2007).  
It is from within these workshops that the BDS movement emerged 
organizationally as a movement that is centralized and unified within 
the OPT through the leadership of the BNC, and yet de-centralized 
within these diverse theatres. Elaborating upon how this form of semi-
decentralized leadership works in Canada, Abigail Bakan states, 
“The BDS movement in Canada was initiated by Palestinian youth who were directly 
linked with the Palestinian BDS call—in email contact regularly, on the phone, fluent in 
both English and Arabic, and so on. And there is an organization called Palestine 
House in Mississuaga (that’s a community center in Canada) and there are people here 
who are part of it. So that’s sort of the network of the Palestinian community. So we’ve 
established links through the Palestinian activists in the BDS movement with the 
Palestinian community here, who are linked directly to Palestine. The BDS movement 
has been a big unifying force, it seems to me, in the Palestinian community” (Bakan, 
interview).  
As such, the BNC gave groups and movements that adhered to its call 
the freedom to create BDS campaigns and actions that spoke best to 
their audiences, received the most public attention, and were 
operationalized within their contexts in the ways deemed most effective 
for public education by these localized forces. Arguably, it is within this 
form of semi-decentralized trans-national organization that much of the 
power and expansiveness of the BDS movement lays. Moreover, the BNC 
itself and the unified leadership mechanism it provided for both 
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Palestinians, and their supporters internationally, solved the BDS 
movement’s initial dilemma of a lack of a Palestinian form of ANC. 
Thus, by the time the BDS movement began to expand in Canada the 
question of unified leadership as a hurdle for support to be mobilized 
within European and North American civil societies had disappeared. To 
this effect, in 2009 Bakan states, 
“I haven’t encountered (the question of the ANC) a lot. The leadership of the BDS 
movement has often involved Palestinian youth, who are very closely connected with 
the Stop The Wall movement, and feel themselves as filling the space that the ANC 
might have filled” (Bakan, interview).  
Furthermore, these strategies, political positions and practices of 
resistance linked to the re-formulation of ‘common sense’ notions both 
within the OPT, and within Europe and North America mirror those of 
the single state movement—and only serve to highlight the interlinked 
nature of the BDS movement and the single state conception of the 
world further. 
B. The Politics of Solidarity, the BDS Tactic, and the Single State Strategy 
  
The standard assumption that the BDS movement against Zionism and 
the re-emergence of the single state idea (with its anti-Zionist 
counterhegemonic project) are separate is reinforced by the BDS 
movement’s tactical decision to not openly support a political solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to the perceived urgent need to 
mobilize as many forces as possible within a minimalist platform. Thus, 
the movement centers itself upon the mobilization of diverse civil 
societies in solidarity with Palestinian civil society’s BDS call—with the 
aim of including and mobilizing as broad and diverse a coalition of 
people, institutions and organizations within it as possible. As such, it 
aims at spreading a simple (and context sensitive) message to its 
audiences. Hence, in an interview on BDS mobilization in Canada, 
Abigail Bakan states, “Those of us who are part of the BDS movement 
work really hard to not make it too complicated—so if you agree with 
these demands, you’re part of the movement” (Bakan, interview). 
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Moreover, while the BNC is the central coordinating body of the BDS—in 
practice it is the solidarity groups and networks who adhere to the BDS 
call in specific contexts who are delegated the tasks of choosing 
appropriate BDS targets and building campaigns that are sensitive to the 
political environments to which they belong (Barghouti 2011a). As such, 
there remains a significant emphasis upon the local, and upon the need 
for activists, intellectuals and groups to be organically linked to the 
communities and realities that they seek to transform.  
In parallel to this, as touched upon above, the BDS movement is based 
within a form of alliance building that adheres to the politics of 
solidarity. As such, those coalitions, movements, associations and 
groups who join the BDS movement and are neither Palestinian nor 
Israeli believe that the question of the form and components of an 
advocated political solution to the conflict is a question that must be 
decided by the Palestinians themselves. Hence, on her preferred vision 
for a future solution, Bakan states,  
“I guess my feeling is that we’ve got a colonial settler-state, and Palestine belongs to 
the Palestinians. I don’t feel normatively in a position to prescribe what the outcome 
would be, but to do my best to remove barriers that could allow Palestinians to be able 
to make their own decisions. And Canada is criminally integrated into this network, 
and the West is in general” (Bakan, interview).  
This view is paralleled by the Palestinians and Israelis involved within 
the BDS movement—who call for action in solidarity with the 
achievement of the above mentioned three specific demands, as 
opposed to any interference in the nature of a future, permanent 
solution. Furthermore, it mirrors the strategy of the single state 
movement itself—which specifically advocated the deliberation upon a 
common platform of unity among Palestinians and anti-Zionist Israelis 
only—prior to the launching of a process of resistance aimed at the 
creation of alliances with groups and institutions globally. This initial 
process of deliberation, and the strategy behind it, was described by 
Ziada: 
“At this stage, it’s central for the idea to be introduced, debated and mobilized within 
our own communities, and not among Westerners. No one who is not Palestinian or 
Israeli can politically support a one state solution, until the people of Palestine 
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themselves support it. We are very conscious to not turn this movement into an 
Orientalist one—which is also why we don’t have any alliances in the UK, or Europe or 
the US. The idea must be mobilized among our own people first—and it is only when 
the Palestinians (for me) want a one state solution that work on an international or 
regional level can begin” (Ziada, interview).  
Thus, the lack of direct mention of a single state as the desired future 
political vision of the BDS movement can also be seen to be a reflection 
of the fact that no official Palestinian body or faction has openly 
supported the single state solution as the desired Palestinian solution as 
of this writing. As such, single state intellectuals are obstructed by this 
obstacle in openly calling for a single state solution within diverse 
theatres of international civil society—since no official representative of 
the Palestinian people has accepted it as the desired solution of the 
unified national collective. This, of course, is further exacerbated by the 
fact that there remains (as of yet) no unified Palestinian national 
collective (which is one of the central raison d’etres of the single state 
movement itself). However, what single state intellectuals can do is 
counter the fragmentation of the Palestinian national collective through 
unified practices of civil resistance centered around the tactic of BDS; 
reformulate a unified collective vision and strategy of resistance 
through the practice of BDS; and create the alternative space and tools 
from within which an alternative unified leadership may emerge. As has 
been demonstrated in the previous chapters—this was precisely the 
meaning behind Bresheeth’s succinct statement that “BDS is a tactic, and 
the strategy is one state” (Bresheeth, interview).  
It is also for the above reasons that it can be argued that the single state 
movement’s strategy involves a significant emphasis upon the 
transformation of political possibilities through initiatives centered 
around critical pedagogy within this present phase of its emergence. 
Thus, as Bakan and Abu-Laban write, the BDS campaign’s “stated goals 
are specifically grounded in education and building an international 
culture that supports Palestinian human rights” (Bakan & Abu-Laban 
2009: 23). This focus is mirrored in the BNC’s website itself, which 
emphasizes the fact that while economic impact is important in BDS 
campaigns, an important measure of their success is their ability to shift 
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conceptions and political positions4. Thus, beyond economic impact, the 
BNC lists the following criteria as measures of a BDS campaign’s success 
in the Western context: 
“Shifts generated in popular discourse over understanding and dynamics of the 
Palestinian struggle; psychological impact upon the offender that their behaviour is 
not acceptable; and greater exposure of the issue in the media”5.  
As such, despite the fact that the BDS movement itself does not take a 
position on political solutions, what remains important here is the fact 
that the BDS movement itself—and all of the multiple actions of 
resistance emanating from within it—is a central weapon of the non-
violent struggle against Zionism. Thus, it arguably paves the way for a 
single state solution on the ground in the OPT—as well as for mobilizing 
support for a single state within diverse theatres of North American and 
European civil society through the process of political education implicit 
within BDS action. Commenting upon the BDS tactic and its strong 
connection with the single state idea, Ilan Pappe says: 
“I think you cross a certain threshold, or red line, when you talk about the BDS, which 
is that of asking questions about the nature of the regime in Israel. The ideology of the 
state. You don’t attack a particular policy, you confront the very nature of the state. 
Now, if that’s the tactic, and that is what the tactic is all about, then of course, the one 
state solution is the next stage—that of not just saying what you don’t want, but what 
you do want, and what you do want allows you to have the moral and political courage 
to support the BDS, and so I think that there is a connection. A very strong connection” 
(Pappe, interview).  
George Bisharat also echoes this view, while highlighting the strong link 
between the BDS tactic, the re-insertion of international law within the 
peace process, and the single state solution: 
“I think that what the Palestinian call for BDS does, is demand respect for international 
law and it demands the fulfilment of substantive rights—the right of return, the right 
to equality of Palestinian citizens of Israel—also the end of occupation—but those first 
two things are demands that are almost incompatible with the two states for two 
peoples vision. So in substance—though not explicitly—they are calling for rights that 
can only reasonably be fulfilled via one state. So, in that sense yes, I think it’s fair to 
say they are part of (the single state) movement” (Bisharat, interview). 
Similarly, commenting upon the effect of the process of entering the 
BDS movement itself upon an activist’s consciousness, Bakan states,  
“What I have found—its a movement in a lot of controversy, its under a lot of threat, 
and people get really interested in Israel and Palestine, and in the peace issue and its 
                                                 
4 (http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/123) 
5 (http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/123) 
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part of the anti-war movement—so when people get involved in it, they move very 
readily towards thinking about the one state solution, and the limits of the two state” 
(Bakan, interview).  
Furthermore, Abunimah highlights the fact that the BDS movement and 
the single state movement are intertwined in terms of the networks of 
intellectuals, activists, and solidarity groups involved in both processes 
of resistance. This is made further apparent by the fact that the 
conferences, initiatives, and alternative media sites of information 
dissemination linked to both movements are largely the same, and 
parallel each other. Thus, Abunimah states  
“The call for BDS is not a call for a one state solution necessarily, but on the other 
hand some of the leading voices for BDS are also leading voices for one state. Omar 
Barghouti’s a very prominent BDS leader, and at the same time has been very 
prominent in initiatives to promote the one state idea. So I think in a sense it wouldn’t 
make sense to establish a separate network of organisations…because also, most 
people who have thought seriously about a one state solution think that BDS is a 
necessary part of the struggle. So, formally you can separate the two notions, but in 
many senses they’re conflated and they run together” (Abunimah, interview). 
However, having highlighted the above, it also remains true that the lack 
of official support for the single state solution within Palestine 
represents an obstacle for the mobilization of direct support for a single 
state solution within Israel/Palestine. Thus, as Bresheeth underlines, 
while the British Committee for the Universities of Palestine (BRICUP) 
was set up in response to the Palestinian call for an institution centered 
academic boycott against Israel—it refrains from talking about a single 
state solution for the simple reason that the Palestinians still officially 
advocate a two-state solution (Bresheeth, interview). Similarly, Pappe 
agrees that the single state movement has “a slight problem with the 
Palestinian leadership” (Pappe, interview)—which is made more complex 
by the fact that while they represent part of the occupation, they also 
still represent, and remain a part of, the occupied (Pappe, interview). It 
is for this reason, as well as that of the current balance of power, that 
the single state conception of the world perceives itself to presently be 
within the preliminary crucial phase of the launching of a war of 
position (Massad, Joseph 2007)—centered upon shifting the conceptions 
and political positions of diverse civil societies. While, as shall be seen 
below, this war of position is centered within Europe and North 
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America—its ultimate goal remains that of becoming powerful enough 
to shift conceptions and political realities and possibilities within 
Israel/Palestine itself.  
III. Building a War of Position: Mobilizing Civil Society in Europe and 
North America 
A. A Geographical focus on Europe and North America and the 
Emergence of an Anti-Zionist Jewish Bloc 
 
In the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy 
conference of 2009, Executive Director Howard Kohr gave a speech 
about an expanding and dangerous concerted campaign of BDS aimed at 
the de-legitimization of the state of Israel “in the eyes of her allies” 
(Kohr 2009). Stating that while this campaign may have originated from 
within the ‘Middle East’, it has not stopped there. Rather, its discourse is 
being echoed in the “halls of the United Nations and the capitals of 
Europe”, in international organizations and universities, and is 
increasingly “entering the American mainstream” (Kohr 2009). Reflected 
in the radio and television shows of the US, in newspapers, in blogs and 
in campuses of elite academic institutions, Kohr states that Israel now 
stands “accused of apartheid and genocide” (Kohr 2009), while Zionism 
is being equated with racism.  
Kohr’s message to his audience however is not one of a dismissal of this 
campaign as another instance of hateful defamation. Rather, he seeks to 
stress the fact that this campaign “is a conscious campaign to shift 
policy, to transform the way Israel is treated by its friends to a state that 
deserves not our support, but our contempt; not our protection, but 
pressured to change its essential nature” (Kohr 2009). As such, Kohr 
underlines the fact that this campaign must not be shrugged off, or seen 
as irrelevant rhetoric—but understood as “a battle for the hearts and 
minds of the world” (Kohr 2009) that is “working on the international 
stage” (Kohr 2009). Thus, Kohn argues, it is tantamount that it not be 
allowed to gain ground in the US. For, “the stakes in that battle are 
nothing less than the survival of Israel” (Kohr 2009). Had Kohr replaced 
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the term Israel with Zionism, all single state intellectuals would have 
agreed. For, as Omar Barghouti highlights, the greatest achievement of 
the BDS movement so far has been to “expose the ‘essential nature’ of 
Israel’s regime over the Palestinian people as one that combines military 
occupation, colonization, ethnic cleansing and apartheid” (Barghouti 
2011b: 11). If one of the indications of the strength of a movement is 
through the counter-reaction of its powerful enemies within a 
hegemonic status quo—Kohr’s statement provides an encouraging sign 
for the expansive counterhegemonic potential being seen within, and 
felt by, the BDS movement. As shall be seen below, this reaction arises 
in parallel with the emergence of a powerful and expansive network of 
anti-Zionist Jews within European and North American civil societies, as 
well as the establishment of the more liberal J Street in the US in 
opposition to AIPAC’s policies.  
It is important to emphasize that the BDS tactic is about the creation of 
an alternative non-violent pathway of civil resistance to the current 
peace process. As has been previously argued it is intimately 
intertwined with the single state’s project to South Africanize the 
conflict, de-legitimize the PA, and re-unify the Palestinian national 
collective. As such, it is an integral component of the single state 
movement’s counterhegemonic resistance against the Israeli/Palestinian 
peace process. More importantly for this chapter though, is that it 
involves the launching of a geographically sensitive and diverse war of 
position against Zionism and the nature of the Israeli regime—with the 
aim of creating space for the building of a new type of anti-Zionist civil 
and political society. This new historical force is seen as key in 
“transforming modes of thinking and acting” and hence possibilities for 
transformation on the ground. Beyond the importance of this strategy 
within Israel/Palestine itself, it is Europe and North America that are 
considered the central arena of struggle for single state intellectuals—
with a special emphasis upon the US as “the main sponsor, supporter 
and protector of Israel, diplomatically, economically, and otherwise” 
(Barghouti 2011b: 80). Thus, it is especially within the arenas of these 
  
224 
civil societies that the single state conception of the world seeks to 
build its war of position, create alternative institutions and intellectual 
resources for a more liberating political culture, and a network of 
groups and movements to build this alternative through critical 
pedagogy and the liberation of the mind.  
Hence, Barghouti writes that while other parts of the world should not 
be ignored, “the West, owing to its overwhelming political and economic 
power as well as its decisive role in perpetuating Israel’s colonial 
domination, remains the main battleground for this non-violent 
resistance” (Barghouti 2006: 56). As has been previously elaborated, the 
strategy launched within Europe and North America specifically is one 
that focuses upon attacking the taboo of debating Zionism and the 
nature of the Israeli regime—as well as re-formulating the intellectual 
conceptions that have veiled the oppressive realities of Oslo and after in 
Israel/Palestine within these civil societies. In this context, a great 
impetus was given to the expansive strength of both the single state 
conception of the world and the BDS movement by the emergence of a 
growing bloc of anti-Zionist Jewish groups and prominent personalities 
as powerful allies. Among them were many prominent intellectuals, 
including Judith Butler, Tony Judt, Jaqueline Rose, Naomi Klein, Mike 
Marqusee and Harold Pinter.  
The emergence of this group of voices as a collective can perhaps be 
traced back to the publishing of a letter in The Guardian in 2007. 
Written by a prominent group of British-Jewish intellectuals, this letter 
was an attack upon the fact that the broad spectrum of Jewish opinion 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was being silenced by “those 
institutions which claim authority to represent the Jewish community as 
a whole (in Britain)” (Independent Jewish Voices 2007). As such, these 
intellectuals declared the establishment of “alternative Jewish voices” in 
relation to the conflict that is committed to social justice and human 
rights. To this effect, they wrote, 
“We hereby reclaim the tradition of Jewish support for universal freedoms, human 
rights and social justice. The lessons we have learned from our own history compel us 
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to speak out. We therefore commit ourselves to make public our views on a continuing 
basis and invite other concerned Jews to join and support us” (Independent Jewish 
Voices 2007).  
While the letter received a significant backlash6, especially within the 
US—it was also instrumental in opening up space for fierce debates 
upon who is allowed to speak for Jewish people globally (Klug 2007), the 
nature of the Israeli regime and Zionism (Goldberg 2007), the myth of 
the self-hating Jew (Jaqueline Rose 2007), and the need to resist the 
concerted fascism of the American Israel Lobby towards Jewish voices 
of dissent (Hayeem 2007). Today, many more prominent personalities 
have added their voices to this group—including Stephen Fry, Mike 
Leigh and Eric Hobsbawm—and Independent Jewish Voices (IJV) itself 
has become an influential group in North America, among several other 
countries.  
For example, as a member of IJV in Canada, Abigail Bakan recounts her 
own journey towards anti-Zionism: 
“I’m clearly Jewish, my family’s very strongly identified as Jewish...I was Bar Mitzva’d, I 
went to Hebrew school, my father was a rabbinical scholar—so the reality of my family 
history is clearly Jewish. My family’s history goes back to Eastern Europe, my parents 
were the children of survivors of the first wave of pogroms and grew up in the States, 
and I have relatives who stayed over, and so there’s lots and lots of Jewishness, but 
religiously I’m not a practicing Jewish person…I think Jewishness is increasingly not a 
stable category. But the other thing is that the synagogues (here) have been 
overwhelmingly Zionized. So part of my feeling catapulted out of a Jewish religious 
identity that rejected the Zionist narrative that is a very powerfully part of most 
religious institutions in the West. So, now I’m active in the Jewish anti-Zionist political 
community, which I feel quite at home in. And that is a way, and a number of us have 
been talking about it, of reclaiming what it means to be Jewish, and part of the Jewish 
community” (Bakan, interview). 
This reclaiming of a universal, humanist, rights championing Jewish 
tradition that calls for a public, liberating re-appropriation of what it 
means to be Jewish from within the obfuscations of Zionism—has been 
a potent call that has represented a significant threat to Zionist 
hegemony within these civil societies. Thus, on the particular intensity 
of the backlash to anti-Zionist Jewish actions and voices in North 
America, Bakan states,  
                                                 
6 To read more about the details of this backlash, see: (Karpf et al. 2008) A Time to 
Speak Out: Independent Jewish Voices on Israel Zionism, and Jewish Identity, London, 
Verso.  
 
  
226 
“I think it is possible that in Canada and the US we have a particular problem with 
Zionism. The backlash is pretty intense here. The Zionist Lobby, The Christian Zionists, 
the sense of trauma in the Jewish community, the fear of dialogue... I think we’ve got a 
particular set of problems to work through, but on the other hand, what I find is that 
as individuals get their confidence up and start talking, it’s like, hello, where have you 
been all my life! And you meet lots and lots of people who want to talk about this, but 
they’re just afraid of being slapped down and charged with anti-Semitism or punished. 
The repression in the US has been pretty bad too—the Daniel Pipes kind of witch 
hunting, Norman Finkelstein losing his job...”(Bakan, interview). 
Thus, while this growing collective of anti-Zionist Jews have created 
much controversy, and been met with intense repression and criticism—
there is a cathartic process of reclaiming their humanist Jewish identity, 
history and heritage from Zionism that has been unleashed, as well as a 
space within which an expansive number of Jewish people globally are 
realizing that they are not alone, finding the courage to speak out, and 
creating groups and networks of activism, linkages and solidarity.  
One of the most significant examples of these groups is that of the 
International Anti-Zionist Jewish Network (IJAN). IJAN was initially 
founded in London with the participation of Israeli-Jews who had 
previously been linked to Matzpen—most notable among them being 
Moshe Machover. IJAN pledges to oppose Zionism, its colonial legacy 
and continued expansion, as well as to directly confront and expose 
Zionist organizations and institutions in solidarity with the Palestinian 
struggle for self-determination and their call for BDS7. Hence, in addition 
to its own initiatives and networks, many of IJAN’s statements and calls 
come out in parallel with those of the Palestinian BNC—sending out a 
united message of resistance from Palestinians, Israeli-Jews and anti-
Zionist Jewish people globally. Moreover, the network’s principles of 
unity mirror those of the single state conception of the world, and 
significantly include challenging Ashkenazi racism towards Arab-Jews8, 
as well as taking a stand against the conflation of Judaism with Zionism 
and racism. In this vein, IJAN’s over-arching commitment is to the “de-
colonization of Palestine”9, as an act of exorcism for both the colonizer 
and the colonizer. Groups who adhere to these principles of unity are 
                                                 
7 (http://www.ijsn.net/about_us/charter/)  
8 (http://www.ijsn.net/about_us/unity/) 
9 (http://www.ijsn.net/about_us/purpose/) 
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invited to affiliate themselves with IJAN—who’s network now 
encompasses chapters in several cities in the US, Canada, and Europe, as 
well as India and Argentina, and significantly, within Israel itself.  
Perhaps most significant among IJAN’s campaigns has been an 
international campaign against the Jewish National Fund—which it 
launched with Habitat International, the Scottish Palestine Solidarity 
Campaign and the BNC—and involves a network of activists in the US 
and several European cities10. IJAN has also launched a 
counterhegemonic program of education in the form of study groups 
that counter Zionism’s narrative of history, identity and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and are meant to inform action for transformation. 
Thus, commenting on the purpose of six study groups that have been 
set up in the US, the website of “Study to Action” states,  
“Through political education, we are working to build a framework for a shared 
understanding of imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism, and locate our work within 
different political ideologies, tendencies, and movements, and within a history of anti-
Zionist and anti-imperialist struggle and strategy. We will use study to inform our 
campaigns and tactics and assess our context, conditions, and strategic role. We hope 
that through this process we will build relationships within the network, and deepen 
our strategy and practice as we support our personal transformation and emotional 
divestment from Zionism”11. 
As the Electronic Intifada reports, IJAN seeks “to rekindle a long Jewish 
tradition of participation in struggles for liberation and against 
exploitation and oppression” (IJAN 2008), as well as “challenge Zionism 
and its claim to speak on behalf of Jews worldwide” (IJAN 2008). To this 
end, in June 2010 IJAN held the first ever “Assembly of Jews 
Confronting Racism and Israeli Apartheid” in Detroit. Within it, it 
introduced its Jewish Anti-Zionist Academic Network (JAZAN), which 
aims to “broaden and deepen anti-Zionist discourse and put forward 
alternative visions”12. The forum itself emphasized that academic 
institutions were a central arena from within which this work must be 
done: 
“Teachers, researchers and writers who work on university and college campuses 
engage with political justice both ideologically in our own work and materially in 
                                                 
10 (http://www.ijsn.net/641/) 
11 (http://www.ijsn.net/C9/) 
12 (http://www.jewsconfrontapartheid.blogspot.com/) 
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collective struggle—as such the academy is a site within which there is potential for 
Zionist discourse to be de-legitimized and Zionist militarism to be strategically 
opposed”.13 
Consequently, JAZAN has launched several collaborative projects 
between anti-Zionist Jewish intellectuals with the above aims, and also 
serves as a network of support and linkages among anti-Zionist 
intellectuals, student, faculty and staff members.  
Commenting upon a similar dynamic that has occurred among anti-
Zionist Jewish academics and students in Canada, Abigail Bakan 
recounts the formation of the Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid (CAIA) 
and Faculty for Palestine, in the context of the ensuing backlash to 
attempts to re-formulate hegemonic conceptions on Israel and Zionism 
within Canadian academic institutions. She states, 
“I helped start the Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid (CAIA) here in Canada, which 
launched Israeli Apartheid Week, and that wasn’t my sector, students really did that. 
But then we formed a committee of the Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid called 
Faculty for Palestine that’s a network—and it’s just taken off. There’s like 400 of us 
now…it’s an email tree…We wanted to defend the students being attacked for 
participating in Israeli Apartheid Week. There were efforts to ban the word apartheid 
from campuses, the poster was banned on a couple of campuses, and the professoriate 
who support Zionism are very well organized. They’ve got years on us in that sense. 
They have seen that as intellectual space they want to preserve. So we felt that faculty 
who were defending Palestine had to find a way to come together” (Bakan, interview).  
Moreover, Bakan highlights that within Canada Independent Jewish 
Voices has emerged as a nation-wide network of Jews who are critical of 
Zionism (Bakan, interview). Within this network are several groups, one 
of which is called Not in Our Names, Jewish Voices Opposing Zionism. 
As Bakan states, “both of these groups have now taken positions in 
support of the BDS campaign—so yes, it’s really taken off” (Bakan, 
interview). Israeli Apartheid Week itself has become the largest and 
most significant BDS student-led campaign (Barghouti 2011b: 21-22) 
within university campuses in the West today.  
In parallel to this, it is important to note that networks such as IJAN and 
CAIA have also been instrumental in linking the Palestinian BDS call 
with the wider anti-war movement within their localities. Thus, in IJAN’s 
press release upon its formation, the network states, 
                                                 
13 (http://www.jewsconfrontapartheid.blogspot.com/) 
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“Anti-Zionism is part not only of the movement against racism but also the movement 
against war. We are convinced that we speak to a great unexpressed, in fact censored 
sentiment of support for this perspective, including among Jewish people” (IJAN 
2008). 
Similarly, on the formation of these linkages in Canada Bakan states,  
“Making the links (is important) so that Israel/Palestine is not this exoticized issue that 
you have to be a specialist to talk about, or afraid to talk about. Just putting it in the 
context of apartheid, anti-war, labour, faith-groups—just putting it there—then the 
human rights arguments are pretty obvious...Through the anti-war movement, there 
are links between the Islamic community and the BDS movement, and they’ve been 
very supportive. And there have been links with the United Church, so…faith 
communities have been really active” (Bakan, interview).  
Hence, the emergence of this new bloc of anti-Zionist Jewish voices, 
many of whom stand in solidarity with the Palestinian BDS call and 
center their actions of opposition to Zionism and the state of Israel 
around its demands, has given a significant boost to the BDS movement 
within Western civil societies. It has also resulted in strengthening the 
revived links between the Palestinian struggle for liberation and diverse 
anti-war movements and forums within different locations and contexts 
in the West. The next section attempts to paint a brief picture of this 
expansion as part of a growing war of position linked to the single state 
conception of the world.  
B. The BDS Movement: A Gradual Expansion within Civil Societies 
 
Beyond this specific emergent bloc of anti-Zionist Jewish groups—the 
BDS call has made rapid achievements within civil societies in Europe 
and North America, and continues to expand. Thus, in parallel to the 
above, the Palestinian BDS call was endorsed by the sixth annual World 
Social Forum (WSF) in Caracas, and its Social Movements’ Assembly 
adopted the call (Badil 2006). From within this platform, the assembly 
also called upon the European Social Forum to give special attention to 
the on-going colonization of Palestine and the BDS call during its own 
form in May (Badil 2006). Palestinian civil society also attended the WSF 
in Nairobi in 2007 to present their BDS call to around 100, 000 delegates 
from the Global South, and call for the building of a global BDS 
movement within that arena (Badil 2007).  
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By 2009, the BDS campaign scored a significant victory when the eighth 
annual US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation’s national conference 
(which is made up of around 300 groups) unanimously voted to endorse 
the academic and cultural boycott of Israel (Elia 2009). This in effect 
aligned and unified all Palestinian solidarity groups and movements 
within the US with the BDS call and narrative. As Nada Elia, who 
presented the call with Omar Barghouti at the conference wrote, this 
vote “will go down in history as the moment US-based Palestine 
solidarity activists overcame tactical differences that had long hindered 
us, to finally come together to confront Israeli apartheid” (Elia 2009).  
As previously highlighted, the academic and cultural boycott of Israel is 
of specific importance to BDS campaigners in Europe and North 
America. It is important to underline that these boycotts are 
institutional, and as such, do not target individuals. Hence, the 
Palestinian Campaign for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel 
(PACBI)’s call14 “specifically targets Israeli academic institutions because 
of their complicity in perpetuating Israel’s occupation, racial 
discrimination, and denial of refugee rights” (Barghouti 2011b: 94). 
Barghouti clarifies the form of this complicity, writing, 
“This collusion takes various forms, from systematically providing military-intelligence 
establishment with indispensable research—on demography, geography, hydrology, 
and psychology, among other disciplines—that directly benefits the occupation 
apparatus to…institutionalizing discrimination against Palestinian Arab citizens; 
suppressing Israeli academic research on the Nakba; and directly committing acts that 
contravene international law, such as the construction of campuses and 
dormitories...in the OPT, as Hebrew University has done” (Barghouti 2011b: 94-95).  
As such, the call is part of a targeting of institutions complicit in 
oppression within Israel until they comply with international law—as 
well as a call for international universities to divest and disinvest from 
Israel. This campaign’s roots can be traced back to the UK—when a 
petition initiated by Hilary and Steven Rose for ending EU funding of 
research collaboration with Israel was published by The Guardian in 
2002 (PACBI 2009). While attracting a significant backlash, this petition 
                                                 
14 PACBI’s detailed guidelines for the academic boycott of Israel can be read here: 
(http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1108).  
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was also instrumental in the formation of BRICUP, which was a pioneer 
in advocating for this boycott movement in Europe and North America, 
instrumental in linking it with British academic unions, and in the union 
movement in the UK in general (PACBI 2009).  
The Israeli bombing of Gaza in 2009 was key in the expansion of the 
BDS movement in Europe, and North America. Thus, in the UK at least 
17 universities saw a wave of student-led occupations in solidarity with 
the Palestinians. These occupations made various demands—which 
included official condemnation of the Israeli attack by their universities, 
the establishment of scholarships for Palestinian students, and 
institutional divestment from any Israeli companies complicit with 
apartheid, colonization and occupation (Humphries 2009). Many of 
these occupations scored significant victories within their institutions, 
and were visited by prominent guest lecturers linked to the anti-war 
movement within the UK (Humphries 2009) as part of efforts to stage 
counterhegemonic lectures and talks that paralleled the action. In the 
US, these efforts reached a peak with the decision of the prestigious 
Hampshire College in Massachusetts to divest from six military 
companies complicit in Israel’s occupation—and “to adopt a ‘social 
responsibility screen for Hampshire’s investments” (Horowitz & Weiss 
2010). Another significant BDS victory was achieved in Olympia’s 
Evergreen College, which passed a resolution to divest from “companies 
profiting from the occupation and banned the use of Caterpillar 
equipment on campus” (Horowitz & Weiss 2010). In 2009, more than 40 
campuses in the US launched similar campaigns. 
Of course, the divestment campaign itself encompasses a much broader 
scope than that of academic institutions, and it is here that the most 
significant victories have been made in the West (Horowitz & Weiss 
2010). These campaigns range from attacks on Israeli cosmetic 
companies like AHAVA who manufacture their products in Israel’s 
illegal settlements (Barghouti 2011b: 26), to motions for pension funds 
to divest from Israeli Apartheid (Barghouti 2011b: 27), to campaigns 
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targeting Israeli ‘blood diamonds’ (Barghouti 2011b: 27). Most 
significant among these global campaigns in terms of economic loss has 
been the campaign launched against French conglomerates Veolia and 
Almstom, for their involvement in the Jerusalem Light Rail project—
which illegally sought “to cement Israel’s colonial hold on occupied 
Jerusalem as well as on the colonies surrounding it” (Barghouti 2011b: 
27). Dubbed “Derail Veolia” this campaign “launched in 2008 in Bilbao, 
Basque Country, (cost) Veolia particularly contracts worth billions of 
dollars…due to intensive campaigning against the company in several 
countries” (Barghouti 2011b: 27). As part of this campaign, Dutch ASN 
Bank also severed its ties to Veolia (Horowitz & Weiss 2010), who has 
since dropped out of the project all together.  
Moreover, the Church of England had been among the first institutions 
to divest from Caterpillar (The Electronic Intifada 2006), and by 2010 
several Churches in Europe and North America had either endorsed 
aspects of the BDS call, or moved closer towards passing BDS 
resolutions (Irving 2010). In the aftermath of the attack on Gaza in 
2009, The Nation reported that several rabbis in the US had also begun 
to openly be critical of Israel and to discuss the silence of Jewish 
communities on the war crimes committed in Gaza with their synagogue 
congregations (Horowitz 2009), while liberal Jewish-Americans’ views on 
Israel shifted dramatically and culminated in the formation of J Street—
a reformist Israeli lobby to counter the influence of AIPAC (Horowitz 
2009). Commenting upon the formation of J Street, Bakan states,  
“It’s a new organization that’s an alternative to AIPAC. They call themselves pro-peace, 
pro-Israel, but they’re an alternative lobby group that seems to want the US, and the 
Democratic Party in particular, to have an autonomous strategy that will pressure 
Israel in the interest of what they see as a peace strategy. So not terribly radical, but 
it’s very much not AIPAC” (Bakan, interview). 
In the context of the extent to which synagogues in the US have been 
Zionized, the strong links between AIPAC and the Democratic Party in 
the US, and Christian Zionism itself—the emergence of voices critical to 
Israeli policies within the religious institutions of churches and 
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synagogues, as well as a more reformist alternative to AIPAC should not 
be under-estimated.  
In parallel to the shifts and actions above, trade unions Europe and 
North America have also been a significant arena within which the BDS 
call has been gaining support—with particular success being achieved in 
the UK, Ireland, South Africa and Scandinavia. Hence, in the UK for 
example,  
“The British Trade Union Congress, representing more than 6.5 million workers, 
unanimously passed a motion in September 2010, supported by the public-sector 
union Unison and the Fire Brigade Union as well as the Palestine Solidarity Campaign 
(UK), calling for boycotting the products of and divesting from companies that profit 
from Israel’s occupation” (Barghouti 2011b: 25).  
In Norway the Norwegian Civil Service Union voted in favour of an arms 
embargo on Israel, while Connex Ireland annulled its plans to train 
Israeli engineers and drivers in Ireland (Bakan & Abu-Laban 2009: 25). In 
Canada, the largest public-sector union of workers in Ontario (CUPE)—
representing 200, 000 workers—overwhelmingly passed a resolution 
endorsing BDS against Israeli apartheid (Coalition Against Israeli 
Apartheid 2006). The resolutions also commits CUPE Ontario to educate 
its members on the apartheid nature of the Israeli state and Canada’s 
support for these racist practices” (Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid 
2006) and pledges to “call on the Canadian Labour Congress to join the 
campaign against Israeli apartheid” (Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid 
2006). In 2008, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers became the first 
national union in North America to endorse the BDS call (Anti-Apartheid 
Wall Campaign 2008). After the Israeli attack on the Free Gaza Flotilla, 
the UK’s largest union, UNITE, “passed a motion to “vigorously promote 
a policy of divestment from Israeli companies,” along with a boycott of 
Israeli goods and services” (Horowitz & Weiss 2010). Meanwhile, Sweden, 
the US, South Africa, India and Turkey saw their dockworkers’ unions 
endorse the BNC’s appeal to boycott the loading and offloading of 
Israeli ships (Barghouti 2011b: 25); while in Norway the Locomotive 
Drivers’ Unions stopped all train, trams and subways for two minutes in 
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a nation-wide show of solidarity with the Palestinian people (Stop the 
War Coalition UK 2009).  
The cultural boycott15 itself has seen numerous prominent academics, 
film-makers, artists and authors endorse it—among whom are American 
author Alice Walker, Jewish-American academic Judith Butler, Jewish-
American author Naomi Klein, British film-maker Ken Loach, French 
film-maker Jean-Luc Goddard, and British artist and author John Berger 
(Barghouti 2011b: 22). In a statement on his reasons for declining to 
participate in the Haifa Film Festival, Ken Loach said, 
“I support the call by Palestinian film-makers, artists and others to boycott state 
sponsored Israeli cultural institutions and urge others to join their campaign. 
Palestinians are driven to call for this boycott after forty years of the occupation of 
their land, destruction of their homes and the kidnapping and murder of their 
civilians. They have no immediate hope that this oppression will end. 
As British citizens we have to acknowledge our own responsibility. We must condemn 
the British and US governments for supporting and arming Israel. We must also 
oppose the terrorist activities of the British and US governments in pursuing their 
illegal wars and occupations. However, it is impossible to ignore the appeals of 
Palestinian comrades. Consequently, I would decline any invitation to the Haifa Film 
Festival or other such occasions” (PACBI 2006). 
 
In response to this, the Greek Cinematography Center also withdrew all 
Greek films from the Haifa Film Festival (Bakan & Abu-Laban 2009: 26). 
In parallel to this, several famous artists have also responded to the BDS 
call, and cancelled performances, or appearances in Israel—including 
American actress Meg Ryan, and artists Elvis Costello, Gill Scott-Heron, 
Carlos Santana, the Gorillaz, Massive Attack, the Pixies, Bono, Roger 
Waters, Faithless, Bjork, and Vanessa Paradis (Barghouti 2011b). In the 
aftermath of the Gaza bombing in 2009, these calls reached North 
America, where prominent artists and film-makers drafted the “Toronto 
Declaration”16 in protest of the Toronto International Film Festival’s 
association with the Israeli Consulate, and “a city-to-city program 
featuring Tel Aviv as part of a campaign by the Israeli government to 
“rebrand” itself after the Gaza conflict” (Horowitz 2009). Signed by the 
                                                 
15 To read the guidelines of the cultural boycott in detail, see, 
(http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1045) 
16 (http://www.bdsmovement.net/?q=node/535)  
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likes of Danny Glover, Jane Fonda, Julie Christie and Viggo Mortensen, 
the declaration stated, 
“We object to the use of such an important international festival in staging a 
propaganda campaign on behalf of what South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and UN General Assembly President Miguel 
d’Escoto Brockmann have all characterized as an apartheid regime” (Horowitz 2009).  
Earlier that year the Edinburgh International Film Festival had also 
returned money donated to it by the Israeli Embassy, after it received a 
“torrent of angry letters expressing incomprehension, fury or sadness at 
the EIFF being associated with the Israeli State”17. In the US context, 
while not being an endorsement of the comprehensive BDS call itself,  
“More than 150 US and British theatre, film, and TV artists issued a statement initiated 
by Jewish Voice for Peace, supporting the spreading cultural boycott inside Israel of 
Ariel and the rest of Israel’s colonial settlements, due to their violation of international 
law” (Barghouti 2011b: 22).  
In addition to these actions, there is also a growing movement of 
architects that have also joined the BDS movement in the West (APJP 
2006), as well as doctors (PACBI 2007). 
In the context of the above, there has simultaneously been a rise in state 
sponsored sanctions action against Israel, as well as support for the 
movement from within the UN. Thus, in 2008, president of the UNGA 
Father Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann called upon the UN to: 
“Use…the term “apartheid” to describe Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. (Brockmann) noted the resonance of the sanction campaign against South 
Africa in the UN historically, and suggested, “perhaps we in the United Nations should 
consider following the lead of a new generation of civil society, who are calling for a 
similar non-violent campaign of boycott, divestment and sanctions to pressure Israel 
to end its violations”(Bakan & Abu-Laban 2009: 25).  
UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights John Dugard also termed 
Israeli policies in the OPT as apartheid, as did Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu (Barghouti 2011b: 198), while UN Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights Richard Falk criticized the UN’s inaction during the Gaza siege, 
and later came out in support of the Palestinian BDS call. In an interview 
in 2010, Falk stated, 
“The best hope for the Palestinians is what I call a legitimacy war, similar to the anti-
apartheid campaign in the late 1980s and 1990s…I think that is happening now in 
relation to Israel. There’s a very robust boycott, divestment and sanctions campaign all 
                                                 
17 (http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/405)  
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over the world that is capturing the political and moral imagination of the people, the 
NGOs and civil society and is beginning to have an important impact on Israel’s way of 
acting and thinking” (Barghouti 2011b: 16).  
Meanwhile, in both Norway and the Basque Country local regional 
councils passed motions for the comprehensive boycott of Israeli goods 
in 2005 (Bakan & Abu-Laban 2009: 26), foreshadowing a growing trend 
of state sponsored BDS action that would also emerge. Thus, in 2006 the 
Irish Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs called upon the Irish 
government to “push for sanctions against Israel in the EU due to 
Israel’s human rights abuses” (Bakan & Abu-Laban 2009: 25-26), while 
the Norwegian government banned arms trading with Israel (Barghouti 
2011b: 209). Perhaps most significant among these actions though has 
been the Norwegian government’s decision to divest its pension fund 
(which is the third largest in the world) from the Israeli military 
manufacturer Elbit Systems (Pappe 2009a). The Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance stated that its divestment was due to “the company’s complicity 
in Israel’s violation of international law” (Barghouti 2011b: 29). As Pappe 
writes,  
“The significance is not about who was targeted, but rather who took the decision: the 
Norwegian ministry of finance through its ethical council. No less important was the 
manner in which it was taken: the minister herself announced the move in a press 
conference. This is what transformed for a short while the media scene in the Zionist 
state” (Pappe 2009a).  
Following this decision, in 2010 a Swedish investment fund followed 
suit, citing the same reasons; the Norwegian pension fund divested from 
Africa Israel due to their complicity in the expansion of settlements; 
while Deutsche Bank sold its stakes in Elbit Systems, and the largest 
bank in Denmark, Danske Bank, divested from both Africa Israel and 
Elbit Systems (Barghouti 2011b: 30). In the aftermath of the Israeli 
attack on the Freedom Flotilla the Turkish parliament also unanimously 
voted to “revise (its) political, military and economic relations with 
Israel” (Barghouti 2011b: 209), while in the Global South—Venezuela 
and South Africa withdrew their ambassadors, and Bolivia and 
Nicaragua suspended their relations with the Israeli state.  
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While the civil societies in Europe and North America, and the 
institutions bolstering their common sense notions of Israel/Palestine 
remain the central focus of the BDS tactic against Israeli apartheid, 
colonization and occupation—it is important to highlight that these 
practices of resistances both resulted in, and were given significant 
impetus by, a growing “Boycott from Within” inside of Israel Proper. As 
has been underlined above, a significant aspect of the Palestinian BDS 
call involved an invitation to “conscientious Israelis” to join the call in 
joint struggle for the de-colonization of Palestine and the mutual 
liberation of Israelis and Palestinians. In 2009, these Israeli-Jews (most 
of whom are prominent single state intellectuals, or belong to groups 
within Israel/Palestine that are linked to the single state conception of 
the world) formed “Boycott! Supporting the Palestinian BDS Call from 
Within” (Barghouti 2011b: 31). Groups linked to this movement include 
Zochrot, the AIC, ICAHD and Who Profits from the Occupation? (A 
Coalition of Women for Peace) (Barghouti 2011b: 31). This movement 
has been instrumental in strengthening the cultural and academic 
boycott of Israel, in convincing artists to cancel concerts and 
appearances in Israel, as well as prominent intellectuals, film-makers 
and figures from accepting awards and honours from Israeli 
institutions. Moreover, they have been a significant ally to anti-Zionist 
Jewish voices and their actions globally. Furthermore, they have also 
been instrumental in giving a boost towards BDS to those liberal Jewish 
voices in North America who remain Zionist—but support ending the 
Israeli occupation and strengthening what they perceive to be the Israeli 
peace camp from within. Perhaps most crucially though, these Jewish-
Israeli voices of dissent seek to highlight the fact that the idea that 
Israeli society is monolithic and void of oppositional voices to Zionism 
and separation—that can, and must, be expanded through the external 
pressure of BDS—is false.  
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IV. Conclusion: BDS and the potential for an anti-Zionist War of Position 
It was Ehud Olmert who first warned that if the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict was transformed into a “South African style struggle” centered 
within a rights-based agenda the “state of Israel (would be) finished” 
(Landau et al. 2007). It was also Olmert who stated that within this 
scenario, “the Jewish organizations, which are our power base in 
America, will be the first to come out against us” (Landau et al. 2007). 
This chapter has tried to show that the BDS movement has taken 
significant steps paving the way towards this shift in conceptions and 
political positions within diverse civil societies in Europe and North 
America. As illustrated by Howard Kohr’s warnings at the AIPAC 
conference in 2009, the emergence of J Street, and the reported shift in 
the views of liberal Jewish voices in the US, it is suggested that Olmert’s 
fears regarding the political red lines of Jewish American supporters of 
Israel were not baseless. It is argued that through mobilizing a rights-
based approach within an over-arching framework of South-Africanizing 
the conflict—the BDS tactic has succeeded in creating a significant rift 
within this constituency, and the arenas of civil society in Europe and 
North America more generally. This success is only amplified further by 
the emergence of an expansive bloc of anti-Zionist Jewish voices within 
this theatre, intent on reclaiming their humanist Jewish heritage and 
identity from Zionism. Contending that BDS is an integral tactic within 
the single state movement’s over-arching strategy of creating an anti-
Zionist war of position against the Israeli regime, this chapter has 
simultaneously attempted to demonstrate the expansive potential 
within this tactic.  
As such, while the BDS tactic has been launched in 2005, it is the 
contention of this chapter that it has already achieved significant 
victories in terms of its own self-prescribed goals. As has been 
previously highlighted, in terms of transforming the political 
possibilities within the OPT itself (and among all three segments of the 
Palestinians) it has already established itself as a promising alternative 
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route of non-violent civil resistance to Israeli apartheid, colonization 
and occupation. Thus, it has broken through the divisive dichotomy 
created by the resistance through armed struggle represented by 
Hamas, and the non-violent collaboration of the PA and its institutions. 
Simultaneously aimed at shaming the PA’s policies of collaboration and 
normalization with Israel from within, the BDS call seems to have 
managed to have some transformative impact here as well. Hence, by 
2010 The Nation reported that, “Even the Palestinian Authority—never 
celebrated for its connection to the grassroots—has made a nod toward 
the movement, with Prime Minister Salam Fayyad vowing to empty 
Palestinian homes of goods made in the settlements” (Horowitz & Weiss 
2010). A little later this nod turned into a law drafted by the PA (and 
signed by Fayyad) calling upon President Abbas to make the selling of 
Israeli settlement products illegal (Prusher 2010). While not very 
revolutionary, these changes do show that the PA is not immune from 
the tactic of highlighting its image as one of shameful collaboration. As 
such, this arena could lead to significant inroads being made towards 
the greater (single state) goal of attacking it as an institution that lacks 
legitimacy, does not represent the Palestinian people, and as such needs 
to be reformulated from within the grassroots. Moreover, this tactic 
creates much potential for the reformulation of Fatah itself—and the 
Palestinian factions generally—as the more disenchanted among them 
find the space and courage to defect from the PA, or embrace an 
alternative strategy of resistance in the form of BDS.  
While Hamas is less targeted by this tactic, the BDS call does call upon 
the movement to also accept the call as a form of powerful non-violent 
resistance—and perhaps most crucially, as a method of ending the 
fragmentation of the Palestinian national collective. While both the BDS 
and single state movements have a long way to go towards the 
achievement of this particular goal—the BDS call itself, along with the 
unifying practice of BDS, and the emergence of the BNC set encouraging 
precedents in the search for both unity for the three Palestinian 
segments, as well as a unified leadership to represent their demands as 
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mutually inclusive. Interlinked with the goals of the BDS call itself, the 
emergence of the Israeli-Jewish “Boycott from Within” is also a 
significant achievement in terms of both revolutionizing possibilities on 
the ground in Israel/Palestine—and creating a powerful platform of 
Israeli legitimacy for attacking Zionist ideology globally.  
To this effect, perhaps the most significant achievement of the BDS 
movement in terms of its stated goals is that of reformulating the 
Israeli-Palestinian struggle into a South-African style struggle; breaking 
the taboo upon criticizing both Zionism and the nature of the Israeli 
regime in Europe and North America; as well as being instrumental in 
creating the space and environment for the emergence of a significant 
bloc of anti-Zionist Jewish voices within these civil societies. 
Highlighting the diverse arenas targetted by the BDS movement, and the 
effectiveness of its particular form of semi-centralized organization—
this chapter attempts to show the rapid growth of the movement within 
unions, media outlets, academic, cultural, and religious institutions, as 
well as institutions linked to international law and universal human 
rights conventions ratified by states. As demonstrated by this chapter, 
this expansive momentum has gone as far as repositioning the policies 
of some states towards Israel (most notably Norway) in the short span 
of five years. Moreover, it’s interlinkage with transformations within 
Israel/Palestine, and the opening up of new spaces of resistance within 
its framework, arguably shows great signs of promise as a potentially 
expansive anti-Zionist war of position against the state of Israel. 
Whether or not this potential will be fulfilled, or a more powerful 
counter-attack will emerge against it, remains to be seen. 
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Conclusion  
I. Reflections on Saidian-Gramscian Counterhegemony  
 
In a Guardian article entitled, “The Power of Utopianism”, Mike 
Marqusee argues that those who perceive politics to be, and practice it 
as, “the art of the possible” are conservative reformists at heart who 
would like to see “vested interests prevail” (Marqusee 2010). Marqusee 
paints those politicians who follow this dictum as unimaginative 
pragmatists, who shrink the space available for transforming unjust 
status quos, disregard the powerful motivational force of utopianism in 
the making of human destinies, and ultimately, are unmoved by 
injustices, or the plight of the oppressed around the world. Instead, they 
practice a kind of politics that is based upon their own narrow 
definitions and experiences of the possible, and that is designed to let 
injustices stand. In opposition to this dictum, Marqusee writes,  
“Utopias provide a perspective from which the assumed limitations of the present can 
be examined, from which familiar social arrangements can be revealed as unjust, 
irrational or unnecessary. They are a means of expanding the borders of the possible. 
You can’t chart the surface of the earth or compute distances without a point of 
elevation—a mountain top, a star or a satellite. You can’t chart the possible in society 
without an angle of vision, a mental mountain top that permits the widest sweep. The 
pundits championing the art of the possible are the flat-earthers of today, afraid to 
venture too far from shore lest they fall off the face of the earth” (Marqusee 2010).  
Similarly, in a conference on the Left in Palestine, Azmi Bishara argued 
that prior to being about a particular methodology, it should be recalled 
that the Left is about certain values. It is about justice, human dignity, 
the pursuit of happiness, and above all else, it is about equality (Bishara 
2010). For, it is for these reasons and beliefs, for this vision of a more 
dignified future, that people wage collective struggles against the 
greatest of odds. A decade earlier, paralleling both Marqusee and 
Bishara, Edward Said expressed a similar sentiment. Writing in “On Lost 
Causes” Said argued that, “Every political theorist and analyst stresses 
the importance of hope in maintaining a movement” (Said 2000d: 544). 
Above all else, it was hope that Said argued was key in overcoming the 
daunting challenges the Palestinians faced as a people—hope that kept 
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them alive as a collective, hope that empowered them to always re-
invent and re-imagine new possible alternatives at the darkest of 
historical junctures.  
In many ways, reflecting the political experiences of these intellectuals—
it is hope and the powerful human ability to imagine new possible 
pathways towards more just, uplifting and liberating realities from 
within the settings of oppressive status quos, that once was (and in 
some cases still is) the central impulse of the advent of critical theory 
within academia, and in this case specifically, within the discipline of 
International Relations. At the heart of this revolution in thought—was a 
firm belief in the power of theory itself to start from within, inform, 
enable and revolutionize liberating political practice on the ground. In 
doing so, this kind of theory illuminated existing opportunities and 
possibilities for change. It emphasized the centrality, and political 
nature of both knowledge, and its producers, in building, maintaining 
and dismantling status quos. It reminded people that all history and 
world orders are secular and created by ordinary men and women, that 
realities of oppression and injustice were neither divinely ordained, nor 
inevitable and natural. Perhaps even more importantly for the purpose 
of this thesis, the advent of critical theory highlighted the fact that 
those who produce knowledge—or intellectuals—are in possession of 
the power to give ordinary people the gift of critical thinking. Thus, 
should these intellectuals so choose, they could use their positions of 
privilege in order to empower people, transform their historical self-
understandings, and in so doing—give them the key with which they 
themselves could become historical forces of social transformation in 
the world. 
For Antonio Gramsci, it was this form of empowerment—activated by 
the organic intellectual—that he famously argued held the key to the 
transformation of the oppressed into a collective “historical force” of 
liberating political change. Similarly, it was this type of intellectual that 
animated Said’s writings on social transformation—an intellectual which 
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he painted as an amateur; as an “exile” inhabiting marginal spaces, who 
is driven by a spirit of intervention against oppressive status quos; as 
well as a moral witness who is endowed with the ability to publicly 
represent, testify for, and highlight those voices, and struggles whose 
narratives, realities and lives have been erased, or misrepresented, by 
those in power (Said 1996). In interpreting the writings of both these 
intellectuals in tandem, this thesis has endeavoured to make a case for 
the centrality of this role of the organic intellectual in both embodying 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, and affirming Said’s notion of the 
intellectual vocation as one that is never paralyzed by a sense of 
political defeat—but is conscious of the ever present possibility of 
resistance on the ground (Said 2001). In other words, organic 
intellectuals possess the power to re-formulate a losing battle within a 
larger struggle of resistance in a new, re-vitalized direction that rejects 
the idea that any cause is ever lost. In many ways, this is also one of the 
central affirmations behind Gramsci’s writings upon the war of position 
as a revolutionary strategy—one that can always be re-formulated within 
an ever-continuous interlinked battle between the hegemonic and the 
counterhegemonic.  
This thesis has striven to illustrate and analyze what it argues to be 
such a phenomenon of counterhegemonic resistance in the making. 
Thus, mobilizing key Saidian inspired Gramscian concepts, it has 
endeavoured to paint a rare picture of the beginnings of the creation of 
a new conception of the world by interlinked blocs of organic 
intellectuals—and hence of a new historical force energizing the 
political possibilities on the ground. Through a critique of the more 
dominant neo-Gramscian approaches to Gramsci in IR, and a re-
excavation of a Saidian Gramsci, chapters one and two emphasized the 
revolutionary nature of philosophy in Gramsci’s writings, the inherent 
link between thought and action within it, and, as such—attempted to 
re-vitalize this form of empowering Gramscian counterhegemony in the 
context of struggles for social transformation against oppression. In re-
vitalizing this form of Gramscian resistance this thesis also attempted 
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to stress that counterhegemony itself is a long and difficult process that 
is never spontaneous. Rather, it is a struggle that begins with what can 
be described as a practice of ‘education for liberation’. As such, in 
mapping the present day single state movement, this thesis presented 
an analysis of this practice, and underlined the fact that alternative 
conceptions of the world must be built on contextualized grounds in a 
slow and ever-contested process.  
It is within this context that chapter three stressed that the single state 
movement should be conceived of as a re-formulated war of position 
against the Palestinian-Israeli peace process—after the failure of Arafat’s 
war of position to create a territorially viable two-state solution within 
its confines. It is also within this context that chapters four and five 
argued that the single state movement revolves around the launching of 
a project of critical pedagogy by organic intellectuals within their own 
communities in order to transcend the common sense notions linking 
them to the status quo—in a process of mutual transformation and 
empowerment. It is in view of these processes that this thesis contended 
that this movement’s dynamics, strategies and practices of resistance 
can most fruitfully be understood as a Gramscian form of philosophical 
movement (Gramsci et al. 1971) that begins within the level of the 
ethico-political and is aimed at the larger aspiration of creating a 
“reconstructive moment” (Eschle & Maiguashca 2005: 216).  
Paralleling the above, this thesis argued that the articulated anti-Zionist 
conception of the world animating the single state solution has arisen 
from within, and in opposition to, the dominant common sense of the 
present Israeli-Palestinian ‘peace process’, and the Zionist ideology of 
separation upon which it stands. In highlighting this 
interconnectedness, it attempted to demonstrate that the single state 
movement is both a reflection of, and an attempt at activating Gramsci’s 
philosophy of praxis. It is from within this premise that this thesis 
argued that the single state intellectuals energizing this movement in 
the making are organic intellectuals who strive to begin with the 
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common sense of their communities, in order to be able to transcend it 
with them—in a mutually transformative process of empowerment. For, 
it is within this process that Gramsci argued the key to revolutionary 
praxis lies—as well as the ability to build a critical consciousness and an 
empowering, liberating alternative conception of the world that has the 
power to then become ‘life’. Following this particular Gramsci, this 
thesis contended that this insurrectionary anti-Zionist alternative 
vision—along with its interlinked practices of resistance—contains 
within it the power to transcend the common sense notions of these 
intellectuals’ communities, de-linking their thoughts and action from 
within the hegemony of the present status quo.  
Moreover, in stressing the level of the ethico-political, and the centrality 
of the formation and articulation of conceptions of the world within it, 
this thesis re-centered the revolutionary nature of Gramsci’s writings 
upon philosophy—and the role of the organic intellectuals within them 
as key energizing links between thought and action within their own 
communities. As such, it demonstrated the centrality of single state 
intellectuals in activating a Gramscian form of revolutionary praxis—
and in launching a project of critical pedagogy as the vehicle through 
which social transformation must begin on the ground. Furthermore, as 
chapters one and two argued, staking this point of beginning emerged 
out of an impulse to re-excavate an obscured image of Gramsci within 
the discipline which contends that the beginning of the political desire 
to revolutionize possibilities on the ground—and lay the groundwork 
for the emergence of new political and civil societies—must be located 
in the transformation of people’s thoughts. As chapters four and five 
illustrated, this pathway towards revolution is one that is advocated by 
single state intellectuals as the most energizing way forward, and 
underlies many of their political practices of resistance today.  
In this vein, this thesis mobilized this image of a Saidian inflected 
Gramsci to highlight that in a context where conceptions of the world 
take center stage in the transformation of political possibilities, and 
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igniting Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis—it is social forces that are 
defined by their modes of thought and action that are central. As such, 
as illustrated in chapters four, five, and six, it is groups of people united 
by particular conceptions of the world here (as opposed to class) that 
take center stage in the analysis of the emergent blocs and alliances of 
social forces countering the hegemony of Zionism. Of course, this 
emphasis within this thesis was guided by the self-understandings and 
strategic political maps of the intellectuals argued to be central forces 
behind the re-emergence of the single state idea, and its building into a 
movement of resistance in the making.  
Hence, remaining true to the decolonial Saidian-Gramscian framework 
outlined in the first two chapters, the reconstructive analysis of this 
emerging phenomenon of resistance both center and takes seriously the 
practices of counterhegemonic resistance themselves. In doing so, this 
thesis tried to re-assert Gramsci’s insistence upon the transformative 
power of the human being—and to underline the centrality of Gramsci’s 
philosophy of praxis in both the creation of revolutionary theory and re-
invigorating the building of counterhegemony as a long-term process of 
resistance. This emphasis, and point of beginning, has influenced the 
over-all picture of this thesis in two main ways. On the one hand, the 
intentional interlinking between thought and action within the single 
state idea—as the arena within which empowering social transformation 
should be located—has been a central influence behind this thesis’ 
illustration of this movement in the making as a Gramscian inspired 
form of counterhegemonic resistance centered upon the activation of a 
transformative program of critical pedagogy. As chapters four and five 
illustrated, this is reflected within the practices, strategies and self-
understandings of single state intellectuals themselves. Hence, in both 
illustrating and analyzing this phenomenon of resistance by recalling 
Marx’s thesis eleven, this thesis has tried to pay attention to the 
aspirations, self-understandings and situated contexts of the re-
emergent social forces within it, and their freedom to transform the 
world according to their own realities, desires and self-understandings.  
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On the other hand, this decolonial emphasis upon the re-energizing of 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis within the larger arena of those writing 
about resistance in IR—simultaneously underlies this thesis’ choice to 
begin from within, and highlight, the contextualized realities, practices, 
self-understandings and strategic maps of those involved in building the 
resistance itself. Hence, it is important to underline that much of the 
analysis presented in this thesis began within a mapping of the 
struggles, self-understandings and strategies of the intellectuals 
themselves argued to be central leaders and organizers within this 
movement in the making. In taking this different point of beginning, 
this thesis has attempted to be decolonial in its engagement with 
theorizing itself. Following Saurin, it has striven to organically link the 
de-colonizing of knowledge on resistance with those struggling against 
the real structures and practices of imperial relations (Gruffydd Jones 
2006: 219). Similarly, following Said, it has equally tried to rub the 
theorists’ nose back into “what Yeats calls the ‘uncontrollable mystery 
on the bestial floor’” (Said 2001: 84). However, in choosing this different 
point of beginning, it was not the intention of this thesis to argue 
against the undeniable importance of the structures of domination 
present in a particular historical juncture in shaping resistance, 
perpetuating oppressive realities, and constraining social change.  
Rather, the central impulse behind this shift of emphasis onto the 
political practices of situated activists struggling to create specific types 
of social change—was an attempt to uncover alternative pathways to 
power and social transformation than those often imagined by most IR 
scholars to be the most fruitful. Thus, the choice to give the visions, 
practices and mapped pathways to power of those struggling on the 
ground space and voice—was driven by the potential therein for a more 
liberating picture of resistance and human agency to emerge in critical 
IR today. In the particular spirit of a decolonial critical theory, this 
endeavour must also be one that is created in dialogue with activists’ 
own situated knowledge of resistance—and built in tandem with an 
analysis of their experiences and practices of resistance itself—and not 
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only carried out in abstract within the insulated corridors of academia. 
For, it is this dialectic that Gramsci argued was the key to revolutionary 
praxis. And yet, as chapter one attempted to demonstrate, it is precisely 
this dialectic that appears to be lacking in many theoretical accounts of 
resistance in IR today. 
In a different vein, the focus upon counterhegemony, and the 
highlighting of the centrality of common sense within the framing of 
this thesis—emphasizes that part of the struggle against common sense, 
involves an active effort by organic intellectuals to widen the scope of 
dissent and create spaces of resistance where none had existed before. 
It is argued to be a strategy involving the geographical and intellectual 
conquest of diverse interlinked civil societies—turning enough of its 
institutions and associations into interlinked social forces within a rival 
historic bloc, championing a more just social and political reality. It is 
an educative, gradual process, and not necessarily one that starts from a 
terrain within which it has many followers. Thus, while it could be 
argued that the fact that the majority of Jewish-Israelis oppose a single 
state solution today presents a significant obstacle to the present single 
state movement—for Gramsci specifically, this is not an insurmountable 
obstacle. For, as many single state intellectuals point out, this struggle 
represents first and foremost a process of resistance that must be built 
within the strategy of a war of position. Thus, the central issue revolves 
around where to uncover the spaces from within which organic 
intellectuals can launch their counterhegemonic movement and create 
new constituencies and possibilities on the ground—not how large or 
small their pool of supporters happens to be within the present 
historical conjuncture. 
The importance of this aspect of Gramsci’s revolutionary project within 
the single state movement is also reflected in the fact that, while single 
state intellectuals do think that it is important to debate what a future 
Palestinian state should look like—they have shifted this focus to the 
more urgent task of analysing where the potential for mobilizing a 
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solution lies, what its obstacles are and whether or not this potential 
can be transformed into a powerful counterhegemonic movement aimed 
at re-unifying the Palestinian national collective and creating an anti-
Zionist historic bloc against Zionism and separation. This is done from 
within the premise that the single state movement begins with the 
assertion that the reality on the ground in Israel/Palestine is of a single 
apartheid state, and that it is Zionism itself that stands in the way of 
both a single state solution and a viable two-state solution. As such, 
chapter five argues that the practices of resistance of the movement are 
most effectively seen through the lens of anti-Zionist practices against 
Zionism’s processes of separation.  
Chapter six takes this argument further, highlighting the centrality of 
the BDS tactic within the strategy of the single state movement, and of 
the BDS movement within its anti-Zionist war of position. Hence, it 
underlined the importance of the BDS call within the single state 
movement’s goal of unifying the Palestinian national collective through 
the practice of resistance itself. In parallel to this, it argued that the 
mobilization of the BDS tactic within a framework that is centered upon 
the universality of human rights and international law—is not only 
aimed at unifying the Palestinian collective in an alternative movement 
centered within a rights-based approach underlining the centrality of 
democracy and equal citizenship for all in seeking a solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Interlinked with this is also an attempt at 
highlighting the three-tiered apartheid system (Barghouti 2009) of the 
Israeli state outlined by single state intellectuals, and the launching of a 
war of position within Europe and North America aimed at both 
breaking the taboo of critically engaging with Zionism and the nature of 
the Israeli regime itself—and mobilizing diverse personalities, 
institutions, groups, unions, companies and ultimately states to oppose 
Zionism through the practice of BDS. Framed within a mobilization of a 
politics of solidarity that by its definition does not interfere within the 
arena of political solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this tactic 
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is argued to be a powerful and potentially expansive channel through 
which the single state movement’s anti-Zionist war of position could 
continue to gain momentum and expand.  
Similarly, in highlighting the divisions, tensions and debates within the 
single state movement, chapters four, five and six have striven to stress 
the fluid, transformative nature within the process of creating Gramsci’s 
historic bloc itself. As such, these chapters emphasized that while these 
tensions do not disappear or cease to exist—they are negotiated within 
the framework of a politics of solidarity that highlights the unified 
objective of countering an unjust reality of domination that is 
oppressing all the social groups involved within a counterhegemonic 
effort. Thus, it is the common principles underpinning an empowering 
politics of liberation that are highlighted in this process—and it is these 
principles upon which unified agreement that a more just world must 
be built is reached. In the context of the single state movement, this 
kind of politics is reflected in the initially tense divide between those 
who supported a secular, democratic state solution, and those who 
championed bi-nationalism. As these chapters demonstrated, in the 
process of forming a common anti-Zionist platform—these organic 
intellectuals would later declare this divide a false dichotomy, and 
embrace agreed upon principles (rather than defined visions of 
solutions) as the basis upon which the unity of their struggle should be 
collectively waged (Abunimah, interview). 
However, in highlighting these divisions and tensions and the types of 
negotiations underpinning them, these chapters have simultaneously 
underlined the weaknesses of the single state movement—and the 
obstacles it faces in becoming a counterhegemonic force from within 
this particular theoretical lens. As such, chapters four and five stressed 
that while many single state intellectuals perceived themselves to be 
active members within a movement of resistance, some did not, and 
others did not think that there was a movement at all. Interlinked with 
this, these chapters underlined the dilemma faced by many intellectuals 
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within the movement in defining the exact boundaries or nature of their 
role in the realm of the more official arena politics—due to the fact that 
they have no official mandate to represent their constituencies; have yet 
to consider proposals to establish a joint leadership in exile, and hence 
form their own party (Pappe 2007); or alternatively, to become endorsed 
by an officially established party or faction within Palestine/Israel and 
work from within such a platform to create a more grassroots form of 
leadership from within the OPT. Similarly, and in view of these 
dilemmas, they have yet to decide to actively mount a challenge within 
institutions such as the UN (Karmi 2009) as a recognised joint 
Palestinian-Israeli alternative force to the PA and its continued 
participation within the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As these 
chapters argue further, these weaknesses are linked to there being no 
consensus within the movement upon what kind of political force the 
majority of its members seek to transform it into becoming, and as 
such, through what kind of vehicle. This lack of consensus reveals that 
while the majority of single state intellectuals are comfortable in 
engaging in a unified transformative process centered around critical 
pedagogy and the creation of a counterhegemonic alternative to the 
form of two-state solution embedded within the peace process—there is 
hesitation on where to go from there due to a lack of desire to become a 
more conventional political party themselves, and a distrust (and 
opposition to) approaching the more official avenues of established 
Palestinian political power. Of course, this is linked to a daunting 
obstacle facing the movement in this context—that of the lack of unified 
Palestinian national leadership, and thus, the continued fragmentation 
of the Palestinian national collective. Hence, while one of the central 
objectives of the single state’s strategies and re-formulations is the re-
unification of the Palestinian people through a new grassroots 
leadership embracing its pathway of non-violent resistance—it remains 
a long way from reaching this goal. This remains an obstacle standing in 
the way of more significant mobilization of its alternative within the 
OPT. This reality is further exacerbated by the fact that the Palestinians 
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under occupation remain one of the least involved segments of the 
Palestinian collective within the single state movement. Thus, it remains 
in many ways a movement that is powered, articulated and mobilized 
for primarily from exile.  
As chapter six argued, the single state movement tried to overcome 
these interlinked obstacles by sidestepping direct endorsement and 
promotion of a single state solution—and attempting to lay the 
groundwork for its emergence through the practice of BDS instead. And 
while this chapter stressed the expansive power of this tactic; the 
potential within it for creating space for new grassroots forms of 
leadership to emerge in the OPT; and of building new forms of unified 
Palestinian resistance to counter both those represented by Hamas and 
the PA—the single state solution itself remains to be brought back upon 
the agenda as its endorsed political programme among all of its 
Palestinian and Israeli supporters. Thus, while this thesis finds that the 
single state movement has laid much of the groundwork required to 
become an expansive counterhegemonic force through this Gramscian-
Saidian lens, it has yet to seize this expansive potential and direct it 
through a unified joint Israeli-Palestinian leadership officially endorsing 
a single state solution to the conflict. Similarly, while support for it has 
been on the rise in the OPT despite the fact that it is not represented as 
a solution within this context, there remains a need for the movement to 
mobilize mass support among this segment of the Palestinians—and for 
the alternative to have more concrete presence within the OPT in order 
for it to become a force that unites all three segments of the Palestinian 
people. To this end, single state intellectuals must address the obstacle 
presented by Palestinians within this segment who continue to support 
a separate independent Palestinian state, address their fears, and 
incorporate them within the transformative dynamic of negotiating a 
common unified anti-Zionist platform. One avenue through which to do 
this involves a concerted effort to both target and mobilize the younger 
generations of Fatah who are disillusioned with the PA and actively 
searching for alternative solutions centered on popular resistance—as 
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well as members of Hamas who are sympathetic to the single state’s 
vision, willing to renounce a vision of an Islamic state, and to embrace 
BDS as a strategy of resistance. This, of course, applies equally to the 
younger members of all the factions within the OPT. In this way, single 
state intellectuals could continue to engage in the directive 
transformative activities they are most comfortable with—while 
simultaneously establishing a more grassroots form of party from 
within the OPT that establishes them as a recognizable political force in 
this arena. This kind of strategy could complement their insurrectionary 
activities among Palestinian-Israelis, and the Palestinian Diaspora—and 
go a long way towards unifying the Palestinian people within an 
alternative resistance strategy that has more power to call for the 
dissolution of the PA, and bring down the Palestinian political elites still 
supporting the peace process. In the end, the expansive anti-Zionist 
counterhegemonic potential being presently built cannot begin to 
transform itself into a declared political force until the Palestinian 
people officially voice their support for a single state solution to the 
conflict, and force the PA to walk away from the current peace process. 
The actualization of the transformative power within the politics of 
solidarity framework built and energized by the BDS tactic is 
conditioned upon this premise—in order for it to truly become a tactic 
within a strategy that leads to a single state solution.       
 
A Note on Limitations 
As previously highlighted in the introduction, the illustration and 
analysis of the single state movement within this thesis represents both 
a reflection of the inclusions and central driving forces behind this 
resurgent phenomenon of resistance, as well as its obstacles and 
exclusions. As such, mainly due to practical issues of geographical 
accessibility and limited sources of information, this thesis has not been 
able to engage with Palestinians in the OPT as much as it would have 
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liked. This limitation is greater in the context of a lack of direct 
engagement with Palestinian refugees in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—
upon whom sources of information in the context of the single state 
solution are difficult to find. This, of course, applies equally to 
Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, and Palestinians affiliated with Hamas. 
Such engagements would have surely made possible a much richer, 
more penetrating and textured analysis of the single state movement 
itself, and clarified the effectiveness of its strategies and practices of 
building counterhegemony further. Moreover, the recent, emergent 
character of the single state idea itself also represents an obstacle in 
terms of a deeper analysis of the effectiveness of its strategies and 
practices of resistance, as well as the form of movement it is in the 
process of becoming. It is for this reason that a focus upon the 
practices, visions and self-understandings of those blocs of intellectuals 
argued to be central driving forces behind its ignition—served to be a 
particularly illuminating window into this movement in the making in 
this context.  
Furthermore, as highlighted above, the choice of beginning within, and 
focussing upon counterhegemony as a situated practice of resistance 
was undertaken within a decolonial Saidian-Gramscian framework. 
Hence, this thesis has not directly engaged with hegemony, or tried to 
illustrate its detailed workings, production and maintenance. Instead, to 
the extent that this thesis has engaged with hegemony itself—as 
demonstrated in chapters four and five for example—it was through an 
understanding of it as a situated form of domination that is discerned 
through the political practices, strategies, and understandings of the 
single state intellectuals attempting to transform it. This 
conceptualization was further emphasized by highlighting the fact that 
the single state movement dealt with this hegemony in a manner that 
both stressed contextual sensitivity, and this hegemony’s different 
formulations (and hence strategies used to counter it) in relation to the 
single state idea in different geographical theatres. In a different vein, as 
highlighted in chapter three, this thesis engaged with hegemony 
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through this lens in order to affirm Gramsci’s claim that every 
relationship of hegemony is an educational relationship (Gramsci et al. 
1971)—whose transformation on the ground must begin with an 
empowering critique of the common sense notions upholding it as an 
inevitable, just or desirable status quo. Thus, it has tried to highlight the 
interlinked nature of both hegemony and counterhegemony through 
this engagement with the centrality of the theory of common sense in 
Gramsci’s writings in both upholding hegemony, and providing the key 
to transformative counterhegemony in the form of the long-term 
revolutionary strategy of the war of position.  
In doing so, it is important to underline that it was not the intention of 
this thesis to argue against the centrality of analyzing the processes of 
hegemony itself in creating a clearer picture of the power and 
effectiveness of a counterhegemonic movement. While this was touched 
upon in chapters four, five and six in the form of the backlashes and 
obstacles that have faced the single state movement—the scope of this 
thesis did not permit a more comprehensive engagement with the 
processes of hegemony itself. A further obstacle to this kind of more 
comprehensive analysis—and another central element behind the 
emphasis placed within this thesis—revolves around the relatively new 
re-emergence of the single state solution as an arguable phenomenon of 
resistance. Thus, apart from some of the backlashes mentioned within 
this thesis, many of the possible counter-attacks to the single state 
movement from within the hegemonic blocs up-holding the current 
peace process, and the ideology of Zionism and separation on which it is 
based, remain to be seen. The same, of course, can be said for the 
potential within the single state movement itself to build its resistance 
into a more powerful, and hence damaging and transformative, war of 
position.  
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Appendix  
Key Figures in Resurgence of the Single State Solution (Cited by the 
Author) 
 Abigail Bakan is Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University in 
Canada. She is a Socialist and has always supported a single state in 
Israel/Palestine. She is also Jewish. Her parents were children of 
survivors of the east European pogroms and were raised in New York 
City in the US. Like most North American Jews, Bakan lost her 
relatives in the death camps of the Jewish holocaust. Today, she is a 
prominent anti-Zionist Jewish activist in Canada, has been 
instrumental in forming Faculty for Palestine in solidarity with CAIA, 
and is an active member of several anti-Zionist Jewish groups in 
North America. 
 Ali Abunimah was born in Washington DC. His mother is from Lifta, 
and became a refugee in 1948. His father, a former Jordanian 
diplomat and ambassador to the United Nations, is from the West 
Bank village of Batir. Abunimah grew up in Europe. He is a journalist, 
a fellow at the Palestine Center in Washington, and a co-founder of 
the Electronic Intifada. He never felt that the two-state solution was 
just, but had accepted it as the most realistic solution. He publicly 
came out against it in 2003 and has been a vocal single state 
advocate ever since.  
 Asa’ad Ghanem is the Head of the Department of Government and 
Political Philosophy and Senior Lecturer at the School of Political 
Sciences in the University of Haifa. He is Palestinian-Israeli, and 
advocates for a binational single state in Israel/Palestine. 
 Azmi Bishara is a Palestinian-Israeli who was instrumental behind the 
founding of the National Democratic Assembly in Israel, which he 
represented in the Knesset. Prior to this Bishara was Head of the 
Philosophy and Cultural Studies Department of Bir-Zeit University. 
He has been instrumental in leading the re-emergence of the single 
state solution, and the debate upon equal citizenship and democracy 
  
257 
among Palestinian-Israelis. Bishara has since been exiled from Israel 
as a result of his activities. 
 Eitan Bronstein is an Israeli-Jewish activist for peace and coexistence 
in the framework of a single state in Israel/Palestine. He is the 
founder of Zochrot. He was born in Argentina, and moved to Israel at 
the age of 5 with his parents—as settlers on Kibbutz Bahan near the 
Green Line. Today he lives in Herzliya and is a director in the School 
for Peace in the mixed Arab-Jewish village of Wahat al-Salam near 
Jerusalem.  
 Eyal Sivan is an Ashkenazi Jewish-Israeli Reader in Media Productions 
at the University of East London. He is an award-winning filmmaker, 
producer and essayist. Born in Haifa, he grew up in Jerusalem and 
settled in Paris in 1985. He is broadly socialist, supported a single 
state solution prior to Oslo, and currently lives in London.  
 George Bisharat is Professor of Law at Hastings College of the Law in 
San Francisco. He is Palestinian-American. His father was a 
Palestinian refugee from Jerusalem and his mother is American. He 
grew up in the US. Bisharat is an influential commentator on the legal 
and human rights aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and a 
human rights activist. He always supported a single state in 
Israel/Palestine, though the Oslo process convinced him to be open-
minded towards the two-state solution. He is a prominent single 
state advocate today.  
 Ghada Karmi is a research fellow and lecturer at the Institute of Arab 
and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. She was born in 
Jerusalem, became a refugee in 1948 and grew up in Britain. She is a 
physician, and academic, a writer and the author of several books on 
Israel/Palestine. She supports a single state solution, and is a 
prominent activist within it. 
 Haim Bresheeth is an Ashkenazi Jewish-Israeli. He is the Chair of 
Media and Cultural Studies at the University of East London, a 
filmmaker and photographer. He is broadly socialist, a former 
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Matzpen member and a prominent BDS and single state solution 
activist.  
 Ilan Pappe is Professor of History and Director of the European 
Center for Palestine Studies at the University of Exeter. He is the 
author of several critically acclaimed books on the history of 
Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian question. He is also a peace 
activist. Pappe is an Ashkenazi Jewish-Israeli (of German descent), is 
an influential member of the resurgent single state idea, and 
supported a single state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
prior to Oslo.  
 Jeff Halper is a Jewish-Israeli anthropologist and peace activist. He is 
an American citizen and grew up in Minnesota in the 60s—where he 
was influenced by the civil rights and anti-war movements. He 
supports a single state solution in Israel/Palestine in the form of a 
federation, and is the co-founder and coordinator of ICAHD. 
 Joseph Massad is Associate Professor of Modern Arab Politics and 
Intellectual History at Columbia University, and the author of several 
influential books on Arab and Palestinian identity. He was Edward 
Said’s doctoral student and close colleague. Massad is a Palestinian 
refugee who was born in Jordan, is an American citizen, and a 
prominent single state supporter in Palestine/Israel. 
 Khaled Ziada is a Palestinian activist from the Gaza Strip who was 
one of the founders or the London One State Group at SOAS, and is 
one of the most influential personalities within the SOAS Palestinian 
Society. He supports a single state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and lives in London.  
 Leila Farsakh is assistant professor of political science at the 
University of Massachusetts who specializes in Middle East politics. 
She is Co-Director of MIT’s Jerusalem 2050 Project, and won the 
Peace and Justice Award from the Cambridge Peace Commission in 
2001. She is part of the Palestinian Diaspora, was born in Jordan, and 
supports a single state solution in Israel/Palestine. 
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 Michel Warschawski is an Ashkenazi-Jewish Israeli. A Polish-French 
Rabbi’s son, Warschawski moved to Israel when he was 16 to study 
the Talmud. He is a socialist internationalist, a former Matzpen 
member, the founder of the joint Israeli-Palestinian Alternative 
Information Center in Jerusalem, and a single state supporter. 
 Mike Marqusee is a Jewish anti-Zionist British-American journalist 
and writer. He is an activist for social justice who has written books 
and columns on diverse topics, including, If I am Not for Myself: 
Journey of an anti-Zionist Jew. Marqusee was a trade union activist in 
his youth, as well as a member of the Labour party until 2000. He 
supports a single state solution in Israel/Palestine today. 
 Moshe Machover is Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
London. He is a Jewish-Israeli who was born in Tel Aviv, and to 
London in 1968 to become British citizen. He is an anti-Zionist 
socialist internationalist, and one of the founders of Matzpen. 
Machover was instrumental behind the launching of IJAN in London, 
and supports a socialist single state in Palestine/Israel.  
 Nadim Rouhana is Professor at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy. He is Palestinian-Israeli, the Director of Madal al-
Carmel, and an instrumental figure in both the drafting of the Vision 
Documents and the re-emergence of the single state solution among 
Palestinian-Israelis. 
 Omar Barghouti is an independent Palestinian researcher and human 
rights activist, with a background in the philosophy of ethics. He is a 
Palestinian refugee who grew up in Egypt and now lives in Ramallah. 
Barghouti is a founding member of PACBI and Palestinian Civil 
Society’s BDS Campaign against Israel, and is an advocate of a secular 
democratic state in Palestine/Israel.  
 Smadar Lavie is a cultural anthropologist specializing on Egypt and 
Israel/Palestine. She is currently Associate Professor at the University 
of Virginia. Lavie is a Mizrahi Jewish-Israeli, a feminist, and a member 
of the Mizrahi Democratic Rainbow Coalition. She supports a single 
state solution. 
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 Uri Davis is an Ashkenazi Jewish-Israeli academic, human rights 
activist, socialist and anti-Zionist. He has written several pioneering 
books against Zionism. He was born in Jerusalem, is a British citizen, 
and considers himself a Palestinian-Jew. He is an Observer member 
of the PNC and supports a single state solution in Israel/Palestine 
along the lines of the Belgian model.  
 Yasmin Abu-Laban is Associate Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Alberta. She is part of the Palestinian Diaspora. Her 
father was a Palestinian refugee from Jaffa, and her mother was an 
American of Scottish origin. She is both a Canadian and American 
citizen, specializes on gender, ethnic politics and citizenship theory, 
and has supported a single democratic state as an ideal since the 
1980s. 
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